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ABSTRACT
The globalisation o f capital markets and corporate failures draw shareholders’ and 
stakeholders’ attention to the importance of risk reporting. However, traditional financial 
statements fail to satisfy users’ needs for information because they provide only a partial 
view regarding a company’s risk profile. Recently, risk reporting has become the focus of 
interest. This, however, has not been translated into empirical research that investigates risk 
reporting in corporate annual reports. This study addresses this gap through examining risk 
reporting practices in Egypt. The key objectives o f this study are to measure the extent of 
mandatory and voluntary risk reporting, identify the nature of voluntary risk reporting and 
investigate firm characteristics, corporate governance and ownership structure that could 
explain variation in risk reporting practices in the annual reports of Egyptian companies. In 
addition, the study aims to identify factors that may obstruct the presentation of risk 
reporting in annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
This study is carried out in two main phases. In the first phase, the annual reports of 106 
listed companies for the years 2006/2007 were examined to measure the extent of risk 
reporting and examine potential determinants of risk reporting. In the second phase, 15 
semi-structured interviews were carried out with academics, external auditors, regulators 
and financial managers to identify factors that may obstruct risk reporting in corporate 
annual reports.
The results indicate a low level o f compliance with mandatory risk reporting requirements. 
Also, the results indicate a low extent o f voluntary risk reporting with a tendency to report 
more past and qualitative than future and quantitative risk-related information. It is 
suggested that competition, role duality, board size, ownership concentration, profitability 
and auditor type influence the risk reporting practices o f Egyptian companies. The study 
identified several accounting practice problems (such as lack of effective profession and 
enforcement mechanisms, adequate continuing education and qualified accountants), 
accounting education problems (such as inadequate local accounting textbooks, 
bookkeeping-oriented accounting education and lack of cooperation between the 
profession and universities) and the Egyptian culture o f secrecy, as key obstacles to the 
presentation o f risk reporting in corporate annual reports.
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This chapter presents an introduction to this study. Section 1.2 discusses the background 
and motivations o f the study. Research objectives, questions and justifications are 
presented in section 1.3. Section 1.4 is devoted to the research contribution while section
1.5 discusses the research methodology. Finally, section 1.6 presents an outline of the 
thesis.
1.2 Background and Motivations
The increase o f international trade through multinational companies, the 
internationalisation o f capital markets, transition from socialist centrally planned 
economies to free market economies and developing countries’ need to attract foreign 
investments have emphasised the importance o f financial reporting in corporate annual 
reports (Decker and Brunner, 2003). Regulators, investors and other stakeholders have 
become more interested in the level and quality of corporate financial reporting (Frost 
and Ramin, 2003) and companies seek to satisfy the needs of global investors and 
creditors (Murphy, 1999). The pressure o f international capital markets has a significant 
impact on the financial reporting practices of multinational companies (Gray et al., 1995; 
Iatridis, 2008). In addition, the transition from centrally planned economies requires 
enhancement in corporate financial reporting to ensure that investors receive relevant 
and useful information (Saudagaran and Meek, 1997). Effective communication between 
a company and its investors is an important precondition for the effectiveness of capital 
markets (Akhtaruddin, 2005).
Several factors such as culture, legal systems, sources o f finance, tax systems, accounting 
profession and inflation level may cause a diversity o f accounting practices among 
different countries (Nobes, 2002a). This diversity may result in less optimal investment 
decisions, difficulties in capital market interpretation of company performance and 
difficulties in raising capital on favourable terms and hence there is an imperative need 
for comparable financial statements (Decker and Brunner, 2003). Saudagaran and Meek 
(1997, p. 136) indicated that ‘as such, diversity imposes costs on the resource allocation 
system worldwide. Harmonisation of this diversity may provide one solution*.
Since 1973, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), the predecessor 
of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), has played an important role in 
harmonising accounting practices through formatting and publishing accounting
1
standards that underpin the preparation and presentation o f financial statements (Nobes 
2002b). In supporting this effort, the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions recommended the acceptance o f International Accounting Standards (IASs) 
by its members (Decker and Brunner 2003). Despite the wide acceptance of IASs, 
empirical research provides evidence of non-compliance. An in-depth understanding of 
the determinants o f compliance with IASs is important to assist accounting standard- 
setters and regulatory bodies, such as the IASB, to support international acceptance of 
the IASs (Street and Gray, 2002).
The expansion in globalisation, rapid economic changes and an aggressive business 
environment have contributed to the increasing attention given to risk and risk 
management reporting (Woods and Reber, 2003; Kajiiter, 2006). Corporate failures such 
as Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat have drawn shareholders’ and stakeholders’ attention 
to the importance o f risk and uncertainty related information (Linsley et al., 2008; 
Solomon et aL, 2000). Changes in the business environment have led to the emergence of 
risk management as a standalone discipline (Woods and Reber, 2003) and highlighted its 
role in the maximisation o f shareholder value (Solomon et al., 2000). Hence, a pressing 
need for enhanced risk and risk management reporting has emerged (Carlon et al. 2003; 
Woods and Reber, 2003). Companies should report not only their activities but also the 
risks suirounding them and their ability to manage these risks (Eccles et al., 2001; 
ICAEW, 1999). Empirical research indicated that increased risk disclosure assists 
institutional investors in investment decisions (Solomon et al., 2000).
Enhanced risk reporting provides forward-looking information, reduces cost of capital, 
encourages better risk management and enhances management accountability and 
financial reporting usefulness (ICAEW, 1997 and 2002). Healy and Palepu (2001) and 
Guan et al. (2007) argue that information asymmetry and agency problems are the main 
motivations o f the demand for financial disclosure. Lack o f risk reporting leaves 
investors unable to adequately identify a company’s risk/return profile and consequently 
they fail to consider the scale and categories of risk in their investment decisions (Linsley 
et al., 2008). In addition, if investors have to engage in their own monitoring activities to 
assess management effectiveness in measuring and managing different risks, this 
increases agency costs (Woods and Reber, 2003). A solution to information asymmetry 
and agency problems is based on contracts between managers and investors and 
accounting regulations that stimulate and require managers to disclose their private 
information (Healy and Palepu, 2001).
The main objectives o f financial statements are to assist users to evaluate a company’s 
ability to generate cash and cash equivalents and the timing and certainty of their 
generation, review its financial position and structure, liquidity and solvency and evaluate 
its ability to cope with changes in the surrounding environment. However, financial 
information in financial statements lacks adequate disclosure regarding risks and 
uncertainty (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; Schrand and Elliot, 1998). In the US, Roulstone 
(1999) argues that quantitative risk reporting is vague, boilerplate disclosure and difficult 
to understand. In the UK, institutional investors consider risk reporting practices 
inadequate (Solomon et aL, 2000). Consequendy, companies should consider procedures 
that assist in reducing the ‘risk information gap* (Eccles et al., 2001).
Accounting standard-setters and regulatory agencies have taken several steps to improve 
risk disclosures. For example, the IASB issued three standards related to financial 
instruments presentation and measurement, namely IAS 32, 39 and International 
Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 7. A similar approach has been followed by the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). In addition, in 1997, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission promulgated the disclosure requirements for market risk of 
derivative instruments. However, current mandatory reporting requirements discuss only 
a limited set o f  risks and predominantly address financial risks only (Cabedo and Tirado, 
2004; Eccles et al., 2001). This means that mandatory risk disclosure requirements 
provide only partial disclosures (Linsley et al., 2008) and provide only a limited view of a 
company’s risk/retum  profile (Eccles et aL, 2001). To address this deficiency o f financial 
statements, the Institute o f Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), the 
Canadian Institute o f Chartered Accountants (CICA) and the IASB have taken initiatives 
to provide guidelines for a more comprehensive approach of risk reporting.
In 1997, the ICAEW published the first paper o f a series that discuss risk reporting. In 
this paper, Financial Risk Reporting - Proposal for a Statement of Business Risk, the 
ICAEW proposed that listed companies should provide appropriate information 
concerning the different risks that a company may face to assist users in identifying its 
risk profile. The proposal suggests four steps to assist companies in preparing high 
quality risk reports (see Table 1.1).
Table 1.1: A Summary' o f  ICAEW (1997): Financial Risk Reporting - Proposal for a Statement of  
B usiness Risk
Steps T h em es Explanation
1. Identify and 
prioritise key risks Consider all types o f  
risk
Many risks may impact on prospective cash flows and the 
financial position. The proposal encourages companies to 
disclose financial/non-fmancial risks and internal/external 
risks.
2- Describe 
actions taken to 
manage each risk
Report actions taken
Investors have to be provided with essential information to 
facilitate their assessment o f  the effectiveness o f  
management actions in amending the risk profile.
3. Identify how  
risk is measured Using a wide variety 
o f  measures
There is a need to develop and improve new risk measures 
and expand risk measures to include measures with 
operational and strategic nature and not limiting them only 
to measures with financial nature.
4. Filtering the 
information to be 






Qualitative characteristics o f  accounting information should 
be used as a filter for the information to be disclosed. It is 
essential to discuss material risks, risks that may influence 
company’s objectives and strategies, and provide relevant, 
reliable, comparable and understandable disclosure.
In the same vein, in May 2006, the CICA issued an interpretive release to management
discussion and analysis (MD&A) regarding risk disclosures. The underlying purpose o f  
this release is to explain how MD&A preparation and disclosure guidance can be applied 
to a particular topic, namely risk reporting. The proposal o f  the CICA has two key steps 
and several sub-steps that a company can use (see Table 1.2).
Table 1.2: Summary o f the CICA Risk D isclosure M D&A Interpretive Release
Key steps Sub-steps
1. Identifying key 
risks to disclose
A. Identifying and classifying risks.
B. Risk disclosure should be prepared through the eyes o f  management, 
integrated with financial statements, complete and material, with 
forward-looking orientation and with strategic perspective.
C. The revision o f  the regulatory requirements regarding risk disclosure.
2. Determine what to 
disclose regarding 
risks
A. Risk management strategies.
B. The impact o f  risk on underlying performance drivers.
C. Organizational capability to manage risk.
D . The impact o f  risk on results and financial condition.
The IASB issued a discussion paper, Management Commentary, in 2005 and an exposure
draft on the same matter in 2009. These discuss the framework for the preparation and 
presentation o f  a management commentary. According to the IASB, the elements o f a 
useful and relevant management commentary should include, among others, a clear 
description o f  the significant resources, risks and relationships that affect the entity’s 
long-term value and how those resources, risks and relationships are managed (IASB, 
2005 and 2009).
The link between corporate governance and risk reporting has been emphasised since 
enhanced disclosures o f  risk-related information became a main component o f  corporate 
governance reforms (Solomon et al., 2000). Whittington (1993, p.311) argues that
‘financial reporting is an important element o f the system of corporate governance and 
some failures o f corporate governance may therefore be due to inadequate financial 
reports*. The Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
emphasises that ‘disclosure should include...material information o n .. .foreseeable risk 
factors...* (OECD, 2004, p.22) and added ‘disclosure o f risk is most effective when it is 
tailored to the particular industry in question. Disclosure about the system for 
monitoring and managing risk is increasingly regarded as good practices* (OECD, 2004, 
p.53). Similarly, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
asserts that (UNCTAD, 2006, p.24):
Users o f financial information and participants in the marketplace need information on 
foreseeable material risks, including risks specific to industries or geographical areas, 
dependence on certain commodities, financial market risk and derivative risks. The 
corporate governance structures in place to assess, manage and report on these types of risks 
should be the subject o f corporate governance disclosure.
Higson (2003) argues that reporting corporate performance and risk should be based on 
a corporate governance perspective. This confirms the view o f Solomon et al. (2000) that 
institutional investors who consider corporate governance to be an approach to enhance 
corporate performance require more disclosure including risk disclosure.
Egypt is one o f the most significant countries in the Middle East and North Africa 
region. It occupies the northeast comer of Africa and the heart o f the Middle East. 
Egypt has very strong economic relationships with the main economic blocs in the world. 
For example, Egypt and the European Union (EU) have a well-established economic 
relationship and the EU is Egypt’s principal trade partner. Imports from EU constitute 
42% and 48% o f total imports and exports to the EU constitute 38% and 37.5% of total 
exports in 2007/2008 and 2008/2009 respectively (CBE, 2010).
Egypt has witnessed a transition from a centrally planned economy to a free market one 
which in turn impacted on the financial reporting practices of Egyptian companies. 
During the 1960s, the Egyptian government adopted policies to nationalise foreign 
investments and build up the public sector. The government established the Central 
Authority Organisation (CAO) to audit state-owned companies and monitor the 
implementation o f economic plans. To support macro-level economic planning, the 
CAO developed a uniform accounting system (UAS) to be applied by state-owned 
companies. The UAS has a significant bearing on financial reporting practices in Egypt
because it was designed to satisfy only governmental agencies* needs for information. 
During this period, the activity of the Egyptian exchange (EGX) collapsed.
In the early 1990s, the Egyptian government undertook an economic reform based on 
the privatisation o f state-owned companies and the restructuring of banking and 
financial systems. It issued public sector law 203 o f 1991 to facilitate privatisation 
through allowing the public offering of state-owned companies* shares in the capital 
market and implemented a new Capital Market Law (CML) 95 o f 1992 to organise and 
restore the capital market. The number of listed companies increased remarkably from 
654 in 1997 to 1151 in 2001. In 2005, the Egyptian stock market was ranked top of the 
emerging capital markets. Foreign direct investment plays an important role in the 
activity o f the Egyptian exchange with foreigners* transactions constituting 28.4% and 
47.5% o f total trading volume and market capitalisation in June 2006 (CMA, 2006a).
The Egyptian government recognised the importance o f high quality corporate financial 
reporting and the adoption o f IASs as necessary prerequisites to the success of the 
privatisation program. In 1997, the Ministry o f Economy issued the ministerial decree 
No. 503 to announce the issue o f 19 Egyptian Accounting Standards (EASs) that are 
completely based on the IASs. The decree mandated the application o f IASs/EASs to all 
companies regulated by CML. In 2006, the second version o f EASs was issued 
containing 35 accounting standards including, for the first time, two risk-related 
standards, namely EAS 25: Financial Instrument: Disclosure and Presentation and EAS 
33: Segment Reporting. Although Egypt was ranked in 2005 among the top five best- 
performing stock exchanges in terms of returns, Egypt faces some economic weaknesses 
sim ilar to those o f Asian countries including rigid exchange rates, lack o f adequate 
regulation and monitoring o f the financial system and lack o f transparency which in turn 
lead to the increase in risk premium on debt (Chabrier, 1998). The deficiency of risk- 
related disclosures exaggerated the East Asia financial crisis because investors lack 
relevant information to assess companies* risk exposures (Rahman, 1998). Most Egyptian 
companies do not provide investors with relevant information to predict the timing, 
amounts and uncertainties o f prospective cash flows and gain a comprehensive 
understanding o f a company*s risk profile. Risk information has received little 
importance in Egyptian companies* disclosure practices (Abd-Elmalek, 2006). Moreover, 
Ali (2005) indicates that listed companies do not sufficiently discuss future policies and 
risk exposures in their board of directors* reports.
It is worth addressing the risk reporting gap in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies 
through measuring compliance with mandatory risk reporting, identifying the 
characteristics o f voluntary risk reporting. Also, equally important is identifying the 
determinants o f risk reporting and reasons for non-compliance with mandatory and the 
low presentation o f voluntary risk reporting to contribute to accounting research and 
inform policy makers.
1.3 Research Objectives, Questions and Justification
Several studies aim to identify the impact o f firm-specific characteristics such as firm size, 
profitability, liquidity, and industry membership on disclosure extent (Ahmed, 1996; 
Ahmed, 2006; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Hossain et al., 1995; Raffoumier, 1995; Depoers, 
2000). The main objective o f the present research is to extend this stream of studies 
through investigating risk reporting practices in the annual reports o f Egyptian listed 
companies. The research aims to measure compliance with mandatory risk reporting and 
to identify the amount and nature o f voluntary risk reporting. In addition, the research 
aims to investigate the corporate characteristics, corporate governance and ownership 
structure that could explain variations in risk reporting practices and identify factors that 
may obstruct the presentation o f risk reporting in the annual reports o f Egyptian 
companies. The objectives o f this study are met by investigating the following questions:
1. To what extent do Egyptian listed companies comply with the mandatory 
disclosure requirements o f EAS 25 and EAS 33?
2. What are the impacts of competition, company risk level, company-specific 
characteristics, corporate governance and ownership structure on compliance 
with the mandatory risk reporting in financial statements o f Egyptian listed 
companies?
3. Is there any change in compliance levels o f mandatory risk reporting between 
2006 and 2007?
4. To what extent do Egyptian listed companies provide voluntary risk reporting in 
their board o f directors* reports?
5. What are the impacts of competition, company risk level, company-specific 
characteristic, corporate governance and ownership structure on the voluntary 
disclosure o f risk-related information in board o f directors* reports of Egyptian 
listed companies?
6. Is there any association between the extent o f mandatory risk reporting and the 
amount o f voluntary risk reporting provided in the annual reports of Egyptian 
listed companies?
7. What are the factors that may impede presentation of mandatory and voluntary 
risk reporting in the annual reports of Egyptian listed companies?
The results o f this study are important to both policy makers and regulators. They should 
be aware o f any systematic differences in the disclosure practices of different companies 
in order to consider these differences in any amendments to existing financial reporting 
requirements (Malone et al., 1993). Identifying companies characteristics that impact on 
disclosure will also assist regulatory agencies in their efforts to educate companies 
(Owusu-Ansah, 2005). Cairns (1998, p.64) indicates that the emphasis of the IASC ‘has 
shifted from getting companies to use the standards to ensure full compliance with IASs 
in IAS financial statements*. Chamisa (2005) highlights the lack of studies that investigate 
compliance with the IASs in developing countries and calls for more country-specific 
studies. Empirical evidence indicates that country o f domicile is a major determinant of 
compliance with the IASs (Herrmann and Thomas, 1996; Nicholas and Street, 2007; 
Street and Gray, 2002). The results of this study will provide evidence regarding 
compliance with the IASs in the distinctive context o f Egypt.
Identifying current financial reporting practices is a first and essential step to enhance 
financial reporting in general and risk reporting in particular. This may be achieved 
through measuring the extent and amount of mandatory and voluntary risk reporting and 
identifying what kinds o f risks are disclosed by what types of companies. In addition, the 
Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority1 (EFSA), the successor o f the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA), could benefit from identifying the causes for non-compliance and low 
disclosure o f risk and hence contribute to the enhancement of risk reporting practices of 
Egyptian companies. To date, there is no empirical study regarding the reasons of low 
compliance with disclosure requirements in Egypt. The results o f this study may assist 
the EFSA to better understand the impact of secrecy as a dominant value of accounting 
practice in Egypt on presentation o f accounting disclosure especially disclosure related to 
sensitive topics such as risk reporting.
Empirical evidence has noted that Egyptian companies implement IASs selectively 
(Dahawy et al., 2002) which supports measuring compliance with the IASs on an
1 According to law No. 10/2009, The Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority replaced the Capital 
Market Authority effective 1“ o f July 2009.
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individual basis. However, none of the disclosure studies that address compliance with 
the IASs in Egypt examined compliance with risk-related accounting standards or 
examine the impact o f corporate governance on compliance with the IASs. The results 
o f this study may provide insights regarding the impact o f two key corporate governance 
mechanisms, role duality and board size on the financial reporting practices of Egyptian 
companies.
The findings o f this study could assist the EFSA to be more informed about the 
weaknesses in the application o f IASs and guide its efforts to encourage Egyptian 
companies to comply with the IASs. Egyptian companies could gain several benefits 
from full adherence to the IASs such as listing on international stock markets, reducing 
the cost o f capital, the possibility to raise capital internationally and the marketability of 
their stocks by expanding ownership.
1.4 Research Contribution
This research contributes to the disclosure literature in several dimensions through 
investigating risk reporting practices in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies 
because the topic and the country have received little attention from accounting 
researchers.
First, although there is considerable research that addresses voluntary and mandatory 
disclosure practices in developed countries, little is known about developing countries in 
general and Egypt in particular. Few studies address compliance with mandatory 
disclosure requirements in Egypt. Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003) examined 
compliance with the IASs before the issuance o f the EASs in 1997. Samaha and 
Stapleton (2008) discuss compliance with the IASs after the issuance o f the EASs in 1997. 
However, neither o f these studied compliance with the requirements o f two risk-related 
accounting standards, namely segment reporting and financial instruments disclosure.
Second, more than 100 countries require or permit the application of IASs. The major 
issue, however, is the extent to which companies comply with the requirements of IASs 
and the challenge is to ensure that IASs are implemented by companies in both 
developing and developed countries (Chamisa, 2000). Empirical research provides 
evidence o f non-compliance with the IASs (Street and Bryant 2000; Street and Gray
2002). The compliance with accounting standards is mixed and selective due to the lack 
of effectiveness o f external auditors* and enforcement mechanism* functions (Al- 
Shammari et al., 2008; Street et al., 1999). This research contributes to the literature by
examining the impact o f auditor type on compliance with the IASs in one of the 
developing countries, Egypt.
Third, Egypt is a country with notable societal values. According to Hofstede (1984), 
Egypt is a society with a greater tendency towards collectivism, high power distance and 
high uncertainty avoidance as benchmarked against the UK and the US. These societal 
values are associated with a preference for statutory control, uniformity, conservatism 
and secrecy (Gray, 1988). Consequently, Egypt is a fertile ground to address the potential 
conflict between risk disclosure and secrecy.
Fourth, although increasing attention has been given to risk reporting, this has not been 
translated to empirical research that addresses risk reporting in corporate annual reports 
(Linsley and Shrives 2006). Recendy, a few studies have addressed risk reporting in 
annual reports. However, nearly all o f these studies have been conducted in developed 
countries such as Canada (Lajili and Zeghal, 2005), Italy (Berretta and Bozzolan, 2004), 
Germany (Kajiiter 2006), Japan (Konishi and Ali, 2007), the UK (Abraham and Cox, 
2007; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Rajab and Handley-Schachler, 2009; Woods and Reber,
2003) with exceptions being Malaysia (Amran et al., 2009) and the United Arab Emirates 
(Hassan, 2009). Consequently, little is known about risk reporting in developing 
countries in general and Egypt in particular. In addition, there is a tendency in risk 
reporting studies to employ bivariate statistical methods for data analysis and few of 
them use multivariate statistical methods and this may overlook the insights that 
multivariate analysis can bring. This study addresses this point by using both bivariate 
and multivariate statistical methods.
Fifth, risk reporting studies tend to focus on examining either voluntary (Berretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2006) or mandatory risk reporting (Kajiiter, 2006; 
Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007) and none o f these studies examines the interaction between 
voluntary and mandatory risk reporting. This study aims to address this gap in the 
literature through examining the potential association between mandatory and voluntary 
risk reporting in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies. Sixth, analytical research has 
suggested proprietary costs as a major determinant of disclosure in corporate annual 
reports. Proprietary costs explain managers’ incentives to withhold information despite 
market incentives to disclose more information (Verrecchia, 1983; Wagenhofer, 1990). 
However, there is little empirical evidence regarding the impact o f proprietary costs on 
accounting disclosure (Leuz, 2003; Prencipe, 2004). It is expected that proprietary costs
have a substantial impact on risk reporting since risk-related information is considered 
commercially sensitive information (ICAEW, 1997). This study aims to address this gap 
in the literature through empirical examination of the association between competition 
and risk reporting in the annual reports of Egyptian companies.
Seventh, reviewing the literature indicates that most disclosure studies aim to measure 
the extent o f  disclosure in corporate annual reports and identify key determinants that 
may explain the measured level o f disclosure. However, very few studies take a further 
step and investigate the factors that may hinder presentation of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure (Al-Mulhem, 2003). This study aims to provide a comprehensive investigation 
o f risk reporting practices in Egypt. Therefore, the study intends to measure the level and 
amount o f mandatory and voluntary risk reporting and then explore potential factors that 
may obstruct the presentation o f risk-related information in the annual reports of 
Egyptian listed companies.
Eighth, prior disclosure studies seek to identify the determinants of general mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure without paying attention to the type of information and this 
may overlook the specific nature o f reported information such as risk-related 
information. Prior disclosure studies tend to view disclosure as less defined (Gray et al. 
1995). Empirical research provides evidence that determinants of disclosure vary 
according to the nature o f disclosed information (Leuz, 2003; Meek et al., 1995). Meek et 
al. (1995) indicate that determinants o f disclosure vary across voluntary disclosure of 
strategic, non-financial and financial information. In the same vein, Leuz (2003) brings 
additional evidence that determinants o f disclosure vary across the voluntary disclosure 
o f segment information and cash flow information. This study aims to explore whether 
determinants o f risk reporting differ from other general disclosures.
1.5 Research Methodology
This research responds to calls for employing both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches in the same study (Denzin, 1978). Combining both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches has several advantages: it minimises the problems associated with 
the dependency on a single research method (Cohen et al., 2000); it contributes to 
enhancing research data by collecting quantitative and qualitative evidence and therefore 
supports research validity and credibility (Sarantakos, 2005); and it provides 
complementary insights to research questions (Collis and Hussey, 2003).
This study is carried out in two main phases after a review of the literature related to risk 
disclosure. In addition, the study reviewed a number o f positive theories of accounting 
that explain managers’ incentives to disclose or withhold information such as agency 
theory, political cost perspective, signalling theory, proprietary cost perspective, 
stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory. Based on this review, the study identified firm- 
specific characteristics, corporate governance and ownership structure that may explain 
the variation in mandatory and voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports. These 
disclosure determinants are competition, company risk level, board size, role duality, 
auditor type, ownership concentration, managerial ownership, governmental ownership, 
institutional ownership, firm size, profitability, liquidity and industry
In the first phase, the study aims to measure the extent and amount o f mandatory and 
voluntary risk disclosure in the annual reports o f Egyptian listed companies. The annual 
reports and ownership structure of 106 companies were collected from Egypt for 
Information Dissemination (EGID) for the years 2006 and 2007. To measure the 
compliance with mandatory and presentation o f voluntary risk reporting, the study uses 
an unweighted disclosure index and content analysis as measurement instruments which 
are widely used in disclosure literature (Beattie et al., 2004).
A variety o f statistical methods has been used to analyse secondary data such as 
univariate, bivariate and multivariate analysis. Univariate analysis aims to provide 
descriptive statistics regarding variables under investigation. Exploring the data has been 
emphasised as the first essential step in quantitative data analysis (Bryman and Cramer,
2005). In bivariate analysis, the association between variables under examination is tested 
and potential collinearity problem is assessed. In multivariate analysis, dependent 
variables (extent and amount o f risk disclosure) are regressed against independent 
variables (competition, corporate governance, ownership structure and firm-specific 
characteristics) to estimate the significance and direction o f relationships between them. 
In addition, normality, linearity, heteroscedasticity assumptions are assessed. In the 
second phase, semi-structured interviews are carried out to better understand risk 
reporting practices o f Egyptian companies. The interviewees are academic, external 
auditors, regulators and financial managers. The main objective of this stage is to identify 
factors that may obstruct compliance with mandatory and presentation of voluntary risk 
reporting. Inductive/deductive and data matrix approaches have been used in identifying 
m ain themes and conducting qualitative data analysis. Table 1.3 summarises research 
objectives, questions and research methods.
T a b le  1.3: R esearch  O b jectives, Q u estio n s and M eth od s
Research O bjectives Research Q uestions Research  
M ethods and 
Data Analysis
Measure the level o f  compliance with 
EAS 25 and EAS 33 in financial 
statements o f  Egyptian listed companies.
To what extent do Egyptian listed 
companies comply with the mandatory 









Identify the influence o f  competition, 
company risk level, corporate-specific, 
corporate governance and ownership 
structure characteristics that determine 
and influence mandatory risk reporting in 
financial statements o f  Egyptian listed 
companies.
What are the impact o f  competition, 
company risk level, firm characteristic, 
corporate governance and ownership 
structure on compliance with mandatory 
risk reporting in financial statements o f  
Egyptian listed companies?
Identify any changes in compliance level 
before and after the application o f  risk- 
related accounting standards.
Is there any change in compliance level o f  
mandatory risk reporting between 2006 
and 2007?
Measure the amount and identify the 
characteristics o f  voluntary risk reporting 
in board o f  directors’ reports o f  Egyptian 
listed companies.
To what extent do Egyptian listed 
companies provide voluntary risk 
reporting in their board o f  directors’ 






Identify the influence o f  competition, 
company risk level, corporate-specific, 
corporate governance and ownership 
structure characteristics that determine 
and influence voluntary risk reporting in 
board o f  directors’ reports o f  Egyptian 
listed com jianies^
What are the impact o f  competition, 
company risk level, firm characteristic, 
corporate governance and ownership 
structure characteristic on the voluntary 
disclosure o f  risk-related information in 
board o f  directors’ reports o f  Egyptian 
listed com£anies?
Identify the association between 
mandatory and voluntary risk reporting 
in annual reports o f  Egyptian listed 
companies.
Is there any association between the 
extent o f  mandator)7 risk reporting and 
the amount o f  voluntary risk reporting 
provided in annual reports o f  Egyptian 
listed companies?
Correlation
Identify the factors that may impede 
compliance with and presentation o f  
mandator)' and voluntary risk reporting 
in annual reports o f  Egyptian listed 
companies.
What are the factors that may impede 
presentation o f  mandatory and voluntary 






This thesis consists o f  10 chapters. Chapter 1 presents the background and motivations, 
research objectives, questions and justifications and research methodology. Chapter 2 is 
devoted to discussing the Egyptian context. It discusses financial reporting related 
regulations, econom ic development, the cultural values o f  Egyptian society, accounting 
education and the accounting and auditing profession in Egypt. Chapter 3 presents a 
number o f  positive theories o f  accounting that explain the variation in the extent o f  
disclosure in corporate financial reports such as agency theory, political cost perspective, 
signalling theory, proprietary cost perspective, stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory. 
Chapter 4 reviews the literature on the determinants o f  disclosure and obstacles o f  
disclosure in corporate annual reports.
Chapter 5 presents the development o f  research hypotheses while chapter 6 discusses 
research methodology especially research approach, methods, sampling procedures, 
validity and reliability and ethical considerations. Chapter 7 is devoted to statistical 
analysis and the findings o f  the determinants o f  mandatory and voluntary risk reporting 
in the annual reports o f  Egyptian companies. Chapter 8 presents the interview results 
regarding the factors that may impede the compliance with mandatory and presentation 
o f  voluntary risk reporting in Egypt while chapter 9 presents a discussion o f  the findings. 
Chapter 10 is the conclusion and presents a summary o f  the study, recommendations, 
limitations and suggestions for future research. Figure 1.1 shows the thesis structure.
Figure 1.1: T h esis  Structure
Chapter (1) Introduction
Chapter (2): Egypt: Background
Chapter (4): Literature ReviewChapter (3): Disclosure 
Theories
Chapter (5): The Development 
of Research Hypotheses
Chapter (6): Research 
Methodology
Chapter (7): Determinants o f  
Risk Reporting in Annual 
Reports o f  Egyptian Companies
Chapter (8): Factors that 
influence Risk Reporting
Chapter (9): Discussion
Chapter (10): Summary and 
Conclusion
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CHAPTER 2: EGYPT: BACKGROUND
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the national background of the study. It discusses Egyptian culture 
and its impact on accounting practices, economic development and the accounting and 
auditing profession. In addition, it describes regulations that influence financial reporting 
practices in Egypt. The chapter provides a brief presentation for aspects such as 
companies act, capital market regulations, accounting profession and education, Egyptian 
accounting standard-setting process and code of corporate governance. The key 
objective o f providing such a discussion is evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of 
these aspects and their potential influence on mandatory and voluntary risk reporting 
pracdces. Section 2.2 discusses Egyptian culture. Section 2.3 is devoted to economic 
development and section 2.4 presents companies act and capital market regulation. The 
accounting profession is presented in section 2.5 while section 2.6 examines the 
accounting education in Egypt Section 2.7 presents Egyptian accounting standards while 
Section 2.8 discusses corporate governance in Egypt and section 2.9 is a summary and 
conclusion.
2.2 Egyptian Culture Dimensions
Accounting research has witnessed increasing attention being paid to the impact of 
societal values on accounting practices (Gray, 1988; Hamid et al., 1993). El-Rashedy 
(2006) indicates that societal values are an important factor that affects accounting 
practices and should underpin the process of accounting standard-setting in a country. 
Saudagaran and Meek (1997, p.129) highlight the fact that ‘a nation’s accounting 
standards and practices are the result of a complex interaction of cultural, historical and 
institutional factors’. In addressing the impact of cultural dimensions on corporate 
fjnanrial reporting practices, accounting researchers draw heavily on the seminal work of 
Hofstede (1984) and Gray (1988) (Baydoun and Willett, 1995). Moreover, Brown and 
Humphreys (1995) argue that Hofstede’s (1984) framework of societal dimensions is a 
well-established and useful framework to a better understanding of national cultural 
differences. Moreover, based on Hofstede’s (1984) cultural values, several studies 
examined the impact o f the Egyptian cultural values on managerial practices and 
reported findings that are consistent with the findings of Hofstede (1984) (Beekun et al., 
2008; Douglas et al., 2007; El-Kot and Leat, 2008; Humphreys, 1996; Leat and El-Kot,
2007).
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Culture is ‘the collective programming o f  the mind which distinguishes members o f  one 
group or society from those o f  another’ (Hofstede, 1984, p.82). Hofstede (1984, p.83-84) 
identifies four main cultural dimensions which are presented in Table 2.1.
T able 2.1: H ofsted e’s (1984) Cultural D im ensions
Cultural





Individualism stands for a preference for a loosely knit o f  framework in society 
wherein individuals are supposed to take care o f  themselves and their immediate 
families only. Its opposite, Collectivism, stands for a preference for a tightly knit 
social framework in which individuals can expect their relatives, clan or other in­
group to look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty... the fundamental 
issue addressed by this dimension is the degree o f  interdependence a society 
maintains among individuals. It relates to people’s self-concept: ‘I’ or ‘we’.
Large versus Small 
Power Distance
Power distance is the extent to which the members o f  a society accept that power in 
institutions and organizations is distributed unequally... People in Large Power 
Distance societies accept a hierarchical order in which everybody has a place which 
needs no further justification. People in Small Power Distance societies strive for 
power equalisation and demand justification for power inequalities. The fundamental 





Uncertainty avoidance is the degree to which the members o f  a society feel 
uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity... Strong uncertainty Avoidance 
societies maintain rigid codes o f  belief and behaviour and are intolerant towards 
deviant persons and ideas. Weak uncertainty avoidance societies maintain a more 
relaxed atmosphere in which practice counts more than principles and deviance is 
more easily tolerated. The fundamental issue addressed by this dimension is how a 




Masculinity stands for a preference in society for achievement, heroism, 
assertiveness, and material success. Its opposite, Femininity, stands for a preference 
for relationships, modesty, caring for the weak, and the quality o f life. This 
fundamental issue addressed by this dimension is the way in which a society allocates 
social (as opposed to biological) roles to the sexes.
Gray (1988) links H ofstede’s (1984) societal values to their accounting counterparts.
Accounting values proposed by Gray (1988) are important in explaining the basic 
features o f  and national difference in financial reporting practices in different countries 
(Salter and Niswander, 1995). Gray (1988, p.8) recognises four underlying accounting 
values as follows (see Table 2.2):
T a b ic  2.2: Gray’s (1988) A cco u n tin g  V alues
A ccounting Values D efinition
Professionalism versus 
Statutory Control
A preference for the exercise o f  individual professional judgement and the 
maintenance o f  professional self-regulation as opposed to compliance with 
prescriptive legal requirements and statutory control.
Uniformity versus 
Flexibility
A preference for the enforcement o f uniform accounting practices between 
companies and for the consistent use o f  such practices over time as opposed to 




A preference for a cautious approach to measurement so as to cope with the 




A preference for confidentiality and the restriction o f  disclosure o f information 
about the business only to those who are closely involved with its management 
and financing as opposed to a more transparent, open and publicly accountable 
approach.
The direction o f  the association between Hofstede’s (1984) cultural dimensions and
Gray’s (1988) accounting values and their potential impact on accounting practices is 
summarised in Table 2.3:
Table 2.3: T he A ssociation  betw een  H ofstede’s (1984) Cultural D im ensions and Gray’s (1988) 
A ccounting Values
Cultural D im en sion
Relationship to accounting values
Professionalism Uniformity' Conservatism Secrecy
Individualism + -
Uncertainty avoidance + + +
Power distance + NR +
Num inng (Femininity) NR NR + +
Accounting practice mainly influenced Authority Application Measurement Disclosure
Adapted: Roberts et al. (2005, p. 185).
+: Positive relationship. For example, the higher individualism is, the higher professionalism will be.
Negative relationship. For example, the lower uncertainty avoidance is, the higher professionalism will
be.
NR: N o  relationship.
Empirical evidence supports the significant explanatory power o f  Gray’s (1988) model in 
explaining and predicting financial reporting practices. Empirical evidence indicates that 
uncertainty avoidance is the strongest cultural dimension in forming an accounting 
profession, the nature o f  regulation and the nature o f  measurement and disclosure 
practices (Salter and Niswander, 1995). In the same vein, Chanchani and Willett (2004) 
provide empirical evidence for the usefulness o f  Gray’s (1988) accounting values. 
Moreover, Baydoun and Willett (1995) argue that the impact o f  cultural values is likely to 
be more significant on disclosure than accounting measurement.
Hofstede (1984) reported Egypt as a society with a high propensity to collectivism, high 
power distance, high uncertainty avoidance and low masculinity as compared to 
Anglo/American societies such as the UK. Consequendy, according to Gray (1988), 
Egyptian society is expected to have a tendency to accounting values that prefer statutory 
control, uniformity, conservatism and secrecy. Baskerville (2003) criticises the work of 
Hofstede (1984) and consequently the work of Gray (1988) on the ground that it equates 
nation with culture and it is difficult to understand culture by using numeric indices and 
matrices techniques.
Egypt witnessed a dramatic transition from socialist economy to free market economy 
which in turn may impact the accounting values of Egyptian society as described by Gray 
(1988). Abd-Elsalam (1999) argues that Egyptian accounting practices moved from 
statutory control, uniformity and more conservatism, as dominant accounting values in 
the socialist era in the early 1960s, to more professionalism, flexibility and less 
conservatism in the early 1990s as a result o f the privatisation program, revitalisation of 
capital market and the adoption o f IASs. However, Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2007) 
argue that secrecy still impacts the disclosure practices of Egyptian companies. As a 
result, Egyptian companies are more likely to resist compliance with accounting 
standards and presentation o f more voluntary disclosure in their annual reports (El- 
Rashedy, 2006; Dahawy et al., 2002) especially with the unexpected lack of effective 
enforcement mechanisms (see section 2.4).
The Egyptian government realised that sound corporate financial reporting and the 
adoption o f IASs are necessary requirements for the success of its privatisation program 
adopted in the early 1990s (ROSC, 2002). However, the preparation of EASs that are 
based entirely on the IASs ignores the fact that IASs are based on the Anglo/American 
approach to financial reporting and reflects Western societal values (Flower, 1997). 
Therefore, the preparation of EASs does not reflect the nature of Egyptian societal 
values (El-Rashedy, 2006) and results in potential conflict between the disclosure 
requirement o f IASs/EASs and the secrecy as a dominant accounting value in Egypt (El- 
Rashedy, 2006; Dahawy and Conover, 2007).
2.3 Economic Development
This section outlines the development of the Egyptian economy in the second half of the 
20th century to date during which it witnessed a dramatic transition between different 
economic and social systems. Moreover, it sheds light on the impact o f economic
transition on accounting practices and the profession in Egypt since socioeconomic and 
accounting changes are inseparable. The presentation of economic developments aids a 
better understanding o f the development of the accounting profession in Egypt. 
Generally, the Egyptian economy has developed through five distinctive phases. A 
summary for each phase is presented below.
2.3.1 Pre 1956
During the pre 1956 period, the Egyptian economy was mainly agrarian together with 
industries closely related to agriculture, such as cotton. Government intervention in 
economic activities was very limited and restricted to infrastructure investment and social 
services while other economic activities such as banking, insurance and manufacturing 
were controlled by private sector (Hegazy, 1991). Foreign investment made little 
contribution in the industrial and agricultural sectors but had a major contribution in the 
financial sector (Abd-Elsalam, 1999). Even after the revolution o f 1952, the private 
sector still received support from the Egyptian government and dominated the Egyptian 
economy while the public sector had a minor role in economic development. In 1954, 
the Companies Act was promulgated to foster confidence in the business environment 
and encourage the role o f the private sector in economic development (Hegazy, 1991). 
This economic environment allows the accounting profession to play an important role 
and creates a demand for chartered accountants’ services (Amer, 1969). In this period, 
the organisation o f Egyptian accounting profession and financial reporting reflects 
western influence because the Egyptian accounting system was mainly derived from the 
British one (Samuels and Oliga, 1982).
2.3.2 From 1956 to 1973
This period witnessed a transition from a liberal economy to a centrally planned 
economy with a great role for the public sector (Abd-Elsalam, 1999). As a response to 
the Suez War o f 1956, the Egyptian government commenced a nationalisation policy 
involving a radical change in the economic and social system. The main reasons behind 
nationalisation were to control the major strategic economic sectors, to support the 
national economy and to achieve social welfare through reallocating economic resources 
(Amer and Khairy, 1981). The Egyptian government nationalised foreign investments 
and launched a massive public sector to shrink the role of the private sector (Abd- 
Elsalam, 1999). The government believed that the public sector was the main means of 
economic development and social welfare (Amer, 1969). In 1952, 28% of gross
investment was directed to the public sector and by 1960 the public sector received 74% 
o f  gross investment (Ikram, 2006). By July 1964, 80% o f  economic resources were 
nationalised (Amer, 1969).
In 1962, the national charter was enacted to declare explicidy the adoption o f  socialist 
thought in Egypt. The charter was based on the philosophy that economic development 
should not be based on a profit-oriented private sector but must be guided by socialism; 
therefore the role o f  the private sector in the economy declined while the public sector 
became the engine o f  development and economic growth (Ikram, 2006). These dramatic 
changes in econom ic and political orientation contributed to weakening investors’ 
confidence in the capital market and the collapse o f  the stock exchange (Hegazy, 1991).
The nationalisation and rapid growth o f  the public sector resulted in the nationalisation 
o f  the accounting profession because o f  the government employment o f  private 
chartered accountants and a lack o f  professional standards and conduct (Amer, 1969). 
These socio-political changes caused the Big-8 audit firms to leave Egypt in 1965 and 
resulted in a dramatic decline in the number o f  private accounting firms (Briston and El- 
Ashker, 1984).
During the period 1967-1973, the Egyptian-Israeli conflict reached its peak. In this 
period, the Egyptian government adopted a war economy policy that directed all 
economic policies to support the Egyptian army, national security and socially-oriented 
policies (Hegazy, 1991). The public sector was the main economic tool to achieve these 
goals and the activity o f  the Egyptian exchange deteriorated until the 1990s (see Table 
2.4).
T able 2.4: Indicators o f  Stock Market D evelopm ent during 1958-2002
Indicators o f  the Egyptian exchange activity 1958 1974 1991 2002
Number o f  listed companies 275 55 627 1150
Market capitalisation (%)* 13 1 7.80 -  !"
Value o f  trade (%)■ 3.20 0.10 0.10 7.40
Turnover ratio (%)* 22.60 0.95 4.80 24.50
Value o f  new issues (%)■ 6.20 0.50 1.20 3.20
■As a percentage o f  GDP.
Source: Bolbol et al. (2005).
2.3.3 From 1974 to 1980
After the October 1973 War, the Egyptian government sought to re-build the economy 
through a series o f  political and economic reforms. Due to limited internal resources, the 
attraction o f  foreign investments was chosen as an approach (Abd-Elsalam, 1999). Law 
32 o f  1977 was enacted to reflect an ‘open door policy’ adopted by the Egyptian
government to encourage both Arab and foreign capital. The encouragement of foreign 
investments intensified the demand for chartered accountants because foreign 
enterprises refused to subject their financial statements to government audit and 
preferred independent auditors (Briston and El-Ashker, 1984). Moreover, professional 
accounting authorities grew in importance and relationships with international 
accounting organisations were re-established (Samuels and Oliga, 1982).
However, the implementation o f the ‘open door policy* was not successful. The poor 
application o f the ‘open door policy* resulted in excessive unproductive consumption 
patterns, a significant deficit in the balance of payments and significant reliance on 
external debts (Hegazy, 1991). The public sector dominated the economy especially in 
the manufacturing and petroleum industries, import, export and infrastructure activities 
(Ikram, 2006). Moreover, due to a lack of relevant financial reporting and protection of 
small investors, economic problems and tax disincentives to investment in securities, the 
stock exchange remained dormant until the 1990s (Bolbol et al., 2005).
2.3.4 From 1981 to 1990
During this period, the Egyptian government faced major economic problems such as 
high unemployment rates, low economic growth, low productivity o f public sector 
enterprises and high external debts. It recognised the need to improve the business 
environment and encourage the private sector. Consequently, new Companies Act 159 of 
1981 and new Income Tax Law 158 of 1981 were promulgated with the goal of 
encouraging foreign private investment. By 1986, the drop in oil prices and the world 
recession led to a significant decline in oil and Suez Canal revenues and a slowdown of 
the economy. By 1990-1991 the economy was on the verge of collapse. The budget 
deficit was approximately 20% of GDP and external debt was about 151% of GDP 
(Bolbol et al. 2005).
2.3.5 From 1991
The International Money Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) persuaded the Egyptian 
government to move towards the privatisation o f state-owned companies, reforming 
banking and the financial system and adopting rational exchange rate policies (Ikram,
2006).
Regarding its privatisation program, the Egyptian government issued public sector law 
203 of 1991 that grouped 314 non-financial state-owned companies into 27 new holding 
companies and facilitated the privatisation process through allowing state-owned
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companies to offer shares on the stock market. Afterwards, new capital market authority 
law 95 o f  1992 was enacted to facilitate the privatisation process, encourage foreign 
investment and restore the capital market. The application o f  IASs/EASs became 
mandatory for the companies listed on the stock exchange. As o f  June 2000, the 
government had sold its controlling stake and minority interest in 118 and 16 state- 
owned companies respectively with a sales price o f  approximately L.E 14.17 billion 
(Ikram, 2006). The Egyptian stock market1 achieved a rapid increase and decrease in 
terms o f  the number o f  listed companies and a sustained increase in market capitalisation 
between 1997 and 2007. Table 2.5 indicates some figures regarding the performance o f  
the Egyptian exchange.
T able 2.5: Perform ance o f  Egy ptian Exchange betw een 1987 and 2007
Indicators 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007




71 82 112 121 112 122 172 243 456 534 768
Percentage o f  market 
capitalization to G D P
27%' 29% 36% 36% 30% 29% 35% 43% 74% 73% 105%
Source: EG X Annual Report (2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007).
The number o f  listed companies dramatically increased during the period 1997-2002. Tax 
exemption, among other reasons, was the main motivation for companies to be listed on 
the EG X. Listed companies gain tax exemption equal to a percentage o f  paid-up capital 
according to the deposit rate determined by the Central Bank o f  Egypt (Tax law, 1981). 
However, in June 2002, the CMA issued new listing rules to be effective on August 2003. 
Due to the difficulties that companies are likely to face to satisfy the requirement o f the 
listing and delisting rules (ROSC, 2001) and the annulment o f  the tax exemption by the 
new tax law (Tax law, 2005), the number o f  listed companies decreased noticeably 
between 2003 and 2007.
2.4 Regulatory Fram ew ork and Financial R eporting
This section provides a discussion o f  companies act, capital, market law, listing rules and 
their influence on financial reporting practices o f  Egyptian companies.
1 The Egyptian Exchange (EGX) is among the oldest stock exchanges in the world and the first exchanges 
to be established in the Middle East. Alexandria stock exchange was established in 1883 while Cairo stock 
exchange was established in 1903. In 1940, they constituted the fifth largest stock exchange in the world 
(Hassan et al. 2006).
2.4.1 Companies Act
The adoption o f socialist thought since the early 1960s, coupled with nationalisation of 
most existing companies at that time, resulted in a number of restrictions that prevented 
the establishment o f new joint stock companies. The lack of individual initiatives to 
establish strong economic entities negatively affected the development of the national 
economy.
After the adoption of an open-door policy in the mid-1970s, there was an urgent need to 
encourage domestic and foreign investment through the issuance o f a new law governing 
the establishment o f joint stock companies. In October 1981, Law of Joint Stock 
Companies, Limited by Shares Companies and Limited Liability Companies No. 
159/1981 (hereafter referred as the companies act) was issued. The Companies Act aims 
to regulate all the aspects related to companies from constitution until dissolution.
Through several articles, the Companies Act has organised the process of financial 
reporting in terms o f the components and timing of statements and reports to be 
published and approved by general assembly, responsibility for preparing financial 
statements and information that should be included in the board o f directors’ report. The 
Companies Act indicates that (Companies Act, 1981):
1- Management is responsible for preparing financial statements and a report 
regarding its activity during the financial year and its financial position at the end 
o f the financial year. The management should prepare financial statements and 
board o f directors’ report within two months o f the end of the financial year.
2- Management should publish financial statements, a summary of the board of 
directors’ report and the complete auditors’ report in two daily newspapers at 
least two weeks before the general assembly meeting.
3- A company has to prepare financial statements according to accounting standards 
specified by regulations.
4- Appendix 1 of the executive regulation of the Companies Act indicates the 
information that should be included in the board of directors’ report. The report 
should include an overview regarding the development of company activities and 
financial position. In particular, the report should include information such as:
•  General status o f the company, its business results and business prospects.
•  The main activities of the company and its subsidiaries and any changes in 
subsidiaries’ ownership structure during the year.
•  Classification o f sales and net profit (loss) according to basic activities.
•  Sales exported to foreign markets.
•  Information regarding stocks and bonds that are issued during the year.
5- The external auditor should state in the audit report whether the balance sheet, 
profit and loss account and information included in the board of directors’ report 
are consistent with a company’s records.
However, a careful review o f the Companies Act and the executive regulation indicates 
that:
•  The Companies Act does not require companies to publish a formal annual 
report hence a very small number of companies publish annual reports above and 
beyond what is required by the Companies Act (ROSC, 2001).
•  The Companies Act does not discuss extensively accounting and auditing 
standards and does not contain any sanctions for standards violation (ROSC, 
2002).
•  Although the Companies Act has been revised several times, it still limits 
financial statements to balance sheet and profit and loss account.
•  The Companies Act requires companies to publish a summary board of directors’ 
report. However, most companies usually do not publish this summary. Even if 
the summary is published, it is not sufficient and ignores a lot of relevant 
information (Sobehi, 2002). This requirement may not assist users of financial 
information to make more informed decisions especially when only a summarised 
board o f the directors’ report is published (ROSC, 2002).
•  The Companies Act does not include explicitly risk information in the 
information that should be included in board of the directors’ report and leaves it 
to management discretion.
2.4.2 Capital Market Regulations
Although the CMA was established in 1978 by law No.73, it received its vital role and 
complete capacity to regulate the Egyptian capital market through law 95 of 1992. 
Reactivating the EG X was imperative for the success of the state-owned enterprises 
privatisation program. Briefly, the CML has an important role in regulating the capital
market, establishing the legal structure of the EGX, maintaining market integrity, fairness 
and transparency and controlling the operations of capital market participants (ROSC
2004). In order to increase its effectiveness in regulating the capital market, the CML 
provides the CMA with a number of administrative sanctions such as warnings, delisting, 
suspending and rescinding licenses, revoking transactions and examinations (ROSC,
2001).
2.4.2.1 Capital Market Law and Financial Reporting
The CML comprises several articles that govern financial reporting o f listed companies. 
These articles identify the timing of financial statement delivery, components of financial 
statements and board o f directors’ report, what should be published and when and the 
sanctions for the violation o f listing rules. CML states that:
1- Every company offering securities for public subscription is required to notify the 
authority a month prior to the general assembly meeting of its balance sheet and other 
financial statements as well as board o f directors’ and auditor’ reports. The company's 
balance sheet and other financial statements should be prepared in accordance with 
accounting and auditing standards as specified, or referred to, by the executive 
regulations. The company should publish an adequate summary of its semi-annual and 
annual financial statements in two daily and widely circulated newspapers, one of which 
at least is in Arabic. Every company should disclose immediately any contingent 
fundamental conditions, which would affect its business or financial position and publish 
an adequate summary in two daily morning and widely circulated newspapers, one of 
which at least is in Arabic.
2- Delaying in the delivery of financial statements in complying with the rules of listing 
and delisting o f securities shall be penalised by a fine o f L.E. 2000 for each day of delay.
2.4.2.2 Listing and Delisting Rules of EGX and Financial Reporting
The CMA issued decree No.30 o f the listing and delisting rules of EGX in June 2002 to 
be effective on August 2003. The rules highlight the importance o f timely preparation 
and presentation o f financial statements and full compliance with accounting and 
auditing standards and other regulations (ROSC, 2002). The main reason for issuing this 
decree was the need to enhance financial reporting practices through emphasising the 
importance o f providing high quality disclosure by listed companies. Therefore, delisting 
is the consequence o f non-compliance with disclosure requirements included in these
rules. Listing and delisting rules contain several articles that organise and regulate 
financial reporting practices as following (CMA, 2002a):
1- A listed company should ensure that the board of directors’ report includes relevant 
information regarding audit committee activities during the year.
2- A listed company should provide the CMA and EG X with a copy of its annual 
financial statements, board of directors’ report and auditor report whenever approved by 
the company’s board o f directors. A copy of these financial statements should also be sent to 
stock exchange within 10 days o f their approval by the general assembly (Emphasis 
added).
3- Financial statements should be prepared according to the EASs and forms included in 
Appendix (3) o f the executive regulation of capital market law 95 of 1992. They should 
also be audited according to the Egyptian auditing rules and this should be clearly stated 
in the auditor’s report.
However, a critical review o f the CML and listing and delisting rules of the EGX reveals 
a number o f weaknesses in the regulation o f financial reporting:
•  In assessing the level of compliance with the Egyptian accounting standards, the 
CMA pays more attention to the appearance rather than substance of the annual 
reports (ROSC, 2002).
•  Although market participants emphasise the importance o f the board of 
directors’ report in the annual reports (ROSC 2004), the absence of a detailed 
report in the annual reports of several listed companies is often observed (ROSC,
2001).
•  There is no legal requirement to report potential risks other than the qualified 
auditor opinion if there is high uncertainty regarding the company’s going 
concern (ROSC, 2004).
•  Although the CMA exerts massive efforts to monitor companies’ compliance 
with disclosure requirements of the EASs and listing and delisting rules of EGX, 
the effectiveness o f those efforts is questionable. For example, the checklist used 
by the CMA to monitor companies’ compliance does not cover information that 
should be included in the board o f directors’ report according to the 
requirements o f Companies Act and listing and delisting rules of the EGX 
(Sobehi, 2002). Moreover, empirical research reveals non-significant
improvement in the quality of annual reports before and after the application of 
listing and delisting rules o f the EGX (Abd-Elhamed, 2003).
•  The CMA and the EG X give an extremely high priority to the timing of financial 
statements delivery. They emphasise the importance that a company should 
deliver its financial statements within the dates specified by the laws and 
regulations regardless the content of the financial statements (Abd-Elmalek, 2006; 
El-Essely, 2005).
•  The sanctions o f CML are related to the failure to deliver financial statements on 
time and are not applied to board of directors* report therefore companies have 
the incentive to withhold board of directors* reports without facing any sanctions.
•  In general, regulations that organise capital market are weak and are not applied 
effectively (Abd-Elmalek, 2006). ROSC (2002, p. 8) states that ‘no effective 
regulatory mechanisms exist for imposing sanctions on accountants and auditors 
who fail to comply. Moreover, legal provisions are vague about the civil or 
criminal liabilities o f parties responsible for supplying misleading or incorrect 
information in audited financial statements*. Giving more details, ROSC (2002, 
p.8) indicates that ‘although there are some legal provisions that mention the 
liabilities o f directors and auditors, these seem to be unclear and, in practice, the 
accountants and auditors do not face any real liability if they violate the legally 
established accounting and auditing standards. Egyptian accountants and auditors 
were never sued for their professional misconduct*.
•  The EG X  has no power to regulate financial reporting of listed companies. The 
stock exchange has no jurisdiction to impose fines for non-compliance or 
provide reward for compliance with financial reporting requirements (ROSC,
2002).
•  The listing and delisting rules of EGX does not properly distinguish between 
annual financial statements and annual reports and uses these different concepts 
as synonyms. The failure to provide precise differentiation between these 
concepts may cause confusion to preparers o f financial reports.
2.5 Accounting and Auditing Profession in Egypt
Egypt lacks a professional accounting and auditing authority that has the power to 
monitor members* performance, professional conduct and impose sanctions (ROSC, 
2002). This section presents the accounting and auditing profession in Egypt through the
presentation o f professional bodies, admission to the profession and auditor 
independence.
2.5.1 Accounting Professional Bodies
There are several professional bodies that are involved in organising and developing the 
profession. A summary o f these professional bodies is presented below.
2.5.1.1 Egyptian Society of Accountants and Auditors
In 1946, the royal charter was enacted to establish the Royal Egyptian Society of 
Accountants and Auditors. In 1953 its name was changed to the Egyptian Society of 
Accountants and Auditors (ESAA). The main purpose o f the society is to raise the 
education and professional knowledge of practitioners and maintain an adequate 
presentation o f the profession internationally. The ESAA has been a member of the 
International Federation o f Accountants (IFAC) since 1980. The ESAA supports the 
accounting and auditing profession in Egypt through participation in several activities 
such as:
•  Holding courses and training programs for accountants who wish to join the 
profession.
•  Organising lectures, seminars and discussions in all matters related to accounting 
and auditing profession.
•  Exchanging experience with local and international associations in order to 
enhance the accounting and auditing profession.
Due to British colonisation, the British accounting profession had a significant influence 
on the ESAA (Amer and Khairy, 1981). However, the ESAA does not function as a self- 
regulatory agency due to a weak disciplinary authority (ROSC, 2002). The ESAA has a 
significant participation in setting the EASs. The ESAA has received a delegation from 
the committee o f accounting and auditing standards. The ESAA’s standards setting 
committee selects, translates and drafts the EASs, which are based on the IASs, and then 
sends them to the committee for discussion, confirmation and approval.
Members o f the ESAA have to achieve at least 120 hours o f continuing education during 
three years with a minimum of 25 hours per year. Otherwise, they may lose the ESAA 
membership. Moreover, the ESAA members should follow the Egyptian code of ethics 
for professional accountants which is based entirely on the IFAC code of ethics. Finally, 
the ESAA runs several training programs for its members to ensure that its members
receive high quality training before entering or when practising the profession (ROSC,
2002).
2.5.1.2 Syndicate of Commercial Professions
The Egyptian Syndicate of Accountants and Auditors was established by law 349 of 1951 
and in 1972 it was dissolved and replaced by the Syndicate of Commercial Professions 
(SCP). The SCP consists o f seven divisions one o f them is the accountants and auditor 
division. The main objectives of the SCP are:
•  Enhancing the education and professional knowledge of the members and to 
maintain profession dignity.
•  Participating in the discussion of economic development plans.
•  Participating in the planning of economic and business educational programs in 
order to meet society needs.
•  Cooperation with national and international counterparts and exchange 
information and experience regarding mutual issues and projects.
However, the efforts o f the syndicate are mainly limited to social services provided to its 
members. Moreover, the syndicate has no power for a supervisory role or contribution to 
organising and developing the profession (Kayed, 1990).
2.5.1.3 Egyptian Institute of Accountants and Auditors
According to the recommendation of the international conference of accountant and 
auditors held in Egypt in 1980, the Egyptian Institute of Accountants and Auditors 
(EIAA) was established by presidential decree 484 of 1983. The establishment of EIAA 
was a result o f cooperation between the Egyptian government and United States Agency 
for International Development. The institute commenced its activities in 1988 as a quasi 
independent body under the supervision of the SCP- accounting and auditing division 
(Hegazy, 1991). The main objectives of the EIAA are:
•  Preparing and organising practical programs, professional training and continuing 
education for accountants and auditors.
•  Conducting research and studies needed to formulate and update accounting and 
auditing standards and rules of professional conduct.
•  Holding scientific conferences to discuss contemporary professional issues.
•  Exchanging experience with international professional organizations in all 
professional affairs.
The EIAA held a series o f  conferences to discuss the application o f  IASs in Egypt in 
1987, 1989 and 1992. The three conferences discussed a number o f accounting standards. 
The Table 2.6 presents these standards:
Table 2.6: A ccounting Standards d iscussed  by the EIAA
Year Accounting standards
1987 Disclosure o f accounting policies.
Depreciation accounting.
Valuation and presentation o f  inventories according to historical cost. 
Accounting for the effects o f changes in foreign exchange rates.
1989 Statement o f  resources and application o f  funds. 
Capitalisation o f  borrowing costs.
Information to be disclosed in financial statements. 
Presentation o f  current assets and liabilities.
1992 Accounting for the effects o f  price changes.
Accounting for construction contacts.
Accounting for property, plants and equipments.
Accounting for business combination.
Accounting for research and development costs.
Related party disclosure.
Accounting for investments.
Accounting and disclosure o f government grants and assistance. 
Extraordinary items and changes in accounting policies. 
Contingencies and events that occur after the balance sheet date.
Adapted: El-Deeb (1993).
However, due to a lack o f  enforcement power and government support, none o f these 
standards was adopted or applied by Egyptian companies. Those standards were neither 
mandated by law nor included in the CML (Abd-Elsalam, 1999).
2.5.1.4 Central Authority Organisation
After the adoption o f  socialism and centrally planned economic policies by the Egyptian 
government in the early 1960s, the need for an authorised governmental professional 
body, that audits and monitors the financial activities o f  public sector companies and 
government agencies, had emerged. Accordingly, the Central Authority Organisation 
(CAO) was enacted by presidential decree 129 o f  1964 which was superseded by 
presidential decree 144 o f  1988. The main duties o f  the CAO are (Kayed, 1990):
•  To audit state-owned companies and government agencies.
•  T o supervise state-owned companies in financial and technical aspects.
•  To monitor the implementation o f  economic development plans.
In December 1966, the CAO developed a uniform accounting system (UAS) to be 
effective from 1st July 1967. All state-owned companies except banks and insurance 
companies should apply the requirements o f  the UAS. The transition to a centrally
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planned economy highlighted the need to design and apply an accounting system that 
facilitates economic planning at the macro-level (Hegazy, 1991). The main objectives of 
the UAS are:
•  Providing a wide range o f necessary information for planning, coordinating and 
controlling purposes at all levels of the economy.
•  l i nking the accounts at micro and macro level to facilitate the calculation of
national income through unified accounting concepts and standards.
•  Facilitating collection, tabulation and storage o f unified accounting information.
•  Measuring the performance of state-owned companies.
•  Measuring the efficiency o f state-owned companies in allocating economic
resources.
However, the UAS seemed to be an accounting handbook that prescribed precise 
measurement and evaluation procedures, movements between accounts and content and 
format o f financial reports (Al-Hashim, 1977). Moreover, the UAS tended to undermine 
the importance o f accounting disclosure and assigned high importance to accounting 
measurements. As Briston and El-Ashker (1984, p. 135) state:
The main impetus for accounting uniformity in Egypt came not from a concern with the 
disclosure system but from the need for uniformity for planning and control purposes, so 
that particular attention is paid to the standardisation o f the measurement...
According to the UAS, the main objective of financial statements is to reflect actual and 
planned operations and to assist central government in planning and evaluating the 
operations o f different economic sectors (Al-Hashim, 1977). The UAS aimed to meet the 
needs o f government agencies, such as the Ministry o f Planning and Ministry of Finance, 
for information and undermined the needs of other users for accounting information 
such as investors (El-Essely, 1987). In fact, the users and regulators of unified accounting 
information are the same group (Al-Hashim, 1973).
2.5.2 Admission to the Profession
There are two main routes to joining the accounting and auditing profession in Egypt. 
The first route is through law 133 of 1951 (hereafter referred as the profession law) while 
the second route is the membership of the ESAA. The profession law and the ESAA 
have a significant influence on the accounting profession by restricting the practice of
public accounting to individuals with specific qualifications (Briston and El-Ashker, 
1984). The requirements of each route are briefly described as follows:
2.5.2.1 Law 133 of 1951
According to the requirements o f the profession law, public practising of accounting and 
auditing requires registration in the general registry of accountants and auditors managed 
by the Ministry o f Finance. The candidate should comply with the following educational 
and training requirements:
•  The applicant should have a bachelor o f commerce - accounting section or 
bachelor o f commerce - business administration section and a diploma in taxes 
from an Egyptian institute/university or an equivalent degree recognised by the 
Ministry o f Higher Education.
• The applicant should spend three consecutive years of training in an auditing firm. 
During this period the applicant should practice all accounting and auditing 
related tasks without any interruption.
After completing the training requirement, the applicant should spend another five years 
o f further practical work in order to be entided to work as an external auditor of joint 
stock companies. However, the admission to the profession through this route has 
received several criticisms. The profession law allows the Ministry of Finance to exempt 
individuals occupying certain accounting positions from training requirements. For 
example, these accounting positions include the chief accountant or financial director in 
government authorities, public organisations, state-owned companies, the tax authority 
and CAO. These accounting positions are called ‘equivalent positions’. Accordingly, 
several individuals became chartered accountants without the required knowledge and 
experience (Kayed, 1990). In addition, the profession law does not require the passing of 
any examinations to be a chartered accountant and the length of compulsory training 
does not mean that the trainee will receive adequate training and hence several trainees 
may practise the profession without the necessary professional skills and knowledge 
(ROSC, 2002).
2.5.2.2 Membership of the ESAA
According to the requirements of ESAA, the public practising of accounting and auditing 
requires membership o f the ESAA. To be a member o f the ESAA, the candidate should 
satisfy the following educational and training requirements:
•  The applicant should have graduated from the faculty of commerce - accounting 
section from an Egyptian or equivalent university.
•  The applicant should spend three years of training in an audit firm member of 
the ESAA or in the CAO.
•  The applicant should have passed two exams by the end of the training period. 
The first exam is an intermediate exam which covers the following subjects: 
financial accounting, cost accounting, auditing, and information systems. The 
second exam is the final exam which covers management accounting, advanced 
auditing, advanced financial accounting and taxation.
Moreover, the ESAA membership is admitted to the members of the ICAEW and the 
holder o f a PhD degree in accounting with three years experience in practice. Once the 
applicant has become a member of the ESAA he/she is entitled to act as external auditor 
o f joint stock companies.
2.5.3 Auditor Independence
Several articles in the profession law and Companies Act support auditor independence. 
For example, article 27 o f the profession law stated that the auditor should not:
•  Engage in any other profession or business without permission.
•  Advertise professional service or follow any other way that breaches the dignity 
o f the profession to gain clients.
Moreover, Companies Act and its executive regulation stipulated that:
•  The general assembly appoints the auditor(s) and determines audit fees.
•  The auditor cannot combine work as an independent auditor and to be a member 
o f the company board o f directors or work permanently as a consultant for the 
company.
However, the independence o f auditors is questionable (Kayed, 1990). ROSC (2002) 
identifies some indicators for auditor lack of independence in Egypt such as:
•  Some auditors have issued unqualified audit reports despite material
misstatements that should be mentioned in the audit report.
•  Auditors may assist their clients in preparing disclosure in financial reports and 
selecting accounting treatments to ensure favourable tax consequences.
•  Auditors may accept new clients even over their capacity. This raises quality 
concerns and potential violation of accounting and auditing standards.
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•  In practice, the process of appointment and dismissal of independent auditors 
influences audit quality.
This brief presentation highlights the fact that there is an urgent need to establish an 
independent professional body with essential authority to organise the profession 
according to a code of ethics (ROSC, 2004).
2.6 Accounting Education
Accounting education has been present in Egypt since 1837 through the establishment of 
the School o f Accountancy but this closed in the late 1840s. Then, in 1868, the School of 
Survey and Accountancy was established. Accounting education became present in an 
organised structure in 1911 with the establishment of the Higher School of Commerce 
which became the faculty of commerce in the Egyptian University (Cairo University 
now). Currendy, 17 government and 16 private universities, besides a large number of 
higher institutes, offer various degrees in accounting including Bachelor, Diploma, 
Master and PhD. Undergraduate study in accounting consists of 4 years of study for a 
B.Com with a major in accounting. The courses cover the following subjects:
•  Accounting principles
•  Accounting information systems
•  Principles and advanced managerial accounting
•  Advanced financial accounting
•  Specialised accounting systems
•  Principles o f internal control
•  Tax accounting
Intermediate accounting 
Principles and advanced cost accounting 
Accounting for partnership 
Corporation accounting 
Zakat accounting
Principles and advanced external auditing 
Operations research in accounting
However, there is no course that covers professional ethics and the interpretation and 
implementation of the EASs/IASs. Kayed (1990) highlights the major problems of 
accounting education in Egypt as the following:
•  Lack o f updated textbooks in Arabic and a shortage of discussing topics such as 
the role o f accounting in economic development and research methodology.
•  Very litde attention has been given to the Egyptian accounting practice problems.
•  Free government education and over population create heavy demand on higher 
education which, in turn, is given limited financial and technical resources. 
Consequently, Egyptian universities suffer from a very poor staff/students ratio 
and a busy schedule o f faculty members.
•  Textbooks mainly focused on technical rather than conceptual issues.
•  Inadequacy o f accounting libraries and other educational materials.
In addition, ROSC (2002) indicates that the accounting curricula cover only basic topics 
and fail to present international standards and practice and suffer from the shortage of 
implementation guidelines on the EASs/IASs. Such problems threaten the quality of 
accounting education in government universities.
All these problems in Egyptian accounting education have been reflected in accounting 
practice. Accounting education problems result in a lack of accounting knowledge of 
most graduates, lack o f knowledge regarding the application of accounting and auditing 
standards, outdated Arabic translations of the IASs and the precedence of tax accounting 
over financial reporting. It is not surprising that auditors and clients decide on and 
prepare together accounting treatments and disclosures in financial reports (ROSC, 2002). 
Kayed (1990) argues that the development of accounting education in Egypt requires 
incorporating a case study approach, field trips, practical training and real world 
problems in accounting education.
2.7 Egyptian Accounting Standards
1980 was the first year that accounting standards became a focus of interest when the 
SCP sponsored the international conference of accountants and auditors held in Cairo to 
discuss the possibility o f releasing accounting standards that suit the Egyptian context. 
The adoption o f IASs with some necessary adjustments to be suitable for the local 
environment and the establishment of the EIAA were the main conclusions of the 
conference (Hassanen, 2003).
In the early 1990s, the Egyptian government adopted economic reform policies by 
applying the rules of free-market economies and a privatisation program. Therefore, the 
need to enhance the quality o f accounting disclosure emerged as a vital factor for the 
success of the privatisation program during the economic transition (Sobehi, 2002). The 
Egyptian government realised that the existence of a sound financial system, credible 
corporate financial reporting and adoption of international accounting and auditing 
standards are key factors that underpin the success of this program (ROSC, 2002).
Chamisa (2000) provides support for the relevance of the IASs to developing countries. 
He establishes his argument based on several aspects, namely accounting needs, private 
sector and a similar environment argument. According to the accounting needs argument, 
the IASs are designed to provide users of financial statements with the information they 
need; therefore developing countries adopt the IASs because they satisfy successfully
users’ needs for information. Consequently, developing countries adopt, amend, integrate 
in their regulations or reject certain IASs in the light o f  users’ needs for information. The 
private sector argument reveals that several developing countries adopt or have 
transformed to a free market economy and give the private sector an important role in 
the economic reform process. In these circumstances, the IASs are more relevant to 
developing countries. Finally, the a similar environment argument is based on the claim 
that although each country has its unique environment, developed and developing 
countries share a number o f  similar environmental aspects and information needs. 
Consequently, the adoption o f  IASs by developing countries may bring some advantages. 
From the companies’ viewpoint, the IASs will decrease the cost o f  preparing, 
communicating and auditing financial statements and secure more effective relationships 
with international investors (Roberts et al., 2005). Moreover, IASs will enhance the 
contracting process between companies and a number o f  other parties, mainly lenders 
and management through providing information that is more relevant (Ball, 2006).
From the investors’ standpoint, the IASs may lead to more informed investment 
decisions and reduce investment risk by providing more accurate, relevant and timely 
information. In addition, the IASs may reduce information asymmetry between more 
informed and less informed investors. Therefore, they probably secure more protection 
for less informed investors (Ball, 2006). Moreover, the IASs may reduce the need to 
acquire more information to amend the reported information as result o f applying 
different accounting rules, which in turn reduce the cost o f  data acquisition and the 
problems that may occur as a result o f  complex and vague accounting rules (Roberts et 
al., 2005).
Statistics about foreign investment in Egypt during the period 2001-2006 support that 
claim. The adoption o f  IASs by the Egyptian government, among other factors, 
contributes to the increase o f  direct foreign investment and foreign investment in 
securities. Table 2.7 indicates the figures related to the foreign investment during 
2001/2006:
Table 2.7: D irect Foreign Investm ents and Foreign Investm ent in Securities
2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006
Direct investment ($ million) 428.2 700.6 407.2 3901.8 6111.4
Investments in securities ($ million) 998.9 -405.2 -225.6 831.1 2746
Source: CBE (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006).
Moreover, foreigners’ transactions in the Egyptian stock market increased rapidly 
between 1996 and 1999. Table 2.8 highlights the significant contribution o f  foreigners’ 
transactions in the Egyptian stock market in terms o f  the percentage o f  trading volume 
and market capitalisation.
Table 2.8: Activity o f  Foreign Investors in the Egy ptian E xchange betw een 1996 and 1999





Source: Hodeb (2006), p. 192.
Recently, the percentage o f  foreigners’ transactions in the stock market constitutes 
26.9% (28.4%) o f  trading volume and 43.2% (47.5%) o f  market capitalisation in 
3 0 /6 /2 0 0 5  (30 /6 /2006) (CMA, 2006a).
2.7.1 Egyptian Standard-Setting Process
Belkaoui (1994) proposed four strategies that developing countries may choose among 
them in building their accounting standards. These strategies are:
1 - The Evolutionary Approach
According to this approach, a developing country defines its own accounting values and 
needs and uses them to derive its own techniques, concepts, institutions, profession and 
education without any exterior pressure or intervention.
2- The Transfer o f  Technology Approach
The transfer o f  accounting technology can take place through several channels such as 
international accounting firms and multinational companies. In addition, international 
accords and cooperative arrangements have a significant role in the transfer o f  
accounting technology.
3- The Adoption o f  International Accounting Standards
A developing country may adopt the IASs or employ them as the foundation for its own 
national standards to:
•  Decrease the cost o f  preparing and establishing accounting standards.
•  Encourage and attract foreign investment.
•  Provide the accounting profession with the opportunity to cope with entrenched 
standards o f  conduct.
•  Keep pace with global trends towards harmonisation.
•  Strengthen its position as a committed member o f the international community.
Moreover, developing countries may prefer this strategy because they lack essential 
financial resources, expertise and skills to establish their own accounting standards 
(Cairns, 1990; Roberts et al., 2005).
4- The Situationist Strategy
This strategy seeks to produce accounting standards in the context of factors that have 
significant influence on the development of accounting. These factors include cultural 
linguistics, political and civil tights, economic and demographic characteristics, legal and 
tax systems, education and profession.
Egypt applies the third strategy as a basis for establishing the EASs. Using mimetic 
isomorphism of institutional theory, Hassan (2008, p.470) analyses the reasons for 
adopting the IASs as a basis o f the EASs. He states that:
The Egyptian regulators* source o f knowledge, the lack o f domestic investors' desires to 
change the EFRR (Egyptian Financial Reporting Regulation) and the immature 
accounting profession that is incapable of professionally enforcing new standards, have led 
the regulators to choose the IA Ss as the best framework to improve the practice of 
accounting in Egypt.
In May 1996, the Minister o f Economy issued decree No. 323/1996 and then decree No. 
478 in 1997 to establish the committee o f accounting and auditing standards and rules of 
professional conduct. The committee is responsible for issuing accounting standards to 
be used in preparation o f financial statements and auditing standards to be used by 
auditors and related rules o f professional conduct. These standards form the overall 
framework for the preparation o f financial statements and audit work.
In October 1997, the Minister of the Economy released ministerial decree No. 503 that 
contained 19 EASs effective from January 1998 and then three additional standards are 
added by ministerial decree No. 345 of 2002. Ministerial decree 503 of 1997 mandated 
the use o f the EASs by all enterprises regulated under the supervision of the CML. 
However, the introduction o f the decree indicates that the IASs should be applied to any 
accounting treatment in the absence of the EASs (MOE, 1997).
In July 2006, the Ministry of Investment issued ministerial decree No.243 that 
superseded the previous ministerial decrees, No. 503 and 345. The decree contains 35
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EASs based completely on the IASs, but with minor differences, effective from the 
January 2007. The new version of EASs remedies the deficiencies in the previous 
standards by including a conceptual framework for the preparation and presentation of 
financial statements and two risk-related accounting standards, namely EAS 25, Financial 
Instruments: Presentation and Disclosure and EAS 33, Segment Reporting (MOI, 2006).
It is obvious that the process followed in preparing the EASs did not follow the essential 
procedures suggested by the FASB in the US, the ASB in the UK and IASB. This means 
that the EASs ignore the environmental and cultural dimensions of Egyptian society (El- 
Rashedy, 2006). Belkaoui (1988, p.177) stated that ‘the standard-setting process in the 
developing countries has not followed a unique strategy proper to these countries and 
their context*. Consequendy, this may threaten compliance with the EASs.
2.8 Corporate Governance
Corporate governance has received increasing attention especially since the mid-1990s at 
both international and national level. Several international bodies such as the OECD, the 
WB and the IMF seek to establish and promote the principles and foundations of good 
corporate governance practices. They provide assessment and classification of countries 
in terms o f the quality o f corporate governance in their markets (Abd-Elhamed, 2003). 
At the national level, Egypt takes several initiatives to apply the principles of corporate 
governance such as the establishment of the Egyptian Institute of Directors (EIoD) and 
the embracing of the OECD*s corporate governance principles.
The Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the failure o f large companies in some developed 
countries such as Maxwell in the UK and Enron in the US have pointed out that 
financial, managerial corruption and manipulation highlighted the role of good corporate 
governance practices in eliminating these financial crises (El-Essely, 2005). In addition, 
developing countries that adopt economic reform policies give high priority to corporate 
governance in order to gain the confidence o f investors and attract more foreign 
investment (Abd-Elhamed, 2003).
2.8.1 Corporate Governance Definition and Importance
Corporate governance is an eclectic and multifaceted subject (Brennan and Solomon,
2008); therefore, there is no consensus on a single acknowledged definition of corporate 
governance (Solomon, 2007). Current definitions of corporate governance form a 
continuum o f definitions ranging from a very narrow perspective to a wider point of 
view (Solomon and Solomon 2004). On the one hand, corporate governance is defined
as ‘the system by which companies are directed and controlled* (Cadbury Code, 1992, 
p.15). This definition reflects a narrow point of view of corporate governance because it 
focuses mainly on the importance of controls in companies (Mallin, 2006) and limits 
corporate governance to the relationship between a company and shareholders only 
(Solomon, 2007). It stresses the means of confirming that a company is managed to 
achieve the objectives established by shareholders (Sternberg, 2004).
Alternatively, the OECD presents a wider definition of corporate governance. According 
to this definition, corporate governance is ‘a set o f relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance 
also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the 
means o f attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined’ 
(OECD, 2004, p .ll) . This definition provides a broad perspective of corporate 
governance that takes into consideration not only shareholders but also a large group of 
stakeholders (Solomon, 2007). In addition, it emphasises the role of corporate 
governance as a key element in establishing and monitoring corporate objectives and 
performance (Mallin, 2006). The main reason that the OECD provides a wider definition 
of corporate governance is to facilitate the adoption o f its principles by diverse corporate 
governance systems around the world (Solomon and Solomon, 2004).
Corporate governance is a key factor in improving economic efficiency and growth. It 
m ain ta in s investors’ confidence as a key factor for companies to acquire capital at lower 
cost (OECD, 2004). Corporate governance is important to the sustainability of 
companies in the long term (Mallin 2006). Effective corporate governance practices may 
increase the level o f protection to shareholders and other stakeholders’ rights, contribute 
to decrease risk to the minimum level and enhance a company’s performance and 
competitive position (Abd-Elhamed, 2003).
Financial reporting is the primary source of independently verified information to capital 
providers about managers’ performance and therefore financial reporting and corporate 
governance are necessarily connected (Sloan, 2001). La Porta et al. (1998, p.1140) 
emphasise this inevitable relationship by indicating that:
Accounting plays a potentially crucial role in corporate governance. For investors to know 
anything about the companies th y  invest in, basic accounting standards are needed to 
render company disclosures interpretable. Even more important, contracts between
managers and investors typically rely on the verifiability in court of some measures of firm s’ 
income or assets.
The effectiveness o f the governance role of accounting information depends heavily on 
the capacity o f accounting standards to provide comprehensive measures that could 
capture the topic under investigation and eliminate manipulation in financial statements 
that may take place in the absence of the standards (Benston, 1982).
Good corporate governance emphasises the importance o f risk reporting to management, 
shareholders and other stakeholders (Konishi and Ali, 2007). Better risk reporting will 
enhance management accountability, investors’ protection and ensure equal treatment of 
all investors (ICAEW, 1997). The effective employment of corporate governance will 
increase the quality of disclosure and transparency in financial reports, which in turn will 
provide more protection to shareholders and stakeholders rights. Moreover, good 
corporate governance will increase compliance with accounting standards through 
effective auditing (Al-Hezan, 2005).
2.8.2 Corporate Governance in Egypt
As a result o f increased awareness regarding the importance of corporate governance and 
the need to establish an independent body to issue an Egyptian code of corporate 
governance, the Minister of Foreign Trade issued ministerial decree No.675 of 2003 that 
established the EIoD. Then, the Minister of Investment issued ministerial decree No.40 
o f 2004 that identifies the objectives, duties and responsibilities of the EIoD as well as 
regulates the financial aspects and responsibilities of both the board of trustees and 
institute executive manager. The main objectives of the EIoD are to:
•  Enhance the performance of members and chairman of management board and 
executive managers regarding corporate governance practices.
•  Facilitate exchanging and sharing experience regarding corporate governance 
implementation and development through holding national and international 
conferences.
•  Offer advice to a company’s board of directors.
•  Carry out research and studies in corporate governance standards and 
international standards related to corporate governance (MOI, 2004).
Based on these objectives, the EIoD has two key roles, developing a code of corporate 
governance and supporting a director’s professional capabilities (ROSC, 2004). As a 
consequence o f the continuous efforts of the EIoD, the first guidance to corporate
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governance was released in October 2005. Based completely on the principles of the 
OECD, the guidance endeavours to identify essential procedures that support optimal 
equilibrium between the interests of management, shareholders and stakeholders (EIoD,
2005). The guidance provides a series of procedures that complement the articles 
included in Companies Act No. 159 of 1982, CML No. 95 of 1992 and listing and 
delisting rules o f EGX. The guidance recommends that listed companies and financial 
institutions should apply the recommendations o f this guidance. The guidance mainly 
discusses topics such as the role and responsibilities of the general assembly, board of 
directors, external auditor, internal auditing and disclosure of social policies. However, 
although the guidance emphasises the importance of social disclosure, it does not 
provide an extensive discussion of risk disclosure practices, as the principles of the 
OECD require.
A year later, the EIoD issued in October 2006 a code o f corporate governance for the 
public enterprise sector that is reviewed by the OECD and World Bank experts. The 
main objective o f the guidance is to enhance corporate governance practices of public 
sector enterprises which in turn will contribute to better economic performance and the 
success of the privatisation program (EIoD, 2006). The guidance is based entirely on the 
principles o f the OECD and is applicable to the public sector companies regardless 
whether they listed on a stock exchange or not.
2.8.3 The Assessment of Corporate Governance Practices in Egypt
The WB and the IMF have launched a program to assist its member countries in 
discovering weaknesses in their corporate governance frameworks. The program aims to 
benchmark a country’s corporate governance framework and companies’ practices 
against the corporate governance principles of the OECD (ROSC, 2001). The program 
of Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) conducted two corporate 
governance assessments of corporate governance practices in Egypt under the 
supervision o f the Ministry o f the Economy and Foreign Trade in 2001 and 2004. The 
reports indicated some weaknesses in corporate governance structure, especially the 
finanrial reporting element and made several recommendations. Although the reports 
indicated some minor enhancement in corporate governance practices between 2001 and 
2004, they diagnosed several weaknesses. The ROSC reports (2001 and 2004) reveal that:
• Board remuneration is disclosed without details while executive managers’ 
remuneration is not reported at all.
• The absence o f material risk factors disclosure in annual reports.
•  There is no adequate disclosure regarding corporate governance policies and 
structure.
•  Very few companies have effective audit committees that can supervise the audit 
process.
•  Timeliness o f financial statements remains a problematic issue.
•  Publishing a detailed board of directors’ report in the annual reports of most 
listed companies is very rare.
•  There are significant gaps between official accounting standards and actual 
practices. For example, there are several deficient disclosures such as lack of 
segment reporting, lack of related party disclosure and insufficient risk and non­
performing loan disclosures by banks.
However, the ROSC (2001 and 2004) reports provide several recommendations to 
enhance corporate governance practices in Egypt. These recommendations are:
•  There is a need to encourage more non-financial disclosure.
•  It is important to introduce a code of corporate governance best practices and 
encourage companies to report the level o f compliance with the code 
requirements.
•  Risk disclosure should be reported besides risk management practices.
•  There is urgent need to establish an independent accounting and auditing body 
with the power to regulate the profession based on a code of ethics.
In response to the ROSC recommendations, the EIoD was established. In addition, the 
CMA has put many initiatives into effect to apply a number of these suggestions. In 
August 2006, the CMA prepared a registry of auditors who are approved to  audit the 
financial statements o f listed companies and financial intermediaries companies (CMA, 
2006b). Moreover, in December 2006, the CMA issued a standard for quality control to 
be applied to audit and limited review of financial statements and all auditors listed in the 
CMA auditors’ registry should comply with that standard (CMA, 2006c). Finally, in July 
2008, the CMA established a quality control unit to monitor the performance of auditors 
who are registered in the CMA’s registers. The main objective is verifying compliance 
with relevant professional quality standards, auditing standards and professional conduct 
(CMA, 2008).
2.9 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has provided a discussion of Egyptian culture, economic development, 
accounting profession and education and corporate governance due to their significant 
impact on the accounting practices o f Egyptian companies. In addition, it discussed the 
regulatory framework and accounting standards that organise financial reporting 
practices o f Egyptian companies. The discussion attempted to discover the potential 
influences o f these regulations and standards on financial reporting practices.
Egypt is a society with distinctive cultural dimensions such as a preference for 
collectivism, high power distance, high uncertainty avoidance and low masculinity as 
compared to Anglo/American societies and hence prefers accounting values that support 
statutory control, uniformity, conservatism and secrecy. No doubt, the secretive 
accounting value has a significant impact on the risk reporting practices of Egyptian 
companies.
The review o f Companies Act, CML and listing and delisting rules o f EGX indicate 
several weaknesses in the financial reporting environment. Although there are several 
regulations organising financial reporting practices in terms o f the content and timing of 
delivery, those regulations suffer from a lack of effective application, precise and well- 
defined sanctions and effective monitoring systems. They also show confusion between 
basic concepts such as financial statements and annual reports and discouragement of 
voluntary disclosure. Moreover, legal requirements do not encourage risk reporting and 
limit the possibility o f including risk information in board of directors' reports. Therefore, 
insufficient and summarised board of directors reports are published to users of financial 
statements.
Egypt needs a professional body with the power to monitor members' performance, 
professional conduct and impose penalties. The profession law allows individuals 
without the required knowledge and experience to practice. In addition, the profession 
law does not require any examinations or continuing education to be a chartered 
accountant. There is evidence regarding the lack of auditors’ independence and there is 
an urgent need for a code o f ethics.
Accounting education in Egypt suffers from several weaknesses. It covers only basic 
topics with a focus on book-keeping and procedures-aspects, undermines the importance 
of f i n a n c i a l  reporting and fails to discuss the implementation of accounting standards.
The assessment o f corporate governance in Egypt indicates low disclosure of material 
risk factors in annual reports and a gap between official accounting standards and actual 
practice. In addition, there is a need to motivate Egyptian companies to present more 
risk and risk management disclosure.
In these circumstances, compliance with the EASs is questionable. Therefore, these 
circumstances emphasise the importance of measuring the level of compliance with the 
EASs, identifying voluntary risk reporting practices of Egyptian companies and 
identifying factors that may impede compliance with those standards. In addition, there is 
a strong need to identify the influence of corporate governance on companies* disclosure 
practices and to discuss factors that may threaten voluntary risk reporting. The next 
chapter will discuss a number of disclosure theories that assist in explaining the variation 
of risk reporting in companies* annual reports.
CHAPTER 3: DISCLOSURE THEORIES
3.1 Introduction
Accounting researchers employ a variety of disclosure theories to underpin a consistent 
and cohesive framework for examining and understanding different accounting practices 
(Deegan and Unerman, 2006). Generally, accounting literature distinguishes between two 
distinctive groups of theories, namely normative and positive theories.
Normative theories are based on the researchers values, norms, beliefs and judgement. 
The m ain purpose o f normative theories is prescription. Therefore, normative theories 
aim to prescribe Svhat should be* in a particular situation (Deegan and Unerman, 2006; 
Watts and Z im m erm an , 1986). Normative theories are value judgements, closed and 
non-empirical theories and their results are based entirely on their hypotheses (Wolk et 
al., 1992). The m ain criticism to normative theories is their limited use of observations in 
constructing theories; therefore they may depart significantly from existing accounting 
practices (Deegan and Unerman, 2006). Consequently, the results of normative theories 
may be viewed as unscientific and suspicious (Mathews and Perera, 1996).
During the 1970s, a tendency of accounting researchers to employ an empirical approach 
in accounting research flourished (Mathews and Perera, 1996). Positive theories of 
accounting aim to explain and predict accounting phenomena; therefore they attempt to 
describe Svhat is* rather than prescribing ‘what should be* (Deegan and Unerman, 2006; 
Wolk et al., 1992). The explanation focuses on providing reasons for observed 
accounting practices while prediction focuses on predicting unobserved accounting 
practices (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).
Although different theories stem from different assumptions and provide different 
insights to the same phenomena, they share considerable common attributes and 
sometimes they overlap theoretically (Solomon, 2007). It is recommended to employ 
more than one theoretical perspective in one piece of research in order to benefit from 
the integration of theories (Shnves and Linsley, 2003a) and different points of view 
provided by different theories since each theory will provide a partial view about the 
phenomena under investigation (Deegan and Unerman, 2006). Wolk et al. (1992, p.42) 
support and encourage employing more than one theoretical perspective.
The point is not that ... theory is either ■right* or 'wrong*; theories...are both partial 
descriptions of the workings and interrelationships of the firm  and its constituent
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participants. Various competing theories and viewpoints may bring important insights to 
accountants\ auditors, users and standard-setters. No individual approach should be 
deemed superior to all others, for important contributions may come from any and all 
sources.
This study aims to identify and explain the extent of risk reporting in the annual reports 
of Egyptian listed companies. In addition, the research aims to identify empirically the 
impact of competition, ownership structure, firm-specific and corporate governance 
characteristics on risk reporting practices in Egypt. Therefore, it employs a variety of 
positive theories o f accounting including agency theory (section 3.2), signalling  theory 
(section 3.3), proprietary cost perspective (section 3.4), political cost perspective (section 
3.5), stakeholder theory (section 3.6) and legitimacy theory (section 3.7) to better 
understand risk reporting practices and identify the potential determinants which may 
explain the variation in risk reporting practices in the annual reports of Egyptian 
companies. The following sections provide a presentation for these theories and section 
3.8 is a summary and conclusion.
3.2 Agency Theory
Agency theory has been employed by researchers from different disciplines including 
accounting, economics, finance, marketing, political science, organisational behaviour 
and sociology (Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theory offers the chance to examine social 
phenomena from a principal-agent point of view (Subramaniam, 2006). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976, p.308) define the agency relationship as a ‘contract under which one or 
more persons (the principals)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent\ In addition, Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.310) define the firm as a ‘nexus for 
contracting relationships*. These definitions are very important to accounting research 
since a variety o f agency contracts are established and controlled in terms of accounting 
information (Leftwich et al., 1981).
Agency theory is based on two important assumptions (Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Subramaniam, 2006; Watts, 1977):
a- Both the principal and agent are seeking to maximise their own interest, 
b- The interest o f the principal and that of the agent may diverge and the agent may 
not perform in the best interest of the principal and hence a conflict of interest 
may emerge.
Agency relationship and agency problem are inseparable and information asymmetry 
between the agent who has superior information and the principal exacerbates the 
problem (Subramaniam, 2006). The conflict of interest will cause two main problems: 
moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard occurs due to the limited ability of the 
principal to evaluate and assess directly the manager’s performance. An adverse selection 
problem occurs when the principal and the agent have different risk attitudes (Eisenhardt,
1989). An example of the adverse selection problem is where a manager may be reluctant 
to provide investors with relevant disclosure because he/she may achieve benefits from 
non-disclosure (Subramaniam, 2006).
In order to reduce agency problems, the principal and the agent may consider different 
monitoring and bonding activities and, of course, there are some costs related to those 
activities. Jensen and Meckling (1976) identify three types of agency costs that arise due 
to a lack o f interest convergence between the agent and principal. These costs are 
monitoring expenditure by the principal, bonding expenditure by the agent and residual 
loss. Kelly (1983, p. 116) highlighted monitoring and bonding expenditures. He stated:
The agent may contract to ensure that the principaTs interest will not he harmed or to 
provide for retribution i f  such harm occurs. These contracts represent bonding costs that are 
borne by the agent. Additionally, the principal may incur expenditure in attempting to 
restrict the manager’s actions. These monitoring costs are also borne by the agent. A s  thy  
reduce the pricefor the firm  ys equity.
Watts and Zimmerman (1979, p.276) explain residual loss. They indicated that:
Bondholders and shareholders anticipate the manager’s behaviour and appropriately 
discount the price of the bonds or shares ... Hence, the promoter (or manager) ... receives 
less for the shares and bonds he sells that he would i f  he could guarantee that he would 
continue to act as he did when he owned the firm  (i.e., when there were no outside 
shareholders or bondholders). This difference in the market value of the securitises is part of 
the cost o f an agency relationship, it is part of agenty costs (the residual loss), and is borne 
by the promoter (or manager).
Because agency costs are inevitable and borne by the manager, he/she is motivated to 
reduce the expected agency costs to the possible minimum level (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Therefore, managers are motivated to engage voluntarily in monitoring and 
bonding activities (Ng and Koh 1994). These activities may include bonus schemes, 
performance-based contracts, debt covenants, audit committees and increased disclosure
(Birt et al., 2006). Annual reports are one of the most important vehicles that managers 
may use to reduce agency costs via providing information to confirm their acting in the 
best interest o f shareholders (Ness and Mirza, 1991; Watts, 1977; Watson et al., 2002). 
According to Firth (1980), one o f the major purposes o f corporate annual reports is 
providing information about the company to shareholders to facilitate monitoring agency 
relationships. Moreover, in terms of agency costs, the annual report is an effective 
mechanism to mitigate agency costs (DeAngelo, 1981; Depoers, 2000). Managers are 
motivated to provide information regarding risk management to confirm their 
accountability and interest to achieve the objective of shareholder wealth maximisation 
(Linsley and Shrives, 2000; Solomon, 2007) and to reduce information asymmetry and 
investors uncertainty (Shrives and Linsley, 2003b).
Based on the argument that the amount of agency costs will vary among different firms 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), accounting researchers employ agency theory to examine 
some unexplained corporate characteristics (Fellingham and Newman, 1979). Watts and 
Zimmerman (1979, p.277) argue that:
Agenty theory predicts that accounting practices (i.e., the form, content, frequency, etc., of 
external reporting) would vary across corporations...depending on the nature and 
magnitude o f the agenry costs.
Consequendy, accounting researchers apply agency theory to underpin the stream of 
accounting research that examines the association between extent of disclosure and some 
specific-firm characteristics (Ng and Koh, 1994; Watts, 1977; Watson et al., 2002). 
Moreover, accounting researchers draw on agency theory to examine the association 
between corporate governance variables and extent of disclosure. They establish their 
analysis of this relationship on the argument of Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.308) that 
‘the issues associated with the separation of ownership and control in the modem diffuse 
ownership corporations are intimately associated with the general problem of agency’.
3.3 Signalling Theory
Signalling theory was developed to explain information asymmetry in the labour market 
and employed in a variety o f disciplines including accounting disclosure (Campbell et al., 
2001). Information asymmetry arises because one party in a market has more 
information than the other party (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Spence (1973) applies 
signalling theory to explain information asymmetry between the employer and employee 
and explains how employees with a high level of education may use this information to
signal information about their productivity to screen themselves from employees with a 
low level of education.
Scott (2003, p.422) defines a signal as ‘an action taken by a high-type manager that would 
not be rational if that manager was low type\ Signalling theory aims to explain how 
information asymmetry between different parties in the market could be eliminated by 
the more informed party signalling to the less informed party (Morris, 1987). In the 
context o f voluntary disclosure, signalling theory predicts that, in the presence of 
information asymmetry, investors may not be able to differentiate high quality companies, 
e.g. companies with high quality investment projects, from low quality companies, e.g. 
companies with low quality investment projects. Therefore, investors may withdraw from 
the capital market or offer a low, or at least average, price for any security (Scott, 2003). 
Consequently, high quality companies have a greater incentive to disclose more 
information to the capital market to distinguish themselves from low quality companies 
(Campbell et al., 2001) and receive an above the average market valuation while low 
quality companies consider signalling to the capital market very costly for them (Clarkson 
et al., 1994). This perspective is referred to as the market for lemons perspective1 
(Deegan and Unerman, 2006).
Companies with superior risk management performance have increased incentives to 
disclose risk information to gain advantages from reporting this additional information in 
terms o f share price upward adjustments (Linsley and Shrives 2000; Shrives and Linsley, 
2003b; Woods and Reber, 2003).
Although signalling and agency theory can be used to explain similar accounting practices, 
they are based on different assumptions. Agency theory draws on the assumptions of 
individual rational utility maximisation and separation of ownership and control while 
signalling theory is inspired by information asymmetry assumption. However, the two 
theories are consistent because monitoring costs and separation of ownership and 
control involve information asymmetry between managers and the capital market. 
Therefore, the two theories are not mutually exclusive and could be used together to 
bring more insights to a company’s accounting policies’ choice (Morris, 1987).
Ross (1979) argues that in a competitive market setting managers have incentives to 
reveal relevant information to the capital market because their compensation is
1 Akerlof (1970, p.489) uses the ‘Market for Lemons’ expression in the analysis o f information asymmetry 
in used cars market to distinguish good cars from bad cars (which in America are known as ‘Lemons’).
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associated with a company’s market value. Consequently, managers with good news 
information are motivated to signal this information to the market to raise equity market 
value. Even managers with no news information are motivated to disclose information in 
order to discriminate themselves from bad news companies because the capital market 
may interpret no news as bad news. This means that all managers except those with bad 
news are motivated to disclose more information to investors. Dye (1985) argues that 
managers may be reluctant to disclose bad news because investors’ knowledge regarding 
managers’ information is incomplete. Therefore, managers may withhold bad news 
because investors are uncertain about the kind of information the managers possess.
Empirical research supports the argument that companies with good news will disclose 
voluntarily this information to the market. Lev and Penman (1990) address whether 
companies that disclose earning forecasts have higher market valuation than non­
forecasting companies. The study draws on the assumption that companies with good 
news will disclose such forecasts and therefore an increase in their market value is 
expected. In contrast, companies with bad news will not disclose and therefore their 
market value is expected to decrease. Lev and Penman (1990) indicate that companies 
with good news disclose forecasts to distinguish themselves from bad news companies. 
However, empirical evidence indicated that non-disclosing companies are not penalised 
in terms o f equity market value decline. In other words, the result does not support the 
argument that the stock prices of non-disclosing companies in the same industry are 
negatively influenced by non-disclosure.
Contrary to Ross (1979) and Lev and Penman (1990), Skinner (1994, p.39) argues that 
managers may voluntarily disclose bad news for two reasons:
First, stockholders may sue when there are large stock price declines on earnings 
announcement days, since stockholders can allege that managers failed to disclose adverse 
earning news promptly ... Second, managers may incur reputational costs i f  th y  fa il to 
disclose bad news in a timely manner... For example, mony managers may choose not to 
hold the stock of firms whose managers have a reputation for withholding bad news and 
analysts may choose not to follow these firms* stocks.
In summary, the main contribution of signalling theory is its argument that managers of 
high quality companies have greater incentives to comply with accounting standards or 
provide voluntarily more information in order to screen themselves from other 
companies (Morris, 1987) because failure to do so will negatively impact their
compensation (Deegan and Unerman, 2006). Finally, since companies differ in quality 
these incentives should be greater in large firms (Morris, 1987).
3.4 Proprietary Cost Perspective
Several accounting researchers aim to model the impact of competition on management 
incentives to reveal voluntary disclosures (Clinch and Verrecchia, 1997). This stream of 
accounting research utilises a broad definition o f disclosure cost. Cost of disclosure is 
non-zero and comprises two basic components, proprietary and non-proprietary cost 
(Campbell et al., 2001). Non-proprietary cost includes the cost of collecting, processing, 
retrieving and disseminating information. Proprietary cost is ‘the cost associated with 
disclosing information which may be proprietary in nature and therefore potentially 
damaging’ (Verrecchia 1983, p. 181). For instance, disclosing high profit or demand may 
assist the company in receiving a favourable response from the capital market but at the 
same time may harm the company through exposure to increased competition (Gigler, 
1994). Therefore, proprietary cost refers to the loss of earnings as a result of increased 
competition (Wagenhofer, 1990).
The main problem is a company may wish to disclose proprietary information to assist 
the capital market in assessing a company’s share price more precisely but at the same 
time disclosing such information may provide valuable strategic information to 
competitors (Darrough and Stoughton, 1990). Therefore, the company has to trade-off 
the positive and negative impacts of disclosing proprietary information (Darrough, 1993) 
and hence it is expected that no firm will completely disclose its private information 
(Gigler, 1994).
Proprietary cost is very important in explaining why managers may withhold information. 
Verrecchia (1983) argues that when managers withhold private information, in the 
presence o f proprietary cost, the capital market is uncertain about the reason behind this 
action. Consequently, the capital market may interpret information withholding as bad 
news or as good news but not good enough to justify disclosure.
Verrecchia (1983) argues that competition has a negative impact on voluntary disclosure. 
He states that ‘firms in highly competitive industries may regard public disclosure of any 
kind as potentially cosdy in the assistance it renders competitors. Firms in less 
competitive industries may see no cost associated with making public disclosures’ 
(Verrecchia 1983, p. 191). Wagenhofer (1990) argues that a company decision to disclose 
private information is a trade-off between disclosing favourable and unfavourable news.
On the one hand, a company seeks to avoid proprietary cost through preventing 
potential competitors from taking adverse action. Therefore, the company has the 
incentive to disclose unfavourable information to the product market. On the other hand, 
a company seeks to maximise shareholders’ wealth by reporting favourable information 
to the capital market. In contrast to Verrecchia (1983), Wagenhofer (1990) argues that 
proprietary cost is not only a result o f disclosing proprietary information but also it could 
be a result o f nondisclosure. A company may face proprietary cost even in the case of 
nondisclosure due to adverse actions by competitors based on the information conveyed 
by non-disclosure. Wagenhofer (1990) concludes that voluntary disclosure is a multi­
dimensions decision which is influenced by competition, risk o f adverse actions by 
potential competitors and the nature of private information.
In line with Wagenhofer (1990), Darrough and Stoughton (1990) argue that the nature of 
private information impacts voluntary disclosure. A company will use favourable and 
unfavourable information in different ways to gain benefits from the capital market and 
deter the entrance of potential competitors to the product market. However, contrary to 
Verrecchia (1983), Darrough and Stoughton (1990) conclude that competition pressure 
through hazard of entry encourages voluntary disclosure because low entry barriers will 
lead to higher entry probability and therefore full disclosure will be a consequence under 
a high competition environment.
Feltham and Xie (1992) indicate that managers in their decision to disclose or withhold 
private information are more concerned about the response of both capital and product 
markets to their decisions. Managers wish to report favourable news to the capital market 
to obtain funds on favourable terms while they disclose bad news to the product market 
to reduce competition. Therefore, full disclosure takes place if one of the markets is the 
main concern o f the managers or if the response of one market is more important than 
that o f the other market. Finally, partial disclosure exists when managers have relatively 
equivalent concern about the response of the two markets.
Darrough (1993) argues that the decision to provide voluntary disclosure depends on the 
nature of the competition in product markets and the nature of private information. He 
argues that disclosing private information to competitors is not always harmful, in terms 
of reducing prospective profits. In some circumstances, companies may benefit from 
sharing information to coordinate actions to their mutual advantage.
In summary, proprietary cost perspective predicts that firms with good news will 
voluntarily disclose more information if the perceived benefits from disclosure are 
greater than disclosure costs (Clarkson et al., 1994). The main contribution of proprietary 
cost perspective is including both the benefits and costs related to information disclosure 
in the analysis o f disclosure practices (Prencipe, 2004) and providing a wide range of 
interpretation of managers’ decisions to withhold information (Craswell and Taylor, 
1992).
3.5 Political Cost Perspective
Firms are subject to scrutiny by a variety of political groups including government, 
labour unions, consumer groups and environmental lobby groups (Deegan and Unerman, 
2006). The political sector has the authority, power and incentives to lobby for wealth 
transfer between various groups including the corporate sector which may experience 
wealth relocation in favour of other parties in society (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; 
Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1979). Political intervention may take several forms including 
more social responsibility and regulation, higher corporate tax rates (Hagerman and 
Zmijewski, 1979), antitrust investigations, union demands, price controls (Kelly, 1983) 
and in extreme cases it can take forms such as nationalisation and expropriation (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1978).
Political cost perspective derives its importance from its role in facilitating the inclusion 
o f political aspects in accounting research. Political process theories acknowledge the role 
of accounting information in the political process (Inchausti, 1997; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). For instance, companies with high profits could be subject to 
political costs if their profitability draws the attention of political parties and the media. 
Therefore, government may impose additional taxes or more regulation on these 
companies (Scott, 2003).
Companies’ annual reports have a significant role in the political process. The political 
sector may use annual reports for close examination of politically visible firms. 
Consequendy, firms could use their annual reports to reduce the risk of adverse political 
interference and related costs (Kelly, 1983; Holthausen and Leftwich, 1981).
The exposures to political scrutiny, pressure and potential wealth transfer motivate 
managers to adopt accounting policies that decrease reported earnings and consequendy 
reduce wealth transfers (Deegan and Unerman, 2006; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) highlight the possibility of reducing political costs and
highlight implicitly the potential role of accounting disclosure as one of the tactics that a 
company could use to mitigate political costs.
Based on this analysis, Belkaoui and Karpik (1989) argue that firms with high political 
visibility tend to use more voluntary disclosure than firms with low political visibility. In 
a similar manner, companies with high political sensitivity are motivated to disclose risk 
information to diminish governmental intervention and regulation. The obvious reason 
for this behaviour is reducing detailed and more cosdy requirements imposed by 
regulations and accounting standards (Linsley and Shrives, 2000). Accounting researchers 
employ several measures as proxies for political costs including firm size and industry 
membership (Kelly, 1983; Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1979).
Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) argue that political costs are a function of firm size. 
This means that large companies are scrutinised more closely than smaller companies 
because smaller companies are less politically sensitive and thereby are less likely to be 
subject to political wealth transfer and adverse governmental actions (Kelly, 1983; Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1986). Watts and Zimmerman (1986) acknowledge the importance of 
industry membership as a proxy for political costs because certain industries are more 
politically sensitive than others. They based their argument on the U.S. government 
reaction to the oil and gas companies in the 1970s.
Zimmerman (1983) supports the use of firm size as a proxy for political costs. He finds a 
significant relationship between effective tax rates (as a proxy for political costs) and firm 
size after controlling for industry. Moreover, he finds that the strongest association 
between those two variables is in the oil and gas industry.
Empirical research supports the use of accounting disclosure in managing potential 
regulatory costs. Blacconiere and Patten (1994) and Patten and Nance (1998) indicate 
that chemicals and oil and gas companies provide more voluntary (environmental) 
disclosure in their annual reports to confirm their ability to manage exposure to future 
regulatory costs. They propose a negative relationship between investors’ perception 
regarding the potential effect of regulatory costs and the existence of voluntary 
disclosure.
3.6 Stakeholder Theory
In 1963, the term ‘stakeholder’ was used for the first time in management research by the 
Stanford Research Institute (Freeman, 1983). Stakeholders are ‘those groups and 
individuals that can affect, or are affected by, the accomplishment of organisational
purpose. Each of these groups plays a vital role in the success of the business enterprise 
in today’s environment’ (Freeman 1984, p.25). Stakeholder groups include employees, 
suppliers, competitors, stock markets, industry bodies, communities, society and 
government agencies and may extend to include future generations (Gray et al., 1996; 
Solomon, 2007). According to stakeholder theory, a firm could be viewed as ‘a nexus of 
cooperative and competitive interests possessing intrinsic value’ (Shankman, 1999, p.322). 
Stakeholders can be classified as primary or secondary stakeholders. A primary 
stakeholder group has an essential role for corporate survival while a secondary 
stakeholder group is a group that is not involved with the company in any transactions 
but still influences or is influenced by a company’s strategies (Clarkson, 1995). In 
addition, Damall et al. (2009) classify stakeholder groups into internal (located within the 
corporation) and external (located outside the corporation) groups.
Stakeholder theory aims to explain organisation policy towards a variety of stakeholders 
(Nasi et al., 1997). Stakeholder theory seeks to explain the potential influence of 
stakeholders’ expectations on corporate strategies and how a company can manage these 
expectations (Deegan and Unerman, 2006). Stakeholder theory is based on the 
assumption that a company will respond to the expectations and demands of stakeholder 
groups (Deegan and Blomquist, 2006). Also, it highlights the potential influence of 
stakeholders on corporate operations and disclosure policies (Deegan and Unerman,
2006).
Stakeholder theory supports the importance of corporate governance structures which 
ensure that the management regard the interests of a wide range of stakeholders not only 
the interest o f stockholders (Alam, 2006). Roberts (1992) argues that companies may 
employ disclosures for managing stakeholder relationships and building up their 
reputation for being socially responsible. Moreover, stakeholder theory acknowledges the 
importance o f information in facilitating an organisation’s accountability regarding its 
strategies that may influence stakeholders’ interest and highlights the need for a 
conceptual framework of financial reporting that considers the information needs of a 
variety o f user groups not only investors needs (O’Dwyer, 2005). In the same vein, 
Solomon (2007, p.23) states:
A. basis for stakeholder theory is that companies are so large and their impact on society so 
pervasive that th y  should discharge an accountability to many more sectors of society than 
solely their shareholders.
According to stakeholder theory, a company should provide a wide range of information, 
e.g. financial, social and environmental, to meet the expectations of different stakeholder 
groups (Alam, 2006). Gray et al. (1996, p.46) state:
Information ... is a major element that can be employed by the organisation to manage (or 
manipulate) the stakeholder in order to gain their support and approval, or to distract their 
opposition and disapproval
Therefore, companies are motivated to disclose different types of information, e.g. risk 
and risk management related information, in order to confirm that they act according to 
stakeholders’ expectations (Deegan and Unerman, 2006). Based on this analysis, 
managers are motivated to report risk and risk management disclosure in order to 
establish and maintain adequate relationships with stockholders as well as other 
stakeholder groups and to avoid stakeholders’ scepticism about a firm’s prospective 
performance (Iatridis, 2008). Consequendy, disclosing risk-related information may 
support a company’s reputation for being more responsible than other companies that 
do not disclose such information. For example, a company may include environmental 
risk information in its annual report to satisfy the information needs of environment 
lobby groups and avoid more regulations (Woods and Reber, 2003).
Stakeholder theory assumes that stakeholder groups do not all have the same amount of 
power. Stakeholders’ power is a function of the extent to which the company depend on 
stakeholder groups and their ability to get access to the political process and the media 
(Nasi et al., 1997). Consequently, a company is keen to satisfy the demands of more 
powerful stakeholder groups, those groups which control the essential resources of a 
corporation (Roberts, 1992; Ullmann, 1985). Therefore, in order to achieve its strategic 
objectives, a company needs to prioritise its stakeholders and to balance stakeholders’ 
demands (Alam, 2006).
Although stakeholder and agency theory are based on different assumptions regarding 
human behaviour, motivation and the level of analysis (Shankman 1999) they could be 
viewed as c o m patible theories (Solomon, 2007). Hill and Jones (1992, p. 134) confirm 
this point of view, they state:
Nevertheless, there is a parallel between the general class o f stakeholder-agent relationships 
and the principal-agent relationships articulated by ageny theory. Both stakeholder-agent 
and principal-agent relationships involve an implicit or explicit contract, the purpose of 
which is to try and reconcile divergent interests.
3.7 Legitimacy Theory
Although it is very difficult to establish a definition for the notion o f a social contract, 
researchers employ it to construct a series of societal expectations regarding how 
companies should perform their functions (Deegan and Unerman, 2006). Shocker and 
Sethi (1974, p.67) provide an explanation of the notion of a social contract:
A ny social institution - and business is no exception - operates in society via a social 
contract, expressed or implied, whereby its survival and growth are based on:
1) The delivery of some socially desirable ends to society in general, and
2) The distribution of economic, social, or political benefits to groups from 
which it derives its power.
In a dynamic society, neither the sources of institutional power nor the needs for its services 
are permanent. Therefore, an institution must constantly meet the twin tests of legitimay 
and relevance by demonstrating that society requires its services and that the groups 
benefitingfirom its rewards have society*s approval.
Accordingly, the notion of social contract governs and organises the mutual relationship 
between society as a provider of economic resources on one side and the corporate 
sector as a provider o f commodities and services on the other. In addition, it emphasises 
that a company should legitimate its operations.
Lindblom (1994, p.2 cited in Deegan and Unerman 2006, p.271) defines legitimacy as:
A  condition or status which exists when an entity*s value system is congruent with the 
value system of the larger social system of which the entity is a part. When a disparity, 
actual or potential, exists between the two value systems, there is a threat to the entity*s 
legitimacy.
In addition, Suchman (1995, p.574) defines legitimacy as:
A  generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, 
or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and 
definitions.
These two definitions acknowledge the importance o f society’s perception in determining 
the extent to which a company meets society’s expectations (Nasi et al., 1997). 
Legitimacy theory acknowledges the influential role o f the media in shaping public 
opinion, orientation and perception (Deegan, 2006). The media can aggravate and guide 
public pressure on companies to provide more disclosures (Aerts and Cormier, 2009).
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Moreover, the two definitions recognise a company as a social actor which seeks to be 
perceived conducting its operations in accordance with society’s norms, values and 
boundaries (Deegan and Unerman, 2006; Gray et al., 1996; Sethi, 1978); therefore its 
activities are legitimate and it can continue to exist (Deegan, 2006). Legitimacy theory 
hypothesised that ‘the greater the likelihood of adverse shifts in the social perceptions of 
how an organisation is acting, the greater the desirability on the part of the organisation 
to attempt to manage these shifts in social perceptions’ (O’Donovan, 2002. p.345).
The breach o f the social contract between a company and society and the failure to meet 
society’s expectations may threaten the existence of a company (Deegan, 2006). A society 
may place different restrictions on this company (Deegan and Unerman, 2006). These 
restrictions may take the form of demand reduction by customers, supply reduction by 
suppliers, difficulties in recruiting employees and difficulties in attracting financial 
resources (Deegan, 2002; Neu et al., 1998).
Deegan (2007) argues that legitimacy is a dynamic process because society’s expectations 
may vary from time to time and from one society to another at the same point of time. 
Therefore, a company should adapt to changes in society’s expectations. This dynamic 
nature of legitimacy may result in a ‘legitimacy gap’ between a company and society due 
to the potential change in society’s expectations and business strategies (Sethi, 1978; 
O ’Donovan, 2002).
In order to reduce this legitimacy gap, Lindblom (1994) (cited in Deegan and Unerman, 
2006, p.274; Deegan, 2006, p. 173) suggests four tactics a company could employ to gain 
or m aintain its legitimacy. These tactics refer to strategies that a company may use to:
• Educate and inform its ‘relevant publics’ about (actual) changes in the 
organisation’s performance and activities which bring the activities and 
performance more into line with society’s values and expectations;
•  Change the perception of ‘relevant publics’ regarding an organisation’s 
performance and activities - but not change the organisation’s actual 
behaviour (while using disclosures in corporate reports to falsely indicate 
that the performance and activities have changed);
•  Manipulate perceptions by deflecting attention from the issue o f concern 
onto other related issues through an appeal to, for example, emotive 
symbols, thus seeking to demonstrate how the organisation has fulfilled 
social expectations in other areas of its activities; or
• Change external expectations of its performance, possibly by 
demonstrating that specific social expectations are unreasonable.
Legitimacy theory has been employed to explain the use of a variety of corporate 
strategies including voluntary disclosure in companies’ annual reports (Deegan 2006). 
Deegan (2002), O ’Donovan (2002) and Deegan and Unerman (2006) acknowledge the 
important role o f accounting disclosure in implementing the tactics suggested by 
Lindblom (1994) because legitimacy theory draws heavily on society’s perceptions 
regarding a company’s operations and therefore accounting disclosure has an influential 
role in shaping this perception.
Shrives and Linsley (2003b) argue that companies running more risky operations might 
use disclosure to support their legitimacy by reporting more risk-related information to 
highlight how effectively they manage these risks. Similarly, Linsley and Kajiiter (2008) 
indicate that companies may use disclosure to explain risk exposure and how it has been 
addressed to restore their reputation and legitimacy. Deegan and Unerman (2006) argue 
that companies become more concerned about reputation risk management because the 
failure to operate in line with society’s expectations will damage a company’s reputation 
which is an important determinant of a company’s prospective value. Therefore, 
managers are motivated to provide risk and risk management information in the annual 
reports in order to gain or maintain the reputation that they meet society’s values, norms 
and expectations and thereby support prospective profits. Moreover, companies are 
more motivated to comply with mandatory disclosure requirements in order to confirm 
their acceptance and adherence to social norms and values and to obtain social 
legitimacy.
Finally, it is important to consider the overlap between stakeholder theory and legitimacy 
theory and the confusion between political cost perspective and legitimacy theory. On 
the one hand, Gray et al. (1995a) contend that the accounting literature tends to deal 
with stakeholder and legitimacy theory as competing theories while they stem from the 
same assumptions. Deegan and Blomquist (2006) highlight the contrast between and the 
basic features of the two theories. Deegan and Blomquist (2006, pp.349-350) state:
Whilst legtimay theory discusses the expectations of society in general.. .stakeholder theory 
provides a more refined resolution by referring to particular groups within society 
(stakeholder groups). 'Essentially, stakeholder theory accepts that because different 
stakeholder groups will have different views about how an organisation should conduct its
operation, there will be various social contracts “negotiated” with different stakeholder 
groups, rather than one contract with society in general. Whilst implied within legitimacy 
theoiy, stakeholder theoiy explicitly refers to issues of stakeholder power, and how a 
stakeholder's relative power impacts their ability to “coerce” the organisation into 
complying with the stakeholder's expectations.
Briefly, stakeholder theory examines the impact of stakeholder groups on management 
strategies including disclosure (Roberts, 1992) while legitimacy theory discusses the 
tactics that a manager may use to gain or maintain a company’s legitimacy (O’Donovan, 
2002).
On the other hand, Milne (2002) argues that accounting literature seems to be confused 
between political cost perspective and legitimacy theory and sometimes employs political 
costs in such a broad manner that it blurs with other disclosure theories. Deegan and 
Unerman (2006) contend that legitimacy theory is distinct from political cost perspective 
in three aspects. First, legitimacy theory draws on the notion of social contract. Second, 
legitimacy theory is not based on wealth maximisation and individual self-interest 
assumptions. Third, legitimacy theory does not assume any hypotheses regarding market 
efficiency.
3.8 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has presented a number of accounting theories that are widely used by 
researchers to explain and predict accounting practices including financial reporting 
practices. Accounting researchers have used them to explain managers’ incentives to 
disclose information in corporate annual reports or to explain why managers may 
withhold information. These theories include agency theory, signalling theory, 
proprietary cost perspective, political cost perspective, stakeholder theory and legitimacy 
theory. The main reason to employ these theories is to better understand the risk 
reporting practices of Egyptian listed companies and identify the potential determinants 
of these practices.
Agency theory suggests that managers seek to reduce agency problems through increased 
disclosure to confirm that they work in the best interests of the shareholders. Signalling 
theory argues that, due to information asymmetry, managers of high quality companies 
are willing to disclose more information to distinguish themselves from other companies. 
Proprietary cost perspective examines the impact of competition on accounting 
disclosure and explains why managers may refrain from disclosing information in annual
reports. Proprietary cost perspective argues that managers may be reluctant to provide 
more disclosure if this disclosure may damage companies’ competitive advantages.
Political cost perspective examines the impact of political pressures on accounting 
practices. It argues that companies with high political visibility disclose more information 
than companies with low political visibility in order to reduce any potential political 
interference. Stakeholder theory identifies the relationship between the company and a 
wide range o f stakeholders and explains companies’ incentives to provide a variety of 
information to satisfy stakeholders’ demand for information. Finally, Legitimacy theory 
is based on the notion of a social contract between the company and society. Legitimacy 
theory highlights the importance of disclosure in corporate annual reports in maintaining 
and restoring companies’ legitimacy.
A number o f empirical studies that used these theories to explain disclosure practices 
and their determinants will be discussed in the next chapter. In addition, the 
development o f research hypotheses will be based on these theories to examine the 
associations between competition, corporate-specific characteristics, corporate 
governance, ownership structure and risk reporting practices in Egyptian companies’ 
annual reports.
CHAPTER 4: LITERATURE REVIEW
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter introduced a number of disclosure theories that have been used by 
accounting research to explain the variation of disclosure extent in companies’ annual 
reports. Based on these theories, this chapter reviews a number of disclosure studies 
closely related to risk reporting in order to identify corporate-specific characteristics, 
corporate governance and ownership structure that may influence the extent of risk 
reporting in companies’ annual reports. In addition, this chapter aims to identify 
measurement instruments used to quantify the amount/level of disclosure and statistical 
analysis approaches used in data analysis. Moreover, this chapter reviews a number of 
studies that highlight the impact of accounting education and practice problems on 
disclosure in corporate annual reports.
Section 4.2 discusses risk definition and the benefits of risk reporting. Section 4.3 
discusses the determinants o f segmental reporting and the cost of segment disclosure. 
Section 4.4 presents corporate governance mechanisms as determinants of disclosure 
studies while section 4.5 addresses the determinants of risk reporting. Disclosure studies 
in Egypt are presented in section 4.6. Section 4.7 highlights accounting education and 
practice problems that may influence accounting disclosure. Section 4.8 is a summary and 
conclusion.
Since the seminal work of Cerf (1961), accounting researchers have aimed to explore and 
investigate firm-specific characteristics that may explain variation in disclosure 
quantity/quality in corporate annual reports. These characteristics, called the 
determinants of disclosure, include firm size, listing status, leverage, profitability and 
auditor type (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999).
Accounting researchers have employed different theoretical perspectives to explain and 
predict the relationship between disclosure quantity/quality and firm-specific 
characteristics. These include agency theory (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Owusu- 
Ansah, 1998), political cost (Ahmed and Nicholas, 1994; Dumontier and Raffoumier, 
1998), proprietary cost perspective (Craswell and Taylor, 1992; Depoers, 2000; Gelb, 
2000; Prencipe, 2004), signalling theory (Inchausti, 1997; Meek et al., 1995), legitimacy 
theory (Herrmann and Thomas, 1996; McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993) and 
stakeholder theory (Linsley et al., 2006).
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There is a tendency for voluntary disclosure studies to focus mainly on developed 
countries (Cooke, 1989a; Cooke, 1989b; Cooke, 1991; Cooke, 1992; Cooke, 1993; 
Hossain et al., 1995; Raffoumier, 1995; Depoers, 2000) while little is known regarding 
developing countries (Alsaeed, 2006; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Hossain et al., 1994). 
In contrast, mandatory disclosure studies have paid more attention to developing 
countries (Ahmed, 1996; Ahmed, 2006; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Ali et al., 2004; Craig and 
Diga, 1998; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Patton and Zelenka, 1997) and little attention has been 
paid to developed countries (Inchausti, 1997; Malone et al., 1993; Owusu-Ansah, 2005; 
Wallace et al., 1994). This may be because compliance with mandatory requirements is a 
major concern for developing countries. A variation between companies, especially in 
developing countries, regarding their compliance with mandatory requirements is 
expected because there are incentives for non-compliance such as lack of effective 
enforcement mechanisms and a weak accounting profession (Ahmed and Nicholas, 
1994) and hence, under these circumstances, mandatory disclosure tends to be voluntary 
in nature (Marston and Shnves, 1996). A few disclosure studies have investigated 
disclosure determinants in the Middle East in general (Alsaeed, 2006; Al-Shammari et al., 
2008) and Egypt in particular (Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; Hassan et al., 2006; 
Samaha and Stapleton, 2008).
Disclosure is an abstract concept and therefore its measurement is not a straightforward 
process (Malone et al., 1993; Wallace, 1987). Accounting researchers have sought to 
construct a measurement instrument to quantify this abstract concept. Generally, 
accounting researchers can choose between a disclosure index and thematic content 
analysis (Beattie et al., 2004). Therefore, measurement validity and reliability have become 
critical issues to disclosure studies regardless o f the measurement instrument used 
(Marston and Shrives 1991). A disclosure index can be used to measure the extent of 
disclosure in a certain context (Coy et al., 1993). A disclosure index is employed to 
measure the level o f mandatory, voluntary and aggregate (both mandatory and voluntary) 
disclosure in annual reports based on research objectives (Marston and Shrives, 1991). In 
measuring the extent of disclosure, accounting researchers use different scoring schemes; 
namely dichotomous scoring (Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; Cooke, 1989a; Owusu- 
Ansah, 1998; Samaha and Stapleton, 2008) or ordering scheme (Buzby, 1974b; Copeland 
and Fredericks, 1968; Robins and Austin, 1986). Moreover, researchers may select 
between a weighted and an unweighted disclosure index. A weighted index refers to an 
index which assigns a higher importance to certain information items than others based
on the perception of user groups such as investors regarding their relative importance. In 
contrast, an unweighted index assigns equal importance to each information item. Both 
weighted and unweighted disclosure indices have their opponents and proponents 
(Akhtaruddin, 2005; Chavent et al., 2006; Owusu-Ansah, 2000). A number of studies use 
both o f them and find non significant differences in the results (Adhikari and Tondkar, 
1992; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987).
Content analysis is a systematic method that seeks to provide a valid and reliable 
quantitative presentation o f specific communication content (Berelson, 1952; Riffe et al.,
2005). Content analysis has been used extensively by social and environmental disclosure 
studies (Gray et al., 1995b; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Milne and Adler, 1999; Tsang, 
1998; Unerman, 2000) and recendy by risk reporting studies (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; 
Linsley and Shrives, 2005 and 2006; Shrives and Linsley, 2003b; Woods and Reber, 2003) 
due to its assistance in identifying the basic characteristics of reported information. 
Content analysis assists researchers to reduce a large amount of coding units to a 
manageable few sets of themes or categories (Boyatzis, 1998; Neuendorf, 2002; Weber,
1990).
From a statistical point of view, disclosure studies tend to employ different statistical 
techniques to investigate the relationship between the extent o f disclosure and its 
determinants. Researchers may employ bivariate analysis (Cooke, 1993; Konishi and Ali, 
2007; Marston and Robson, 1997; Salamon and Dhaliwal, 1980; Samaha and Stapleton, 
2008; Tai et al., 1990) and/or multivariate analysis (Alsaeed, 2006; Cooke, 1991; Depoers, 
2004; Meek et al., 1995; Prencipe, 2004). Univariate analysis includes the Chi-square test, 
the t-test, the Mann-Whitney U test and the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test. Multivariate 
analysis includes the use of regression analysis to investigate simultaneously the impact of 
firm-specific characteristics on disclosure extents. Researchers use different approaches 
of regression. For example, Alsaeed (2006), Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) and Owusu- 
Ansah (1998) use ordinary least square (OLS) regression while Kelly (1994), Dumontier 
and Raffoumier (1998), El-Gazzar et al. (1999), Leuz (2004) and Brit et al. (2006) employ 
logit/probit regression. Selection between different regression approaches is influenced 
by the nature o f disclosure extent (dependent variable) measurement. Several disclosure 
studies tend to transform dependent variable (extent of disclosure) and/or independent 
variables (determinants) to ranks (Ali et al., 2004; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Wallace and 
Naser, 1995) or to normal scores (Cooke, 1998; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Haniffa
and Cooke, 2002) before applying OLS regression to consider the nature of the 
dependent variable and to reduce any potential statistical problems.
4.2 Risk Definition and Benefits of Risk Reporting
This section discusses risk definition and the benefits of risk reporting.
4.2.1 Risk Definition
It is useful to define the term ‘Risk* before providing any further discussion of empirical 
research regarding risk reporting. Schrand and Elliott (1998) argue that defining risk is a 
complicated task for many reasons. First, different users have different perspectives 
regarding different types of risk. For example, some users may focus on liquidity risk 
while others may focus on market risk. In addition, different users may have different 
preferences regarding risk time scale. For example, some users may focus on short-term 
liquidity risk while others consider long-term liquidity risk as more crucial. Second, a 
difficulty in defining risk may arise because risk type may influence management 
capability to control it.
The most important question regarding risk definition is whether it is a one-sided or two- 
sided concept (Schrand and Elliott, 1998). A one-sided definition of risk takes into 
consideration only the exposure to loss; risk is defined as the probability of loss 
(Horcher, 2005). A two-sided risk definition is compatible with finance discipline’s 
definition which considers risk as the variability of outcomes around the expected return. 
This means that this definition accepts both positive and negative outcomes (Shrives and 
Linsley 2003a). A two-sided concept of risk is supported by the result of a case analysis 
undertaken by the American Accounting Association (AAA) and the FASB reported at 
the 1997 annual conference: Risk and Financial Reporting. The participants pointed out 
that risk definition should be a two-sided concept which includes the potential for gain 
and the exposure to loss (Schrand and Elliott, 1998).
Accounting standards such as IAS 32 and EAS 25 provide a definition for four categories 
o f financial risks (see Table4.1). The main theme of these risk categories emphasises 
financial risks and ignores non-financial risks.
T a b le  4.1: F in an cia l R isk  C ategories
Risk
Category Risk D efinition
Market risk
A- Currency risk: the risk that the value o f  a financial instrument will fluctuate 
because o f  changes in foreign exchange rates.
B- Fair value interest rate risk: the risk that the value o f  a financial instrument will 
fluctuate because o f  changes in market interest rate.
C- Price risk: the risk that the value o f financial instrument will fluctuate due to 
changes in market price, whether those changes are caused by factors specific to 
the individual instrument or its issuer or factors affecting all instruments traded 
in the market.
Credit risk The nsk that one party to a financial instrument will fail to discharge an obligation and cause the other party’ to incur a financial loss.
Liquidity risk
The risk that an entity will face difficulty in raising funds to meet commitments associated 
with financial instruments. Also, liquidity risk may result from an inability to sell a 
financial asset quickly at close to its fair value.
Cash flow  
interest rate 
risk
The risk that future cash flow o f a financial instrument will fluctuate due to changes in 
market interest rates. In the case o f a floating rate debt instrument, for example, such 
fluctuations result in a change in the effective interest rate o f  the financial instrument, 
usually without a corresponding change in its fair value.
However, other professional bodies provide a broader risk definition that includes both 
financial and non-financial risks. For example, ICAEW (1997) adopted the definition o f  
risk as ‘uncertainty as to the amount o f  benefits. The term includes both potential for
gain and exposure to loss’. 'This definition emphasises that business risks lead to 
uncertainty' about benefits that companies may achieve when performing their goals, 
targets and strategies. Consequendy, inappropriate risk reporting may contribute to 
investors’ misperception about the certainty o f  prospective cash flows (ICAEW, 1997). 
'This definition takes a balanced view and emphasises the potential for upside and 
downside risk as well. Moreover, this definition successfully recognises that risks might 
occur as a result o f  internal and external factors and might be featured as financial and 
non-financial risks.
Based on this point o f  view, Linsley and Shrives (2006, p.388) provide a broad definition 
o f risk reporting. Disclosures are considered as being:
risk disclosures if  the reader is informed of any opportunity or prospect, or of any hazard, 
danger, harm, threat or exposure, that has already impacted upon the company or may 
impact upon the company in the future or of the management of any such opportunity, 
prospect, hazard, harm, threat or exposure.
This definition is a two-sided definition that includes both risk opportunity and exposure. 
Moreover, this definition has important consequences in the statistical analysis o f risk 
reporting. Based on this definition, risk disclosures could be classified into various 
categories according to economic consequences (bad, neutral and good news risks), time
orientation (past versus future risks) and risk quantification (quantitative versus 
qualitative risks). This definition of risk reporting is adopted through this study.
4.2.2 Benefits of Risk Reporting
It is evident that providing risk information will contribute to achieving numerous 
benefits to preparers and users of annual reports. For example:
• Providing information about management’s risk strategy and tolerance may assist 
users in evaluating a company’s financial position and performance as well as 
identifying the sustainability and fluctuation of earning and cash flows (CICA,
2006).
•  The existence o f an enhanced risk management process is an underlying 
prerequisite to achieve improved risk reporting. Companies which acknowledge 
the importance o f risk reporting are most likely to successfully develop and 
improve their risk management strategies and this may result in maximising 
shareholder value (ICAEW, 1997).
•  Providing high quality risk information may lead to a code of best practice of risk 
management policies and standardised risk measurement which in turn may result 
in an enhancement in companies’ awareness concerning risk management and 
measurement practices (CICA, 2006).
•  The underlying objective of financial reporting is providing useful information 
that assists users of financial reports in making economic decisions through 
reporting information about the amount, timing and uncertainty of prospective 
cash flows. Reporting forward-looking information about key factors that may 
impact prospective performance, cash flow and financial position is important to 
investors and financial markets (ICAEW, 1997).
•  Risk reporting contributes to promoting accountability by permitting 
management to disclose useful information about their efforts to discharge their 
responsibilities as well as supporting investor protection through helping 
investors to confirm or amend their view about a company’s risk profiles 
(ICAEW, 1997).
Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that improved share liquidity and lower cost of capital are 
the main benefits of increased disclosure. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) indicate 
analytically that increased disclosure to reduce information asymmetry will increase the 
liquidity of shares and hence a company could reduce its cost of capital through
attracting large positions from institutional investors. Reduced information asymmetry 
has a significant role in decreasing the cost of capital and security prices volatility 
(Kothari, 2001). Providing high quality risk disclosure may lead to a decrease in the cost 
of capital, suitable risk premium and effective resource allocation (CICA, 2006). A 
company’s risk profile and uncertainty related to prospective cash flows are underlying 
factors in determining a company’s cost of capital. Creditors request a high risk premium 
for lending to risky companies. Consequently, adequate risk reporting may contribute to 
more effective resource allocation and providing capital at the lowest cost (ICAEW 
1997). Several empirical studies provide support for this point of view.
In respect of liquidity, Welker (1995) examines empirically the association between 
analysts’ ratings o f a firm’s disclosure as a measure of disclosure and bid-ask spreads as a 
measure o f liquidity. The result indicates a significant negative association between the 
two measures. This means that companies with high disclosure ratings have a small bid- 
ask spread and hence their shares are more liquid. In the same vein, Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000) examine the association between disclosure and liquidity in Germany. The results 
indicate that German firms that apply the IASs or US GAAP, and hence provide higher 
disclosure, have lower bid-ask spreads and higher share turnover than firms that apply 
German GAAP only.
With respect to the cost o f capital, Botosan (1997) examines the association between the 
level of voluntary disclosure and the cost of equity capital. The results indicate that, for 
companies with low analyst following, there is a significant negative association between 
the extent of voluntary disclosure and the cost o f equity capital even after controlling for 
company size and market beta. In the same vein, Sengupta (1998) tests the association 
between corporate disclosure quality and cost of debt. The result indicates a significant 
negative association between disclosure quality and cost o f debt. Moreover, Hail (2002) 
and Botosan and Plumlee (2002) find a similar conclusion.
4.3 Segment Reporting Studies
Segment reporting refers to the split o f a company into its major segments and provides 
information about each. The importance of segment reporting stems from the distinctive 
features o f different countries and industries in terms of profitability, growth 
opportunities, degree and type of risks, rates of return on investments and capital 
requirements (Roberts et al., 2005). Based on the information regarding line of business 
and geographic segments, the past performance and future prospects of a company can
be better understood (Roberts, 2002). Gray and Roberts (1989) indicate that the benefits 
of voluntary disclosure include more informed investment decisions, more accurate risk 
assessment and more accurate earning forecasts. In addition, providing information about 
segments* earning, risks, and growth opportunities can protect these companies from 
over or under reactions from stockholders. Moreover, providing segmental reporting will 
assist financial analysts and creditors as well as investors in the decision making process 
(Herrmann and Thomas, 1996).
4.3.1 Costs of Segment Reporting
Roberts and Gray (1995) identify two major costs of segmental reporting, namely the 
cost of collecting, processing and disseminating information (non-proprietary costs) and 
competitive disadvantage as a result o f reporting segment information (proprietary costs). 
With respect to the first group of costs, Edwards and Smith (1996) argue that cost of 
collecting and processing information is not a significant deterrent to segment reporting 
because accounting information systems in most companies already produce such 
disaggregated information. Moreover, a large number of managers indicate that 
information systems in their companies did not need significant enhancement to produce 
segment information. This result confirms Gray and Roberts* (1989) findings that cost of 
data collection and processing seems to be important but not significant enough to limit 
voluntary segment disclosure.
With respect to the second group of costs, Leuz (2004) argues that segmental reporting is 
a highly sensitive topic because it reveals strategic information regarding business and 
geographic segments. Gray and Roberts (1989) believe that segment reporting is more 
sensitive to the cost o f competitive disadvantage as a major obstacle to disclosure. 
Edwards and Smith (1996) confirm this point of view. They indicate that competitive 
disadvantage is a m ain reason for non-disclosure of segment information. Several 
empirical researchers support this argument. For instance, Leu2 (2004), Brit et al. (2006) 
and Nicholas and Street (2007) indicate that competition is a key determinant of segment 
reporting.
4.3.2 Determinants of Mandatory Segment Reporting
A number o f research papers that discuss the determinants of mandatory segment 
reporting will be presented in this subsection.
Prather-Kinsey and Meek (2004) identify disclosure practices and the degree of 
compliance with segment reporting under the requirements of IAS 14 for a sample of
international companies that claimed the adoption of IASs during the period 1997-1999. 
In addition, the study aims to relate the level of compliance with segment reporting to 
firm-specific characteristics, namely company size, country of domicile, industry type, 
international listing and auditor type. The study uses a sample of 133 companies in 1997, 
146 companies in 1998 and 134 companies in 1999 covering 22 countries and 6 
industries. The analysis indicates that the adoption of IAS 14 results in a significant 
increase in the number of lines of business and geographic segments disclosed. The study 
documents a low level of compliance with primary and secondary segments disclosure 
requirements. Moreover, regression analysis for the primary segment indicates significant 
positive relationships between level of compliance, country of domicile (being located in 
Switzerland), international listing status and auditor type (being audited by one of the 
Big-5 auditors). In contrast, regression analysis for the secondary segment indicates 
positive relationships between level of compliance with segment reporting and company 
size, industry type and auditor type (being audited by one o f the Big-5 auditors).
Focusing on the Middle East, Al-Omari et al. (2007) examine the level of compliance 
with segment disclosure and its determinants in the annual reports of Jordanian 
companies. To measure the level of segment disclosure, they construct a disclosure index 
that consists o f 21 items which are derived from IAS 14 and the Jordanian Securities 
Commission requirements. The sample consists of 67 industrial companies listed on the 
Amman stock exchange in 2002. The results show a very low average compliance with 
the segment disclosure requirement of 15%. The results indicate positive relationships 
between firm size, governmental ownership and the level of mandatory segment 
reporting. However, the result supports non-significant associations between leverage, 
assets-in-place, earnings volatility and the extent of segment disclosure.
Nicholas and Street (2007) investigate the impact of competition on the decision of 
segment reporting according to the requirements of IAS 14. Moreover, the study 
controls for company size and country of domicile. The study examines the annual 
reports o f a global sample o f 160 companies that are domiciled in 15 countries during the 
period 1999-2002. Logistic regression indicates a significant association between 
competition and the disclosure of business segment reporting. In addition, the result 
shows a positive association between firm size and disclosure of business segment 
reporting. Finally, the result indicates a negative association between disclosure of 
business segment reporting and being domiciled in China and France in 2001-2002 and 
1999-2000 respectively.
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Recently, Wan-Hussin (2009) investigates the determinants of the decision to adopt 
mandatory segment reporting by Malaysian companies. The study examines the impact of 
family member representation on the board of directors and board characteristics on the 
adoption o f segment reporting. In addition, the study controls for firm size, leverage, 
institutional ownership, profitability, board size and ethnicity o f the chief executive 
officer (CEO). The study examines the annual reports for the years 2001 and 2002 of 64 
companies spanning 8 industrial sectors. Binomial and multinomial regression indicates 
positive relationships between the representation of family member on the board, 
percentage o f affiliated directors and the adoption of mandatory segment reporting. 
However, the results do not support any significant association between the other 
determinants and the adoption of mandatory segment reporting.
This review indicates that litde attention has been given to the determinant of mandatory 
segment reporting in general and in the Middle East in particular. This study will attempt 
to fill this gap through addressing the determinants of mandatory segment reporting in 
one o f the Middle East countries, Egypt.
4.3.3 Determinants of Voluntary Segment Reporting
Several accounting studies aim to explain the variation in voluntary segment reporting in 
corporate annual reports. The main focus is voluntary segment reporting in developed 
countries, especially Australia. However, little is known regarding voluntary segment 
reporting in developing countries such as Egypt.
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) examine economic incentives for voluntary segment 
reporting in Australia. Based on proprietary cost perspective, agency theory and political 
cost perspective, the study tests the impact of diversification, ownership diffusion, level 
o f minority interest, company size, industry membership and financial leverage on the 
decision of voluntary segment reporting. The study measures company size through 
three proxies: total assets, number of shareholders and number of subsidiaries and 
measures diversification through a dummy variable that takes the value one when the 
company is diversified on unrelated markets and technology and the value zero when the 
company is diversified on related industries. The study surveys the annual reports of 65 
diversified companies listed on the Australian stock exchange for the year ending during 
1984. The probit regression result documents a significant association between 
ownership diffusion, being oil, gas and mining companies, level of minority interest, 
company size and voluntary segment reporting. However, there is no evidence for a
significant association between type of diversification, financial leverage and the decision 
of voluntary segment reporting.
Kelly (1994) provides additional empirical evidence about the association between the 
decision of voluntary segment reporting and certain firm characteristics. Based on agency 
theory and proprietary cost perspective, the study examines the influence of return on 
investment, financial leverage and some control variables such as industry membership, 
firm size and auditor identity on segment reporting decisions. The study reviews the 
annual reports o f 132 multi segment companies listed on the Australian stock exchange 
in the year 1984. Applying binary probit regression, the result indicates that there is a 
significant negative association between return on investment and the decision of 
voluntary segment reporting. This means that companies with high return on investment 
are reluctant to provide segment reporting in order to reduce proprietary cost 
accompanied by segment disclosure such as competition disadvantage or attracting new 
competitors to the market. In addition, there is a significant influence of industry 
membership on the decision of voluntary segment disclosure. Companies operating in 
the field o f building contractors and supplies and industrial and diversified resources tend 
to voluntarily disclose segment information. However, the decision of voluntary segment 
reporting is not significandy related to leverage, company size, auditor identity and other 
industry membership.
Mitchell et al. (1995) examine the differences in segment reporting practices in Australia. 
The study investigates economic incentives for the decision of voluntary segment 
reporting. Consequendy, the study tests the influence of company size, leverage, assets- 
in-place, earning volatility, ownership diffusion, minority interest, listing on foreign stock 
exchanges, diversification and industry type on voluntary segment reporting. The study 
reviews annual reports o f 129 diversified companies listed on the Australian stock 
exchange for the year 1983. The sample includes 43 companies that disclose segment 
information and 86 companies that did not. The logit regression indicates positive 
associations between company size as measured by total assets, number of shareholders 
and number o f subsidiaries, leverage, industry membership and the voluntary adoption of 
segment reporting. In other words, companies which are large, highly leveraged and 
involved in oil and mining activity tend to provide voluntary segment reporting. 
However, there are non-significant associations between assets-in-place, earnings 
volatility, ownership diffusion, minority interest, listing on foreign stock exchange, 
diversification and voluntary segment reporting.
Herrmann and Thomas (1996) aim to identify segment disclosure practices of companies 
in the European Union and to examine factors which may explain variation in the quality 
of segment reporting. The study examines the influence of country, firm size, industry 
type and multiple listing status. The study analyses the annual reports of 223 companies 
from 10 countries for the year 1992-1993. The study documents that ‘country* variable 
has a significant influence on line of business and geographical segment reporting. France 
and the UK provide the highest amount of business and geographical segment 
information compared to other countries. In addition, there is a significant positive 
relationship between company size and the quality of segment reporting. In other words, 
large firms tend to disclose higher quality segment reporting than small firms. Multiple 
listing status has a significant positive influence only on the quality of geographical 
segment reporting but does not have any significant influence on business segment 
reporting. However, there is a non-significant influence for the ‘industry’ variable on the 
quality o f business and geographical segment reporting. This study can be criticised on 
the ground that it does not determine the basis used to classify industries according to 
competition and political risk. Moreover, the study does not mention the basis used to 
classify countries according to the proprietary nature of segment reporting.
Following the study o f McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993), Aitken et al. (1997) examine 
the influence o f the same variables on voluntary segment reporting decisions. The main 
differences between the two studies are the measurement of diversification and sample 
size. McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) measure diversification using a dummy variable 
while Aitken et aL (1997) build a continuous variable which captures the degree of 
diversification through measuring the correlation among the earning of the firm’s 
segments. In respect of sample size, McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) use a sample that 
consists o f 65 companies while Aitken et al. (1997) filter the sample by excluding one 
segment companies and hence the sample is limited to 26 companies only. Statistical 
analysis indicates a significant association between minority interest, company size and 
the voluntary segment reporting decision while the influence of ownership diffusion and 
industry is mixed. Also, there is no evidence for a significant influence for financial 
leverage on segment reporting. Finally, diversification has a significant association with 
voluntary segment reporting decisions. Therefore, firms which diversify into unrelated 
industries tend to adopt segment reporting voluntarily. This implies that the proxy of 
diversification on the basis of the correlation among segments earnings enhances the
measurement of diversification compared to the proxy of diversification of McKinnon 
and Dalimunthe (1993).
Focusing on the Italian context, Prencipe (2004) examines the determinants of the extent 
of segment reporting for a sample of 64 non-financial companies listed on the Milan 
stock exchange in 1997. Specifically, the main contribution of the study is its attempt to 
investigate the influence of three new determinants which are derived from the 
theoretical framework of proprietary cost perspective. These determinants are the 
correspondence between segments and legally identifiable sub-groups of companies, 
listing status age and growth rate of total assets. Also, the study examines the effect of 
company size, ownership diffusion, leverage and profitability on the extent of segment 
reporting. These variables are derived from the theoretical framework of agency theory. 
The result indicates significant positive relationships between the correspondence 
between segments and legally identifiable sub-groups of companies, listing status age and 
the extent o f segment reporting. This result supports the relevance o f proprietary cost 
perspective to segment reporting and assists in explaining companies’ incentive to 
withhold segmental disclosure. However, there is a non-significant relationship between 
the growth rate o f total assets and the extent of segment reporting. In respect of agency 
theory variables, there are positive relationships between company size, leverage, 
ownership diffusion and the extent of segment reporting while there is no evidence of a 
significant association between profitability and the extent of segment disclosure. 
However, the study limits the analysis to line of business segments only. Furthermore, it 
supports the argument that there is a non-significant difference between the weighted 
and unweighted disclosure index since the two indices reveal similar results.
Focusing on Germany, Leuz (2004) examines the impact of competition as a potential 
determinant of voluntary disclosure on segment disclosure in annual reports of German 
companies for the year 1996. The sample consists of 109 non-financial companies and 
the variables used as determinants of voluntary segment reporting are trading volume, 
profitability and capital intensity. Furthermore, the study controls for firm size, leverage, 
diversification, concentration of ownership and foreign business. Probit regression 
indicates that German companies with low profitability and which face high barriers to 
entry are more likely to report segment information. Moreover, the result shows that 
large firm s and less concentrated-ownership companies tend to provide voluntary 
segment information. However, the result indicates non-significant associations between
leverage, trading volume, diversification, foreign business and voluntary segment 
disclosure.
Brit et al. (2006), in the Australian context, investigate the impact of ownership 
concentration, competition in product markets and the interaction between ownership 
and competition on voluntary segment reporting. The study uses a sample of the top 500 
companies during the period 2001-2003 with 825 firm/year observations. The study 
proxies for ownership by the percentage of shares owned by the top 20 shareholders and 
proxies for competition in the industry by the Herfindahl index while controls for firm 
size and cross-listing. Probit regression indicates positive associations between ownership 
concentration, competition in product markets, the interaction between ownership and 
competition and voluntary segment reporting. Companies with high levels of ownership 
concentration and companies operating in a high competition industry tend to disclose 
more voluntary segment information. Moreover, the result indicates positive significant 
associations between firm size, cross-listing and voluntary segment disclosure.
4.4 Corporate Governance Studies
This section presents a discussion o f a number o f studies that aim to identify the impact 
of corporate governance and ownership characteristics on mandatory (section 4.4.1) and 
voluntary (section 4.4.2) disclosure. However, little attention has been given to the 
impact o f corporate governance and ownership characteristics on risk reporting.
4.4.1 Corporate Governance and Mandatory Disclosure
Very few studies address the impact of corporate governance mechanism on mandatory 
disclosure, namely mandatory share option disclosure. Forker (1992) examines the impact 
of corporate governance mechanism and ownership patterns on mandatory share options 
disclosure. The study employs the proportion of non-executive directors on the board, 
audit committee and role duality as proxies for corporate governance mechanism and 
employs managerial ownership as a proxy for ownership pattern. In addition, the study 
controls for the proportion o f share options held by directors, firm size and auditor type. 
The study examines financial statements of the largest 97 and the smallest 85 UK listed 
companies for the period between October 1987 and September 1988. The order probit 
regression model indicates a positive association between the proportion of options held 
by directors and mandatory share options disclosure. In addition, the result shows a 
negative association between role duality and share options disclosure. This means that 
companies with a high proportion of options held by directors and companies with
separation between the chair of the board and the CEO position tend to comply more 
with mandatory share options disclosure. Moreover, the results do not support any 
association between the other variables and mandatory disclosure of share options.
Focusing on Australia, Bassett et al. (2007) examine the association between corporate 
governance and level of mandatory employee stock option disclosures in the annual 
reports o f 283 listed companies. The study employs auditor type, proportion of non­
executive directors sitting on the audit committee, board size, proportion of non­
executive directors with no related party transactions sitting on the board and role duality 
to proxy for corporate governance mechanisms and controls for firm size and US listing. 
The result indicates a positive association between auditor type and mandatory employee 
stock option disclosures but a negative association between role duality and mandatory 
employee stock option disclosures. This means that companies audited by one of the 
Big-4 auditors and companies with separation between the chair o f the board and the 
CEO tend to comply more with mandatory employee stock option disclosures. However, 
there is no evidence for a significant association between the other variables and 
mandatory employee stock option disclosures.
4.4.2 Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure
A number o f disclosure studies address the impact of corporate governance mechanism 
on general voluntary disclosure with little attention being given to voluntary risk 
reporting.
Ho and Wong (2001) examine the relationship between certain corporate governance 
factors and the level of discretionary disclosure provided in the annual reports of 98 
companies listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange for the year 1997. The main 
objective o f the study is to identify corporate governance mechanisms that probably 
influence firms’ disclosure behaviour. They test the impact of the proportion of 
independent non-executive directors, the existence of an audit committee, the existence 
of dominant personalities and the proportion of family members on the board on the 
level of voluntary disclosure. To measure the extent of voluntary disclosure, the study 
uses a disclosure index weighted by financial analysts’ perceptions of the importance or 
the usefulness o f certain information items. Regression analysis indicates that there is a 
significant positive relationship between the existence of an audit committee and level of 
voluntary disclosure. Also, there is a significant negative relationship between the 
proportion o f family members on the board and level of voluntary disclosure. This
means that companies that have an audit committee and a low percentage of family 
members on the board tend to release more voluntary disclosure than companies without 
an audit committee and with a high percentage of family members on the board. There 
was no evidence for a significant relationship between the percentage of independent 
non-executive directors, the existence of dominant personalities and level of voluntary 
disclosure.
Eng and Mak (2003) test the potential impact of corporate governance on the extent of 
voluntary disclosure for a sample drawn from firms listed on the Singapore stock 
exchange at the end of 1995. The main purpose of the study is to investigate the 
association between ownership structure (managerial ownership; blockholder ownership 
and existence o f government ownership), board composition (percentage of outside 
directors on the board) and level of voluntary disclosure. The study surveys the annual 
reports o f 158 companies in 9 industries. Regression analysis shows that there are 
significant negative relationships between managerial ownership, percentage of outside 
directors on the board and extent of voluntary disclosure while there is a significant 
positive association between existence of governmental ownership and extent of 
voluntary disclosure. This means that the voluntary disclosure level increased with the 
existence o f governmental ownership and decreased with higher managerial ownership 
and higher proportion of outside directors on the board. Moreover, there is a non­
significant association between blockholder ownership and extent of voluntary 
disclosure. In the same context, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) examine the relationship 
between board structure and the extent of voluntary disclosure. The study investigates 
the association between board size, the percentage of independent non-executive 
directors and the CEO duality on the extent of voluntary disclosure. The study surveys 
the annual reports o f 104 firms listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange in the year 2000. 
The regression analysis indicates that a high level of voluntary disclosure is significantly 
associated with a high percentage of independent non-executive managers on the board. 
Moreover, the analysis reveals that companies with a majority of independent directors 
on the board have a higher level of voluntary disclosure than companies with a low 
representation of independent directors on the board. Finally, there are non-significant 
associations between board size, the CEO duality and the extent of voluntary disclosure.
Focusing on developing countries, Barako et al. (2006) examine voluntary disclosure 
practices in Kenya and their association with corporate governance and ownership 
structure variables, namely proportion of independent directors on the board, the CEO
duality, audit committee, shareholder concentration, foreign ownership and institutional 
ownership. Barako et a l (2006) implement a weighted and unweighted disclosure index 
consisting o f 47 information items to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure and 
investigate the annual reports of 43 financial and non-financial companies listing on the 
Nairobi stock exchange from 1992 to 2001. Statistical analysis indicates that there is a 
significant increase in the extent of voluntary disclosure through the period under 
investigation. In addition, there are significant positive associations between having an 
audit committee, foreign ownership, institutional ownership and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. Contrary to expectation, there are significant negative associations between 
the proportion of independent directors on the board, shareholder concentration and the 
level o f voluntary disclosure. Finally, there is no support for a significant association 
between the CEO duality and level of voluntary disclosure. The main contribution of the 
study is examining voluntary disclosure practices and its determinants through 
longitudinal research which covers 10 years. However, they do not provide separately any 
descriptive statistics about the average of voluntary disclosure level for each year under 
investigation and so the development of the extent disclosure could not be clearly 
assessed.
In another developing country, Tsamenyi et al. (2007) identify disclosure practices and 
factors that probably influence the extent of voluntary disclosure in a developing country, 
Ghana. The study examines the impact of blockholding ownership and dispersion of 
shareholding on the extent of voluntary disclosure for a sample of 22 financial and non- 
financial companies listed on the Ghana stock exchange during the period 2001-2002. 
This sample forms 97.54% of the market capitalisation at the end of December 2002. 
The results are a sign o f the low level of voluntary disclosure. The extent of disclosure is 
48.23% and 52.52% for 2001 and 2002, respectively. Also, there is a significant negative 
association between the extent of voluntary disclosure and blockholding ownership. This 
means that companies with high blockholding ownership tend to provide low voluntary 
disclosure because blockholders can get more information through the influence of their 
executive and board representation. Moreover, the results indicate that there is a 
significant positive association between the extent of voluntary disclosure and dispersion 
of shareholding. However, the study uses a small sample size which may reduce the 
generalisability of the results.
Huafang and Jianguo (2007) examine the association between corporate governance and 
voluntary disclosure to identify empirically discretionary disclosure practises and its
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determinants in China. The study tests the impact of ownership structure and board 
composition on voluntary disclosure. Ownership structure is measured by blockholder 
ownership, managerial ownership, state ownership, legal-person ownership and foreign 
listing/shares ownership while board composition is measured by the proportion of 
independent directors and the CEO duality. The study surveys the annual reports of 559 
companies listed on the Shanghai stock exchange in 2002. The sample covers 11 
different industries. Descriptive statistics indicate that the extent of voluntary disclosure 
is notably low. The average disclosure level is 4.92% with a minimum of 0% and a 
maximum of 21%. In respect of ownership structure, regression analysis points out that 
the extent o f voluntary disclosure significandy increases with the increase in blockholder 
ownership and foreign listing/shares ownership. However, there are non-significant 
associations between managerial ownership, state ownership, legal-person ownership and 
the extent o f voluntary disclosure. In respect of board composition, the result indicates 
that there is a significant positive association between the proportion of independent 
directors on board and the extent of voluntary disclosure while there is a significant 
negative association between the CEO duality and the extent of voluntary disclosure.
4.5. Risk Reporting Studies
The lack of risk disclosure information in financial reports is a key element that threatens 
the relevance o f financial reports (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004). Annual reports suffer from 
inappropriate disclosure of different types of risk and forward looking information. 
Consequendy, a lot of effort should be exerted in order to address this ‘reporting gap* 
and to enhance the relevance of financial reports (Eccles et al., 2001). However, only a 
few papers examine the nature and the determinants of risk reporting. Most of these 
studies address risk reporting in developed countries such as Canada (Lajili and Zeghal,
2005), Italy (Berretta and Bozzolan, 2004) Germany (Kajiiter, 2006), Japan (Konishi and 
Ali, 2007), the UK (Abraham and Cox, 2007; Shrives and Linsley, 2003b; Linsley and 
Shrives, 2006; Woods and Reber, 2003) and the exception is Malaysia (Amran et al., 
2009) and the United Arab Emirates (Hassan, 2009). In addition, there is a tendency for 
risk reporting studies to focus on voluntary risk reporting (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004) 
and give little attention to mandatory risk reporting (Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007). In this 
section both mandatory (section 4.5.1) and voluntary (section 4.5.2) risk reporting studies 
will be presented.
4.5.1 Determinants of Mandatory Risk Reporting
Only a few studies address the determinants of mandatory risk reporting. Consequently, 
our understanding to these determinants is limited.
Kajiiter (2006) analyses the development of risk reporting practice and its determinants 
in Germany. Through a longitudinal study, Kajiiter (2006) examines the annual reports of 
80 non-financial companies listed on the DAX100-Index with 405 company-year 
observations during the period 1999-2003. Using content analysis, the result indicates 
that the total volume of risk information and risk management system information have 
increased significantly during the period 1999-2003. The bivariate analysis indicates 
significant positive associations between company size (as measured by total assets), 
ownership diffusion (as measured by the percentage of shares owned by small individual 
investors) and the total volume of risk disclosure. In addition, there is a variation in the 
total volume of risk disclosure between industry sectors. However, this variation is 
statistically non-significant. The multivariate analysis confirms positive significant 
relationships between company size, ownership structure and volume of risk reporting. 
Moreover, industry type has a significant influence on the volume of risk disclosure. 
Kajiiter (2006) provides a study of risk reporting over an extended period from 1999 
until 2003 for a large sample size. As opposed to other studies of risk reporting, this 
study examines the determinants of risk reporting by examining the ‘simultaneous 
impact* of three independent variables, company size, ownership structure and industry 
type, on the extent of risk reporting rather depending on bivariate analysis only. 
However, the study does not provide any analysis of the nature and the characteristics of 
risk reporting during the period under study and fails to give a complete picture about 
the development of risk reporting practices in Germany during 1999-2003.
Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) examine the compliance with the IASs, namely IAS 32 and 
39, and the determinants of risk disclosure practices in financial reports of Portuguese 
listed companies. The study examines associations between the level of compliance with 
IAS 32/39 and firm and corporate governance characteristics including firm size, 
economic sector, auditor type, listing status, multinationality, leverage, reliance on equity 
market, the Portuguese securities market recommendations and the proportion of 
independent directors on the board. The study employs an unweighted disclosure index 
derived from IAS 32 and IAS 39 and reviews the annual reports of 55 financial and non- 
financial companies listed on Euronext Lisbon in 2001. Descriptive statistics indicate that 
the level of compliance is 44% and ranges from 16% to 64%. Accounting policy
disclosure achieves the highest level of compliance (80%) and credit risk disclosure 
achieves the lowest level of compliance (6%). On the one hand, multivariate analysis 
indicates that there are significant positive associations between company si2e, auditor 
type and the level of compliance with IASs. On the other hand, there are negative 
associations between economic sector, listing status and the level of compliance with 
IASs. This result reveals that companies which are large, audited by one of the Big-4, 
involved in the non-financial sector and with multiple listing status provide a higher level 
of compliance than companies which are small, non-audited by one of the Big-4, 
involved in the financial sector and listed on the domestic stock market only. However, 
there is no evidence for a significant association between multinationality, leverage, 
reliance on equity market, the Portuguese securities market recommendations, the 
proportion of independent directors and level of compliance.
Focusing on the Middle East, Hassan (2009) examines risk reporting in the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE). The study crafts a disclosure index of 45 information items to measure 
the extent of risk reporting in annual reports of Emirate companies and employs four 
firm-specific variables; namely company size, industry type, level of risk and reserves, to 
explain the variation in risk reporting practices. The sample size is limited to 41 financial 
and non-financial companies and their annual reports of 2005 have been examined. The 
result indicates a low level of risk reporting, 19.61%. The regression result indicates that 
both level of risk and industry type are main determinants of risk reporting in the UAE 
while firm size and reserves have a non-significant impact on risk reporting. Companies 
with a high risk level and financial companies provide a high level of risk reporting 
compared to companies with low risk levels and non-financial companies. The main 
drawback of this study is the limited sample size and the pooling of financial and non- 
financial companies in one sample despite the fact that they operate under different 
regulations and might face different risks.
4.5.2 Determinants of Voluntary Risk Reporting
A number of studies address the determinants of voluntary risk reporting. Most of them 
take place in developed countries while little is known about developing countries.
Woods and Reber (2003), in a pilot study, examine risk disclosure practices in the UK 
and Germany during 2000 and 2001. The study has three main objectives. First, to 
analyse and compare the extent and the nature of risk disclosure in the annual reports of 
a sample of UK and German companies. Second, to examine the impact of German
Accounting Standard 5 (GAS 5) on the extent and the nature of risk disclosure presented 
by German companies. Third, to examine risk disclosure practices across different 
industries. The sample consists of six UK companies and their German counterparts as 
matched by si2e and covers six industries, namely airways, banking, energy, financial 
services, pharmaceuticals and telecommunication. Findings indicate that the 
implementation of GAS 5 resulted in a significant increase in the extent (as classified by 
risk categories) and the nature (as classified by risk characteristics) of risk disclosure in 
the annual reports of German companies during the period 2000 and 2001. However, the 
UK companies present significant high risk disclosures in terms of the extent and the 
nature compared to German companies during the period 2000 and 2001. Moreover, 
there is a significant increase in the extent of risk disclosure across all industries during 
2000 and 2001. Also, there is a significant difference in risk disclosure by industry sector 
between UK and German companies in 2001.
This study is one of the seminal studies that explore risk reporting practices. The 
comparison between the UK and Germany is useful since each country has a different 
risk reporting approach. While the UK adopts a voluntary risk reporting approach, 
Germany adopts a mandatory one. However, the main drawback of the study is the 
small sample size and the method of applying content analysis. The study searches, using 
computer software, firstly for the word ‘risk’ and secondly identifies sentences related to 
risk reporting. Consequendy, the search may fail to identify some risk-related sentences 
just because they do not contain the word ‘risk’.
Shrives and Linsley (2003b) examine and compare risk reporting in the financial reports 
of a sample of UK and German companies for the year 2001. The study explores the 
association between the amount of risk disclosure and firm-specific attributes, namely 
company size (as measured by total assets, total sales and equity market value), book to 
market value of equity and financial leverage. The study surveys the annual reports of 11 
UK companies and their matched German counterparts. Non-parametric statistical 
analysis reveals a non-significant difference in the total amount of risk disclosure and the 
amount of risk disclosure classified by risk categories presented by German companies 
and that provided by UK companies. This result contradicts the result of Woods and 
Reber (2003) and this may be due to the sample size and different methodological 
approaches of content analysis. Bivariate non-parametric analysis indicates that there is a 
significant positive association between the total amount of risk disclosure and company 
size as measured by total sales while there are non-significant associations between the
other two measures of firm size (total assets and equity market value), book to market 
value of equity, leverage and the total amount of risk disclosure. Woods and Reber (2003) 
and Shrives and Linsley (2003b) are considered to be crucial studies in the risk reporting 
literature since each study examines risk reporting in the UK and Germany from a 
distinct point of view. Taken together, these two studies allow examination of the impact 
of GAS 5 on risk reporting through statistical comparison of the level of risk disclosure 
presented in the annual reports of German companies before and after the application of 
the German accounting standards. Also, they examine the association between the extent 
of risk disclosure and company characteristics. Moreover, they present comparative 
studies of the extent and the nature of risk disclosure between UK and Germany 
companies.
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) propose a framework for risk disclosure analysis through 
developing a disclosure index which assists in the assessment of risk disclosure quality. 
This framework of risk disclosure quality consists of four interrelated components: 
information content, the influence of risks (economic sign) on company future 
performance, type of measures (qualitative/quantitative) used to express the potential 
effects of risks and the approach of risk management. To measure these four 
components, Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) construct four different indices: quantity, 
density, depth and outlook profile of disclosure. The study surveys the MD&A section of 
85 non-financial companies listed on the Italian stock exchange in 2001. The result 
indicates that Italian companies tend to disclose more information about company 
characteristics and disclose less information about company strategy and environment. 
Moreover, Italian companies do not tend to disclose any information about the influence 
of risks on future performance. In addition, Italian companies tend to disclose more 
finan cial information compared to non-financial information. In respect of the 
associations between company size, industry type and disclosure indices, regression 
analysis indicates that company size and industry have a significant association with both 
quality and depth index while they have non-significant associations with density, oudook 
profile and the quality (total) index. Consequendy, Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) argue 
that the latter three indices can be used to rank companies according to their risk 
disclosure quality. Botosan (2004) criticises the indices proposed by Beretta and Bozzolan 
(2004) on the grounds that these indices, like previous indices found in the disclosure 
literature, merely measure the quantity not the quality of disclosure through counting 
information items.
Lajili and Zeghal (2005) investigate risk disclosure and risk management information in 
the annual reports of Canadian companies. The main objective of the study is to examine 
risk disclosure characteristics (intensity, nature, volume and location) and usefulness. The 
sample consists of 300 companies as of December 1999. In terms of disclosure intensity, 
the result indicates a disclosure rate of 76% and this means that 24% of the sample do 
not provide any information about risk management. Moreover, 23% of the disclosing 
companies provide mandatory disclosure only, 14% of the disclosing companies provide 
voluntary disclosure only while 63% of the disclosing companies provide both 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, all the companies that operate in 
department stores, financial management, food stores, hospitality, industrial contractors, 
integrated oil, mining, mining exploration, pipelines and wholesale distributions provide 
risk reporting. In contrast, companies involved in breweries and beverage and tobacco 
industries do not provide risk information at all. In terms of disclosure volume, the 
results indicate that the volume of risk disclosure in the MD&A section is greater than 
the volume of risk disclosure in the notes to financial statements section. In terms of risk 
management disclosure location, the result indicates that 85% of the sample disclose risk 
information in the MD&A section only while 82% of the sample disclose risk 
management information in the notes to financial statements section only. In addition, 
67.55% of the sample disclose risk management information in both the MD&A and 
notes to financial statements sections. Furthermore, financial risk, commodity risk and 
market risk category are the most frequently disclosed categories since 25% of the sample 
provide such disclosure. In terms of the nature of risk information, the results reveal that 
risk information disclosed by Canadian companies has a qualitative nature. Consequendy, 
the usefulness of such disclosure is limited due to ambiguities, scattering and the lack of 
quantification.
Focusing on the UK, Linsley and Shrives (2006) investigate the characteristics of risk 
disclosure presented in the annual reports of 79 non-financial companies listed within the 
FT-SE100 in the UK for the year-end date near to January 2001. The study examines the 
associations between company size, company risk levels and the extent of risk disclosure. 
The study measures company size through two proxies: turnover and equity market value 
and measures company risk level through seven different proxies: gearing ratio, asset 
cover, beta factor, ratio of book to market value, qui score, Business in the Community 
Index of Corporate Environmental Engagement (BIE Index) and Innovest Eco Value 
‘21™ Rating model. The result reveals that risk management policy and integrity risk
categories are the top of risk categories presented by UK companies. This pattern of 
disclosure reflects the impact of the Turnbull Report on financial reporting. Also, 
statistical analysis documents that the number of non-monetary, future, good risk 
disclosure sentences are significantly greater than the number of monetary, past and bad 
risk disclosure sentences, respectively. Furthermore, bivariate analysis indicates significant 
positive associations between the two measures of company size, BIE Index and ECO 
Value as measures of company risk level and the volume of financial, non-financial and 
total risk disclosure. Finally, there is no evidence for a significant association between the 
volume of risk disclosure and the other five measures of company risk level.
Focusing on the banking industry, Linsley et al. (2006) analyse the financial reports of a 
sample of UK and Canadian banks in order to examine the pattern of risk disclosure 
provided by these banks. The study aims to explore the association between amount of 
risk disclosure and bank size, profitability, level of bank risk and risk definition 
disclosure. The study reviews financial reports of 18 matched pairs banks (9 banks form 
each country matched by size) for the year-end near to December 2001. In respect of the 
pattern of risk disclosure, the result indicates that credit risk category, capital 
structure/adequacy risk category and market risk category have the highest volume of 
risk disclosures. In addition, UK and Canadian Banks tend to disclose more qualitative, 
future and neutral risk disclosures than quantitative, past and good/bad news disclosures. 
In respect of the association between the volume of risk disclosure and some bank- 
specific characteristics, statistical analysis indicates a non-significant difference between 
the volume of risk disclosure presented by UK banks and that of their Canadian 
counterparts. Furthermore, there are significant positive associations between the two 
measures of bank size (total assets and market capitalisation), the number of risk 
definitions and the volume of risk disclosure. However, there are non-significant 
associations between profitability, the level of bank risk and the volume of risk 
disclosure. Nevertheless, the study does not provide a separate analysis for each country 
instead it combines the two groups of banks into one.
Following Linsley and Shrives’ (2006) path-setting study, Konishi and Ali (2007) 
investigate risk reporting practices in Japan. The study has two objectives. The first is to 
explore the nature of risk reporting practices. The second is to explain the association 
between the volume of risk disclosure and some corporate characteristics, specifically, 
company size (turnover and total assets), profitability (return on assets and return on 
equity), the level of company risk (gearing ratio and market to book value), industry and
ownership distribution pattern. The study surveys the annual reports of 100 non-financial 
companies listed on the Tokyo Stock exchange for the year-end date near to March 2003. 
In respect of the nature of risk reporting, the result indicates that the number of non­
monetary and good risk disclosures is significantly greater than the number of monetary 
and bad/neutral risk disclosure. Also, the number of past risk disclosures significantly 
exceeds the number of future risk disclosures. In respect of the association between the 
volume of risk disclosure and corporate attributes, in line with Linsley and Shrives 
(2006), the bivariate analysis indicates significant positive associations between the two 
measures of company size and the volume of total, financial and non-financial risk 
disclosures. The result provides evidence that risk disclosures vary across different 
industries. However, there is no evidence for significant associations between 
profitability, level of company risk, ownership distribution pattern and the volume of risk 
disclosures.
Abraham and Cox (2007) examine the association between ownership structure, 
corporate governance, US listing characteristics and the quantity of risk reporting in the 
annual reports of 71 UK companies for the year 2002. The study focuses on institutional 
investors, the number of executive directors, the number of dependent non-executive 
directors, the number of independent directors and US dual listing as key determinants of 
risk reporting. Moreover, the study controls for firm size, leverage, stock return volatility 
and industry. The results support positive associations between US dual listing, the 
number of executive and independent directors, firm size, return volatility and the 
amount of risk reporting. This means that British companies with dual listing, a large 
number of executive and independent directors, high stock return volatility and a large 
size tend to present more risk disclosures. In addition, the result shows a negative 
association between institutional ownership and the quantity of risk disclosure and 
presents evidence regarding the impact of industry on risk disclosure. However, leverage 
and number of dependent non-executive directors have non-significant impacts on the 
amount of risk disclosure.
Amran et al. (2009) examine the determinants of voluntary risk management reporting in 
the annual reports of Malaysian companies. The study examines the impact of company 
diversification, firm size, leverage, and industry on risk management disclosure through 
the examination of the annual reports of 100 non-financial companies listed on the Bursa 
Malaysia for the year 2005. Using content analysis and OLS regression, the results 
indicate that large companies provide more risk management disclosure than small
companies and presents evidence regarding the impact of industry membership on risk 
management disclosure. Finally, the results do no support any impact of leverage and 
diversification on risk management disclosure.
More recently, Rajab and Handley-Schachler (2009) examine the impact of firm si2e, 
leverage, industry, and US listing on risk reporting in the UK. The study aims to assess 
risk disclosure practices in three periods 1998, 2001 and 2004 to examine the impact of 
accounting regulation recommendations on risk reporting. The study employs a sample 
that consists of 52 UK non-financial listed companies 28 of them companies with US 
listing. The result indicates that the average of risk disclosure sentences has increased 
dramatically from 50.23 sentences (1998) to 64.96 (2001) and to 93.5 (2004) across the 
period under investigation. Using bivariate analysis, the result reveals non-significant 
associations between firm size, leverage and risk disclosure. In contrast, the result 
suggests significant impacts of industry and US listing on risk reporting. Industrial 
companies and companies with US listing tend to disclose more risk information than 
non-industrial and non US listing companies.
4.6 Disclosure Studies in Egypt
Although financial reporting practices in developed countries have been extensively 
investigated by a large number of studies, there is a lack of empirical evidence about the 
association between the level of mandatory/voluntary disclosure and corporate 
characteristics in developing countries (Alsaeed, 2006; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; 
Akhtaruddin, 2005). This section presents a number of studies that address mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure in Egypt.
Abd-Elsalam. and Weetman (2003), in their exploratory study, investigate the impact of 
relative familiarity and language barriers on the level of compliance with IASs. In order 
to test this influence, they construct three disclosure indices: an index for the IAS items 
which already exist in long established company legislation (LA.S-CA), an index for IAS 
items which exist in a new capital market law (IAS-CML) and an index for IAS items 
which are not available in an approved Arabic version (IAS-NA). Moreover, the study 
aims to explain the observed level of compliance in terms of corporate-specific 
characteristics including legal form, profitability, share trading, type of business, audit 
firm, leverage and the manner of referring to international standards in audit reports. The 
study surveys the annual reports of 72 non-financial companies listed on the EGX for 
the year 1995/1996. The results document that Egyptian companies do not provide full
compliance with IASs since the overall level of compliance is 83%. However, the level of 
compliance with IAS items which already exist in company law is significantly greater 
than both the IASs items which exist in a capital market law and IASs items which are 
not available in an approved Arabic translation. In respect of the first index, regression 
analysis results indicate significant positive associations between legal form, share trading 
and the level of compliance with IAS-CA. In respect of the second index, there are 
significant positive associations between share trading, types of business, audit firm and 
the level of compliance with IAS-CML while the association with financial leverage is 
significant and negative. Finally, there are significant positive associations between legal 
form, audit firm, the manner of referring to auditing standards (only in the case of 
omitting audit firm) and the level of compliance with IAS-NA.
Dahawy et al. (2002) examine empirically the association between accounting cultural 
values and the implementation of IASs in Egypt. Based on Hofstede’s (1984) and Gray’s 
(1988) cultural and accounting values models, the study explains dominant accounting 
values in Egypt. According to these models, the dominant accounting values are secrecy 
and conservatism which are related to accounting disclosure and measurement 
respectively. The study performs an in-depth analysis for the financial statements of three 
companies which operate in the infrastructure sector for three years. Moreover, the study 
interviews the CEO and head of accounting department of each company. Financial 
statements were benchmarked against IAS 1 (presentation of financial statements), 5 
(information to be disclosed in financial statements), IAS 8 (profit or loss for the period, 
fundamental changes in accounting policies), IAS 21 (the effects of changes in foreign 
currency rates) and IAS 25 (accounting for investments) during 1995-1997. The finding 
indicates that the conflict between secrecy as an accounting value and IASs disclosure 
requirements results in a significant non-compliance and selective implementation of 
IASs. The three companies’ present a lower level of disclosure than what is required by 
IASs and their managements are selective in standards’ implementation.
Dahawy and Conover (2007) extend the study of Dahawy et al. (2002) through 
depending on a more comprehensive disclosure checklist prepared by the CMA which is 
based on IASs to measure Egyptian companies’ compliance with mandatory disclosure 
requirements. The study uses a sample of 17 companies of the most active companies in 
the EGX for the year 2004. The result indicates that Egyptian companies do not present 
a full compliance with IASs; the average compliance level is 61%  with a maximum of 
76%  and a m inim um  of 52% . Culture has been highlighted as a major reason for non­
compliance with IASs. However, the study suffers from some limitations. First, the 
sample size is rather small, it focuses only on the most active companies and it fails to 
relate the measured level of compliance to firm-specific characteristics to provide an 
explanation for variation in compliance level. Second, the study does not refer to other 
factors that may cause non-compliance and which need more investigation to identify 
their impact on compliance level.
Hassan et al. (2006) examine the determinants of mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
through using data of 77 non-financial listed companies spanning the period 1995-2002. 
The study constructs two different disclosure indices to measure the level of disclosure in 
annual reports. The first index consists of 49 disclosure items and is designed to measure 
the level of compliance with mandatory disclosure while the second index consists of 26 
disclosure items and is designed to measure the level of voluntary disclosure. Hassan et 
al. (2006) construct the two indices based on the CMA disclosure checklist and disclosure 
checklist of the Centre of International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). The 
results indicate that Egyptian companies have a high level of compliance with mandatory 
disclosure while they provide a rather low level of voluntary disclosure. The level of 
mandatory disclosure is 90% while the level of voluntary disclosure is 48%. With respect 
to the determinants of mandatory disclosure, the results indicate that Egyptian 
companies which are small in size, belong to the private sector, more profitable, with 
high leverage and are heavily traded on the stock exchange provide a higher level of 
compliance than companies which are large, belong to the public sector, less profitable, 
less leveraged and less traded. With respect to the determinants of voluntary disclosure, 
the results show that companies that are large, belong to the private sector, more 
profitable, with less leverage and are less traded companies provide a higher level of 
voluntary disclosure than companies which are small, belong to the public sector, less 
profitable, high leverage and heavily traded.
The approach used by Hassan et al. (2006) to distinguish mandatory items from 
voluntary items is a major threat to the findings. The study calculates a compliance level 
for each item of the 75 items that comprise the disclosure checklist across the sample. 
Then, by visualising the result, the study uses a disclosure level of 78% as a cut-off point 
to distinguish between mandatory and voluntary disclosure. Any items with a disclosure 
level above 78% are included in the mandatory index otherwise they are included in the 
voluntary index. This treatment explains why the compliance level is high compared to 
other studies in Egypt and voluntary disclosure extent is low. Moreover, the study uses
the CIFAR disclosure checklist which is used and developed to assess disclosure level in 
developed countries regardless of its relevance to the Egyptian context. The approach 
used by Hassan et al. (2006) may distort the findings.
Samaha and Stapleton (2008) measure the level of compliance with IASs disclosure 
requirements in the annual reports of Egyptian companies and examine the influence of 
legal status, industry sectors and trading activities on level of compliance. They check the 
financial statements of 281 listed companies for the year 2002 against a disclosure 
checklist that is based on the IASs none of which is IAS 14 or IAS 32. These accounting 
standards are classified into three groups. The first group consists of IASs that are 
covered in Egyptian regulations. The second group consists of IASs that are covered in 
Egyptian regulations but with some differences while the third group covers IASs that 
are not included in Egyptian regulations. The results indicate that Egyptian listed 
companies present a low level of compliance with IASs; the overall average level of 
compliance is 50%. Moreover, the results reveal that the compliance level with the first 
group of IASs is significantly higher than the level of compliance with the second and 
third group of IASs. The result highlights the fact that Egyptian listed companies provide 
a minor voluntary compliance with IASs that are not adopted by the EASs. Finally, 
bivariate analysis reveals that most actively traded companies provide a higher level of 
compliance with IASs than less actively traded companies while there is a non-significant 
difference in the level of compliance between private and public companies and 
manufacturing and trade/service companies.
Recently, El-Sayed and Hoque (2010) examine the impact of international environmental 
factors on voluntary disclosure practices of the top 100 non-financial companies listed on 
the EGX. The international environmental factors are the intensity of global 
competition, international socio-political institutions, international accounting standards 
and international financial institutions. These factors are measured according to a 5-point 
likert scale through a questionnaire survey send to chief financial officers of the sample 
companies to elicit their perception regarding the impact of these factors on voluntary 
disclosure while voluntary disclosure is measured according to an unweighted binary 
disclosure index. Also, the study controls for firm size, government ownership, industry 
membership and cross listing. Descriptive statics show a low level of voluntary 
disclosure. On average, the disclosure level is 55%. The result indicates a significant 
positive association between international accounting standards, international financial 
institutions and voluntary disclosure. The result reveals a significant negative association
between governmental ownership and voluntary disclosure. However, there are non­
significant association between voluntary disclosure and the other variables.
In summary, disclosure studies in Egypt highlight the secretive nature of Egyptian society 
and its potential impact on mandatory and voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 
Egyptian companies. They report low presentation of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure. However, none of these studies addresses mandatory or voluntary risk 
reporting practices, a topic that is influenced significantly by cultural dimensions. This 
study will address this gap through examining compliance with EAS 33 and 25 and 
voluntary risk reporting and their determinants in Egypt.
4.7 Accounting Education and Practice Problems in Developing Countries
Developing countries are the focus of a number of accounting research studies that 
examine accounting education and practice problems. Because of their interdependence, 
accounting education has a significant role in enhancing accounting practice through 
providing qualified and competent accounting graduates (Tipgos, 1987). In addition, 
accounting research aims to identify the potential impact of these problems on 
compliance with mandatory and presentation of voluntary disclosure requirements. 
Accounting education and practice problems are a threat to risk reporting; a topic that 
requires a very high accounting skills and knowledge.
4.7.1 Education and Practice Problems
Several accounting studies highlight the problems that have been impact on accounting 
education and practice in developing countries while other studies aim to propose several 
strategies that may assist in overcoming these problems.
In 1976, the AAA established a committee to identify accounting education and practice 
problems in developing countries in order to improve accounting in these countries. 
Based on a questionnaire survey of 62 participants from different continents, the results 
indicate 14 accounting practice problems (group 1) and 12 accounting education 
problems (group 2). The first group includes problems such as shortage of qualified 
accountants, lack of a strong professional society, lack of effective legislation, 
procedures-oriented accounting practices and tax-oriented accounting practices. The 
second group includes problems such as inadequate local accounting textbooks, 
inadequate accounting education for decision makers and managers, procedures 
approach to accounting education and poorly organised educational accounting 
programs.
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In the same vein, Enthoven (1985) identifies the basic features of accounting education 
and the profession in developing countries. He argues that professional institutions are 
seen to be very weak, ineffective and their institutional framework seems to be out-of- 
date. In addition, accounting education programs and accounting research are separated 
and are not directed to the economic objectives of developing countries. Akathapom et 
al. (1993) investigate the factors that may impede accounting education and profession 
development in Thailand. Based on a questionnaire survey of accounting educators, 
government accountants and public accountants, they identify several reasons that 
negatively impact the development of accounting education and the profession. The 
respondents recognise the irrelevance of the accounting curricula, shortage of qualified 
instructors and the lack of updated accounting textbooks as the main reasons for 
accounting education problems. In addition, the respondents point out that managers of 
Thai companies have very litde accounting knowledge and consider accounting necessary 
only for tax purposes. Furthermore, the respondents highlight the lack of punishment 
mechanism and lack of cooperation between academics and practitioners as potential 
reasons that hinder the development of accounting education, the profession and hence 
accounting practice in Thailand. Recendy, McGee (2006) has highlighted the factors that 
may hinder the adoption and implementation of IFRS in transition economies. He 
identifies four potential factors namely, low power of audit firms to force their clients to 
apply IFRS due to the fear of losing clients, bookkeeping-oriented accounting, the tax 
authority employ tax standards rather than IFRS to determine tax liability and translation 
problems because some English expressions, did not have any local counterparts.
Enthoven (1985) argues that the development of accounting practice in developing 
countries needs more attention to be paid to effective cooperation between the 
accounting profession and educational institutes in both accounting education and 
research, enhancement to accounting curricula, continuing accounting education and 
more emphasis on theoretical aspects in the accounting curricula. In the same vein, 
Tipgos (1987) proposes a number of strategies to enhance accounting education and 
practice in developing countries including maintaining professional integrity through 
monitoring certification procedures, establishing regulations for continuing education, 
providing internship programs for students and faculty members and cooperation in 
educational aspects between the profession and universities. Jensen and Arrington (1983) 
and Akathapom et al. (1993) highlight the importance of cooperation between academics 
and practitioners in accounting research. While Lin and Deng (1992) argue that the
objectives (roles) of accounting, qualitative characteristics of accounting information and 
basic elements of accounting reports should underpin a comprehensive framework for 
accounting education and practice in developing countries. Al-Basteki (2000) investigates 
external auditors, preparers of financial reports point of views regarding the strategies for 
enhancing the accounting profession and practice in Bahrain through a questionnaire 
survey. Fourteen different potential strategies were presented to the participants who 
were asked to rank their effectiveness in improving the accounting profession and 
practice. The results indicate that among the most effective strategies are continuing 
education for certified accountants, strengthening the power and responsibility of 
accountants’ societies, providing practical training to accounting students during their 
undergraduate education and establishing disciplinary measures against violators. More 
recently, McGee (2006) argues that the successful implementation of IFRS requires 
convincing practitioners and managers that the new requirements should be learned and 
applied, continuing professional education and upgrading the accounting curricula of 
universities.
The previous studies highlight the importance of continuing education, practical training 
of accounting students and cooperation between the profession and universities in 
education and research as potential strategies to overcome the problems of accounting 
education and practice in developing countries. Continuing education programs will 
assist practitioners to cope with the fast changing requirements of their duties (Tipgos, 
1987). In addition, practical training for accounting students in their undergraduate 
studies will assist them to apply accounting knowledge in real world situations (Lin and 
Deng, 1992). Furthermore, cooperation between the profession and universities will 
assist in discussing real world problems and will provide the essentials inputs to conduct 
relevant academic research (Al-Basteki, 2000; Akathapom et al., 1993).
4.7.2 Factors impeding Presentation of Mandatory and Voluntary Disclosure
Several accounting studies highlight the low level of compliance with mandatory 
disclosure (Akhtaruddin, 2005; Marston and Robson, 1997; Patton and Zelenka, 1997) 
and low presentation of voluntary disclosure (Barako et al., 2006; Ho and Wong, 2001). 
However, a few accounting researchers identify the factors that may impede compliance 
with and presentation of mandatory and voluntary disclosure. As McGee (2006, p.202) 
pointed out:
Adopting IFRS is one thing. Implementing them is something else. The mere fact that a 
government might adopt new accounting rules does not mean that they will be swiftly, 
efficiently and comprehensively applied and implemented throughout the economy.
This is the case in Egypt since the mere adoption of IFRS could not guarantee 
improvement in the quality of corporate financial reporting (ROSC, 2002). The CMA 
annual report of 2002 and the ROSC report of 2004 notice that there are gaps between 
authorised accounting standards and actual practices (CMA, 2002b; ROSC, 2004). 
However, the CMA has not put into effect any initiatives to investigate the reasons 
behind this gap. This study intends to fill this gap by exploring the potential factors that 
may lead to non-compliance with the EASs and the low presentation of voluntary 
disclosure in corporate annual report.
Based on the problems of accounting education and practice discussed in the previous 
subsection, few studies have examined their impact on accounting disclosure. Tai et al. 
(1990) investigate the reasons for non-compliance with mandatory disclosure 
requirements in Hong Kong through interviewing executive officers of five listed 
companies. The interviewees highlighted the following reasons as a cause for non- 
compliance: difficulties in interpretation of accounting and auditing standards; lack of 
sufficient accounting knowledge and financial resources to cope with changes in 
disclosure requirements, shortage of professional accounting staff; and impression 
management to improve a company’s financial position and performance appearance.
Edwards and Smith (1996) aim to investigate preparers’ perceptions regarding the costs 
related to compliance with segment reporting in UK companies. Drawn from a 
questionnaire survey and semi-structured interviews, the results indicate that competitive 
disadvantages, confidentiality and low benefits to external users are the main reasons for 
non-disclosure of segment reporting. With respect to competitive disadvantage, the result 
indicates that about 33% of the respondents consider competitive disadvantage a main 
concern. In addition, the administrative costs of collecting and processing data are not, 
generally, a reason for non-presentation of segment reporting since about 10% of the 
respondents indicate that their information systems require significant changes to be able 
to produce segment information. Recendy, Al-Mulhem (2003) has investigated the 
obstacles for non-compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements in Saudi 
companies. The study aims to identify preparers and external auditors’ perceptions for 
causes of non-compliance through a questionnaire survey. The results point to the
weakness of enforcement mechanisms and accounting education programs, the lack of 
qualified accountants, lack of awareness regarding accounting concepts and objectives of 
financial reporting, difficulties in understanding and interpreting disclosure requirements 
and lack of sufficient financial resources for accounting training as the main reasons for 
non-compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements.
4.8 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has presented a review of a number of disclosure studies that measure the 
extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure and relate disclosure extent to firm- 
specific, corporate governance and ownership characteristics. Disclosure studies 
employed different measurement instruments (disclosure index and content analysis) to 
quantify disclosure since direct measurement is difficult due to the conceptual nature of 
disclosure. In addition, disclosure studies employed different statistical approaches 
(bivariate and multivariate analysis) for statistical analysis. These varieties in measurement 
instruments, settings of the study, sample size, number of disclosure determinants and 
statistical analysis techniques have led to mixed results (Wallace et al., 1994).
Basically, this chapter reviewed three main groups of disclosure studies, namely 
segmental disclosure, corporate governance studies and risk reporting studies. Studies in 
each group have been divided into mandatory and voluntary studies and a summary is 
presented after each group of studies.
Regarding segmental disclosure studies, it is apparent that there is shortage of studies that 
address determinants of mandatory segmental disclosure in the Middle East generally and 
in Egypt in particular. Moreover, almost all the studies that address determinants of 
voluntary segment reporting take place in developed countries, especially Australia, and 
little is known about developing countries and Egypt specifically. Furthermore, empirical 
evidence highlights the impact of cost of disclosure and the competitive disadvantage of 
segmental disclosure. Prior studies indicate that there is a low level of compliance with 
mandatory segmental disclosure. The results indicate that competition, firm size, country 
of domicile and auditor type may explain variation in compliance levels. Previous studies 
highlight diversification, industry, firm size, ownership structure, leverage and 
profitability as major determinants of voluntary segment reporting.
Regarding corporate governance studies, most of these investigated the impact of 
corporate governance and ownership structure on voluntary disclosure and little is 
known about their potential impact on mandatory disclosure. In addition, most of these
studies focused on developed countries and little is known about developing countries 
such as Egypt. Prior studies employed several corporate governance variables such as 
role duality, board size, audit committee and board competition and ownership patterns 
such as governmental ownership, institutional ownership, managerial ownership and 
ownership diffusion to investigate their impact on the extent of disclosure. However, 
these studies have provided mixed results.
Regarding risk reporting studies, almost all of these studies focus on voluntary risk 
reporting and a very few on mandatory disclosure. To a great extent, the majority of 
studies focus on risk reporting practice in developed counties such as Canada, Italy, 
Germany, Japan and the UK, while risk reporting practices in developing countries have 
not been investigated extensively. None of these studies examined the impact of 
competition on risk reporting. There is a tendency in risk reporting studies to employ 
bivariate statistical analysis and therefore they lack the power and robustness provided by 
multivariate statistical analysis. Furthermore, none of these studies examines the 
association between voluntary and mandatory risk reporting or identifies the reasons for 
low compliance with and presentation of mandatory and voluntary risk reporting. Finally, 
regarding the determinants of risk reporting, empirical research has also provided mixed 
results.
As regards disclosure studies in Egypt, very few discuss mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure. They indicate a low level of compliance with the IASs and low presentation of 
voluntary disclosure is expected due to the secretive culture of Egyptian society. In 
addition, it is evident that Egyptian companies apply accounting standards in a selective 
manner. Therefore, it is important to examine compliance with accounting standards on 
an individual basis since compliance levels may differ from one standard to another. 
However, none of these studies discuses mandatory and voluntary risk reporting in the 
annual reports of Egyptian companies.
This chapter has reviewed a number of studies that identify and discuss accounting 
education and practice problems because these problems may clarify the unexplained low 
compliance with accounting standards and low presentation of voluntary disclosure 
reported by several disclosure studies. These studies underline the inadequate local 
textbooks, bookkeeping-oriented accounting education and limited emphasis on 
objectives of financial reporting as major problems of accounting education in 
developing countries. In addition, a shortage of qualified accountants, an ineffective
profession, tax-oriented accounting practices and ineffective enforcement mechanisms 
have been highlighted as major problems of accounting practice.
Based on the prior studies that discuss determinants of disclosure, the next chapter will 
develop and discuss research hypotheses regarding possible determinants of risk 
reporting practices in Egypt.
CHAPTER 5: THE DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH
HYPOTHESES
5.1 Introduction
The accounting literature that has been discussed in the previous chapter introduces a 
number of determinants that may influence companies’ disclosure practices. These 
determinants are derived from a number of disclosure theories including agency theory, 
signalling theory, political cost perspective, proprietary cost perspective, legitimacy theory 
and stakeholder theory besides empirical prior research. Based on disclosure theories and 
the findings of empirical research discussed in chapter 3 and 4 respectively, the research 
hypotheses have been constructed to explain the potential relationship between risk 
reporting practices (dependent variable) and risk reporting determinants (independent 
variables). These hypotheses will be tested empirically using multivariate statistical 
analysis in chapter 7. This study aims to examine the impact of competition, corporate 
governance (board size, role duality and auditor type), ownership structure (ownership 
concentration, governmental, managerial and institutional ownership) and company risk 
level on risk reporting. In addition, the study controls for several firm-specific 
characteristics such as firm size, profitability, liquidity and industry membership. In 
addition, it aims to test changes in compliance between 2006 and 2007. Finally, the study 
aims to examine the association between mandatory and voluntary risk reporting.
EAS 25, Financial Instruments: Presentation and Disclosure, and EAS 33, Segment 
Reporting, have been selected for this study to reflect mandatory risk reporting because 
they are the most relevant accounting standards which are closely related to risk 
reporting. They reflect different financial risks and the geographic and business segment 
risks a company may face and therefore assist users of financial statements to identify a 
company’s risk/return profile.
Section 5.2 discusses the impact of competition, corporate governance, ownership 
structure, firm characteristics and company risk level on risk reporting. Section 5.3 is 
devoted to the change of compliance between 2006 and 2007 while section 5.4 discusses 
the association between mandatory and voluntary risk reporting. Section 5.5 is a 
summary and conclusion.
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5.2 Determinants of Risk Reporting
This section aims to develop hypotheses regarding the impact of competition, corporate 
governance, ownership structure, firm-specific characteristics and company risk level on 
risk reporting based on disclosure theories and the findings of empirical results.
5.2.1 Competition
A proprietary cost perspective predicts that a firm is less motivated to provide voluntary 
disclosure of proprietary information because potential competitors may use this 
information to make a decision regarding entering its product market (Dye, 1985). 
Therefore, competition in the product market is a key determinant of disclosure policy 
(Clarkson et al., 1994) because the entry of a potential competitor to a product market 
will negatively impact the prospective cash flows of an incumbent firm (Depoers, 2000).
Accounting researchers tend to use barriers to entry as a proxy for competition (Clarkson 
et al., 1994; Depoers, 2000). The proprietary cost perspective predicts that firms 
operating with high barriers to entry tend to disclose more information than firms that 
operate with low barriers to entry because disclosure cannot be used by potential 
competitors due to the difficulty of entering the product market (Depoers, 2000; Laidroo, 
2009). Therefore, companies that are protected by high entry barriers are more likely to 
provide commercially sensitive information such as segment and risk-related information 
(Leuz, 2004).
Empirical evidence reports mixed results for the relationship between barriers to entry 
and disclosure extent. Depoers (2000) reveals a positive relationship between barriers to 
entry and voluntary disclosure. In the same vein, Clarkson et al. (1994) find a positive 
relationship between voluntary disclosure of forecast in the MD&A section of annual 
reports and barriers to entry. Companies with a high level of entry barriers are more 
likely to include forecasts in their MD&A than companies with a low level of entry 
barriers. Moreover, Leuz (2004) reports a significant positive association between barriers 
to entry and voluntary disclosure of segment information in the annual reports of 
German companies. In addition, Laidroo (2009) documents a positive relationship 
between barriers to entry and disclosure extent. In contrast, Prencipe (2004) finds a non­
significant relationship between barriers to entry and voluntary segment disclosure.
Based on the aforementioned theoretical and empirical evidence, the following 
hypotheses are to be tested:
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Hu: there is a positive relationship between barriers to entry and the level o f 
m andatory risk  disclosure o f EAS 25 in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies. 
Hlb: there is  a positive relationship between barriers to entry and the level o f 
m andatory risk  disclosure o f EAS 33 in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies. 
H 1(j  there is  a positive relationship between barriers to entry and the am ount o f  
voluntary risk  disclosure in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
As a proxy for competition, barriers to entry is measured by the amount of total fixed 
assets since this expresses the amount of investment or capital required to establish the 
production process as competitive as well-established companies in the industry 
(Depoers, 2000).
5.2.2 Corporate Governance
This subsection aims to develop hypotheses regarding the association between corporate 
governance and risk reporting practices. Corporate governance variables used in this 
study are board size, role duality and auditor type.
5.2.2.1 Board Size
Corporate governance research investigates the impact of board size as an important 
market-based factor on firm performance effectiveness due to the advantage and 
disadvantages related to it (Luo, 2005).
On the one hand, a small board suffers from a shortage of sufficient expertise and high 
agency costs as a result of the CEO dominance over the board which in turn impair a 
board’s ability to meet corporate governance responsibilities (Bassett et al., 2007; Jensen, 
1993). On the other hand, a large board enjoys wide and more diversified expertise and 
knowledge (Luo, 2005). However, large boards may suffer from dysfunctional problems 
such as lack of board involvement, ineffective discussion and coordination, untimely 
decisions and reduced individual commitments (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). Moreover, 
extremely large boards may have ineffective monitoring abilities (Cheng and Courtenay,
2006). In brief, the advantages of a large board may be outweighed by the incremental 
costs of poor communications and decision-making (John and Senbet, 1998).
A few empirical studies have examined the association between board size and voluntary 
disclosure and come to the same conclusion. Cheng and Courtenay (2006) find a non­
significant association between board size and voluntary disclosure in the annual reports 
of firms listed on the Singapore stock exchange. Bassett et al. (2007) investigate the 
association between board size and mandatory/voluntary employee stock option
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disclosure in the annual reports of Australian listed companies. The result reveals non­
significant associations between mandatory and voluntary disclosure and board size. In 
the same vein, Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) investigate the relationship between board 
size and voluntary disclosure in annual reports of Irish companies. In line with Bassett et 
al. (2007), the result indicates a non-significant association between the two variables. 
These results confirm Cheng and Courtenay’s point of view (2006, p.266) that ‘there is 
no preponderance of theory or empirical evidence to suggest a relation between board 
size and levels of voluntary disclosure, and it remains an empirical issue’. These results 
highlight the importance of conducting more research in different contexts to explore 
empirically the relationship between voluntary/mandatory disclosure and board size. 
Based on the aforementioned theoretical and empirical evidence, the following 
hypotheses are to be tested:
H^: there is a relationship between board size  and the level o f m andatory risk  
disclosure o f EAS 25 in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
Hzb: there is  a relationship between board size  and the level o f m andatory risk  
disclosure o f EAS 33 in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
H^. there is  a relationship between board size  and the am ount o f voluntary risk  
disclosure in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
In this study, board size is measured by the number of board members following 
Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008).
5.2.2.2 Role Duality
From a corporate governance perspective, the board of directors is a key structural 
mechanism in monitoring managerial behaviour and providing protection to stakeholders 
(Rechner and Dalton, 1991). Corporate governance and management literature 
distinguish between two distinctive types of leadership structure, namely dual leadership 
and unitary leadership structure (Solomon, 2007). In a dual leadership structure only one 
person holds the position of the CEO and chair of board of directors (role duality) while 
in a unitary leadership structure there is a separation between the two positions (Barako 
et al., 2006).
Based on the assumption that an executive manager is an ‘opportunistic shirker’, agency 
theory calls for the separation between the CEO and chair of the board of directors. In 
other words, agency theory supports the separation between decision management and 
decision control (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Separating the two positions supports the
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board of directors’ role in monitoring and disciplining executive managers (Barako et al., 
2006), supports the required system of checks and assessment of executive managers’ 
performance (Rechner and Dalton, 1991) and deters withholding unfavourable 
information to the capital market (Ho and Wong, 2001). Moreover, the CEO duality is a 
significant threat to monitoring quality and closely related to poor quality disclosure 
(Forker, 1992). Separating the position of the CEO and chair of board of directors will 
assist in maintaining board independence, reducing agency costs, improving performance 
and increasing board effectiveness (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008).
In contrast, based on the assumption that an executive manager is an honest steward of 
shareholders’ interests, stewardship theory supports combining the positions of the CEO 
and the chair of board of directors for many reasons. Combining the two positions will 
provide the CEO with complete power and authority over the company, his/her role will 
become clearly identified to all managerial levels and the firm can benefit from unity of 
directions which in turn improves firm effectiveness and supports shareholders’ interests 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991).
Empirical evidence presents mixed conclusions for the relationship between role duality 
and disclosure extent. Forker (1992) and Huafang and Jianguo (2007) find a negative 
association between role duality and disclosure extent while Ho and Wong (2001), 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Cheng and Courtenay (2005), Barako et al. (2006) and 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006) document a non-significant relationship between the two 
variables. Based on the aforementioned theoretical and empirical evidence, the following 
hypotheses are to be tested:
H3a: there is  a negative relationship between role duality and the level o f 
m andatory risk  disclosure o f EAS 25 in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies. 
H3b: there is a negative relationship between role duality and the level o f 
m andatory risk  disclosure ofE A S 33 in the annual reports ofE gyptian companies. 
//*.. there is a negative relationship between role duality and the am ount o f 
voluntary risk  disclosure in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
In this study, role duality is measured by a dummy variable following Forker (1992), Ho 
and Wong (2001), Cheng and Courtenay (2006) and Huafang and Jianguo (2007).
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5.2.2.3 Auditor Type
It is argued that a company’s auditor has a significant influence on disclosure policy and 
hence the disclosure extent in annual reports (Ahmed and Nicholas, 1994; Firth, 1979; 
Tai et al., 1990). Therefore, auditor selection is likely to be related to disclosure decisions 
(Craswell and Taylor, 1992).
Auditing is a key monitoring procedure that reduces agency costs (Chow, 1982; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). DeAngelo (1981) argues that audit quality - in terms of high 
probability of reporting misstatements and non-compliance with reporting requirements 
- is an increasing function of auditor size. Large audit firms are more likely to resist 
clients’ pressure than small audit firms because the former have a large number of clients 
with little relative contribution to their revenue (DeAngelo, 1981) while the latter are 
more responsive to clients’ demands due to significant dependence on their clients 
(Malone et al., 1993). Large audit firms have a well-established reputation compared to 
small audit firms (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) hence they lose more than small audit 
firms if they fail to report client misstatements or non-compliance with mandatory 
reporting requirements (DeAngelo, 1981). Therefore, companies may select large audit 
firms to legitimise their activities and confirm their compliance with societal norms and 
values. In addition, in line with agency theory, large audit firms are likely to confer more 
assurance to shareholders which in turn reduces monitoring costs (Wallace and Naser 
1995).
Consistent with signalling theory, Hossain et al. (1995) and Depoers (2000) argue that the 
selection of an external auditor could signal a firm’s value. Bar-Yosef and Livnat (1984) 
indicate that selection of big audit firms is a signal to the capital market that managers 
expect high prospective cash flows and also stockholders tend to prefer large audit firms 
because of their ability to share large losses in cases of poor performance. Moreover, 
large audit firms are more accurate in their audit reports, more experienced in collecting 
and interpreting audit evidence, have staff with relevant client-specific background and 
have more experience in auditing listed companies (Lennox, 1999).
Dumontier and Raffoumier (1998, p.225) argue that big audit firms are motivated to 
force their clients to adopt the IASs to ‘prove they are independent and thus strengthen 
their reputation’ and to maintain their ‘competitive advantage in controlling the 
application of international accounting standards because of the superior international
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training of their employees and because of the existence of economies of scale in the 
development of competence in international accounting standards’.
Wallace et al. (1994) argue that audit firms with international affiliations are likely to be 
larger and supported by the expertise of their affiliated international audit firms than 
other local audit firms. Al-Omari et al. (1999) confirm this argument by indicating that 
investors and creditors in Jordan prefer audit firms with international affiliations because 
of their expertise. Moreover, international audit firms confer more credibility on financial 
reports (Patton and Zelenka, 1997).
Empirical evidence regarding the association between auditor type (being audited by one 
of the Big-4 audit firms or being audited by audit firms with international affiliations) and 
disclosure extent is inconclusive. Ahmed (1996), Inchausti (1997), Patton and Zelenka 
(1997), Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003) and Prather-Kinsey and Meek (2004) reveal a 
significant positive relationship while Hossain et al. (1994), Kelly (1994), Wallace et al. 
(1994), Dumontier and Raffoumier (1998), Owusu-Ansah (1998) and Depoers (2000) 
document a non-significant association between auditor type and disclosure extent. More 
interestingly, Forker (1992) and Wallace and Naser (1995) find a negative relationship 
between auditor type and disclosure extent. Based on the aforementioned theoretical and 
empirical evidence, the following hypotheses are to be tested:
H4a: there is a positive relationship between auditor type (being audited by audit 
Grms with international affiliations) and the level o f mandatory risk disclosure o f 
EAS 25 in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
H4b: there is a positive relationship between auditor type (being audited by audit 
firms with international affihations) and the level o f mandatory risk disclosure o f 
EAS 33 in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
there is a relationship between auditor type (being audited by audit Grms 
with international affihations) and the amount o f voluntary risk disclosure in the 
annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
Auditor type, in this research, is presented by a dummy variable following Malone et al.
(1993), Wallace et al. (1994), Dumontier and Raffoumier (1998), Abd-Elsalam and 
Weetman (2003) and Lopes and Rodrigues (2007).
5.2.3 Ownership Structure
This subsection aims to develop hypotheses regarding the association between 
ownership structure and risk reporting. Ownership concentration, governmental
105
ownership, managerial ownership and institutional ownership will be used as 
determinants of disclosure in this research.
5.2.3.1 Ownership Concentration
In diffused ownership companies, agency theory predicts a divergence of interest 
between the agent(s) and principals) due to the separation of ownership and control and 
the emergence of agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The magnitude of 
monitoring costs, and consequendy agency costs, in a widely held company is greater 
than that of a closely held company (Eng and Mak, 2003; Leftwich et al., 1981) due to 
increased information asymmetry between shareholders and management (Prencipe,
2004). Financial disclosure in annual reports has been suggested as an effective 
mechanism that assists shareholders to better monitor management behaviour and hence 
reduces agency costs and information asymmetry (Depoers, 2000; Malone et al., 1993). 
Based on the above argument, it is expected that widely held companies are more likely 
to provide more information in their annual reports than closely held companies to 
confirm their acting in the best interests of shareholders and to meet the information 
needs of a large number of small shareholders (Craswell and Taylor, 1992; Depoers, 2000; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Wallace and Naser, 1995). 
However, Barako et al. (2006) argue that in more diffused ownership companies 
investors’ ability to monitor management behaviour is very weak due to a small 
ownership stake and therefore they may fail to force the management to provide more 
disclosure in annual reports.
In contrast, in concentrated ownership companies, large shareholders have incentives to 
collect more information, to monitor management and to exercise more significant 
control over the firm and its management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) which in turn may 
decrease the demand for information disclosure (Guan et al., 2007 ; Lakhal, 2007).
The association between compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements and 
ownership concentration is also justified in agency theory context. Small investors 
encourage compliance with the IASs because of their need for extensive disclosure in 
annual reports and the unaffordable costs in obtaining more information (Dumontier 
and Raffoumier, 1998). Consequendy, widely held companies have increased incentives 
to comply with accounting standards, as a bonding activity selected by the managers or as 
a monitoring activity enforced by investors (Dumontier and Raffoumier, 1998; Owusu- 
Ansah, 1998).
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Empirical evidence provides mixed findings regarding the relationship between 
ownership concentration and disclosure extent Huafang and Jianguo (2007) reveal a 
positive relationship while Barako et al. (2006), Guan et al. (2007), Tsamenyi et al. (2007) 
and Laidroo (2009) document a negative relationship between the two variables. Finally, 
Craswell and Taylor (1992), Eng and Mak (2003) and Gha2ali and Weetman (2006) reveal 
a non-significant relationship between ownership concentration and disclosure extent. 
Based on the aforementioned theoretical and empirical evidence, the following 
hypotheses are to be tested:
H5a: there is a negative relationship between ownership concentration and the 
level o f m andatory risk  disclosure o f EAS 25 in the annual reports o f Egyptian 
companies.
HSb: there is  a negative relationship between ownership concentration and the 
level o f m andatory risk  disclosure o f EAS 33 in the annual reports o f Egyptian 
companies.
there is  a negative relationship between ownership concentration and the 
am ount o f voluntary risk  disclosure in the annual reports ofE gyptian companies.
Following Huafang and Jianguo (2007), Guan et al. (2007) and Laidroo (2009), 
ownership concentration is measured, in this study, by the percentage of ordinary shares 
held by substantial shareholders.
5.2.3.2 Managerial Ownership
Agency theory expects a potential conflict of interest between management and 
shareholders and the emergence of agency costs as a result of the separation between 
ownership and control. Drawing on agency theory, managerial ownership has been 
suggested as a vehicle to align the interest of managers and shareholders (Gelb, 2000; 
Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Guan et al., 2007; Laidroo, 2009).
Jensen and Meckling (1976) indicate analytically that the smaller the managerial 
ownership the greater the need for monitoring activities because managers with low 
share ownership have greater incentives to consume perks and transfer wealth from 
shareholders (Chow, 1982; Gha2ali and Weetman, 2006). In contrast, the greater the 
managerial ownership the smaller the agency costs (Owusu-Ansah, 2005) because 
managers in this case bear a large proportion of their decisions consequences (Gha2ali 
and Weetman, 2006). In brief, Chow (1982, p.274) states that ‘the degree of conflicts 
between the manager and the firm’s shareholders and thus the amount of potential
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wealth transfer, increase inversely with the managers’ ownership’. This means that low 
managerial ownership fuels the need for more monitoring activities. Based on the 
aforementioned argument, it is expected that companies with low managerial ownership 
are more likely to provide more risk-related information in the annual reports than 
companies with high managerial ownership to confirm their work in the best interest of 
the stockholders.
Empirical evidence documents inconclusive results for the relationship between 
managerial ownership and disclosure extent. Consistent with the prediction of agency 
theory, Gelb (2000), Chau and Gray (2002), Eng and Mak (2003) and Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006) find a significant negative relationship between disclosure extent and 
managerial ownership. In contrast, Forker (1992), Guan et al. (2007), Huafang and 
Jianguo (2007) and Laidroo (2009) reveal a non-significant relationship between 
disclosure extent and managerial ownership. Based on the aforementioned theoretical 
and empirical evidence, the following hypotheses are to be tested:
H6a: there is  a negative relationship between m anagerial ownership and the level 
o f m andatory risk  disclosure o f EAS 25 in the annual reports o f Egyptian 
companies.
H6b: there is  a negative relationship between m anagerial ownership and the level 
o f m andatory risk  disclosure o f EAS 33 in the annual reports o f Egyptian 
companies.
there is  a negative relationship between m anagerial ownership and the 
am ount o f voluntary risk  disclosure in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
Managerial ownership, in this study, is measured by the percentage of ordinary shares 
held by management following Huafang and Jianguo (2007), Guan et al. (2007,) Donnelly 
and Mulcahy (2008) and Laidroo (2009).
5.2.3.3 Governmental Ownership
Government ownership is considered as a monitoring mechanism that might impact 
disclosure in companies’ annual reports. Accounting literature provides contradictory 
justifications for the possible relationship between governmental ownership and financial 
disclosure. Due to accountability to society, government institutions and agencies may 
force companies with governmental ownership to disclose more information (Ghazali 
and Weetman, 2006). Governmental ownership may encourage companies to provide 
more risk disclosure especially in transition economies where governments adopt a
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privatisation programme by attracting new finance from capital market or selling their 
stake in state-owned companies (Laidroo, 2009; Makhija and Patton, 2004). The conflict 
between commercial objectives of the business and the interests of the society places 
more pressure on these companies (Mak and Li, 2001) to provide more information (Eng 
and Mak, 2003).
Alternatively, government ownership my induce companies to provide less information 
because they operate under separate governmental monitoring (Ghazali and Weetman, 
2006). Moreover, these companies need low outside finance (Laidroo, 2009), have easy 
access to different sources of finance and receive less discipline from the market for 
corporate control since the government tends to be a long-term investor (Eng and Mak, 
2003).
Empirical evidence reveals inconsistent results for the relationship between 
governmental ownership and disclosure extent. While Eng and Mak (2003) document a 
positive relationship, Ghazali and Weetman (2003) and Laidroo (2009) reveal a non­
significant relationship between governmental ownership and disclosure extent. Based on 
the aforementioned theoretical and empirical evidence, the following hypotheses are to 
be tested:
H 7a: there is a relationship between governm ental ownership and the level o f 
m andatory risk  disclosure o f EAS 25 in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies. 
H 7b: there is a relationship between governm ental ownership and the level o f 
m andatory risk  disclosure o f EAS 33 in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies. 
H 7c: there is  a relationship between governm ental ownership and the amount o f 
voluntary risk  disclosure in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
Following Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Huafang and Jianguo (2007) and Laidroo (2009), 
governmental ownership is measured by the percentage of ordinary shares held by 
government.
5.2.3.4 Institutional Ownership
Institutional investors are substantial holders of equity securities and their influence on 
firms’ disclosure practices is well documented. Institutional investors are highly 
motivated to play an active role in monitoring companies’ practices including disclosure 
practices (Barako et al., 2006; Guan et al., 2007) because of their expertise and resources, 
effectiveness in performing monitoring activities and powerful use of voting rights 
(Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). Therefore, institutional investors have an implicit
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commitment to ensure that managers work to the best interests of all shareholders (Birt 
et al., 2006).
Institutional investors have greater incentives to demand more information regarding 
their investment for performance assessment and information asymmetry reduction 
purposes (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; El-Gazzar, 1998). Therefore, companies are 
motivated to disclose risk-related information in their annual reports to assist 
institutional investors in portraying companies’ risk/return profile because they may 
reduce their stake in companies with inadequate risk disclosures (Shrives and Linsley, 
2003b).
Lakhal (2007) argues that institutional investors may act as traders or owners. As traders, 
institutional investors are transient investors who have increasing incentives to demand 
more information. However, as owners, institutional investors play the role of large 
shareholders versus small investors; they monitor the company on behalf of small 
investors and hence demand less disclosure. Bushee and Noe (2000) support a positive 
association between transient institutional investors and financial disclosure. They find 
that transient institutional investors invest significantly in firms with high disclosure and 
raise their stake in response to increased disclosure.
Empirical research provides mixed results for the relationship between institutional 
investor ownership and disclosure extent. El-Gazzar (1998), Healy et al. (1999), Barako 
et al. (2006), Guan et al. (2007) and Laidroo (2009) document a positive association 
between institutional ownership and disclosure extent. This result indicates that 
institutional investors are playing an active role in demanding more information 
disclosure to monitor managers due to their significant stake of ownership and the desire 
to protect their professional reputation (Guan et al., 2007).
In contrast, Schadewitz and Blevins (1998) reveal a significant negative relationship 
between interim disclosure and institutional ownership in Finnish companies. The result 
suggests the existence of other communications channels, such as a seat on the board, to 
acquire information rather than published reports. In the same vein, Lakhal (2007) 
indicates a non-significant relationship between voluntary earnings disclosure in financial 
press release and institutional ownership in French companies. The result suggests that 
institutional investors act as owners and have the ability to obtain their information 
needs directly from the firm and hence their need for corporate disclosure is diminished. 
In addition, Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) reveal a non-significant association between
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voluntary disclosure and institutional ownership. In line with Lakhal (2007), Donnelly 
and Mulcahy (2008) argue that institutional investors are passive with respect to 
disclosure in general or they have more efficient and timely channels for extracting 
relevant information. Based on the aforementioned theoretical and empirical evidence, 
the following hypotheses are to be tested:
H8a: there is  a relationship between institutional ownership and the level o f  
m andatory risk  disclosure o f EAS 25 in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies. 
H8b: there is  a relationship between institu tional ownership and the level o f 
m andatory risk  disclosure o f EAS 33 in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies. 
H8c; there is  a relationship between institutional ownership and the am ount o f 
voluntary risk  disclosure in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
Institutional ownership, in this study, is measured by the percentage of shares held by 
institutional investors following Schadewitz and Blevins (1998), Barako et al. (2006), 
Guan et al. (2007), Lakhal (2007), Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) and Laidroo (2009).
5.2.4 Company Risk Level
This subsection develops hypotheses regarding the association between a company risk 
level and risk reporting.
5.2.4.1 Leverage
Leverage is a measure of external finance in relation to a firm’s capital. Leverage may 
impact both a firm’s motivation to disclose more information and the demand of long­
term creditors for more information (Patton and Zelenka, 1997). Leverage has been used 
by accounting researchers to investigate the influence of a firm’s capital structure on the 
choice of accounting policies (Dhaliwal, 1980). Moreover, leverage can be used as a 
proxy for risk induced by a firm’s capital structure (Beaver et al., 1970). The higher a 
firm’s debts, the greater the volatility of earnings, the greater the cash flow required to 
meet fixed interest charges and hence the greater the probability of default risk (Dhingra, 
1982).
Several studies examined the association between accounting determined risk measure, 
such as leverage, and risk determined measure, such as Beta value as a measure of 
systematic risk (Abdelghany, 2005; Dhingra, 1982; Selva, 1995). The main idea behind 
this association is ‘if an association is observed, the evidence supports the joint 
hypothesis that accounting data reflect the underlying events that determine securities 
riskiness and that such events are also reflected the market prices of securities’ (Beaver et
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al., 1970, p. 655). Beaver et al. (1970) and Dhingra (1982) report a positive association 
between leverage and market risk. Moreover, Farrelly et al. (1985) document a positive 
relationship between leverage and financial analysts’ perception of risk; therefore leverage 
can be considered as a possible measure of risk (Linsley and Shrives, 2006).
Agency theory predicts that the greater the proportion of debt in a firm’s capital 
structure the greater the incentives for wealth transfer from debtholders to stockholders 
(Myers, 1977). Stockholders are motivated to benefit on the account of debtholders by 
taking decisions such as paying large dividends, accepting risky projects or issuing more 
senior debts (Chow, 1982; Schipper, 1981). Consequently, agency theory predicts that 
agency costs are likely to be high for highly leveraged firms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Smith and Warner, 1979; Watts, 1979).
The potential conflicts between debtholders and stockholders will place highly leveraged 
firms under close monitoring by debtholders (Ahmed and Nicholas, 1994) who may 
demand more information including risk information to assist them in assessing a firm’s 
ability to discharge its obligations (Craswell and Taylor, 1992) and in determining 
whether the managers breach debt covenants (Wallace et al., 1994). Therefore, agency 
theory predicts that highly leveraged firms have greater incentives to disclose voluntarily 
more information than less leveraged firms to highlight that they are successfully 
monitoring and managing different risks (Linsley et al., 2006; Wallace et al., 1995; 
Zarzeski, 1996). In addition, highly leveraged firms are expected to comply more with the 
IASs because accounting standards facilitate the monitoring function of annual reports 
(Dumontier and Raffoumier, 1998). Disclosing more information will reduce the conflict 
between shareholders and debtholders (Depoers, 2000), agency costs and information 
asymmetry (Chavent et al., 2006; Inchausti, 1997) and facilitate monitoring activities 
(Hossain et al., 1994; Raffoumier, 1995). In contrast, Lakhal (2007) argues that firms with 
high debts are more likely to provide debtholders with more private information; hence 
there is less need for additional information in annual reports. According to stakeholder 
theory, creditors are one of the main financial stakeholders of a company (Neu et al., 
1998). Roberts (1992) argues that leverage is a proxy for creditors’ stakeholder power and 
hence companies with high leverage levels are likely to be more responsive to creditors’ 
expectations.
Empirical evidence reveals mixed results regarding the association between leverage and 
disclosure extent. Malone et al. (1993) report a positive relationship while Ahmed and
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Nicholls (1994), Wallace et al. (1994), Wallace and Naser (1995), Abd-Elsalam and 
Weetman (2003) and Alsaeed (2006) document a non-significant association. In contrast, 
El-Gazzar et al. (1999) and Guan et al. (2007) reveal a negative relationship between 
leverage and disclosure extent. Based on the aforementioned theoretical and empirical 
evidence, the following hypotheses are to be tested:
H^: there is  a positive relationship between leverage and the level o f m andatory 
risk  disclosure o f EAS 25 in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
H9b: there is a positive relationship between leverage and the level o f mandatory 
risk disclosure o f EAS 33 in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
there is  a positive relationship between leverage and the am ount o f voluntary 
risk  disclosure in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
Leverage, in this research, is measured by the percentage of total liabilities to total assets 
following Raffoumier (1995), Inchausti (1997), Patton and Zelenka (1997), Dumontier 
and Raffoumier (1998), Depoers (2000) and Prencipe (2004).
5.2.5 Firm Characteristics
This subsection develops hypotheses regarding the association between firm-specific 
characteristics as control variables and risk reporting. Firm characteristics included in the 
study are firm size, profitability, liquidity and industry membership.
5.2.5.1 Firm Size
Firm size is considered one of the most important variables that influences disclosure 
extent. Firm size could proxy for different perspectives including competitive advantages, 
information production costs, management ability and advice and political costs (Ball and 
Foster, 1982; Leftwich et al., 1981). Therefore, firm size is a comprehensive variable 
(Abd-Elsalam, 1999) which is most reported as a significant determinant of firm 
disclosure policy (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Foster, 1986). Accounting researchers have 
advanced various reasons to support a positive relationship between firm size and the 
extent of disclosure. They employed agency theory, political cost perspective, proprietary 
cost perspective, disclosure cost and other perspectives to underpin the hypothesised 
association between firm size and disclosure extent.
Agency theory predicts that agency cost is an increased function of firm size as a 
consequence of difficulties in performing monitoring activities in large firms (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). In order to minimise agency costs, managers are likely to disclose 
voluntarily more information (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987). In addition, large firms are
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more expected to comply with accounting standards’ requirements than smaller firm s in 
order to provide superior credibility to their financial reports (Dumontier and 
Raffoumier, 1998).
Moreover, large firms are more politically sensitive and hence are subject to relatively 
larger wealth transfers than smaller firms (Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1979; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). Therefore, large firms are more likely to face political interference 
(Wallace et al., 1994) and are expected to be scrutinised by several governmental agencies 
(Buzby, 1975). Consequently, in order to support their legitimacy, large firms are 
expected to disclose more information than small firms to minimise public pressures, 
government intervention (Hassan et al., 2006; Singhvi and Desai, 1971) and to improve 
their image in the public eye and their ability to gain public support (Craswell and Taylor, 
1992).
In addition, based on a disclosure cost perspective, researchers argue that collecting, 
preparing and disseminating information is a cosdy process and disclosure costs are 
relatively low for large firms (Ahmed and Nicholas, 1994; Dumontier and Raffoumier, 
1998; Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Tai et al., 1990). Large firms have the essential resources, 
expertise and skilled individuals to report more information which in turn results in less 
non-compliance with disclosure requirements (Ahmed and Nicholas, 1994; Ali et al., 
2004; Depoers, 2000). Lang and Lundholm (1993) argue that disclosure cost is a 
decreasing function of firm size as a result of a fixed component of disclosure costs. 
Finally, due to operations complexity, large firms employ effective management 
information systems that produce large volumes of information and this may reduce the 
cost of reporting information (Buzby, 1975; Cooke, 1989a).
Based on proprietary cost perspective, Craswell and Taylor (1992) argue that proprietary 
cost is likely to be inversely related to firm size. This means that large firms face less 
competitive disadvantages by reporting more information than small firms which think 
that more disclosure may threaten their competitive position (Ahmed, 1996; Buzby, 1975; 
Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Tai et al., 1990). In the same vein, disclosing more information 
assists large firms to reduce investors’ adverse reaction to information withholding 
(Inchausti, 1997; Prencipe, 2004).
Firm size could be considered a signal regarding a firm’s ability to adopt and apply 
accounting standards. Therefore, large firms are more likely to report information and to 
comply with statutory regulation than small firms. Murphy (1999, p. 127) argues that
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‘larger firms may have the financial resources required to implement a new set of 
standards. Smaller firms might find that the benefits derived from using IASC standards 
might not offset the funds required to purchase software, hire consultants or train 
personnel\
Consistent with signalling theory, Hossain et al. (1994) argue that large firms are more 
likely to report voluntarily more information than small firms because investors may 
interpret non-disclosure as bad news which in turn may negatively influence a firm’s 
value in capital markets. Schipper (1981) argues that disclosure in annual reports can 
contribute effectively to solve monitoring problems which increase with the number of 
owners. Hassan et al. (2006) contend that signalling  more disclosure to investors will 
contribute to eliminating information asymmetry between large firms and their investors. 
In addition, large firms have a wide range of stakeholders who may have a wide variety of 
information needs that a company should satisfy by disclosing more and varied 
information including risk-related information (Linsley et al., 2006).
Other reasons underpinning a positive relationship between firm size and disclosure 
extent are related to the greater dependence of large firms on the capital market to attract 
finance than smaller firms (Ali et al., 2004; Cook, 1991; Tai et al., 1990). Thereby, large 
firms have greater incentives to disclose more information and comply with mandatory 
disclosure requirement in their annual reports (Ahmed and Nicholas, 1994) to reduce the 
cost of equity and debt capital (Botosan, 1997; Sengupta, 1998). In addition, large firms 
seem to be followed by a large number of financial analysts which in turn create 
enormous demand for more information (Bhushan, 1989; Lang and Lundholm, 1996). 
Consequendy, firms can satisfy this demand by disclosing more and various information 
in their annual reports (Cooke, 1991; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Zarzeski, 1996).
Accounting researchers used different measures as proxies for firm size including total 
assets (Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; Hossain et al., 1995; Patton and Zelenka, 1997), 
sales (Depoers, 2000; Hassan et al., 2006; Inchausti, 1997; Raffoumier, 1995), market 
capitalisation (Wallace and Naser, 1995), number of shareholders (Cooke, 1989b; Cooke, 
1991) and a composite index of a number of variables using factor analysis (Cooke, 1992; 
Craig and Diga, 1998). However, there is no theoretical justification to prefer one 
measure to the others.
Empirical evidence suggests a positive relationship between firm size and disclosure 
extent (Dumontier and Raffoumier, 1998; Marston and Robson, 1997; Owusu-Ansah,
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2005; Tai et al., 1990; Wallace et al., 1994). In addition, Ahmed and Courtis (1999) in 
their meta-analysis study support a positive association between the two variables. 
However, Ahmed and Nicholls (1994), Ahmed (1996), Patton and Zelenka (1997) and 
Street and Bryant (2000) document a non-significant relationship between firm size and 
the extent of disclosure. Based on the theoretical perspectives and empirical results, the 
following hypotheses are to be tested:
H10a: there is  a positive relationship between firm  size  and the level o f m andatory 
risk  disclosure o f EAS 25 in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
H 10b: there is a positive relationship between firm  size  and the level o f mandatory 
risk  disclosure o f EAS 33 in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
H10(j  there is  a positive relationship between firm  size and the amount o f 
voluntary risk  disclosure in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
Following Meek et al. (1995), Raffoumier (1995), Inchausti (1997), Depoers (2000), 
Prather-Kinsey and Meek (2004), Prencipe (2004) and Hassan et al. (2006), firm size in 
this research is measured by net sales.
5.2.5.2 Profitability
Accounting researchers tend to employ profitability to explain cross-sectional variations 
in disclosure extent among different companies. They use different theoretical 
perspectives to underpin their argument regarding the hypothesised relationship between 
profitability and disclosure extent.
Based on signalling theory, Meek et al. (1995) argue that firms with high profitability have 
greater incentives to distinguish themselves from less profitable firms and signal their 
outstanding performance to investors. Moreover, companies with superior risk 
management performance might want to highlight the contribution of risk management 
strategies to their profitability (Linsley et al., 2006). Therefore, firms with high 
profitability will disclose voluntarily more information to the capital market than less 
profitable firms to protect the firm from undervaluation (Inchausti, 1997). In addition, 
more profitable firms tend to comply with the IASs more than less profitable firms 
because compliance signals outstanding performance especially as the IASs limit earning 
management practices (Dumontier and Raffoumier, 1998).
Agency theory predicts that managers of firms with high profitability will disclose 
voluntarily more information in order- to protect their interests (Inchausti, 1997). 
Managers of those firms have greater incentives to disclose more information to protect
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their positions and compensations, to discourage takeovers (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; 
Marston and Shrives, 1996) and to advance a positive impression of their performance 
(Alsaeed, 2006).
Moreover, consistent with political cost perspective, firms with high profitability will 
disclose more information than less profitable firms in order to explain the reasons for 
their superior performance (Inchausti, 1997). Therefore, they can avoid governmental 
intervention, such as high tax rates, and legitimise their activities by confirming their 
accordance with society’s values and norms.
In contrast to the above arguments, more profitable firms may be reluctant to disclose 
more information, such as segment information, due to the proprietary costs imposed on 
firms as a result of the attraction of new competitors (Prencipe 2004). In addition, less 
profitable firms may disclose voluntarily more information to justify their poor 
performance (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Furthermore, managers opt to report poor 
performance to reduce potential litigation and reputation costs (Skinner, 1994). The 
aforementioned theoretical arguments provide different directions regarding the 
relationship between profitability and disclosure extent. Lang and Lundholm (1993) 
argue that the direction of this relationship is ambiguous.
Empirical evidence reveals inconsistent results for the association between profitability 
and disclosure extent. For example, Patton and Zelenka (1997), Owusu-Ansah (1998), 
Ali et al. (2004) and Hassan et al. (2006) document a positive relationship. In contrast, 
Kelly (1994) documents a negative relationship while Malone et al. (1993), Wallace et al.
(1994), Raffoumier (1995), Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003) and Alsaeed (2006) report 
a non-significant relationship between the two variables. Based on the theoretical and 
empirical evidence, the following hypotheses are to be tested:
Hlla: there is a relationship between proGtabiUty and m andatory risk  disclosure o f 
EAS 25 in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
Hllb: there is a relationship between profitability and m andatory risk  disclosure o f 
EAS 33 in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
H llcj  there is a relationship between proG tability and voluntary risk  disclosure in 
the annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
In this research, profitability is measured as the percentage of net profit to total assets 
following Dumontier and Raffoumier (1998), Inchausti (1997) and Ali et al. (2004).
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5.2.5.3 Liquidity
Liquidity ratio expresses a firm’s ability to discharge short-term liabilities without the 
need to liquidate its long-term assets and hence proxies for the soundness of its financial 
position. Many parties such as investors, lenders and governmental agencies are 
concerned about whether a firm is a going concern and consider liquidity as a key factor 
in evaluating bankruptcy risk (Owusu-Ansah, 2005; Wallace and Naser, 1995). Dhingra 
(1982) highlights the importance of liquidity in achieving companies’ strategic objectives 
and the adaptability to changing circumstances and environment.
In line with signalling theory, firms with high liquidity are likely to disclose more 
information than firms with low liquidity in order to signal their superior management 
performance in risk management and the strength of their financial position to interested 
parties (Wallace et al., 1994). However, in contrast, Wallace et al. (1994) argue that firms 
with low liquidity may disclose more information to justify and explain the reasons for 
their poor performance compared to firms with high liquidity.
Empirical evidence reveals inconclusive findings for the relationship between liquidity 
and disclosure extent. Owusu-Ansah (2005) reports a positive relationship while Wallace 
and Naser (1995) and Alsaeed (2006) report a non-significant relationship. More 
interestingly, Wallace et al. (1994) document a negative relationship between liquidity and 
disclosure extent. Based on the aforementioned theoretical and empirical evidence, the 
following hypotheses are to be tested:
Hl2,: there is a relationship between liqu idity and the level o f m andatory risk  
disclosure o f EAS 25 in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
Hm; there is  a relationship between liqu idity and the level o f m andatory risk  
disclosure o f EAS 33 in the annual reports o f Egyptian com panies.
HL^  there is  a relationship between liqu idity and the am ount o f voluntary risk  
disclosure in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
Following Owusu-Ansah (1998 and 2005), in this research, the liquidity is measured as 
current assets excluding inventories/current liabilities.
5.2.5.4 Industry Membership
Industry membership is one of the variables advanced by researchers to explain cross- 
sectional variations in disclosure practices across industries. It is expected that variations 
in disclosure levels in annual reports of companies operating in different industries will
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be found (Cooke, 1992; Malone et. al., 1993). Many reasons have been advanced to 
support this hypothesis.
Industry membership is a key proxy for political costs (Ball and Foster, 1982). Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) argue that industry membership is likely to influence political 
vulnerability since certain companies, such as oil and gas companies, are more politically 
sensitive than others. Moreover, due to their strategic significance, particular industries 
are subject to scrutiny from governmental agencies, socially sensitive interest groups, the 
media and the general public (McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993; Roberts, 1992). 
Consequently, firms in these industries may provide more disclosure including risk- 
related information in their annual reports to legitimise their activities and confirm their 
compliance with societal values. Furthermore, companies in risky industries have 
incentives to reduce investors’ uncertainty regarding the timing and amount of 
prospective cash flows by disclosing more information to assist them in evaluating a 
company’s risk/return profile (Herrmann and Thomas, 1996; McKinnon and 
Dalimunthe, 1993).
A firm usually tends to adopt the same disclosure policy followed by other firms in the 
same industry because failure to do so may be interpreted by investors as a signal of bad 
news (Inchausti, 1997). In addition, Verrecchia (1983) argues that proprietary costs vary 
across different industries. Patten (1991) adds that public pressure varies across different 
industries. Therefore, the relevance of a certain set of disclosure practices is expected to 
vary between industry groups (Meek et al., 1995).
The peculiarity of each industry is another reason for differences in disclosure extent 
across industries (Wallace et al., 1994). Moreover, Cooke (1989a and 1991) refers to the 
bandwagon effect - the impact of an influential firm with a superior level of disclosure on 
other firms in the industry - as a potential reason for variation in disclosure practices 
across industries. Furthermore, technological and market constraints due to competition 
have a significant impact on a company’s risk profile and hence risk disclosure in its 
annual report (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). Finally, Owusu-Ansah (1998) argues that 
there is variation in the level of mandatory disclosure across industries because the nature 
of operations and diversity of products in certain industries may influence their ability to 
comply with mandatory disclosure requirements.
Empirical evidence regarding the association between industry membership and 
disclosure extent reveals mixed results. While Kelly (1994), Wallace and Naser (1995),
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Craig and Diga (1998), Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003) and Lopes and Rodrigues 
(2007) document a significant relationship, Tai et al. (1990), Wallace et al. (1994), 
Herrmann and Thomas (1996), Inchausti (1997) and Patton and Zelenka (1997) 
document a non-significant relationship between industry membership and disclosure 
extent. Based on the aforementioned theoretical and empirical evidence, the following 
hypotheses are to be tested:
Hlu: there is  a relationship between industry m em bership and the level o f 
m andatory risk  disclosure o f EAS 25 in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies. 
Hub: there is  a relationship between industry m em bership and the level o f 
m andatory risk  disclosure o f EAS 33 in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
there is a relationship between industry m em bership and the amount o f 
voluntary risk  disclosure in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
In this research, industry membership will be presented using a dummy variable 
following Wallace and Naser (1995), Patton and Zelenka (1997), Ali et al. (2004) and 
Alsaeed (2006).
Finally, based on the above discussion, it is useful to summarise the relationships 
between the extent of risk reporting, competition, corporate governance, ownership 
structure and firm-specific characteristics in a conceptual framework (see Figure 5.1). A 
conceptual framework is ‘a presentation, either graphically or in narrative form of the 
main concepts or variables, and the presumed relationship with each other’ (Punch, 1998, 
p.56). A conceptual framework assists in a clear presentation of the relationships between 
variables and focusing thinking in planning and data analysis stages (Punch, 1998).
5.3 Changes in Level of Compliance between 2006 and 2007
The first version of the EASs was issued in October 1997 with 19 accounting standards 
to be effective from January 1998; none of them discusses segment reporting or financial 
instruments disclosure. However, Egyptian companies should apply IASs to any issues 
that are not addressed by EASs by referring to the English version of the IASs. This 
means that Egyptian companies should comply with IAS 14 (Segment Reporting) and 32 
(Financial Instrument: Presentation and Disclosure). The second version of EASs was 
issued in July 2006 with 35 accounting standards to be effective from the 1st of January 
2007. In the second version two risk-related accounting standards are introduced in 
Arabic, namely EAS 25: Financial Instruments: Presentation and Disclosure and EAS 33: 
Segment Reporting. McGee (2006) argues that language barriers may be a significant
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obstruct to the successful implementation of IFRS. Based on the Egyptian Context, 
Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003) indicate that the lack of authoritative source material 
in the local language, Arabic, is a major reason of non-compliance with IASs. They 
report a relatively high level of compliance (94%) with IAS items that already included in 
Companies Act while compliance level with IAS items that are not available in Arabic 
was 36% only. Ten years between the first and the second version of the EASs was 
sufficient to make Egyptian companies more familiar with the application of EASs 
especially with the fact that they should refer to the IASs in the absence of the EASs. 
Therefore, it is expected that introduction of the Arabic version of EAS 25 and 33 will 
increase compliance level between 2006 and 2007. In addition, the EFSA and the EGX 
should force listed companies to comply with the EASs. Based on this discussion the 
following hypothesis is to be tested:
Hj.’ there is a signiGcant increase in the com pliance level with m andatory risk  
disclosure o f Egyptian companies between 2006and2007.
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Figure 5.1 A Conceptual Framework o f the Relationships between the Extent o f Risk Reporting, 
Competition, Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure, Firm -specific Characteristics and 
Company Risk Level
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5.4 Association between Mandatory and Voluntary Risk Reporting
There is a lack of accounting research regarding the association between mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure. This may be because empirical studies tend to focus on either 
mandatory or voluntary disclosure. This study aims to address this gap by examining the 
association between mandatory and voluntary risk reporting.
Dye (1986) indicates analytically a positive association between mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure based on the significant positive influence of full disclosure on a firm’s market 
value. Al-Ra2een and Karbhari (2004b) argue that a positive association between 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure reflects a high coordination between the board of 
directors and the management in preparing and writing different parts of annual reports. 
Based on this discussion, the following hypothesis is to be tested:
H f there is  a positive association between m andatory and voluntary risk  
disclosure in  the annual reports o f Egyptian companies.
5.5 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has developed research hypotheses regarding the association between 
competition, company risk level, corporate governance, ownership structure and risk 
reporting practices of Egyptian companies. Corporate governance variables are board 
size, role duality and auditor type while ownership structure variables are ownership 
concentration, managerial ownership, governmental ownership and institutional 
ownership. Moreover, the study controls for some firm-specific characteristics such as 
firm size, profitability, liquidity and industry membership. Based on disclosure theories 
that have been discussed in chapter 3 and prior disclosure studies that have been 
discussed in chapter 4, 13 main hypotheses divided into 39 sub-hypotheses have been 
constructed and will be tested statistically in chapter 7 (see Figure 5.1). In addition, two 
more hypotheses have been developed to test the change in compliance level between 
2006 and 2007 and to examine the association between mandatory and voluntary risk 
reporting.
The next chapter will discuss the methodological aspects of the study that better assist in 
addressing the research questions and hypotheses. It will highlight philosophical position, 
data collection methods, sampling procedures, data analysis techniques and ethical 
considerations.
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CHAPTER 6: RESEAJRCH METHODOLOGY
6.1 Introduction
The preceding chapters discussed the disclosure theories and literature regarding the 
determinants of disclosure and the factors that hinder disclosure in companies’ annual 
reports. Based on this discussion, research hypotheses have been developed. It was 
mentioned in the introduction that this study would be conducted through two main 
phases. Phase 1 aims to measure the level and amount of mandatory and voluntary risk 
reporting then to examine the determinants of risk reporting while phase 2 aims to 
identify factors that may hinder the presentation of mandatory and voluntary risk 
reporting. This chapter aims to present the methodological aspects that can assist in 
answering the study’s research questions. A clear understanding of ontological and 
epistemological assumptions is essential to realise the interrelationship between main 
research components and to defend a philosophical position (Grix, 2002).
Section 6.2 presents the research purpose while section 6.3 and section 6.4 discuss the 
research philosophy and research approach respectively. Section 6.5 presents the data 
collection methods used in collecting primary and secondary data. The secondary data 
collection methods and issues regarding measurement validity, measurement reliability, 
sample size, location of risk information and statistical tests are presented in section 6.5.2. 
The primary data collection methods and issues regarding the interviewing process, 
interviewees’ selection process, qualitative data analysis and ethical considerations are 
discussed in section 6.5.3. Section 6.6 is a summary and conclusion.
6.2 Research Purpose
In terms of research purpose, research is classified as descriptive, explanatory or 
exploratory. The main purpose of descriptive research is to ‘portray an accurate profile of 
persons, events or situations’ (Robson 2002, p.59). In other words, the aim is to provide 
a description of the problem under investigation as it exists (Collis and Hussey, 2003; 
Zikmund, 2000). Availability of essential information regarding the research problem is a 
prerequisite for collecting relevant data in descriptive research (Robson, 2002).
Explanatory research aims to investigate a structured research problem in order to 
explain and identify patterns of relationships between variables (Saunders et al., 2007; 
Robson, 2003). Explanatory research is considered an extension of descriptive research
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by focusing not only on description but also on explanations of relationships between 
variables (Collis and Hussey, 2003).
Exploratory research is appropriate for unstructured research problems (Ghauri and 
Gr0nhaug, 2002) or when a field of study suffers from a shortage of relevant literature 
that may assist in gaining appropriate information regarding the research problem (Collis 
and Hussey, 2003). The main aim of exploratory research is to remove ambiguity from, 
and provide a clear understanding of, a research problem (Saunders et al., 2007; Zikmund, 
2000). Moreover, exploratory research is more appropriate to ‘find out what is happening, 
particularly in little-understood situations, seek new insights, ask questions, access 
phenomena in a new light and generate ideas and hypotheses for future research’ 
(Robson 2002, p.59). The manifest character of that research is searching for rather than 
testing patterns and hypotheses (Collis and Hussey, 2003). Interviewing experts in the 
field of study is one of the predominant methods employed in exploratory research 
(Saunders et al., 2007).
This study is considered to be explanatory and exploratory. In part, it aims to explain 
variations in the level (amount) of mandatory (voluntary) risk reporting of Egyptian 
companies as dependent variables using competition, firm-specific, ownership structure 
and corporate governance characteristics as independent variables. Moreover, this 
research aims to explore factors that may impede compliance with EAS 25 and 33 and 
hinder the presentation of voluntary risk reporting in the annual reports of Egyptian 
companies.
6.3 Research Philosophy
Social research has a number of fundamentally different philosophical stances, including 
positivism, realism, idealism and interpretivism. These philosophical stances have an 
enormous influence on the design of research methodology and the whole research 
process (Stiles, 2003). There is a general consensus that positivism and interpretivism are 
the most influential paradigms that have guided social research orientations (Corbetta, 
2003). It is important to recognise the philosophical stance that a research study adopts 
since it has a significant influence on research design, data-collection methods and data 
analysis techniques (Collis and Hussey, 2003).
6.3.1 Positivism
Positivism can be defined as ‘the study of social reality utilising the conceptual 
framework, the techniques of observation and measurement, the instruments of
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mathematical analysis, and the procedures of inference of the natural science’ (Corbetta 
2003, p. 13). From an ontological perspective, positivism believes that reality exists 
independently out of our experience (Collis and Hussey, 2003) and thinking, observing 
and recording are our instruments to investigate this reality (Moses and Knusten, 2007). 
In addition, positivism believes that there is only one objective, simple and unchanged 
reality which may be controlled by general and rigid laws (Sarantakos, 2005). Moreover, 
positivism claims that reality is the sum of sub-elements and studying these sub-elements 
may lead to knowledge of the complete reality (Wimmer and Dominick, 2000).
From an epistemological point of view, researchers and the objects they investigate are 
completely detached. Researchers who adopt a positivist position believe that objects 
they research exist before, during and after the examination process (Collis and Hussey, 
2003). Therefore, a researcher neither influences nor is influenced by the object under 
examination (Remenyi et al., 1998).
From a methodological standpoint, positivism is concerned with sample 
representativeness, measurement, testing hypotheses, causality and generalisation 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003). In summary, positivism contains ‘realist/objectivist ontology 
and an empiricist epistemology, guides the strategy of quantitative methodology and 
therefore prescribes fixed designs and quantitative methods’ (Sarantakos, 2005, p.30).
From the above presentation, it could be concluded that the main objective of positivism 
is providing explanations and predictions of the subject under investigation and 
generating general statements that are formatted in law-like generalisations regarding the 
population as a whole similar to those of natural science (Cohen et al., 2000; May, 1997; 
Remenyi, 1998).
However, the main criticism of positivism is ignorance of the complexity of the social 
world and insistence on the suitability of dealing with the social world in the same 
manner as natural science. This results in losing the real essence of social phenomena 
through diminishing social world complexity to a sequence of general statements 
(Saunders et al., 2007).
6.3.2 Interpretivism
As a result of the criticism of positivism which is based on the complexity of the social 
world and differences between the centre of attention of social science from that of 
natural science, many researchers have adopted a different philosophical position that 
provides a different research philosophy that can overcome the limitations of positivism
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(Bryman and Bell, 2003). Therefore, interpretivism has emerged at a sharp contrast to 
positivism on the research philosophy continuum. It is defined as a philosophical stance 
which applies ‘naturalistic approaches to inductively and holistically understand human 
experience in context-specific settings” (Amaratunga et al., 2002, pp.18-19). Also, 
interpretivism is ‘the school of thought that stresses the importance of interpretations as 
well as observations in understanding the social world’ (Snape and Spencer, 2003, p.7).
From an ontological perspective, interpretivism believes that reality is socially 
constructed through people’s experience and interpretations (Stiles, 2003). This means 
that there is no one objective reality because the world is just the creation of our minds 
(Walliman, 2006). In fact, because each individual constructs his/her own reality, there 
are multiple realities (Remenyi et al., 1998). In addition, interpretivism believes that reality 
is holistic and cannot be split into sub-elements (Wimmer and Dominick, 2000). The 
consequence of this ontological position is twofold. Firstly, reality is subjective and 
depends on what people perceive and construct as reality but not the reality as exists 
(Cohen et al., 2000). Secondly, in studying social phenomena, social researchers have to 
take into account social, contextual and individual factors that may influence people’s 
perception of reality (Moses and Knusten, 2007).
From an epistemological point of view, there is no detachment between a researcher and 
object under investigation (Corbetta, 2003). Interpretivism assumes that a researcher is 
involved in the research process (Collis and Hussey, 2003) and a real interaction between 
them exists (Snape and Spencer, 2003).
From a methodological perspective, interpretivism seeks to use research methods that 
provide closeness to the subject under investigation and assists in obtaining an in-depth 
understanding of participants’ personal standpoints (Collis and Hussey, 2003). The aim is 
to obtain a unique explanation for a certain situation in a particular context (Wimmer and 
Dominick, 2000).
In summary, interpretivism contains ‘constructionist ontology, and an interpretivist 
epistemology, guide the strategies of qualitative methodology and prescribe mostly 
flexible designs and qualitative methods’ (Sarantakos, 2005, p.30).
6.3.3 Philosophical Position of Current Research
The philosophical position of this research lies between positivism and interpretivism. In 
other words, this research adopts a middle position that lends itself to the appropriate 
attributes of both positivism and interpretivism (Walliman, 2006). This middle position is
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recommended by several researchers. For example, Collis and Hussey (2003, p.48) 
support the possibility of the middle position between the two extremes by stating that 
‘as you move along the continuum, the features and assumptions of one paradigm are 
gradually relaxed and replaced by those of the other paradigm’. Moreover, Moses and 
Knusten (2007, p. 13) consider that this middle position is achievable by ‘blending some 
of the most attractive features of both the naturalist and constructivist approaches’. 
Furthermore, Saunders et al. (2007, p. 116) indicate the suitability of the middle position 
for business research by confirming that ‘business and management research is often a 
mixture between positivist and interpretivist’.
From an ontological point of view, this middle position believes that there is a reality out 
there independent of our experience and interpretations (May, 1997). However, this 
reality is diverse and multi-dimensional and therefore, during investigating this reality, an 
equal importance and weight should be given to both researcher’s and respondent’s 
interpretations (Snape and Spencer, 2003). Reality is knowable in a deficient manner due 
to its special nature and unavoidable insufficient human knowledge. Consequently, 
theories and generalisation related to the reality under investigation should be formatted 
in probabilistic rather than deterministic laws (Corbetta, 2003).
From an epistemological point of view, although a researcher seeks to be neutral and 
objective, he or she may influence the object under investigation (Snape and Spencer 
2003). In addition, the interpretation and understanding of social phenomena should take 
into consideration the circumstances and theoretical framework that govern these 
phenomena (Corbetta, 2003).
From a methodological point of view, combining both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches is desirable since it assists in investigating phenomena from different 
perspectives and overcome the limitations of depending only on one approach and 
therefore obtaining appropriate answers for research questions (Snape and Spencer, 
2003).
6.4 Research Approach
In the field of social research, a distinction is made between two distinguished research 
approaches namely, quantitative and qualitative. The choice between quantitative and 
qualitative approaches is heavily influenced by research purpose and philosophical 
position (Collis and Hussey, 2003). These two approaches lend themselves to different
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ontological and epistemological assumptions (Sarantakos, 2005). Table 6.1 summarises 
these differences:
Table 6.1: Fundam ental D ifferences between Quantitative and Qualitative Research Strategies
Quantitative Qualitative
Principle orientation to the role o f theory 
in relation to research 
Epistemological orientation
Deductive1, testing o f theory
Natural science model, in 
particular positivism
Inductive2, generation o f  
theory
Interpretivism
Ontological orientation Objectivism Constructionism
Source: Bryman and Bell (2003, p .25).
However, researchers tend to argue for combining these approaches in a multi-approach 
study in order to minimise pitfalls and maximise advantages. The next sub-sections aim 
to identify the main characteristics o f  quantitative and qualitative approach and the 
merits o f  combining them.
6.4.1 Quantitative Approach
Quantitative research can be defined as £a research strategy that emphasises 
quantification in the collection and analysis o f  data and that entails a deductive approach 
to the relationship between theory and research ... has incorporated the practices norms 
o f natural scientific m odel... embodies a view o f social reality as an external objective 
reality’ (Bryman and Bell, 2003, p.25). The quantitative approach applies the methods 
used in natural science to investigate social phenomena. Therefore, quantitative research 
depends on fixed-structured and closed research designs (Corbetta, 2003; Snape and 
Spenser, 2003). A quantitative approach aims to achieve the standardisation o f data 
collection methods in order to facilitate generalisation to the entire population through 
depending on representative samples (Corbetta, 2003). In summary, quantitative research 
is ‘objective in nature and concentrates on measuring phenomena. Therefore, a 
quantitative approach involves collecting and analysing numerical data and applying 
statistical tests’ (Collis and Hussey, 2003, p. 13).
The main power o f  a quantitative approach springs from allowing comparisons between 
variables through using appropriate statistical techniques. Furthermore, quantitative 
research provides precise, cost-effective and easily aggregated statistical measures (Patton, 
1990). However, the quantitative approach suffers from several limitations. This
1 Deductive reasoning is a ‘study in which a conceptual and theoretical structure is developed and then 
tested by empirical observation, thus particular instances are deduced from general inferences’ (Collis and 
Hussey 2003, p. 15).
2 Inductive reasoning is a ‘study in which theory is developed from the observation o f empirical reality; 
thus general inferences are induced from particular instances’ (Collis and Hussey 2003, p.15).
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approach focuses on measurement issues and minimises the importance of meaning and 
interpretations that respondents give to reality. In addition, it mainly focuses on 
hypothesis-testing and undermines the importance of hypothesis-generation (Snape and 
Spencer, 2003). Moreover, the quantitative approach fails to discover the essence of 
social reality, studies objects in isolation from their context, and focuses on 
quantifications of social phenomena which may result in biased perceptions regarding 
these phenomena.
6.4.2 Qualitative Approach
Qualitative research is defined by Denzin and Lincoln (2003, pp. 4-5) as:-
A. situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive, 
material andpractices that make the world visible. These practices tranfer the world. They 
turn the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews ... 
Qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This 
means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings...
The qualitative research pays more attention to the meaning and interpretation of social 
phenomena besides the researcher’s and the respondent’s own understanding of reality 
under investigation, uses research methods that emphasise in-depth, rich understanding 
and interpretations and facilitates themes and hypothesis generation (Snape and Spencer, 
2003). Consequently, qualitative research mainly focuses on comprehension rather than 
generalisation and therefore adopts non-standardised research methods and tends to use 
small and intentionally selected samples (Corbetta, 2003). In summary, qualitative 
research can be constructed as a ‘research strategy that usually emphasises words rather 
than quantification in the collection and analysis of data ... emphasises an inductive 
approach to the relationship between theory and research ... and embodies a view of 
social reality as a constantly shifting emergent property of individuals’ creations’ (Bryman 
and Bell, 2003, p.25).
The qualitative research is suitable for studying research questions in an open manner 
and seeks to provide an in-depth and rich understanding and interpretation of the social 
world (Patton 1990; Snape and Spencer, 2003). However, qualitative research has some 
limitations. This approach is criticised for being subjective because the researcher is the 
instrument for both data collection and analysis and also because of the close contact 
between researcher and respondents (Patton, 1990). In addition, qualitative research is 
less powerful in producing comparisons and studying relationships among variables than
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quantitative research. Moreover, qualitative research is time consuming (Sarantakos,
2005).
After presenting the main characteristics o f  quantitative and qualitative approach, it is 
useful to provide a comparison between them in terms o f  research planning, data 
collection and analysis and the final product (see Table 6.2).
Table 6.2: Main Characteristics o f Quantitative and Qualitative Approach
Quantitative Research | Qualitative Research
Research Planning
Theory-research relationship
Function o f literature 
Concepts




Physical researcher- subject 
interaction
Role o f subject studied
Structured; logically sequential 
phases.
Deduction














Empathetic identification with the 







Nature o f  the data
Structured, closed, precedes 
research
Statistically representative sample
Standardized for all subjects. 
Objective: data-matrix
‘Hard’, objective and 
standardised (objectivity vs. 
subjectivity
Unstructured, open, constructed in 
the course o f  research 
Single case not statistically 
representative
Varies according to subjects’ 
interest. Tends not to be 
standardised
‘Soft’, rich and deep (depth vs. 
superficiality)
Data Analysis
Object o f  the analysis
Aim o f  the analysis
Mathematical and statistical 
techniques
The variable (analysis by variable, 
impersonal)
Explain variation (variance) in
variables
Used intensely
The individual (analysis by 
subjects)
Understand the subjects 
N ot used
Production o f Results
Data presentation 
Generalisation 
Scope o f  results
Tables (relationship perspective)
Correlations. Causal models. 
Laws. Logic o f  causation 
Generalisability
Extracts from interview and text 
(narrative perspective) 
Classifications and typologies. 
Ideal types. Logic o f classification 
Specificity
Source: Corbetta (2003, p.37).
6.4.3 Triangulation
The previous sub-sections have presented the main features o f  quantitative and
qualitative research. Although there are major ontological and epistemological differences 
between them, researchers have called for a combination o f quantitative and qualitative
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approaches which is sometimes called triangulation or a multi-method approach 
(Wimmer and Dominick, 2000). Quantitative and qualitative approaches should be 
regarded as complementary rather than competing approaches (Snape and Spencer, 
2003). Obviously, each approach possesses distinctive features which make it more 
appropriate for addressing certain dimensions of the research problem than the other 
(Sarantakos, 2005).
Triangulation is defined as ‘the use of different methods and sources to check the 
integrity, or extend inferences, drawn from the data’ (Ritchie, 2003, p.43). The essence of 
triangulation springs from the fact that:
No single method ever adequately solves the problem of rival causalfactors ..  .Because each 
method reveals different aspects of empirical reality, multiple methods of observations must 
be employed. This is termed triangulation. I  now offer as a final methodological rule the 
principle that multiple methods should be used in every investigation (Denzin, 1978, p.
28).
Triangulation brings many advantages to research; it assists in underpinning research 
design through overcoming the pitfalls and maximising the advantages of each individual 
approach (Patton, 1990). This means that triangulation will minimise the deficiencies of 
depending on a single method and defeat the problem of ‘method-boundedness’ (Cohen 
et al., 2000) which may lead to misleading conclusions (Robson, 2000). Moreover, 
triangulation will support research validity and credibility through enriching the nature of 
research data by combining both qualitative and quantitative data (Sarantakos, 2005). 
Moreover, triangulation may assist a researcher to obtain broader and complementary 
insights to the topic under investigation (Collis and Hussey, 2003). Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) differentiate four types of triangulation:-
• Data triangulation which refers to collecting data in different time scales and/or 
from various sources in the same study.
• Investigator triangulation which refers to the use of various researchers to collect 
and analyse the data and compare the results in an independent manner in order 
to reduce bias resulting from the use of only one investigator.
• Methodological triangulation which refers to the use of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods in a multi-method study to examine the same topic. The 
main aim is minimising the bias resulting from the use of only one method.
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• Theories triangulation refers to the use of different theoretical perspectives in 
order to extend the knowledge through borrowing a theory from a certain 
domain to explain a phenomenon in another domain (Collis and Hussey, 2003; 
Flick, 2002).
This research will achieve data, methodological and theoretical triangulation. Data 
triangulation takes place by collecting data from two different sources. The first source, 
secondary data, is collecting data about the Egyptian companies under investigation. The 
data collected from this source cover basic company, ownership structure and corporate 
governance characteristics. The second source, primary data, is collecting data through 
semi-structured interviews with four groups of participants.
In terms of methodological triangulation, this research will apply a quantitative approach 
to identify the nature, level and amount of mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure and 
then apply a qualitative approach to identify reasons that may impede companies from 
compliance with mandatory risk disclosure and make them reluctant to provide voluntary 
risk disclosure. The use of a qualitative approach as a successor to a quantitative 
approach is an effective way of combining both quantitative and qualitative research 
because many statistical results require in-depth explanations (Snape and Spencer, 2003). 
This way of combining quantitative and qualitative research may contribute to enhancing 
research interpretability through shedding light on areas to which statistical figures 
cannot bring any insights (Robson, 2000). In addition, disclosure studies support 
combining both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Dahawy et al. (2002) 
recommend the use of qualitative interviews in disclosure studies to obtain a better 
understanding of the reasons that hinder the application of certain accounting standards.
In terms of theoretical triangulation, this research employs a number of disclosure 
theories such as agency theory, signalling theory, political cost perspective, proprietary 
cost perspective, stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory to examine and explain the 
variation of risk reporting in the annual reports of Egyptian companies.
6.5 Data Collection Methods
In this section, the main objective is to present the methods that will be used in data 
collection. According to the research approach presented in section 6.4, this research will 
use both quantitative and qualitative methods that best provide the appropriate answers 
to the research questions. In analysing accounting narratives, this research will use two 
methods: a disclosure index for mandatory risk reporting and content analysis for
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voluntary risk reporting. In addition, this research will use semi-structured interviews to 
explore factors behind non-compliance and low presentation of mandatory and 
voluntary risk reporting. However, before providing further discussion on the process of 
data collection, it is important to discuss some factors and cultural difficulties that may 
face researchers in the field of financial reporting in Egypt.
6.5.1 Data Collection Considerations
The need for permission and the shortage of accurate and up-to-date primary and 
secondary data are the main sources of difficulties that researchers are likely to face in the 
data collection process in Egypt (Parnell and Hatem, 1999). Hanafi and Gray (2005) 
share their experience regarding data collection in the Egyptian context. Their experience 
sheds light on potential difficulties related to collecting annual reports and conducting 
interviews. Hanafi and Gray (2005) indicate that:
• Collecting annual reports through direct contact with companies, by means of 
sending faxes, mails and emails, is not an effective vehicle and brings low 
responses.
• The main reason for the extremely low response is the companies’ belief that the 
annual report is a sensitive document.
• The term ‘annual reports’ can refer to different things. It may refer to financial 
statements, financial statements and notes to financial statements and 
occasionally the audit report. This means that annual reports may not contain a 
board of directors’ report. It is not surprising to find this confusion due to the 
absence of a clear distinction between financial statements and annual reports in 
the Company Act, CML and the listing/delisting rules of the EGX. Consequendy, 
many companies do not attach the board of directors’ report to financial 
statements.
• Due to concerns regarding confidentiality, it is very difficult to encourage a large 
number of participants to take part in interviews.
Taking into account these difficulties, Hassan et al. (2006) recommended that the annual 
reports are obtained through sources such as the CMA and the EGX rather than 
approaching other possible sources, such as companies themselves. Due to these 
difficulties, the EGX attempts to provide a solution to the problem of obtaining listed 
companies’ annual reports through establishing a fully-owned subsidiary, EGID. The 
EGID was established in 1999, and began exclusively broadcasting the EGX data to
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local and international customers in early 2002. The main task of the EGID is to make all 
information of listed companies, such as ownership structure, financial statements, and 
dividend payments, available to all users (ROSC, 2004).
6.5.2 Secondary Data Collection Methods
Generally, accounting is considered as a measurement and communication discipline 
since it aims to identify, measure and report economic information to different groups of 
users (Belkaoui, 1981). Financial reporting is a concept that comprises all the information 
provided in annual reports and the additional sources of information (Wolk et al., 1992). 
Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that the identification of the extent of disclosure is one of 
the main difficulties that disclosure research may face. This is due to the very nature of 
the term disclosure which makes it difficult to be measured directly. Wallace (1987, p.431) 
indicates that:
Financial disclosure is an abstract concept that cannot be measured directly. It does not 
possess inherent characteristics by which one can determine its intensity or quality like the 
capacity of a car.
In addition, Malone et al. (1993, pp.257-258) confirm this point of view and reveal that:
Extent of financial disclosure is more a concept, subject to different interpretations, than it 
is a measurable variable. Differing interpretations would include differing sources of 
financial disclosure. Furthermore, even if  there existed a consensus of opinion as to the 
sources of financial disclosure, the means by which to measure the extent therefore would 
vaiy. Because extent of financial disclosure cannot be directly measured, another measure 
served as a proxy.
Consequently, accounting researchers seek to establish an instrument to measure this 
abstract concept. Beattie et al. (2004) present a summary of a variety of approaches that 
may be used by researchers in the analysis of accounting narratives in corporate annual 
reports. An apparent distinction can be made between two major approaches in 
analysing narratives in annual reports namely, the subjective approach and semi-objective 
approach.
A subjective approach is a scoring process based on financial analysts’ ranks of disclosure 
practices. A famous example of such a scoring scheme is the one provided by the 
Association of Investment Management and Research in the US which has been used by 
several researchers as a proxy for disclosure adequacy (Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Lang 
and Lundholm, 1993; Sengupta, 1998). The assessment of overall company disclosure
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adequacy covered three basic categories: annual published information, quarterly and 
other published information and investor relations and related aspects. The final 
disclosure ratings are weighted to derive company score and industry ranks. The main 
disadvantage of subjective rating is that it measures analysts’ perceptions of disclosure 
rather than actual disclosure (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). In addition, it is difficult to 
understand accurately analysts’ motivations and how the rating process is constructed 
(Healy et al., 1999). Moreover, Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that analysts’ ranking is 
questionable due to ambiguity regarding criteria employed in selecting companies to be 
included in the survey, biases inherent in the rating process and, finally, it is very difficult 
to determine to what extent analysts in the sub-committees seriously perform the ratings. 
Therefore, bias and errors in judgement may negatively influence scores awarded to 
companies (Sengupta, 1998).
Alternatively, a semi-objective approach comprises a variety of different methods that 
could be used by researchers such as disclosure indices, thematic content analysis, 
readability studies and linguistic studies. Due to subjectivity and the bias that subjective 
rating brings besides the unavailability of such a rating in Egypt and taking into 
consideration research objectives, this research will depend on a semi-objective approach, 
namely a disclosure index and content analysis, to measure the level and the amount of 
mandatory and voluntary risk reporting. In section 6.5.2.1 and 6.5.2.2, this study will 
discuss the main features and steps in the disclosure index and content analysis 
respectively.
6.5.2.1 Disclosure Index
A disclosure index is defined as:
A.n instrument designed to measure a series of items which, when aggregated, gives a 
surrogate score indicative of the level of disclosure in the specific context for which the index 
was devised. Hxtant indices can be categorised according to whether the index items are 
weighted or unweighted and whether the items are evaluated dichotomouslj or according to 
the quality of individual disclosures (Coy et al., 1993, p.l 12).
Coy and Dixon (2004) state that a disclosure index is a single-figure ratio that is widely 
used by accounting researchers to identify a disclosure level reflecting the entire content 
of annual reports or a certain aspect under investigation such as social and environmental 
reporting or risk reporting. Similarly, Marston and Shrives (1991) believe that a disclosure 
index is a useful research instrument and a sign of its usefulness is its continuous usage
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by accounting researchers for more than four decades since the work of Cerf (1961). 
Therefore, the disclosure index continues to be employed by researchers since disclosure 
in annual reports remains a focus of accounting research.
A disclosure index has some advantages; it is a simple well understood proxy for 
disclosure; also it could be used in the performance evaluation of preparers (Coy et al., 
1993). In addition, it assists in comparing the extent of disclosure of different companies 
(Wallace, 1988). In constructing a disclosure index, a researcher has to take decisions 
regarding:
• Whether the index measures quantity or quality of disclosure.
• The nature of information and items selection.
• A scoring scheme.
• A weighted versus an unweighted index.
• Non-applicable information items.
•  Calculating the index.
All these points will be discussed in turn in the next sub-sections.
6.5.2.1.1 Quantity versus Quality
An important question has been raised by accounting researchers regarding whether the 
disclosure index measures quantity or quality of disclosure. Buzby (1974a) indicates that 
the definition of adequate disclosure should cover form, content and amount of 
information in annual reports besides the qualitative characteristics that accounting 
information should meet. This means that adequate disclosure in annual reports depends 
mainly on both quality and quantity of information (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Several 
researchers argue that disclosure quality is measurable (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Hail, 
2002; Sengupta, 1998). However, measuring disclosure quality is a hard task due to the 
lack of a definition for ‘disclosure quality’ and because of the non-affordable cost of 
measuring quality (Botosan, 2004). Measuring disclosure quality requires a complex set of 
subjective judgements which impair measurement validity (Woods and Reber, 2003). In 
addition, the need for extensive data and extravagant assessment contributes to the 
complexity of measuring disclosure quality (Shevlin, 2004). Botosan (2004, p.290) states 
that:
A.U disclosure measurement frameworks designed to date . . .  ultimately rest 
upon mere counts of disclosure items and the mentioned hypothesis that
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quantity and quality are positively related ...disclosure quality is inherently 
immeasurable.
Marston and Shrives (1991) assert that a disclosure index is merely an instrument to 
measure the quantity of disclosure but not necessarily the quality of disclosure while Core 
(2001) indicates that enhanced measures of disclosure quality should be developed. This 
study aims to measure the extent of mandatory risk reporting in financial statements of 
Egyptian companies and hence it identifies the quantity of disclosure rather than the 
quality of disclosure.
6.5.2.1.2 Nature of Information and Items Selection
Accounting researchers employ the disclosure index in order to measure the level of 
disclosure in companies* annual reports. The purpose of the study has a great impact on 
the nature of items to be included in the index as well as item selection procedures 
(Marston and Shrives, 1991). Items to be included in a disclosure index could be 
classified, according to their nature, as mandatory, voluntary and aggregate (a mix of 
mandatory and voluntary) items. A disclosure index which contains only mandatory 
items aims to measure the degree of compliance with compulsory disclosure 
requirements (Owusu-Ansah, 2000; Wallace et al., 1994) while a disclosure index which 
contains only voluntary items aims to measure the level of voluntary disclosure (Chow 
and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989a; Depoers, 2000; Hossain et al., 1994; Hossain et 
al., 1995). Finally, a disclosure index which contains both mandatory and voluntary items 
aims to measure the aggregate level of disclosure (Cooke, 1993).
With respect to items selection procedure, Marston and Shrives (1991 and 1996) argue 
that there are many approaches that could be used to determine relevant items that 
should be included in a disclosure index such as reviewing relevant literature, list of best 
practices derived from a survey of companies* annual reports, international or national 
accounting standards, legal requirements or using a disclosure checklist that was 
previously constructed by other researchers. In addition, researchers are likely to seek the 
opinions of users of annual reports to derive items to be included in the index (Coy and 
Dixon, 2004).
This study’s disclosure index comprises mandatory disclosure items only in order to 
measure the degree of compliance with mandatory risk disclosure requirements based on 
EAS 25 and 33. Using accounting standards in constructing the index will maintain
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content and construct validity through eliminating subjectivity in choosing disclosure 
items.
Regarding the number of items in a disclosure index, there is no general theory to 
determine the number of items to be included (Wallace et al., 1994; Wallace and Naser, 
1995). Moreover, there is no empirical evidence to support the view that a disclosure 
index with fewer items is less favourable than a disclosure index with more items 
(Marston and Robson, 1997). The number of items in a disclosure index varies among 
studies. However, the number of items to be included in a disclosure index is not a 
problematic issue in this study since it is completely based on the requirements of EAS 
25 and 33.
6.5.2.1.3 Scoring Scheme
Accounting literature indicates that accounting researchers have applied a number of 
different scoring schemes in measuring the extent of disclosure (Hossain et al., 1994). 
Scoring schemes can take a number of different forms such as nominal scores which are 
used to measure the level of disclosure by exploring disclosure or non-disclosure of an 
information item or ordinal score to capture the degree of detail in disclosing an 
information item (Beattie et al., 2004).
Researchers have used simple dichotomous (nominal) scoring schemes to account for the 
presence or absence of an information item (Beattie et al., 2004). This means that 
disclosure is transferred to a binary variable, whether a certain item is disclosed or not 
disclosed (Wallace, 1988). Consequently, this scoring scheme awards the item a score of 
one if it is reported and zero if it is not reported (Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; 
Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Cooke, 1993).
Alternatively, other researchers have proposed a scoring scheme that awards points 
according to the degree of specificity in disclosed information in order to take into 
consideration qualitative aspects of disclosure. For example, Copeland and Fredericks 
(1968) proposed an index for measuring the extent of disclosure based on the particular 
descriptive information in annual reports. Similar to the approach adopted by Copeland 
and Fredericks (1968), Buzby (1974b) proposed a disclosure index which assigns a score 
according to the extent of detail in reporting information in annual reports. For certain 
information items, Buzby (1974b) provides a full score if it was disclosed in detail while a 
half score was awarded if it was disclosed in summary. Wallace et al. (1994) and Wallace 
and Naser (1995) proposed a scoring scheme which aimed to reward the depth of
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information reported in annual reports through giving extra weight to density of 
disclosure. According to this approach, companies are given an extra score if they 
provide more disaggregated information or more explanation which increases users’ 
understanding of accounting information. Therefore, companies will obtain scores based 
on how words improve the understandability of accounting numbers. However, this 
approach can be criticised on the grounds that it contains a high degree of subjectivity 
since the scoring process depends on the coder’s perception regarding the ability of 
qualitative information to improve the understandability of quantitative information.
This study will use a dichotomous scoring scheme because it is less subjective than other 
approaches. In addition, in terms of research objectives, this approach is more 
appropriate because it assists in measuring compliance with mandatory risk reporting. 
This means that the key focus is whether a certain company complies (discloses) or does 
not comply (fails to disclose) mandatory risk-related information rather than assessing 
the quality of that disclosure.
6.5.2.1.4 Weighted versus Unweighted Index
One of the essential issues that a researcher has to take into consideration in constructing 
a disclosure index is determining whether some items in the index should be assigned a 
higher weight than others (Patton and Zelenka, 1997). In terms of the relative 
importance of information items, two distinctive approaches have emerged, namely the 
unweighted and weighted disclosure indices.
In an unweighted disclosure index, each information item is given equal weight 
(Akhtaruddin, 2005; Owusu-Ansah, 2000; Wallace et al., 1994). Therefore, this approach 
overlooks the relative importance of each information item to different group of users 
(Owusu-Ansah, 2000). In addition, an unweighted disclosure index fails to differentiate 
between poor and excellent disclosure (Coy et al., 1993). However, an unweighted 
disclosure index does facilitate independent analysis without relying on the perceptions 
of a particular user group (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987). Furthermore, it removes the 
need for judgement concerning the relative importance of each information item 
(Owusu-Ansah, 2000). Besides, it permits the investigation of disclosure extent in a 
‘general purpose’ context since all information items are considered as equally important 
to the ‘average’ user (Wallace, 1988). An unweighted index is a useful instrument when 
the research focus is directed at all users of annual reports and not limited to a specific 
group of users (Cooke, 1989a). Finally, assigning different weights by different user
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groups to each information item may ‘neutralise’ the weights of each information item 
among all user groups (Wallace, 1988).
Alternatively, a weighted index acknowledges the relative importance of individual items 
of information to different groups of users (Inchausti, 1997). Different groups of users 
may tend to assign varying degrees of importance to different information items 
(Marston and Shrives, 1991). As Cooke (1989a, p.115) stated ‘clearly one class of user 
will attach different weights to an item than another class of user’.
Researchers may use different ways to derive weights (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; 
Chavent et al., 2006; Wallace et al., 1994). Weights may be determined arbitrarily by 
researchers (Cerf, 1961; Singhvi and Desai, 1971), weights previously used in other 
studies may be used (Barrett 1977) or average weights derived from attitude surveys of 
users’ perceptions regarding the importance of each information item (Buzby, 1975; 
Stanga, 1976; McNally et al., 1982; Inchausti, 1997).
Using weights may bring many potential problems. Weights may not reflect actual use of 
information since they are derived from a survey which is not a real economic situation 
(Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987). Attaching weights may favour certain user groups and 
consequently provide a further source of subjectivity in constructing a disclosure index 
(Marston and Shrives, 1996). Moreover, assigning weights through a scaling instrument is 
misleading because the relative importance of each information item varies according to 
several factors such as transaction/event, company, industry, and time of study (Wallace,
1989). Finally, empirical research (Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992; Chow and Wong-Boren, 
1987; Prencipe, 2004; Robbins and Austin, 1986) indicates that weighted and unweighted 
indices provide non-significant differences in their results. Consequently, the use of an 
unweighted index has become a pattern in disclosure studies because it decreases 
subjectivity in the scoring process (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999) and the bias resulting from 
using an unweighted index is lower than that of a weighted index (Marston and Shrives, 
1991).
Based on the previous discussion, this study will employ an unweighted index because its 
focus is not directed at a particular group of users and all information items have the 
same relative importance.
6.5.2.1.5 Non-applicable Items
Another issue that a researcher should take into consideration in constructing a 
disclosure index is whether unreported information items are irrelevant or non-applicable
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to a certain company in the sample or not (Owusu-Ansah, 2000). It is crucial in awarding 
scores to different companies to make a clear distinction between the absence of and 
non-disclosure of a certain information item (Inchausti, 1997). Failure to consider non- 
applicable information items will result in penalising a particular company during the 
scoring process by awarding that company a score of zero for a non-applicable item 
which is not expected to be disclosed (Ali et al., 2004) which in turn may favour larger 
and more diversified companies compared to small and less diversified companies 
(Cooke, 1991; Street and Bryant, 2000).
In order to minimise the bias that may result from penalising companies for irrelevant 
information items, this study will apply the approach proposed by Cooke (1989a) who 
recommends that the entire annual report should be first read before making any 
judgement regarding irrelevant items. The main advantage of this approach is to permit 
the coder to identify the nature and complexity of each company’s activities before 
making an informed judgement regarding these items (Ali et al., 2004). This approach has 
been widely followed by several studies (Ahmed, 1996; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Ali et 
al., 2004; Cooke, 1993; Hossain et al., 1994; Owusu-Ansah, 1998) and will be applied in 
this study.
6.5.2.1.6 Calculating the Index
In calculating the level of compliance with mandatory risk reporting requirements, this 
study will employ an additive, dichotomous, unweighted relative index which has been 
previously used by several researchers (Ahmed, 1996; Cooke, 1989a; Raffoumier, 1995; 
Street and Bryant, 2000). A relative index is expressed as a ratio of computed actual 
scores obtained by a company to maximum scores that a company can be expected to 
obtain (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Ali et al., 2004; Wallace, 1988). The main advantage 
of a relative disclosure index is that it addresses the problem of non-applicable items 
(Ahmed, 1996) when information items do not apply equally to different companies in 
the sample (Moore and Buzby, 1972; Owusu-Ansah, 2000). Therefore, companies are 
not penalised for non-disclosure of non-applicable information items (Marston and 
Shrives, 1991). To be more precise, a disclosure index is operationally expressed as 
(number of items disclosed)/(number of items disclosed + number of items not 
disclosed) (Patton and Zelenka, 1997). This means that under a dichotomous scoring 
scheme, a company is awarded one for disclosure and zero for non-disclosure while the 
non-applicable item will be omitted from both numerator and denominator of the
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disclosure index (Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003). Following Owusu-Ansah (2000), 
the relative mandatory risk reporting index (MRRI) is expressed as following:
nj mj
MRRI,, = /  £ >
/=1 i= l
where:
et- — disclosure value of i item of information required of j sample company. It is one if it 
is disclosed or zero if it is not disclosed.
mj — number of mandated information items applicable to, and are expected to be 
disclosed by, the j sample company where mj-  total number of information items.
tij — number of mandated information items applicable to and are actually disclosed by 
the j sample company.
6.S.2.2 Content Analysis
The second method in the semi-objective approach is content analysis. Content analysis 
is a research method that has been extensively used in social science generally and social 
and environmental disclosure studies particularly. Content analysis is defined as ‘a 
research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the 
manifest content of communication’ (Berelson, 1952, p. 18). Moreover, content analysis 
is:
a summarising quantitative analysis of messages that relies on the scientific method 
(including attention to objectivity-intersubjectivity, a priori design, reliability, validity, 
generalisability, replicability and hypothesis testing) and is not limited as to the types of 
variables that may be measured or the context in which the messages are created or 
presented (Neuendorf, 2002, p.10).
These definitions highlight the underlying concepts in quantitative content analysis such 
as systematic procedures, objectivity through coding manifest rather than latent content 
and measurement reliability and validity. Systematic investigation means that coding 
procedures and rules are consistently applied in order to reduce the coders’ bias to the 
minimum while the design of adequate classification categories, coding rules and 
focusing on manifest content enhances objectivity (Bryman and Bell, 2003). The 
appropriate and comprehensive design of classification categories and coding 
instructions are basic prerequisites for achieving objectivity (Wimmer and Dominick,
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2000). Potter and Levine-Donnerstein (1999, p.265) conclude that ‘objectivity is a 
reasonable expectation with ... coding manifest content*.
Quantitative content analysis is a reduction process that aims to code a large number of 
coding units such as words, sentences or paragraphs in a very small number of categories 
(Weber, 1990) with an objective to achieve statistical analysis rather than express any 
impression regarding a message (Neuendorf, 2002).
Quantitative content analysis has several merits. It is a non-obtrusive and non-reactive 
research method that assists in establishing a manageable set of data without the need to 
get access to the message sender (Riffe et al., 2005). It is a very transparent and flexible 
technique that can be used in different research situations (Bryman and Bell, 2003). 
Moreover, content analysis is a preferable method in cases where other data collection 
methods may result in biased responses (Kolbe and Burnett, 1991). Content analysis is a 
safe method that provides the chance to add coded categories, correct mistakes and 
include missing data (Woodrum, 1984).
However, quantitative content analysis limits the analysis to manifest content only while 
latent content may be important (Brewerton and Millward, 2001; Riffe et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, it focuses only on recorded communications (Babbie, 1998). Finally, 
content analysis is a time consuming and costly research method (Wimmer and 
Dominick, 2000).
It has been previously highlighted that systematic examination is a core character of 
content analysis. Systematic examination emphasises the importance of a well established 
coding scheme that clearly identifies categories as well as rules used in the classification 
process. Three important pillars of the coding scheme should be well defined, namely 
coding unit, classification scheme and coding instructions. A detailed presentation of 
these is provided in the following subsections.
6.5.2.2.1 Unit of Coding
Unit of coding is the basic part of the collected data that could be meaningfully assessed 
(Boyatzis, 1998). Measurement in content analysis depends on counting the occurrence 
of coding units (Weber, 1990) which may reflect the importance of a topic to the 
reporting entity (Gray et al., 1995b). Researchers have employed a variety of coding units 
including word, sentence, portion of page and paragraph. Words have been extensively 
used as a coding unit because word coding is a simple process compared to other units 
of coding (Brewerton and Millward, 2001) and it permits searching for certain words in
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the text (Gray et al., 1995b). However, separate words have no meaning except in a 
sentence format (Milne and Adler, 1999). Moreover, determining the meaning of a word 
in certain circumstances is a problematic issue which may result in a severe disagreement 
between coders (Hackston and Milne, 1996) because the meaning of a word depends on 
its context (Brewerton and Millward 2001). Using a paragraph as a unit of coding suffers 
from complexity (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). Ng (1985 cited in Hackston 
and Milne, 1996, p.84) criticises the use of portions of pages as coding units because 
there is a wide range of print, column and page size used in preparing annual reports 
which may threaten comparability of the annual reports and may result in biased 
measures.
Finally, using a sentence as a coding unit is justified on the basis that it results in more 
reliable inter-coder reliability1 measures compared to other units of coding such as words 
and removes the need to account for, or standardise, the number of words (Hackston 
and Milne, 1996). The main advantage of sentences is that they can be counted more 
accurately than other coding units (Tsang, 1998). Milne and Adler (1999, p.243) support 
the use of the sentence as a coding and measurement unit because ‘using sentences for 
both coding and measurement seems likely, therefore, to provide complete, reliable and 
meaningful data for further analysis’. Hackston and Milne (1996, p.86) argue that there is 
no need to standardise for the length of the annual reports because ‘there is no 
restriction on the number of pages an annual report can include and, if companies 
consider additional disclosure is sufficiently important, it is believed they will include 
extra pages in the report’.
Consequently, based on the previous discussion, this study will use the sentence 
approach as a coding and measurement unit. This approach has been used by several risk 
disclosure studies (Amran et al., 2009; Kajiiter, 2006; Konishi and Ali, 2007; Linsley and 
Shrives, 2006; Woods and Reber 2003), intellectual capital disclosure studies (Abeysekera 
and Guthrie, 2005; Bozzolan et al., 2003; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007) and social and 
environmental disclosure studies (Tsang, 1998; Williams, 1999).
6.5.2.2.2 Classification Scheme
The systematic examination offered by content analysis highlights the importance of 
categories because the findings are based on categories’ validity. Berelson (1952, p. 147) 
emphasises the importance of developing categories in content analysis by stating that:
1 Inter-coder reliability refers to levels of agreement among independent coders who code the same 
content using the same coding instrument (Wimmer and Dominick, 2000, p.150).
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Content analysis stands or falls by its categories. Particular studies have been productive to 
the extent that the categories were clearly formulated and well adapted to the problem and 
to the content. Content analysis studies done on a hit-or-miss basis, without clearly 
formulated problems for investigation and with vaguely drawn or poorly articulated 
categories, are almost certain to be indifferent or low quality, as research productions.
In order to support measurement reliability and validity and appropriate data analysis, 
many authors suggest that categories in the classification scheme should meet certain 
conditions (Brewerton and Millward, 2001; Holsti, 1969; Neuendorf, 2002; Riffe et al.,
2005):
• Categories should reflect the research purpose.
• Categories should be mutually exclusive; this means that coding units cannot be 
placed in more than one category or subcategory.
• Categories should be exhaustive; categories should be appropriately designed to 
capture all coding units; therefore each unit coding is placed in a relevant 
category.
• Categories should be independent; placing of any coding unit does not depend 
on other units of coding.
• Each category should have a separate rule for classifying coding units.
There are two distinct approaches in developing categories or themes in content analysis. 
These approaches are theory/prior research-driven approach and inductive approach 
(Boyatzis, 1998). The main advantage of the former approach is its support for 
measurement validity through guiding researchers to focus only on particular categories 
and assisting researchers in constructing appropriate coding rules that should be used in 
categories’ identification and the codification process (Potter and Levine-Donnerstein, 
1999).
In seeking to measure the amount of risk reporting, it is therefore helpful to classify risks 
into categories that allow for cross-sector comparisons of risk reporting (Woods and 
Reber, 2003). This study will follow a prior research-driven approach because there are a 
reasonable number of disclosure studies that used relevant categories which can be used 
in data analysis purposes. This study will depend on a model suggested by ICAEW (1997) 
and used by prior risk reporting studies (Amran et al., 2009; Konishi and Ali, 2007; 
Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Woods and Reber, 2003). In addition, this study will depend 
on risk categories proposed by German Accounting Standard 5 (exposure draft) because
146
it is the only accounting standard that addresses risk reporting in a comprehensive 
manner (GASB 2000). Appendix 1.A presents risk categories used in this study to classify 
risk reporting.
6.5.2.2.3 Coding Instructions
The other important pillar in the coding scheme is coding instructions. The coding 
instruction is ‘a statement of instructions to coders that specifies the categories that will 
be used to classify the text based on a set of written rules that define how the text will be 
classified. The coding ... enables the message content to be coded in a consistent matter’ 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003, p.202). This definition emphasises the role of coding 
instructions in enhancing inter-coder reliability by shaping clear rules that assist coders to 
consistently code the texts.
Caution should be exercised in establishing clear and precise coding instructions because 
coding instructions should be written in enough detail to efficiendy guide coders during 
the coding process. However, more detailed coding instructions may cause difficulties in 
the coding process (Riffe et al., 2005). The aim is to create a balanced set of coding 
instructions. This study will depend on coding instructions proposed by Shrives and 
Linsley (2003b) Linsley and Shrives (2006) and used by Konishi and Ali (2007) and 
Amran et al. (2009) as a basis for the coding instructions of this research (see Appendix
l.B).
6.5.2.3 Measurement Validity
Measurement validity is one of the most important characteristics of quantitative 
research. Neuendorf (2002, p. 112) summarises the essence of validity by stating that 
Validity is the extent to which a measuring procedure represents the intended, and only 
the intended, concept. In thinking about validity, we ask the question, are we measuring 
what we want to measure?’. In a semi-objective approach, a clear distinction is made 
between face and content validity. Face validity refers to ‘the correspondence between 
investigators’ definition of concepts and their definitions of the categories that measured 
them. A category has face validity to the extent that it appears to measure the construct it 
is intended to measure’ (Weber, 1990, p. 12). In other words, face validity refers to the 
extent to which a measure appears to plausibly capture the concept under investigation 
(Babbie, 1998). On the other hand, content validity is the extent to which a measure 
captures all the features of the concept under examination (Neuendorf, 2002). In 
quantitative research, careful constructions and systematic and standardised
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administration of the measurement instrument are important steps in achieving 
measurement validity (Patton, 1990).
In order to achieve both face and content validity and therefore measurement validity, 
two basic steps are recommended. The first step is establishing a well designed coding 
scheme (classification scheme and coding instructions) that guides coders in the coding 
process (Potter and Levine-Donnerstein, 1999). The second step is getting some reviews 
for the coding scheme by some experts in the field of study (Neuendorf, 2002; Bryman 
and Bell, 2003). The study follows these two steps in establishing both face and content 
validity.
Firstly, this study, as previously highlighted, depends on risk categories that have been 
previously used by a number of academic researchers in constructing categories used in 
coding voluntary risk reporting. Furthermore, this research depends on EAS 25 and 33 in 
constructing disclosure index for measuring compliance with mandatory risk reporting. 
Secondly, the coding scheme has been reviewed by two independent auditors and 
academics (hereafter referred to as the reviewers) who have the essential and also 
immense experience in the field of financial reporting. Asking those reviewers to examine 
the categories and coding instructions ensures the validity of the coding scheme. 
Regarding the disclosure index of mandatory risk reporting, a preliminary disclosure 
checklist based on EAS 25 and 33 has been prepared. In addition, this list has been 
benchmarked against the disclosure checklist of KPMG and Ernst & Young to ensure 
inclusion of any relevant disclosure item. The reviewers examined the indices and 
removed some items because they believed that these items will not be disclosed by all or 
at least by the majority of Egyptian companies (Hassan, 2009). They removed fair values, 
hedging activities, collateral and derecognition disclosure from the check list of EAS 25 
and removed items such as inter-segment transfers, changes in accounting policies and 
entity share of the net profit (loss),of associates, joint ventures or other investments 
accounted for under the equity methods from the check list of EAS 33. Appendix 2 
presents the final disclosure index of EAS 25 and 33. Regarding the voluntary risk 
reporting, the reviewers checked the categories to be used in this study and confirmed its 




Reliability is the other important criterion by which the quality of a certain research can 
be judged. Establishing reliability is not an easy process because it depends on the 
amount of training, definition of categories and complexity of the coding scheme (Bauer, 
2000).
In the context of a semi-objective approach, Krippendorff (2004) identifies three types 
of reliability: stability, reproducibility and accuracy. Stability refers to the extent to which 
coding the text by only one coder will result in a similar result over time. Reproducibility 
or inter-coder reliability refers to the extent to which replicating coding procedures by 
more than one coder will bring about the same results. Finally, accuracy refers to the 
extent to which coding procedures result in the desired outcomes through assessing the 
coder’s judgement in accordance with a certain standard or norm. The assessment of 
these types of reliability requires different procedures; for example, measuring stability 
requires test re-test procedures, measuring reproducibility requires assessing the 
proportion of coding errors between different coders while measuring accuracy requires 
the existence of a predefined standard (Milne and Adler, 1999). Weber (1990) argues that 
stability is the weakest form of reliability since only one coder codes all the texts while 
accuracy is the strongest form of reliability but it is difficult to measure due to the 
absence of predefined standards or norms. Consequently, reproducibility is quite often 
used in assessing reliability.
Reliability in content analysis covers two key issues, namely reliability of coded data and 
reliability of coding instruments. In order to confirm the reliability of coded data, 
researchers tend to employ multiple coders to code the same texts and report the 
coefficient of agreement between them or use a single coder with sufficient training. In 
order to demonstrate the reliability of coding instruments, researchers tend to establish 
well-defined coding categories and decision rules (Milne and Adler, 1999).
Taking into account that the annual reports under examination are written in Arabic 
besides the availability of well-specified coding categories and decision rules (Konishi and 
Ali, 2007; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Shrives and Linsley, 2003b; Woods and Reber, 
2003), the coding process in this study will be conducted by a single coder. The main 
advantage of employing a single coder is ensuring consistency of the coding process 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002 and 2005; Laidroo, 2009). According to Milne and Adler 
(1999), well-specified coding categories and decision rules will lead to little inconsistency
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when used by relatively inexperienced coders and hence reduce the need for expensive 
use o f multiple coders. Following Ghazali and Weetman (2006), a second round o f  
coding for a sample o f  the annual reports was done after completing the first round to 
ensure consistency and there are non-significant differences between the coding in the 
two rounds. An illustration o f  the coding process is presented in Appendix 3.
6.5.2.5 Population and Sample
In 2006, a total o f  407 companies are listed and traded on the EG X  and comprise the 
initial population for this study. Fifty six financial companies such as banks and insurance 
companies are excluded since they operate under different regulations. In addition 
another company operating in the media sector is excluded due to data unavailability. 
The final population for the year 2006 consists o f 350 non-financial companies. 
Following the same procedure, the population for the year 2007 consists o f 288 non- 
financial companies (see Table 6.3).
Table 6.3: Summary o f  Population
2006 2007
Total o f  listed companies 595 435
Non-traded companies ,)s
Listed and traded companies 407 337
Financial companies (56) (48 )
Media companies w
Non-financial companies 350 288
The quantitative approach tends to use probability sampling in which every individual 
unit in the population has a known, but not necessarily equal, chance to be randomly 
selected in the sample (Burgess, 1982; Ritchie et al., 2003). Therefore, the sampling 
process is predetermined and collecting data starts as soon as units are chosen (Arber,
2001). The main aim o f probability sampling is obtaining a representative sample that 
facilitates statistical inference from sample statistics to population parameters (Patton,
1990). Consequently, probability sampling is usually appropriate for testing-hypotheses 
research (Ritchie et al., 2003). Probability sampling includes simple random sample, 
systematic sampling, stratified sampling, multistage sampling and cluster sampling.
Stratified random sampling aims to produce a more representative and accurate sample 
compared to simple random sampling by confirming that various groups in the 
population are represented in the sample and therefore avoids the over-sampling or 
under-sampling that may take place in simple random sampling (De Vaus, 2002; 
Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996; Riffe et al., 2005). Stratified sampling design 
has three stages. Firstly, the population is divided into relatively homogenous sub-groups
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which are called strata. Secondly, within each stratum, sampling units are randomly 
selected. Finally, the sampling units from all strata are pooled to form the sample 
(Corbetta, 2003; Remenyi et al., 1998). This approach has been followed by Haniffa and 
Cooke (2005) and Holder-Webb et al. (2008). In this study, the strata are identified 
according to the EGX’s sectors classification that classifies listed companies into 17 
sectors. This means that all different sectors, except banks, financial services and media, 
are represented in the sample.
Determining the sample size is influenced by two important factors: the degree of 
accuracy and the extent of variation in the key characteristics of the population (De Vaus,
2002). This study will apply the following formula to determine the sample size that takes 
into account these two factors (Corbetta, 2003; Saunders et al., 2007)1:
where:
S = Sample size required.
N = Number of elements in population.
P = Preliminary estimate of percentage of companies in population who possess the 
attribute of interest.
A = Accuracy desired (for example 5%).
Z = number of standard deviations of the sampling distribution (Z units) that 
correspond to the desired confidence level (1.96 for 95% confidence level and 1.64 for 
90% confidence level).
To run this formula, a researcher should deduce the value of P. Saunders et al. (2007) 
propose the inferring of P from a pilot sample of about 30 observations. This approach 
has been followed by Samaha and Stapleton (2008). In this study, the attribute of interest 
for the sampling process a company should be traded at least for the last 4 years, 30 
companies are drawn randomly, of them 27 companies meet the criteria therefore P= 
90%. Using the following parameters, P= 90%, Z= 1.96, A= 0.05 and N= 350, the 
sample consists of 101 companies. However, it is intended to increase the sample size by 
5%. Therefore, the final sample consists of 106 non-financial companies (see Appendix
1 This formula was developed and published by the American National Education Association in 1960. 
Also some research methodology books publish tables for determining sample size for a given population 
based on this formula (see for example Cohen et al., 2000, p.94 and Sarantakos, 2005, p.173).
s =_ pM )
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4). Due to data availability, only 67 and 72 board o f  directors’ reports were available for 
the years 2006 and 2007 respectively (see Table 6.4).
Table 6.4: Summary of Collected Financial Statements and Board of Directors Reports
Year Financial Statements Board of Directors Reports
2006 106 63
2007 106 72
Due to data availability and difficulties o f data collection discussed in section 6.5.1, it 
seems that disclosure studies in Egypt tend to use a relatively small sample size. Table 6.5 
presents a summary o f  sample size for some disclosure studies.
Table 6.5: Summary of Sample Size for Some Disclosure Studies in Egypt
Study Sample Size Population Percentage of Sample Size
Dahawy and Conover (2002) 15 503 3%
Abd-Elsalam and W eetman (2003) 72 746 9.6%
Samaha and Stapleton (2008) 281 934 30%
This study uses a reasonable sample size compared to other disclosure studies in the 
Egyptian context as it represents 30.3% and 36.8% o f the population in 2006 and 2007 
respectively.
6.5.2.6 Location of Risk Information
Although there are a number o f diverse channels that a company may use to 
communicate financial information including annual reports, media and press releases, 
communications with analysts, companies’ websites, newsletter advertisements and 
announcements and booklets and brochures (Marston and Robson, 1997; Zeghal and 
Ahmed, 1990), this study will focus only on measuring the level and the amount o f  
mandatory and voluntary risk reporting in annual reports for several reasons. First, 
annual reports are the major and most important source o f information that a company 
may use to disseminate financial information to diverse user groups including investors, 
creditors, financial analysts, government agencies and other stakeholders (Deegan and 
Rankin, 1997; Hossain et al., 1994; Neu et al., 1998; Singleton and Globerman, 2002). 
Second, it is difficult to construct a measurement instrument such as a disclosure index 
that captures information disclosed in all various communications channels (Marston and 
Robson, 1997). Third, empirical evidence provides support for the superiority o f annual 
reports as a major source o f  information. Chang et al. (1983) investigate the usefulness o f  
annual reports for three user groups; namely individuals, institutional investors and 
financial analysts from three countries, the US, the UK  and N ew  Zealand. The results 
regarding the importance o f annual reports as a source o f information indicate that both
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individual investors and financial analysts in the US and New Zealand and institutional 
investors across the three countries rank annual reports as the most important source of 
information for investment decisions. More recently, empirical evidence from the Middle 
East region has given similar results. Abu-Nassar and Rutherford (1996), Al-Razeen and 
Karbhari (2004a) and Mirshekary and Saudagaran (2005) investigate user groups’ 
perception of corporate financial information sources in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iran 
respectively, and they point out that different user groups consider annual reports as the 
most important source of information. Mirshekary and Saudagaran (2005) argue that this 
result is instructive and applicable to other countries in the Middle East region due to the 
similarity in their social, political and economic environment.
Although there is increasing use of internet reporting as a vehicle to disseminate 
accounting information to a wide range of users (Marston and Polei, 2004), empirical 
research presents evidence of the low usage of internet reporting by Egyptian companies. 
Salama (2009) examines internet reporting of social responsibility disclosure by the 50 
most active Egyptian listed companies. His final sample consisted of 16 companies since 
he excludes 34 companies for different reasons such as companies without websites and 
companies with websites under construction. In the same vein, Aly et al. (2010) examine 
internet reporting of the 100 most active listed companies. They exclude 36 companies 
with web sites under construction and two insurance companies. Their final sample 
consisted of 62 companies, of them only 35 companies that report voluntary disclosures 
on their websites.
6.5.2.7 Statistical Tests
This section introduces statistical techniques used in data analysis and testing research 
hypotheses. From a statistical point of view, data can be classified regarding the level of 
measurement it represents into four groups, namely nominal (categorical) scale, ordinal 
scale, interval scale and ratio scale (Sheskin, 2004). The first two groups are called 
nonparametric data and the last two groups are called parametric data and this 
classification has a significant impact on what data can represent and how data could be 
analysed (Hair et al., 2006). This section discusses univariate, bivariate and multivariate 




Many researchers emphasise the importance of exploring the data as a first and essential 
step in statistical analysis (Bryman and Cramer, 2005). It is important to understand the 
nature of the distribution shape of the variables under examination (Hair et al., 2006). 
Therefore, it is recommended that statistical analysis should begin with descriptive 
statistics and graphs (Myers and Well, 2003) such as location, dispersion measures and 
distribution shape (Barrow, 2006). These descriptive statistics include mean, standard 
deviation, range, skewness and kurtosis measures while graphs include boxplot, 
histogram, and normal probability plot. These descriptive statistics and graphs will assist 
in examining individual variables using a set of complementary methods, gaining a 
reasonable idea regarding the precise form of data distribution and assessing normality 
assumption (Hair et al., 2006). In addition, these descriptive statistics and graphs provide 
an in-depth examination of the data and hence assist in discovering any potential 
problems that may have a negative impact on statistical analysis (Myers and Well, 2003).
6.5.2.7.2 Bivariate Analysis
In bivariate analysis, the main concern is studying the relationship or differences between 
a pair of variables. For testing association between variables, Pearson’s product moment 
correlation coefficient, the r coefficient, which is designed for interval/ratio scale or 
Spearman’s coefficient of rank correlation, the rho coefficient, which is designed for 
ordinal scale could be used. The use of these two tests depends on satisfying certain 
assumptions regarding the distribution of the variables. Regardless of which test is 
employed, the coefficient of correlation produces a value between -1 and +1 where -1 
means perfect negative association, +1 means perfect positive association and zero 
means no relationship between the two variables. However, it is recommended to 
examine a scatterplot of the relationship between variables before computing the 
coefficient of correlation because a scatterplot is a powerful diagnostic tool for any non­
linear relationship between variables. Scatterplot assists in discovering the direction, 
strength of the relationship and whether the relationship is linear or not. If the 
relationship between the variables is nonlinear the use of the Pearson product moment 
correlation coefficient is inappropriate and yields meaningless results and it is preferable 
to use the Spearman coefficient of rank correlation (Bryman and Cramer, 2006; Peers,
2006). Moreover, Myers and Well (2003) argue that Spearman’s rho coefficient is more 
resistant than Pearson’s r coefficient because it eliminates the importance of extreme 
values.
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In order to examine the differences between variables in independent samples, the t-test 
(parametric test) or the Mann-Whitney test (non-parametric test) could be used while the 
t-test or the Wilcoxon Signed ranks test could be employed for related samples. The 
choice between these tests depends on satisfying several assumptions regarding the 
distribution of the data such as normality and homogeneity of variance assumptions. 
Hair et al. (2006) indicate that the aforementioned univariate and bivariate techniques will 
assist in:
• Attaining basic understanding of the data and relationships between variables.
• Ensuring whether the data satisfy the requirement of multivariate analysis.
• Ensuring that the results of statistical analysis are valid and accurate.
6.5.2.7.3 Multivariate Analysis
Multivariate analysis is a group of statistical methods that simultaneously analyse multiple 
measurements on the variables under examination (Hair et al., 2006). One of the most 
widely used multivariate techniques in social science is multiple regression. Multiple 
regression is a statistical method for simultaneous examination of the relationships 
between a set of independent variables (predictors) and a single dependent variable 
(response) (Dewberry, 2004; Landau and Everitt, 2004). Therefore, multiple regression 
assists in investigating the impact of certain independent variables on the dependent 
variable while controlling for other independent variables (Allison, 1999).
The dependent variable should be a quantitative continuous unbounded variable (Field,
2005) and the independent variable(s) should be quantitative or categorical variables. 
Categorical independent variable(s) could be transformed to a set of dichotomous 
variables by employing dummy variable coding. The rule for transforming categorical 
variables is that K of categories should be represented by K-l dummy variables to avoid 
perfect multicolinearity (Allison, 1999; Ho, 2006). Multiple regression technique is based 
on basic assumptions (Field, 2005, Hair et al., 2006; Ho, 2006):
1. Linearity which refers to a linear relationship between dependent and 
independent variables.
2. Normality which implies that the residuals (error term) are normally distributed 
with a mean of zero and a common variance of a2.
3. Homoscedasticity which refers to equal variance of residuals. This means that the 
variability of residuals at one value of the independent variable is approximately 
the same at other levels of the independent variable.
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Checking the aforementioned assumptions and satisfying them is a crucial step in the 
data analysis process because the validity of multiple regression results depends strongly 
on meeting those assumptions (Allison, 1999). For example, the violation of the 
normality or the Homoscedasticity assumption will result in invalid, too stringent or too 
insensitive, hypotheses tests while the violation of the linearity assumption may 
underestimate the actual strength of the relationship between variables (Hair et al., 2006).
In order to test and check multiple regression assumptions, it is recommended to employ 
a plot of standardised residuals against the standardised predicted value, histogram and 
normal probability plot of the residuals to check the assumptions 1 to 3 (Field, 2005). In 
addition, Ramsey’s RESET Test will be used to test the functional form of a regression 
model. This test aims to capture any non-linearity in the regression model by introducing 
different forms of predicted values of dependent variable as regressors and test whether 
the increase in R2 is statistically significant. The null hypothesis of this test is a correct 
linear specification of the regression function and rejecting the null hypothesis indicates a 
misspecification of a linear function (Gujarati, 2003; Heij et al., 2004; Verbeek, 2004). 
Furthermore, the Breusch-Pagan test and Cook-Weisberg tests will be used to test the 
homoscedasticity assumption. The null hypothesis of these two tests is a constant 
variance and rejecting the null hypothesis indicates a violation of the homogeneity 
assumption. The Ramsey’s RESET Test, the Breusch-Pagan test and the Cook-Weisberg 
are available in STATA software.
Statisticians recommend data transformation to mitigate problems arising from the 
violation of the basic assumptions of multiple linear regression (Allison, 1999; Chatterjee 
and Hadi, 2006). Data transformation assists in satisfying the underlying assumptions of 
multivariate techniques and improving the correlation between variables (Hair et al.,
2006). Data transformation includes using logarithms, logit, inverse, square root, cubed 
and squared approaches.
In addition, collinearity is an important issue that should be examined carefully in 
multiple linear regression. Collinearity is a matter of the extent not existence of a 
problem (Gujarati, 2003). Collinearity refers to high correlation between two or more 
independent variables in the multiple regression model (Hair et al., 2006). Due to 
collinearity, a certain independent variable may explain relatively little variance of the 
dependent variable because the independent variable shares much of its variance with 
other independent variables (Dewberry, 2004) and this diminishes the predictive power
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of independent variables (Hair et al., 2006). Traditionally, collinearity could be checked 
by examining a correlation matrix of all independent variables for any highly correlated 
independent variables. It is suggested that a correlation of 0.8 or more may be a matter 
for concern (Field, 2005; Gujarati, 2003). The main disadvantage of this simple method is 
the possibility that the bivariate correlation may conceal serious collinearity among 
variables. Although the correlation matrix may reveal a low correlation between a pair of 
independent variables, collinearity may still be a potential problem (Allison, 1999; 
Gujarati, 2003). A more precise, formal and more frequendy used measure of collinearity 
is the variance inflation factor (VIF) which refers to the degree to which each 
independent variable is explained by other independent variables in a multiple regression 
model (Hair et al., 2006). As a rule of thumb, it is suggested that a VIF value of 10 or 
above indicates a serious collinearity problem in the regression model (Field, 2005; 
Gujarati, 2003; Hair et al., 2006; Paulson, 2007). Moreover, A Condition index is a 
powerful measure to detect collinearity. Through principle components approach, sets of 
linear combination of independent variables are constructed and the variability, 
eigenvalue, accounted for by each of the component is determined. A condition index 
for each component is the square root of the highest eigenvalue divided by the 
eigenvalue for that component. Belsley et al. (1980) suggest that a condition index greater 
than 15 indicates a possible collinearity problem while a value greater than 30 indicates a 
serious problem. Myers and Well (2003, p.665) suggest that if one or more of the 
eigenvalue is zero this indicates that one or more of the variables is completely redundant.
Another aspect that should be examined cautiously is identifying influential observations, 
outliers and leverage points. Influential observations are observations that have 
inconsistent impact on the regression model. Outliers are observations with large residual 
value and which differ from the general trend of the data. Leverage points are 
observations that have undue impact over regression model coefficients because they 
differ from other observations regarding their independent variable values (Hair et al., 
2006; Field, 2005).
Outliers could be detected graphically by plotting standardised or studentised residuals 
for each observation and identifying observations with standardised or studentised 
residuals larger than 2 or by using values corresponding to t values (Chatterjee and Hadi, 
2004; Hair et al., 2006). For instance, it is expected that 5% of standardised or 
studentised residuals are outside the range 11| —< 2  (Fox 1991).
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Leverage points could be detected by a leverage measure (the hat value) which assesses 
the influence of the observed value of the independent variable over the predicted value 
of the dependent variable. The leverage value lies between 0 (no impact) and 1 (complete 
impact) with an average value of (K + ^ /n 1 (Field, 2005). It is recommended to examine 
cases with a leverage value greater than twice the average [2(K+l)/n] (Belsley et al., 
1980). With regard to influential points, there are several measures that could be used to 
assess the impact of these influential observations upon the regression model such as 
(Chatterjee and Hadi, 2006; Field, 2005; Hair et al., 2006; Fox, 1991):
• DIFFit: DIFFit refers to the difference between adjusted predicted value 
(obtained by excluding the observation) and original predicted value (obtained by 
including the observation). If the observation has no large impact on the 
regression model the difference should be small. It is recommended to examine
the observation that its | DIFFit | exceeds the threshold 2 -yJ(K + Y)/(n — K  — I) .
• DIFBeta: DIFBeta refers to the influence of deleting a single observation on the 
parameters of the regression model. Observations with | DIFBeta | exceeds 1 
may be a cause for concern because of undue influence over model parameters.
• Cook Distance: Cook Distance is the most representative measure of the impact 
of a single observation on the overall fit of the regression model. It is 
recommended that an observation with a Cook Distance greater than 4/n-k-l 
should be examined.
Finally, all these diagnostics tools should be used in assessing the robustness and 
predictive ability of a regression model and should not be used as a justification for 
removing observations from the data analysis (Field, 2005). Belsley et al. (1980, p. 15) 
note that:
There is room for misuse of the ... procedures. High-influence data points could conceivably 
be removed solely to effect a desired change in a particular estimated coefficient, its t-values 
or some other regression output.
Hair et al. (2006) emphasise the importance of evaluating outliers, leverage and influential 
observations in terms of the context of analysis and the information they provide. Finally, 
the analysis of variance or Kruskal-Wallis test, a non-parametric test, could be used to 
test the differences between three or more groups of sample data.
1 K is the number of independent variables in regression model while n is the sample si2e.
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6.5.3 Primary Data Collection Method
This section presents the main features of a semi-structured interview as a method for 
collecting primary data. It also discusses the process of interviewing, the credibility and 
dependability of qualitative interviewing, interviewees’ selection process, qualitative data 
analysis and ethical considerations.
6.5.3.1 Semi-structured Interview
Interviewing is one of the methods most extensively used in social science to collect 
primary data. There are many types of interviews; at one end is the structured interview 
and at the other end of the continuum is the unstructured interview (Seidman, 1998). 
The choice among them depends on the philosophical position, research design (Healey 
and Rawlinson, 1994), research objectives and research purpose (Corbetta, 2003).
In a structured interview, the interviewer employs a predetermined and standardised set 
of questions. The interviewer’s role is to ask each interviewee the same questions with 
the same words and in the same order (Corbetta, 2003; Saunders et al., 2007) and to 
record the answers on a pre-coded answers schedule (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). This type 
of interview aims to provide all respondents with an identical interviewing situation 
(Bryman and Bill, 2003). Consequently, any differences between interviewees’ answers 
are related to real differences not to the interview context itself (May, 1997). The basic 
assumptions of this type of interview are that each question has identical meaning to 
every interviewee (Rubin and Rubin, 1995) and each interviewee essentially has the same 
motivation (Corbetta, 2003; Bryman and Bell, 2003). These assumptions facilitate 
comparability between answers as well as generalisation to the population as a whole 
through using a representative sample (May, 1997).
In an unstructured interview, a researcher does not have a structured list of questions to 
ask; instead he/she has only a list of themes or topics that should be explored during the 
course of conversation (Bryman and Bell, 2003; Saunders et al., 2007). Unstructured 
interviews enable the respondents to discuss spontaneously their opinions, experience 
and reactions on a certain issue using their own frame of reference. In unstructured 
interviews, both questions and answers are un-standardised and are not systematically 
pre-coded (Ghauri and Gr0nhaug, 2002). Therefore, unstructured interviews pay more 
attention to the respondents’ point of view and focus on meaning rather than 
quantification and comparability of answers (May, 1997).
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In a semi-structured interview, an interviewer has a series of themes and questions to be 
explored during the course of the interview. The order of the themes and questions may 
vary from one interview to another; also the interviewer has the chance to add or remove 
questions depending on interview context (Bryman and Bell, 2003; Saunders et al., 2007). 
The semi-structured interviews permit the interviewer to ask for more clarification and 
elaboration if the answers are ambiguous and to probe for more in-depth answers 
(Corbetta, 2003). The semi-structured interview permits the respondents to provide their 
answers in their own words but at the same time it permits greater comparability than 
unstructured interviews (May, 1997). In a semi-structured interview a series of open- 
ended questions are used with no predetermined answers and the respondent is free to 
choose any direction he/she prefers (Seidman, 1998). This type of question allows the 
interviewee to respond spontaneously and hence new answers may emerge. Moreover, it 
assists in exploring new themes and recognising the respondent’s levels of knowledge 
and understanding of the issues under examination (Bryman and Bell, 2003).
The above discussion highlights the fact that both the questions’ content and their form 
are important factors in distinguishing between different types of interviews. In 
structured interviews both the content and form of questions are predetermined while in 
unstructured interviews they are not predetermined. In semi-structured interviews the 
content but not the form of question is predetermined (Corbetta, 2003).
The semi-structured interview is considered a relevant method particularly when the 
centre of investigation focuses on the reasons that lie behind a certain phenomenon 
(Healey and Rawlinson, 1994). Thus the semi-structured interview is a suitable research 
method for this study because it will assist in identifying the factors that hinder the 
presentation of mandatory and voluntary risk reporting. Semi-structured interviews assist 
in exploring certain topics in more depth and providing substance and texture to the 
topic under examination by adding illustrative evidence to the quantitative results 
(Corbetta, 2003). It permits the interviewer to get a comprehensive idea of the 
respondents’ point of view because it allows the respondents to answer in their own 
language without any restrictions. Moreover, It provides the interviewer with the chance 
to get more elaboration, to follow-up respondents’ answers and to explore factors that 
underpin respondents’ opinions and beliefs (Ghauri and Gr0nhaug, 2002; Legard et al.,
2003). Furthermore, the semi-structured interview is a flexible method; it can be utilised 
in different empirical situations and shaped according to the context of the interview 
itself so that the interviewer is able to react to themes that emerge during the course of
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interview (Corbetta, 2003; Legard et al., 2003). The semi-structured interview is a 
reasonably effective method of investigation when the concern is investigating relations 
and interactions rather than identifying patterns. Also, it is a very effective research 
method when interviewees’ experiences are widely varying (Healey and Rawlinson, 1994).
However, the semi-structured interview has some disadvantages. It depends heavily on 
the interviewer’s conversational skills and in addition data analysis and interpretation are 
difficult processes (Ghauri and Gr0nhaug, 2002; Patton, 1990). It require much more 
effort to first gain access and contact, then conduct the interviews, and finally analyse the 
data and report the findings (Seidman, 1998).
6.5.3.2 The Process of Interviewing
In a semi-structured interview, a researcher should take into consideration the following 
issues: an interview guide, rapport, probing and interview recording.
In semi-structured interviews, it is usually recommended that the researcher uses an 
interview guide. This is a checklist of themes, topics or detailed questions to be explored 
in the interview (Kvale, 1996). The underlying purpose of an interview guide is to 
provide the interviewer with guidelines and to ensure that the basic information is 
obtained from all interviewees (Patton, 1990). In preparing an interview guide, questions 
should be well crafted to facilitate getting relevant responses to research questions; 
questions should also be worded using understandable and relevant language for all the 
interviewees (Bryman and Bell, 2003).
An interview guide assists in establishing a systematic and comprehensive interview 
across a number of different interviewees, keeping the interaction between participants 
focused but not overlooking interviewees’ perspectives and allowing them to be 
expressed so that the interviewer can use the limited time more efficiently (Patton, 1990). 
This study’s interview guide consists of four sections as follows (see Appendix 5):
Section 1: Introduction.
Section 2: Background information.
Section 3: Factors that may impede compliance with mandatory risk reporting and 
presentation of voluntary of risk-related information.
Section 4: Conclusion of the interview.
As regards rapport, it is recommended that the interviewer should establish a relationship 
of trust and rapport with the interviewees which ensures their complete cooperation
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during the interview (Corbetta, 2003). Rapport is a relationship that encourages 
interviewees to enthusiastically participate in the interview (Bryman and Bell, 2003). 
Rapport could be established at the beginning of the interview through introducing the 
purpose and importance of the study and ensuring full confidentiality and anonymity. 
Better rapport will result in obtaining rich, in-depth and useful information (Ghauri and 
Gr0nhaug, 2002). The interviewer should establish an appropriate and balanced rapport 
since an over-emphasised rapport may cause confusion to the interviewee and could 
bring undesired results (Seidman, 1998).
Probing is an important issue in semi-structured interviews. The semi-structured 
interviews allow the interviewer to probe and hence to enhance the richness of responses 
particularly when the interviewees do not completely understand the questions or do not 
provide comprehensive answers (Bryman and Bell, 2003; Legard et al., 2003). Probing 
can serve three underlying functions, namely identifying the desired level of answers, 
clarifying any vagueness or completing missing information and indicating that the 
interviewer pays attention to the interviewee’s answers (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). 
Consequently, probing may result in discovering new themes which are important for 
understanding the phenomenon under investigation and obtaining appropriate answers 
to research questions (Saunders et al., 2007).
Finally, recording the interview is one of the most important aspects to be discussed with 
the interviewee. It is recommended that the interview is tape-recorded whenever feasible. 
An interviewer should concentrate on what is being said by the interviewee, probing and 
following-up rather than concentrating on taking notes on what is being said (Bryman 
and Bell, 2003). Recording the interview maintains the respondent’s answers in their 
original, accurate and complete form and permits the interviewer to pay more attention 
to the conversation (Legard et al., 2003). However, recording the interview may bring 
undesired results by preventing free expression during the interview (Corbetta, 2003).
This study began the interview by introducing the research objectives, importance and 
ethical considerations. The main aim of this introduction is to establish a well-balanced 
rapport and to remove any misunderstanding regarding the meaning and purpose of the 
research especially where the tradition of research is not well-established (Hatem, 1994). 
In addition, the researcher uses the interview guide to control the course of the interview 
without overlooking the importance of probing questions. Finally, in respect of interview 
recording, similar to Kamel (2006) and Hassan (2008), the researcher was not allowed to
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record the interviews; therefore notes were recorded mainly during and immediately after 
the course of each interview.
6.5.3.3 Credibility and Dependability
Applying validity and reliability as previously highlighted in positivism/quantitative 
research is inappropriate for interpretivism/qualitative research due to the major 
differences between them. Stenbacka (2001) argues that quantitative and qualitative 
researches have fundamentally different purposes; quantitative research aims to generate 
explanation while qualitative research aims to generate understanding. These differences 
support the need to redefine validity and reliability in the context of qualitative research.
Consequently, researchers have called for distinct concepts for validity and reliability in 
quantitative and qualitative research (LeCompte and Goet2, 1982). In other words, each 
approach should be assessed on its own paradigm’s terms (Healy and Perry, 2000). 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) propose two important concepts and several strategies that aim 
to define and establish the quality of qualitative research. They propose the use of 
credibility and dependability in qualitative research which are analogous to validity and 
reliability in quantitative research.
6.5.3.3.1 Credibility
Credibility in qualitative research refers to accuracy, correctness or genuineness (Robson,
2002). Credibility is related to concepts such as honesty, triangulation and data richness 
(Cohen et al., 2000). It is important to identify sources of potential bias that may threaten 
credibility before addressing strategies that aim to establish it. Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
argue that researcher bias and respondent bias are the most important sources of bias in 
qualitative research.
On the one hand, researcher bias refers to the influence of a researcher’s values, frame of 
reference, pre-conceptions and assumptions about the inquiry process. Researcher bias 
takes place when a researcher intentionally selects respondents who may agree with 
his/her ontological and epistemological position (Padgett, 1998) or deliberately selects 
the data to be analysed and reported (Robson, 2002). On the other hand, respondent bias 
has many forms that lie between two extremes; reluctance and helpfulness. Respondents 
may refuse to give information in order to defend their privacy or may enthusiastically 
provide answers that, they believe, will help a researcher (Padgett, 1998; Robson, 2002).
In interviewing, Oppenheim (1996) suggests a number of potential sources of bias such 
as inappropriate sampling, poor rapport, poor interview management, biased prompting
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and poor probes, biased coding process, biased transcripts recording and inappropriate 
managing of problematic interviews. Therefore, minimising these threats contributes to 
enhanced credibility (Cohen et al., 2000).
Lincoln and Guba (1985) propose some strategies for enhancing credibility including 
prolonged engagement, triangulation and member check. Prolonged engagement entails 
spending sufficient time in order to achieve objectives such as understanding phenomena 
and context and establishing trust between the researcher and respondents. Building trust 
is a crucial strategy to minimise deception and hence maximise credibility (Padgett, 1998; 
Flick, 2002). Moreover, member check is one of the most important strategies for 
enhancing credibility (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) through minimising researcher bias 
(Padgett, 1998). Member check entails validation of transcripts, codes, interpretations 
and conclusions by referring back to respondents. This study tends to use rapport, place 
the participants in context and check the experience and comments of each interviewee 
against those of other interviewees as appropriate procedures to enhance credibility 
(Seidman, 1998).
6.5.3.3.2 Dependability
Dependability in qualitative research refers to fidelity to context, specific situations, 
authenticity, integrity, data richness and depth and meaningfulness (Cohen et al., 2000). 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) believe that creating an audit trail is one of the most important 
strategies to achieve dependability. Auditing is ‘an exercise in reflexivity, which involves 
the provision of a methodologically self-critical account of how the research was done’ 
(Seale, 1999, p.468). According to this strategy an auditor reviews the data such as 
transcripts and field notes, data collection, reduction and analysis process, results and 
result reports, interpretations, recommendations and decisions taken by the researcher 
(Flick, 2002). The underlying aim of auditing is ensuring that the proper procedures have 
been employed (Bryman and Bell, 2003). Establishing an effective audit trail in qualitative 
research requires sufficient documentation for every individual step in data collection, 
coding and analysis (Padgett, 1998).
Since documentation is at the heart of dependability, the researcher will keep clear 
documents that prescribe each step in the research process to facilitate an audit trail. 
Moreover, as suggested by Flick (2002), this study will use the first interview to review 
the interview guide, generate new interview questions (if any) and enable training.
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6.5.3.4 Interviewees Selection Process
The qualitative approach tends to use non-probability sampling in which there is no 
technique to identify the probability of every individual unit to be included in the sample 
(Burgess, 1982). This means that the probability of selection is unknown and some units 
have zero probability of being included in the sample (Arber, 2001). The main aim of 
non-probability sampling is selecting information-rich units which are able to provide 
rich and in-depth insights regarding research questions (Patton, 1990) and therefore a 
non-probability sample is mosdy relevant in exploratory research (Remenyi et al., 1998). 
Ritchie et al. (2003, p.78) summarise the basic features of non-probability sampling as 
follows:
Units are deliberately selected to reflect particular features of or groups within the sampled 
population. The sample is not intended to be statistically representative: the chances of 
selection for each element are unknown but, instead, the characteristics of the population 
are used as the basis of selection.
Qualitative research is likely to use non-probability sampling for several reasons. First, 
the underlying assumptions of qualitative research are extremely different from those of 
quantitative research. Second, a statistically representative sample tends to be large and 
this makes the use of qualitative methods time-consuming. Third, statistically 
representative data provide superficial data and this may impede the in-depth 
examination required by qualitative research (Mason, 2002). Fourth, non-probability 
sampling is a preferred choice for studying a specific issue or phenomenon in a great 
focus and depth (Mason, 2002). Fifth, non-probability sampling is advised for 
convenience and limited resources or when the sampling population is inadequately 
defined or a sampling frame is unavailable (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). 
Mason (2002, pp.137-138) defines purposive sampling as:
a set of procedures where the researcher manipulates their data generation, analysis, theory 
and sampling activities interactively during the research process, to a much greater extent 
than in statistical sampling. This sampling strategy is intended to facilitate a process 
whereby researchers generate and test theory from the analysis of their data (inductive 
reasoning) rather than using data to test out or falsify a pre-existing theory (deductive 
reasoning).
In purposive sampling researchers can choose among a variety of different sampling 
techniques one of which is stratified purposive sampling. Stratified purposive sampling is
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a technique that aims to examine differences related to a particular theme or event. 
Sample units are chosen because they have unique attributes and experience which assist 
in intensive exploration of that theme or event. The sample has been built according to 
certain criteria in order to yield a sample that is theoretically and empirically meaningful 
(Mason, 2002) and therefore the knowledge and experience of interviewees are necessary 
criteria in selection process in order to obtain more in-depth insights regarding research 
questions (Remenyi et al., 1998). In line with these conditions, the interviewees in this 
study are selected on the following criteria:
• They should have the required and the essential knowledge and experience in the 
field of financial reporting and accounting standards.
• They are willing and enthusiastic to be interviewed.
The main aim of purposive sampling is theoretical not statistical generalisation (Mason,
2002). Consequently, in purposive sampling the main focus is whether the sample 
provides adequate access to the relevant data or not rather than sample size. Patton 
(1990, p. 184) confirms this point by stating that:
There are no rulesfor sample si%e in qualitative inquiry. Sample si%e depends on what you 
want to know, the purpose of the inquiry, whafs at stake, what will be useful, what will 
have credibility, and what can be done with available time and resources.
Since there is no determined sample size in qualitative research, researchers in qualitative 
research seek for some criteria to guide them in determining the relevant number of 
respondents. Seidman (1998) proposes two criteria for this purpose; sufficiency and 
saturation. On the one hand, sufficiency refers to interviewing a reasonable number of 
participants that can reflect the population and present the diversity in participants’ 
education, work experience and work position. On the other hand, saturation refers to 
the point at which the interviewer gets no new insights and answers. Beside these two 
criteria, the available time and resources are also important factors (Patton, 1990). Kvale 
(1996, p. 102) supports this argument and indicates that ‘in current interview studies, the 
number of interviews tend to be around 15 ±10. This number may be due to a 
combination of the time and resources available for the investigation and of the law of 
diminishing return’.
In this study, the main target is interviewing academics, external auditors, financial 
managers besides the CMA, the EGX and the EIoD disclosure department officers. The 
researcher contacted staff from two leading Egyptian universities who are interested and
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experienced in financial reporting; this contact brought three interviews. In addition, the 
researcher contacted auditing firms that are affiliated with international auditing firms, 
namely the Egyptian partners of Deloitte and Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, Mazars, 
RSM International, PricewaterhouseCoopers and Russell Bedford. Contact with those 
firms resulted in six interviews since one of the firms did not respond to several 
approaches. The researcher sought the help of these firms to arrange interviews or 
provide contact details of financial managers among their clients who can satisfy the 
interviewing criteria. Only three auditing firms provided contact details of five financial 
managers. However, after contacting them several attempts, only two financial managers 
agreed to be interviewed. Finally, the researcher contacted the CMA, the EGX and the 
EIoD requesting an interview with officers from their disclosure departments. After 
several attempts, they allowed the researcher to interview four of their officers. In 
summary, given time and financial resource constraints, the researcher conducted 15 
interviews. The qualification and experience of each interviewee is presented as follows 
(see Table 6.6):
Table 6.6: Interviewees Groups
Interviewees Interviewee
Code
Position Qualification Years of 
experience























Diploma in auditing and 
financial accounting 
Diploma in auditing and 
financial accounting 
Diploma in auditing and 
financial accounting 
Diploma in Tax, auditing and 
financial accounting 


















Diploma in financial accounting 
MBA












Master in accounting and 
finance 





In semi-structured interviews, interviewing a restricted number of participants seems to 
be the norm in accounting research in Egypt. For example, Hanafi and Gray (2005), 
Kamel (2006) and Hassan (2008) interviewed 12,16 and 12 participants respectively.
6.5.3.5 Qualitative Data Analysis
The non-standardised and complex nature of qualitative data has significant 
consequences for the analysis process (Saunders et al., 2007). The collection and analysis 
of qualitative data is an interactive cyclical process (Miles and Huberman, 1994). In 
addition, data analysis is not an easy task but requires special skills. Spencer et al. (2003, 
p. 199) indicate that:
A.najysis is a challenging and exciting stage of the qualitative research process. It requires a 
mix of creativity and tystematic searching, a blend of inspiration and diligent detection.
Consequendy, there is no agreed and standardised procedure regarding how qualitative 
analysis should be performed (Sarantakos, 2005). This in turn results in diverse 
approaches which differ in the aim and focus of the analytical process (Spencer et al.,
2003). Saunders et al. (2007) propose general procedures for the analysis process 
including categorisation, data unitising, recognising and developing categories and 
developing and testing theories to reach conclusions.
There is a general consensus that the coding process is a major part of qualitative data 
analysis (Bryman and Bell, 2003). Codes are tags and labels used for assigning units of 
meaning to collected data (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Dey (1993) argues that coding is 
an essential means to identify what is being analysed and to make meaningful 
comparisons between different cases and variables. The coding process is a crucial step 
in data management which facilitates data labelling, storing and retrieving (Savenye and 
Robinson, 2004). Categories used in data analysis should satisfy two aspects (Dey, 1993). 
First, they should be meaningful in relation to the data (internal aspect). Second, they 
should be meaningful in relation to other categories (external aspect).
Generally, there are two approaches for generating categories, namely the deductive and 
inductive approach. The deductive approach tends to use a theoretical perspective or 
prior research in establishing categories in advance. It depends on pre-determined 
categories in the coding process (Dey, 1993; Saunders et al., 2007). The main advantages 
of this approach are supporting the connection between the research and the existing 
body of literature and providing an initial framework for data analysis (Saunders et al., 
2007). One of the examples of the deductive approach is a pattern matching proposed
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by Yin (2003). This approach involves comparing an empirically based pattern with a 
predicted pattern based on a predetermined theoretical proposition to explain the 
expected findings.
On the other hand, the inductive approach aims to generate categories from the data 
itself without the use of any pre-determined theoretical perspective or prior work 
(Saunders et al., 2007). This approach is suitable for cases where data cannot be allocated 
using pre-determined categories (Dey, 1993) and hence it facilitates exploring the data 
and identifying the themes and issues to be examined (Saunders et al., 2007). One of the 
examples of the inductive approach is the data matrix approach proposed by Miles and 
Huberman (1994). They argue that qualitative data analysis comprises the following 
simultaneous activities: data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing and 
verification. Data reduction refers to ‘the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, 
abstracting and transforming the data that appear in written-up field notes or 
transcriptions, (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 10). First, data reduction facilitates the 
analysis process by focusing, sharpening and organising data and allows detailed 
examination of selected cases (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Savenye and Robinson, 2004). 
Data reduction includes activities such as summarising, coding, themes identification, 
making clusters and partitions and writing memos. Second, data display is another 
important step in qualitative data analysis. A display is ‘an organised, compressed 
assembly of information that permits conclusion drawing and action’ (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994, p. 11). Data display aims to organise reduced data in a visual display 
(Saunders et al. 2007). Data display is an important tool for understanding, explaining 
and exploring the phenomena under investigation (Walliman, 2006). Data display may 
take forms such as matrices and networks. Moreover, data display is important step for 
the validity of qualitative analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Third, conclusion 
drawing and verification aims to search for the meaning of the data, regularities and 
patterns, explanations, causal relationships and propositions (Miles and Huberman, 
1994). In other words, this activity aims to recognise key themes and trends in the data 
and make comparisons between cases (Saunders et al., 2007, Savenye and Robinsons,
2004) and it examines the data for their plausibility, sturdiness and confirmability (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994).
A data matrix is a table with identified rows and columns where data are fitted into the 
cells (Saunders et al., 2007). The main purpose of a data matrix is to provide a general 
description and a comparative analysis for the cases under investigation (Nadin and
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Cassell, 2004). It assists in assembling research questions and explanations more easily 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). The presentation of data matrices allows comparisons 
between and across different cases (Walliman, 2006). Moreover, a data matrix approach 
assists a researcher to focus on and organise the data more coherently (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994), provides accessibility to a massive amount of qualitative data (Nadin 
and Cassell, 2004) and provides a formal and systematic approach for qualitative data 
analysis (Saunders et al., 2007).
Finally, Dey (1993) and Saunders et al. (2007) point to the possibility of combining 
deductive and inductive approaches in one research. They acknowledge the importance 
of research and interview questions as a vital source of ideas for generating categories. In 
addition, they suggest the modification of categories to ensure their sufficiency and 
comprehensiveness to fit the data. This study follows the recommendations of Dey 
(1993) and Saunders et al. (2007) and employs both deductive and inductive approaches 
to derive categories used in qualitative data analysis. Based on prior studies regarding the 
factors that impede the presentation of mandatory and voluntary disclosure, this research 
aims to generate deductively these factors. In addition, based on the data itself, it aims to 
generate inductively themes regarding the factors that the interviewees mentioned in 
their responses. An illustration of coding and data matrix is presented in Appendix 6.
6.5.3.6 Research Ethics and Ethical Considerations
Growing attention has been given to the ethical aspects of social research and the 
commitments that researchers should fulfil to protect those who participate in or are 
affected by an inquiry (Cohen et al., 2000). Ethical issues arise at each phase of social 
research such as research design, data collection and analysis and reporting of findings 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003; Sekaran, 2003). For example, in qualitative interviews 
establishing rapport and encouraging interviewees to talk results in serious ethical 
obligations (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). It is important that a researcher ensures that the 
research is methodologically sound and ethically defensible (Saunders et al., 2007). Ethics 
refers to a code of conduct or expected societal norms of behaviour regarding the rights 
of those who participate in or are affected by research (Saunders et al., 2007; Sekaran
2003). This code ensures that the research will be conducted ethically and will result in 
no harm or adverse consequences to participants (Cooper and Schindler, 2008). De Vaus 
(2002) argues that most professional codes of ethics highlight the following pillars; 
voluntary participation, informed consent, no harm, anonymity, confidentiality and 
privacy.
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Voluntary participation means that participants should understand that their participation 
in the research is completely voluntary so they can withdraw at any time without giving a 
reason (De Vausv 2002). Informed consent means that a researcher should provide 
potential participants with as much information as might be needed to make an informed 
decision regarding their participation in a study (Bryman and Bell, 2003). Informed 
consent secures effective cooperation between a researcher and the participants 
(Zikmund, 2000). Most professional codes of ethics encourage researchers to obtain a 
signed informed consent statement (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). This statement contains 
relevant information regarding:
• The nature, purpose and basic procedures of the study.
• Basic features of the research design.
• The identity of the researcher.
• A description of the potential benefits and reasonably anticipated risks of the 
study.
• A confirmation regarding voluntary participation, confidentiality and anonymity 
(De Vaus, 2002; Kvale, 1996; Sarantakos, 2005).
No harm means that a research should not entail any procedures that can cause harm to 
participants (Sarantakos, 2005). For example, a researcher should not exercise any 
pressures on potential participants to gain access (Saunders et al., 2007) or ask any 
questions that can distress or embarrass the participant and therefore cause psychological 
harm (De Vaus, 2002). Anonymity means that information provided by the participants 
should in no circumstances reveal their identity (Cohen et al., 2000). One means to attain 
anonymity, ensures that the respondent’s name should not appear on the research 
instrument or the data (Sarantakos, 2005). Confidentiality means that the reported 
findings will neither include the respondents’ names nor make it possible for the 
information to be traced back to a particular respondent (Sarantakos, 2005). Therefore, 
private data identifying the participant will not be reported (Kvale, 1996) and no one 
except the researcher will gain access to these data (Seidman, 1998). Ensuring 
confidentiality will improve the quality and honesty of responses, encourage participation 
in the study and protect participants’ privacy (De Vaus, 2002). Finally, privacy means that 
a researcher should not intrude into the private affairs of the respondent or disregard a 
respondent’s values and beliefs (Bryman and Bell, 2003).
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Cardiff Business School is keen to ensure that all research being undertaken within the 
school is ethically sound and therefore any research should be approved, on ethical 
grounds, by the School’s ethics committee before a candidate can collect the data. In this 
study, an application form, a copy of the interview guide and informed consent forms 
have been submitted to and approved by the ethics committee.
In this study, the researcher has taken several precautions to ensure that the study is 
ethically sensible and defensible. At the beginning of the interview, the researcher 
ensured that the participants were well informed regarding the purpose and objectives of 
the study and potential benefits of the study. The researcher explicidy informed the 
participants that their participation is entirely voluntary and hence they had the right to 
withdraw at any time, refuse to answer any question they wished not to answer or 
withhold any part of the interview data they choose (Seidman, 1998). As required by the 
ethics committee, the participants signed off two forms; anonymous and confidential 
data (see Appendix 5). To ensure anonymity and confidentiality, transcription was done 
by the researcher only and the transcripts contained only initials for all proper names 
(Seidman, 1998). Also, interview responses and participants’ identification are 
inaccessible (Cooper and Schindler, 2008) and informed consent forms are kept apart 
from interview responses so it is impossible to identify a participant’s identity 
(Sarantakos, 2005). During the interview, the researcher avoided pressing the participants 
for a response, asking demeaning questions or exercising subjective selection in data 
recording (Saunders et al., 2007). Regarding data processing and storage, the researcher 
confirms that the data will be processed fairly and will not been kept for longer than is 
required (Bryman and Bell, 2003). Finally, it is ethically vital that the reported findings 
well represent the data and the significance of the results is not deliberately overstated 
(Zikmund, 2000).
6.6 Summary and Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to present the methodological aspects of this study because 
they not only reflect the ontological and epistemological position but also influence the 
choice of data collection methods and data analysis. The discussion in this chapter 
presented the research purpose, research approach, and criteria to judge research quality. 
This research is an explanatory and exploratory study that aims to explain the 
determinants of risk reporting and to explore the factors that may impede the 
presentation of risk reporting in corporate annual report. The distinction between 
quantitative and qualitative approaches was established. However, this study has
combined quantitative and qualitative approaches, a form o f triangulation, to address 
properly the research questions. Two data collection methods were discussed, namely the 
disclosure index/content analysis and semi-structured interviews. The former is used to 
analyse accounting narratives in annual reports (Phase 1) and the latter is used to obtain 
rich information regarding the factors that may impede compliance with and presentation 
of mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure (Phase 2).
In constructing a disclosure index, the researcher discussed the merits o f weighted and 
unweighted indices, the score scheme, the selection o f  information items, and the 
treatment o f non-applicable items. Based on this discussion, an unweighted dichotomous 
disclosure index will be used in this study. Regarding content analysis, the researcher 
discussed coding unit, classification scheme and coding instructions. This study depends 
on EAS 25 and 33 and the risk categories developed by the ICAEW and the GAS 5 in 
the coding process to enhance measurement validity. Different statistical techniques that 
will be used to test the research hypotheses have been presented including bivariate and 
multivariate tests. The financial statements o f 106 companies have been selected 
according to a stratified sampling procedure and will be examined via disclosure index 
and content analysis.
Fifteen interviewees have been selected according to certain criteria and a 
deductive/inductive approach will be used in the coding process and identifying the main 
themes. In addition, the ethical considerations raised in semi-structured interview have 
been discussed. The main methodological issues discussed in this chapter and research 
phases are summarised in Table 6.7.
Table 6.7: M ethodological Aspects and Research Phases
Phase 1 Phase 2
Research Purpose Explanatory Exploratory
Research Approach Quantitative Qualitative
Sample Probability sample Non-probability sample
Research Methods Disclosure Index and Content Analysis Semi-structured Interviews
Research Quality Validity and Reliability Credibility and Dependability
Data Analysis Quantitative Analysis Qualitative Analysis
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CHAPTER 7: DETERMINANTS OF RISK REPORTING IN 
ANNUAL REPORTS OF EGYPTIAN COMPANIES
7.1 Introduction
This study examines the determinants of risk reporting in the annual reports of Egyptian 
listed companies through investigating empirically the association between competition, 
company risk level, ownership structure, corporate governance characteristics as 
independent variables and mandatory/voluntary risk reporting as dependent variables. It 
also controls for some firms’ characteristics. There are 13 main research hypotheses, 
divided into 39 sub-hypotheses, to be tested empirically and justified using disclosure 
theories and compared to the empirical findings of similar studies. In addition, two more 
hypotheses are constructed to test the change in compliance level between 2006 and 
2007 and to examine the association between mandatory and voluntary risk reporting. 
The previous chapter discussed the methodological aspects of the study especially 
measurement instruments, statistical analysis techniques, sampling procedures and 
measurement validity and reliability.
This chapter presents the results of descriptive, bivariate statistics and multivariate 
statistical analysis and is organised as follows. Section 7.2 summarises the research 
hypotheses and section 7.3 discusses sample representation. Section 7.4 presents 
descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables as well as bivariate tests. 
Section 7.5 discusses data transformation. Section 7.6 explains the multiple linear 
regression models employed to test the research hypotheses and provides the results 
while section 7.7 discusses the assumptions of multiple regression and section 7.8 is a 
summary and conclusion.
7.2 Research Hypotheses
Research hypotheses have been developed based on disclosure theories (chapter 3) and 
empirical research (chapter 4) and were discussed in chapter 5. A brief summary of these 
hypotheses is presented below (see Table 7.1):
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T able 7.1: Sum m ary o f  R elationsh ip  b etw een  D eterm inants o f  R isk  R eporting  and R isk  R eporting
Categories o f Risk  
Reporting 
Determinants
Determ inants of  
Risk Reporting Measures
Expected Direction of the 
Relationship between  
Determinants and Risk 
Reporting















Percentage o f ordinary 
share held by substantial 









Percentage o f  ordinary 
shares held by 
management 
Percentage o f  ordinary 
share held by + /-
government 
Percentage o f  shares held 
by institutional investors + / -
Company Risk Level Leverage Percentage o f  total liabilities to total assets
+
Firm size Net sales +
Profitability Percentage o f  net profit to total assets + / -
Firm Characteristics
Liquidity Acid test ratio + /-
Industry
membership Dummy variable + /-
7.3 Sample Representativeness
It will be important to provide a summary descriptive statistics o f the sample before 
performing any statistical analysis. Table 7.2 provides information regarding the sample 
based on sales, total assets and market value as measures o f company size.
Table 7.2: Summary Statistics o f the Sample
Mean Median S.D Mm Max
Sales (E£ million) 640 210 1400 0.55 9240
Total Assets (E£  million) 1840 545 5680 42.96 5680
Market Value (E£  million) 2730 312 9960 2.32 83000
* Exchange rate o f  British Pound (£) against Egyptian Pound (E£) is £ \ = E £  11.25 in 2006.
Moreover, a histogram for logarithm o f sales, total assets and market value indicates that 
Egyptian companies would be considered small companies (see Figure 7.1).
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Figure 7.1: H istogram  o f  Sales, T otal A ssets and M arket V alue o f  the Sam ple
C" Std. Dev. a 0 71538 






The comparison between population and sample according to the EG X ’s industrial 
sectors classification is presented in Table 7.3. Construction and material sector 
represents 16% o f the population and equally represented in the sample. The majority o f  
other industries seem to be reasonably represented in the sample. A Chi-squared test 
indicated that there is a non-significant difference between the industry profile o f the 
population and that o f  the sample.
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T able 7.3: P opulation  and Sam ple Industry Profile
Population Sample
Industry Classification No. o f 
companies %
No. o f 
companies %
Communication and Technology 8 2.29 3 2.83
Food and Beverage 48 13.71 13 12.26
Construction and Materials 56 16.00 17 16.04
Real Estate 43 12.29 10 9.43
Industrial Goods and Services and Automobiles 43 12.29 15 14.15
Healthcare and Pharmaceuticals 31 8.86 10 9.43
Travel & Leisure 30 8.57 9 8.49
Oil and Gas 9 2.57 3 2.83
Chemicals 18 5.14
. .  ^
5.66
Personal and Household Products 30 8.57 9 8.49
Basic Resources and Utilities 18 5.14 6 5.66
Retail 16 4.57 5 4.72
Total 350 100 106 100
Calculated y l  =  1.45
Critical y2  for a= 5% is 16.92; therefore the null hypothesis that there no difference between sample
industry profile and population industry profile cannot be rejected.
Comparison between the population and sample according to market value as a proxy 
for company size indicates that the average size o f  companies in the sample is higher 
than the average size o f  the population. However, t-test indicates that the difference in 
the mean total market value for the population and sample is not statistically significant 
but the possibility that size effect may influence the result should be acknowledged (see 
Table 7.4). This discussion may suggest that the sample could provide adequate 
representation o f  the population in terms o f industry profile and company size.
Table 7.4: Market Value Profile for Population and Sample
Mean Median S.D Minimum Maximum
Population (E £  million) 1200 75 5900 1 83000
Sample (E£ million) 2730 312 9960 2.32 83000
t-test =  -1.528, P > 10%; therefore the null hypothesis that there no 
the population and that in the sample cannot be rejected.
difference between company size in
7.4 Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Analysis
This section provides descriptive statistics o f  dependent, categorical and continuous
independent variables. Descriptive statistics presented in this section include mean, 
median, standard deviation, maximum and minimum value, skewness, kurtosis, and 
normality test. In addition, a bivariate analysis tests the difference in the level (amount) o f  
mandatory (voluntary) risk reporting between 2006 and 2007, the nature o f voluntary risk 
reporting in 2006 and 2007 and the association between mandatory and voluntary risk 
reporting.
177
7.4.1 Dependent Variable-Mandatory Risk Reporting
Descriptive statistics show a very low level o f compliance with EAS 25 and EAS 33 in 
both 2006 and 2007. In respect o f EAS 25, the average compliance level in 2006 is 
19.33% with a range o f  50% as a maximum and 5% as a minimum and a median o f  
18.18%. In 2007, a slight improvement on the level o f compliance with EAS25 has been 
achieved. The average level o f compliance increased to 21.57% with a range o f 71% as a 
maximum and 5% as a minimum and a median o f 20.83% (see Table 7.5).
Table 7.5: Descriptive Statistics o f EAS 25 in 2006 and 2007
EAS
25
Mean M edian Standard
Deviation
M inimum M aximum Skewness Kurtosis
2006 19.33% 18.18% 7.9% 5% 50% 1.43 3.65
2007 21.57% 20.83% 10.2% 5% 71% 2.08 6.22
* Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates that indicates that the normality assumption is rejected and the 
distribution o f  the variable is not normal (For 2006 and 2007, P< 0.001).
* Wilcoxon Signed Ranked Test indicates that the increase in compliance level between 2006 and 2007 is 
statistically significant (Z= -4.144, P < 0.001).
In respect o f EAS 33, the average level o f compliance with EAS 33 in 2006 is 18.25% 
with a range o f 80% as a maximum and 0% as a minimum and a median o f  15% while 
the average level o f  compliance in 2007 decreased to 17% with a range o f 60% as a 
maximum and 0% as a minimum and a median o f 10% (see Table 7.6). This result is not 
a surprise and consistent with ROSC (2004) that points out the lack o f  segment reporting 
in the annual reports o f  the 30 top-listed Egyptian companies.





M inimum M aximum Skewness Kurtosis
2006 18.25% 15% 13.7% 0% 80% 2.16 6.71
2007 17% 10% 12.7% 0% 60% 2.01 4.42
’ Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates that indicates that the normality assumption is rejected and the 
distribution o f  the variable is not normal (For 2006 and 2007. P< 0.001).
* Wilcoxon Signed Ranked Test indicates that the change in compliance level between 2006 and 2007 is 
not statistically significant (Z= -0.992, P > 0.05).
The wide range o f  compliance level with EAS 25 and 33 indicates inconsistency in 
disclosure practices among Egyptian companies and potential difficulties in applying the 
disclosure requirements such as competitive disadvantages, difficulties in producing such 
information due to technical problems and auditing difficulties (Prencipe, 2004).
The Wilcoxon Signed Ranked Test has been employed to test the differences between 
the level o f compliance with EAS 25 and 33 between 2006 and 2007. The result (see 
Appendix 8) indicates that the level o f compliance with EAS 25 in 2007 is significandy
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greater than the level of compliance with EAS 25 in 2006. However, the compliance level 
is still unsatisfactory. In addition, there is a non-significant difference in the level of 
compliance with EAS 33 between 2006 and 2007. Consequently, the null hypothesis that 
there is a non-significant increase in the compliance level with EAS 33 cannot be rejected. 
Actually, there is a slight decrease in the level of compliance between the two years. 
However, it is not statistically significant. This result highlights the weak role of the CMA 
and the EGX in supervising companies’ compliance with accounting standards. In 
addition, it indicates the ineffectiveness of auditors in persuading or enforcing their 
clients to respond to the requirements of accounting standards.
Descriptive statistics indicate that the levels of compliance with EAS 25 and 33 are highly 
skewed (1.43 and 2.16 in 2006 and 2.08 and 2.01 in 2007 respectively). A graphical 
examination of the dependent variable using normal probability plots, Q-Q plots and 
histograms indicates that the dependent variables deviate significandy from a normal 
distribution (see Figure 7.2; Appendix 7). Moreover, for more precise results, a K-S test 
of normality has been employed (see Table 7.5 and 7.6). The test rejects the null 
hypothesis that the levels of compliance with EAS 25 and 33 are normally distributed in 
2006 and 2007 and hence the dependent variables are not normally distributed (p < 
0.001). This result supports the use of non-parametric tests for any further bivariate 
analysis.
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Figure 7.2: Q -Q  Plots and H istogram s o f  D ep en d en t V ariables EAS 25 and 33
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7.4.2 Dependent Variable - Voluntary Risk Reporting
For 2006, a total number o f 1464 risk reporting sentences are identified within the 
sample o f board o f  directors’ reports with an average o f  23 sentences. Operational risks 
category represents the largest risk category that includes 1214 risk reporting sentences 
which represent 82.92% o f the total sentences then empowerment risks and financial 
risks which include 115 and 61 risk reporting sentences and represent 7.85% and 4.17% 
o f the total risk reporting sentences respectively. For 2007, a total o f 1889 risk reporting 
sentences are recognised with an average o f 26 sentences. Consistent with the results for 
2006, operation risk category represents 84.97% o f  total risk reporting sentences while 
empowerment risk and financial risk categories represent 7.62% and 4.55% respectively 
(see Table 7.7).
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T able 7.7: N u m b er o f  R isk  R eporting Sen tences by R isk  Category
Year F IN OPR EM P IN F IN T STR Total
2006
No. o f  
risk 
sentences
61 1214 115 13 13 48 1464
% 4.17% 82.92% 7.85% 0.89% 0.89% 3.28% 100%
2007
No. of  
risk 
sentences
86 1605 144 20 0 34 1889
% 4.55% 84.97% 7.62% 1.06% 0% 1.8% 100%
FIN: Financial Risk INF: Information Processing and Technology Risk
OPR: Operational Risk INT: Integrity Risk
EMP: Empowerment Risk STR: Strategic Risk
In addition descriptive statistics (see Table 7.8) show that the total risk reporting variable 
is highly skewed in 2006 and 2007 and not normally distributed. Therefore, non- 
parametric tests will be employed for any further bivariate analysis.
Table 7.8: Descriptive Statistics of Voluntary Disclosure in 2006 and 2007
Mean Median S.D Min Max Skew Kurtosis
2006 23 20 12.88 6 62 1.38 1.62
2007 26 25 14.53 4 95 1.88 6.34
* Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates that indicates that the normality assumption is rejected and the
distribution o f  the variable is not normal (For 2006 and 2007. P< 0.001).
In terms o f characteristics o f risk reporting practices, descriptive statistics show that
Egyptian companies in the sample tend to (see Table 7.9):
• Disclose more qualitative risk reporting than quantitative risk reporting. The 
average o f  qualitative risk reporting in 2006 and 2007 is 16.59 and 17.19 
sentences respectively with a percentage o f 71.4% and 65% o f total risk sentences 
while the average o f quantitative risk reporting is 6.65 and 9.05 sentences in 2006 
and 2007 respectively with a percentage o f 28.6% and 35% o f  total risk sentences. 
Empirical studies in different contexts provide similar results. In the UK, Rajab 
and Handley-Schachler (2009) report a percentage o f  90% for qualitative risk 
disclosure while Woods and Reber (2003) document a percentage o f 56.44% and 
72.9% in the UK  and Germany respectively.
•  Disclose more good news risk reporting than bad news risk reporting. The 
average o f good news risk reporting in 2006 and 2007 is 16.92 and 20.06 
sentences respectively with a percentage o f 73% and 76% o f  total risk reporting 
while the average o f  bad news risk reporting is 5.64 and 5.43 sentences with a 
percentage o f 24% and 21% respectively. In addition, neutral risk reporting 
represents 3% o f  total risk reporting in both 2006 and 2007. This result is 
inconsistent with Woods and Reber (2003) and Linsley and Shrives (2005) who
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document the dominance o f neutral risk reporting over good and bad news 
disclosure in the UK and Germany.
• Disclose more past risk reporting than future (forward-looking) risk reporting. 
The average o f  past risk reporting in 2006 and 2007 is 20.08 (86.4%) and 22.43 
(85.5%) sentences while the average o f future risk reporting is 3.15 (13.6%) and 
3.81 (14.5%) sentences respectively. This result is consistent with Woods and 
Reber (2003), Beattie et al. (2004) and Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) who indicate 
the dominance o f past risk disclosure over future risk reporting. In contrast, 
Linsley and Shrives (2005) report a conflicting result by indicating that future risk 
reporting comprises about 74% o f total risk disclosure.
• Disclose more non-financial risk reporting than financial risk reporting. The 
average o f  non-financial risk reporting in 2006 and 2007 is 22.27 and 25.04 
sentences with a percentage o f 96% and 95.45% o f total risk reporting in 2006 
and 2007 while the average o f financial risk reporting is 0.97 and 1.20 sentences 
in 2006 and 2007 with a percentage o f 4% and 4.55% respectively. This result is 
consistent with linsley and Shrives (2005) who report a dominance o f non- 
financial risk disclosure in the UK, the percentage o f non-financial risk disclosure 
to total risk disclosure is about 73.25%.




% Mean Median Min Max S.D risk
sentences
% Mean Median Min Max S.D
Quantitative 419 28.6 6.65 5 0 30 5.84 652 35 9.05 7 0 38 7.25
Qualitative 1045 71.4 16.59 15 2 47 9.85 1237 65 17.19 15 2 76 10.7
Good 1066 73 16.92 13 1 60 11.98 1444 76 20.06 18 0 31 5.83
Bad 355 24 5.64 4 0 30 6.56 391 21 5.43 3 1 79 13.21
Neutral 43 3 0.68 0 0 10 1.92 54 3 0.75 0 0 21 2.86
Future 199 13.6 3.15 0 0 31 5.71 294 14.5 3.81 1 0 50 6.89
Past 1265 86.4 20.08 18 4 54 10.31 1615 85.5 22.43 21 4 55 10.64
Financial 61 4 0.97 0 0 6 1.38 86 4.55 1.2 0 0 7 2.02
Non
Financial
1403 96 22.27 19 6 60 12.37 1803 95.45 25.04 24.5 4 89 13.77
Total 1464 100 23.24 20 6 62 12.84 1889 100 26.24 25 4 95 14.53
In order to test the differences between the characteristics o f voluntary risk reporting in 
both 2006 and 2007, a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test has been employed. In line with 
Linsley and Shrives (2006), the results indicate that there are significant differences 
between qualitative and quantitative, good and bad news, past and future and non- 
financial and financial risk reporting (p< 0.001) in both 2006 and 2007 (see Table 7.10 
and Appendix 9). The result suggests that the amount o f qualitative, good news, past risk 
disclosure and non-financial risk reporting sentences is statistically greater than the 
amount o f quantitative, bad news, future risk disclosure and financial risk reporting 
sentences in both 2006 and 2007.
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T able 7.10: D ifferences in Voluntary R isk R eporting Characteristics 2006-2007
Qualitative - Good - Past - Non-Financial -
Quantitative Bad Future Financial
2006
Z -5.915 -5.059 -6.820 -6.904
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
2007
Z -5.533 -6.480 -7.350 -7.377
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
In brief, comparing these result with the result o f Linsley and Shrives (2005) for British 
companies, Egyptian companies tend to disclose qualitative, good news, past and non- 
financial risk reporting while British companies tend to disclose qualitative, neutral news, 
future and non-financial risk reporting. The tendency o f Egyptian companies to disclose 
more past risk and the tendency o f British companies to disclose future risk may reflect 
significant differences between Egypt and the UK  in terms o f Hofstede’s (1984) culture 
dimensions and Gray’s (1988) accounting values. Egyptian society has high uncertainty 
avoidance and is highly uncomfortable with ambiguity both o f which are linked to high 
secrecy. This may explain why Egyptian companies are reluctant to present voluntary 
future and quantified risk disclosure.
7.4.3 Association between Mandatory and Voluntary Risk Reporting in 2006 and 
2007
In order to test the relationship between mandatory and voluntary risk reporting, the 
Spearman correlation has been employed. Using pooled data o f 2006 and 2007, the 
correlation test indicates that (see Appendix 10):
• There is a significant positive relationship between the level o f  compliance with
EAS 25 and level o f  compliance with EAS 33 (r= 0.214, p= 0.002).
• There is a significant positive relationship between the level o f compliance with
EAS 25 and the amount o f voluntary risk reporting (r= 0.21, p= 0.016).
•  There is a significant positive relationship between the level o f compliance with
EAS 33 and the amount o f voluntary risk reporting (r= 0.39, p< 0.001).
This result suggests a high co-ordination between the board o f  directors and the 
management in preparing and writing different parts o f the annual reports (Al-Razeen 
and Karbhari, 2004b). This result is consistent with Abayo et al. (1993) who document a 
positive association between mandatory and voluntary disclosure in the annual reports o f 
Tanzanian companies. Similarly, El-Sayed and Hoque (2010) reveal a significant positive 
association between Egyptian companies’ perceived influence o f the IASs and their level 
o f voluntary disclosure. However, Al-Razeen and Karbhari (2004b) report a non­
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significant association between mandatory and voluntary disclosure in the annual reports 
o f Saudi companies. The positive association between mandatory and voluntary risk 
reporting reflects the complementary relationship between them and hence increasing 
mandatory disclosure will increase voluntary disclosure (Dye, 1986).
7.4.4 Categorical Independent Variables
The categorical independent variables in this study are industry membership, auditor type 
and role duality and their related descriptive statistics are presented below.
7.4.4.1 Industry Membership
The sample o f listed companies under investigation consists o f  106 companies spanning 
three sectors, namely manufacturing, non-manufacturing and the service sector. A 
summary o f the sample across different economic sectors is presented in Table 7.11.
Table 7.11: Distribution o f Sample Firms across Industrial Sectors
Manufacturing N on-m anufacturing Service Total
N % N % N %
No. o f  companies in the sample 65 61.3% 18 17% 23 21.7% 106
Descriptive statistics show some differences in mandatory and voluntary risk reporting 
among the three categories o f industry membership in 2006 and 2007 (see Table 7.12). In 
2006, manufacturing companies provide the highest level o f  compliance with EAS 25 
and the highest number o f total risk sentences while service companies provide the 
highest level o f compliance with EAS 33. In 2007, non-manufacturing companies 
provide the highest level o f compliance with EAS 25 while service companies provide 
the highest level o f  compliance with EAS 33 and the highest number o f total voluntary 
risk sentences. Appendix (11) presents risk reporting by industry sectors.
The Kruskal-Wallis test, a non-parametric test, has been used to examine whether there 
are significant differences in mandatory and voluntary risk reporting among the three 
categories o f  industry membership in 2006 and 2007. The result indicates that there are 
non-significant differences in the level o f compliance with EAS 25 and 33 among the 
three groups o f industry membership in 2006 and 2007 (p>0.10) while there is significant 
difference in the amount o f total voluntary risk reporting among the three groups o f 
industry membership (p=0.09 in 2006 and 0.01 in 2007 respectively) (see Appendix 11).
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Therefore, in multivariate analysis, in investigating the association between mandatory 
risk reporting and other independent variables, industry membership will be investigated 
through a dummy variable that reflects only two groups o f industry membership, namely 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing because the service group will be combined with 
the non-manufacturing group. In investigating the association between voluntary risk 
reporting and other independent variables, industry membership will be examined 
through a dummy variable that reflects three groups o f  industry membership, namely 
manufacturing, non-manufacturing and service.
1AA.2 Auditor Type
The sample o f  listed companies under examination is divided into two groups in terms o f  
the identification o f independent auditor(s). The first group is companies audited by 
audit firms with international affiliations while the second group is companies audited by 
audit firms without international affiliations. Table 7.13 summarises the number of  
companies within the two groups.
Table 7.13: Distribution o f Sample Finns according to Auditor Type
With affiliation Without affiliation Total
N % N %
No. o f companies in the sample 54 51% 52 49% 106
Descriptive statistics indicate that companies with different auditor types present 
different levels and amounts o f mandatory and voluntary risk reporting in 2006 and 2007 
(see Table 7.14). For 2006, companies audited by audit firms with international 
affiliations show a higher level o f compliance with EAS 25 and 33. In addition, they 
provide a higher number o f  voluntary risk sentences. For 2007, companies audited by 
audit firms with international affiliations provide a higher level o f  compliance with EAS
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25 and 33. However, in contrast to 2006, companies audited with audit firms without 
international affiliations show higher number o f voluntary risk sentences.


















































































z = -  
2.06, 
P< 0.05
The Mann-Whitney U test, a non-parametric test, has been used to examine whether 
there are any significant differences in mandatory and voluntary risk reporting practices 
between companies that are audited by auditing firms with international affiliations and 
that audited by audit firms without international affiliations (see Appendix 11).
For 2006, statistical analysis indicates that there are significant differences in the level o f  
compliance with EAS25 and 33 between listed companies that are audited by audit firms 
with international affiliations and that audited by audit firms without international 
affiliations. The result suggests that companies audited by audit firms with international 
affiliations provide more compliance with disclosure requirements o f  EAS25 and EAS 33 
than companies audited by audit firms without international affiliations. However, there 
is a non-significant difference in voluntary risk reporting practices between listed 
companies audited by audit firms with and without international affiliations. The result 
suggests that the difference between the two groups o f companies is not statistically 
significant.
Statistical analysis o f the 2007 data reveals significant differences in the level o f  
compliance with EAS 25 between listed companies audited by audit firms with or 
without international affiliations while there are non-significant differences in the level o f  
compliance with EAS 33 between the two groups o f firms. Moreover, the result indicates 
significant differences in total voluntary risk reporting between the two groups o f listed 
companies in terms o f  auditor type. The result suggests that companies audited by audit 
firms without international affiliations provide more voluntary risk reporting than other 
companies audited by audit firms with international affiliations.
7.4.4.3 Role Duality
The third categorical independent variable is role duality. Descriptive statistics indicate 
that listed companies are managed by persons who combine the CEO and chair o f the 
board position. Table 7.15 summarises the number o f companies that separate the 
position o f  CEO and chair o f the board and companies that do not separate between the 
two positions. More than 73% o f the listed companies combine the CEO and chair o f  
the board position. This result is consistent with the result o f ROSC (2001) that the chair 
o f the board and the CEO are often the same person in Egyptian companies.
Table 7.15: Distribution o f  Sample Firms according to Role Duality
N o Separation between CEO and 
chair of the board position
Separation between CEO and 
chair o f the board position Total
N % N %
No. o f companies in 
the sample
78 73.6% 28 26.4 106
Descriptive statistics indicate that companies with and without role duality present 
different levels and amounts o f mandatory and voluntary risk reporting (see Table 7.16). 
The result indicates that, except for voluntary risk disclosure in 2007, companies that 
separate the CEO and chair o f the board tend to provide a higher level o f compliance 
with EAS 25 and 33 and report a higher amount o f voluntary risk information than 
companies without separation between the two positions.
Table 7.16: Descriptive Statistics o f M andatory/Voluntary Risk Reporting by Role Duality
2006 2007
Role





















































Separation 24.60 18 14.55 Z=- 
0.30, 
P> 0.10
21.73 20 10.12 Z=-
1.39,(sentences) No
separation
22.81 20 12.68 27.42 25 15.34 P> 0.10
The Mann-Whitney U test, a non-parametric test, has been employed to assess whether 
there are any significant differences in mandatory and voluntary risk reporting practices 
between listed companies with or without role duality (see Appendix 11).
In both 2006 and 2007, the statistical result indicates that there is significant difference in 
the level o f compliance with EAS 25 between companies with and companies without 
separation between the CEO and chair o f the board position. The result suggests that
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companies with separation of the CEO and chair of the board provide more compliance 
with EAS 25 than companies without this separation. In addition, in both 2006 and 2007, 
the result reveals non-significant differences in the level of compliance with EAS 33 and 
voluntary risk reporting between companies with and companies without separation of 
the CEO and chair of the board.
7.4.5 Continuous Independent Variables
Table 7.17 indicates descriptive statistics of the continuous independent variables for 
2006 and 2007. The table indicates the mean, maximum, minimum, standard deviation, 
skewness and kurtosis of the independent variables and the K-S test of normality. The 
skewness and kurtosis statistics indicate that continuous independent variables are not 
normally distributed. In addition, the K-S test confirms that all continuous independent 
variables depart from normality (p< 0.001). Table 7.17 indicates that, on average, the 
sample companies have a reasonable liquidity position (1.44 and 1.66 in 2006 and 2007 
respectively). In addition, governmental ownership and institutional ownership represent 
about 50% of the ownership structure in 2006 and 2007 while blockholder ownership as 
a measure for ownership concentration represents about 3% of total ownership structure 
in 2006 and 2007.
Table 7.17 shows a high proportion of governmental and managerial ownership in the 
ownership structure of the Egyptian companies. The average of governmental and 
managerial ownership is 25.38% (23.29%) and 14.18% (17.39%) in 2006 (2007) while the 
maximum of governmental and managerial ownership is 99.9% and 98.99% respectively. 
These patterns of share ownership are a result of the institutional situation in Egypt. The 
Egyptian government followed three main approaches in the privatisation of state-owned 
companies. The first is selling shares through initial public offerings in the stock market, 
the second is selling strategic stakes of shares to anchor-investors through public 
auctions and the third is selling significant stake of shares to managers/employees (Ben 
Naceur et al., 2007). According to the CML, any company wishing to be listed in the 
official list should offer to the public at least 30% of total shares. In addition, the listing 
and delisting rules of EGX ban any restrictions on share trading. According to the CML, 
any investor who wishes to acquire more than 10% of total shares of any company 
offering its shares for public subscription should notify the company at least two weeks 
before the transaction; therefore there is no restriction on share ownership.
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The Egyptian government adopted partial privatisation in which the government sells a 
minor stake of shares especially in companies operating in certain industries such as 
pharmaceuticals and mills to highlight to the public its consideration to social aspects 
during the privatisation (Omran, 2004). Kantor et al. (1995) argue that governmental 
ownership is dominant in the Middle East region. Ben Naceur et al. (2007) indicate that 
the Egyptian government held high proportions in the ownership structure even post the 
privatisation. Several studies report a high percentage of governmental ownership and 
managerial ownership in the ownership structure of Egyptian companies. For example, 
Abd-Elsalam et al. (2008) report governmental ownership ranged from 0 to 92% while 
Omran et al. (2008) report governmental ownership ranged from 0 to 95% and Kholeif 
(2008) reports managerial ownership ranged from 0 to 66.27% in ownership structure of 
the 50 most active listed companies.
i
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T able 7.17: D escriptive Statistics o f  C ontinuous Ind ep en dent Variables in  2006 and 2007
Year Independent
Variables
Measures Mean Median Min Max S.
Deviation
Skewness Kurtosis
FS Sales (E£ million) 640 210 0.55 9240 1400 4.39 22
H. Acid test ratio 1.40 1.02 0.15 9.67 1.39 3.4 15.12
FP Percentage o f net profit to total assets .084 .072 0.59 0.102 0.88 6.66
0.28
FL Percentage o f  total liabilities to total assets 0.41 .391 0.07 1.30 0.22 1.15 2.25
2006 BE Total fixed assets (E£ million) 989 231 1.69 38215 3920 8.49 79
BS Number o f members on the board 7.6 " 3 15 2.7 .53 -.27
OC Percentage o f ordinary share held by substantial shareholders (>=  5%) 3.1 0 0 53.46 8.2 3.85 17.39
GO Percentage o f  ordinary shares held by government 25.38 4 0 99.90 33.38 1.03 -.36
MO Percentage o f ordinary share held by management 14.18 .006 0 98.99 26.75 2.02 3.03
IO Percentage o f  shares held by institutional investors 29.32 16.44 0 98.90 31.63 .96 -.46
FS Sales (E£ million) 794 244 3.1 9530 1580 3.65 15
FL Acid test ratio 1.66 1.13 0.23 14.65 1.89 4.3 23.67
FP Percentage o f  net profit to total assets .092 .082
0 18
0.81 0.11 2.77 17.79
PL Percentage o f total liabilities to total assets 0.38 .335
U. IO
0.04 1.13 .22 0.91 0.59
2007 BE Total fixed assets (E£  million) 1070 252 2.7 39183 4050 8.37 77
BS Number o f  members on the board 7.6 7 3 14 2.64 0.62 -0.12
OC Percentage of ordinary share held by substantial shareholders (>= 5%) 2.9 0 0 53.45 7.7
42
21.63
GO Percentage o f ordinary shares held by government 23.29 1.09 0 99.90 32.49 1.15 -0.07
MO Percentage o f  ordinary share held by management 17.39 .02 0 98.99 28.88 1.58 1.17
IO Percentage o f  shares held by institutional investors 27.92 13.37 0 98.90 33.28 1.04 -0.50
* Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates that indicates that the normality assumption is rejected and the distributions o f all the continuous independent variables are not normal (For 
2006 and 2007, P< 0.001).
* Exchange rate o f British Pound (£) against Egyptian Pound (E£) is £1 = ~E£ 11.25 in 2006 and £ \  — E £  11.09 in 2007.
FS Firm Size, FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV Firm Leverage, BE Barriers to Entry, BS Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, 
MO Managerial Ownership, IO Institutional Ownership
190
7.4.6 Correlation among Variables and Collinearity
The key objectives of examining the correlation matrix between independent variables 
and dependent variables are twofold. The first objective is identifying the independent 
variables that are significandy correlated with the dependent variable (mandatory and 
voluntary risk reporting) and hence could explain the variation in the dependent variable. 
The second objective is to use the correlation matrix as a very quick and simple 
diagnostic tool to detect collinearity between independent variables. A Pearson 
correlation has been employed to examine the associations between dependent variables 
and the independent variables and to examine the associations among independent 
variables (see Table 7.18 and 7.19).
With respect to the first objective, testing the correlation between risk reporting and 
independent variables, the correlation matrix shows the following findings.
In respect of EAS 25, the correlation matrix reveals, in both 2006 and 2007, significant 
positive associations between barriers to entry, board size and being audited by audit 
firms with international affiliations and mandatory risk reporting. In addition, the 
correlation matrix indicates a marginally significant positive association between 
mandatory risk reporting and firm size in 2007. Moreover, the findings reveal significant 
negative associations between ownership concentration, government ownership, role 
duality and mandatory risk reporting in both 2006 and 2007. This means the companies 
that provide more compliance with EAS 25 are companies that operate in a high barrier 
to entry environment, companies with large boards, large size companies and those 
audited by audits firm with international affiliations while companies that present less 
compliance with EAS 25 are companies with high ownership concentration, companies 
with high government ownership and those with role duality.
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Table 7.18: Correlation am ong D epend en ts Variables and Independent Variables - 2006
D ependent Variables Independents Variables













FS .115 .263(0 .492(0 1
.240 .006 .000
FL .018 .2460 .025 -.029 1
.856 .011 .845 .769
FP .166 .043 .117 .392(0 .324(0 1
.090 .665 .360 .000 .001
FV -.090 .023 -.030 -.030 -.358(0 -.369(0 1
.359 .813 .818 .756 .000 .000
BE .248(*) .499(0 .623(0 .628(0 .038 .186 -.122 1
.010 .000 .000 .000 .702 .056 .211
BS ■247(*) .077 .282(*) .271(0 .172 .276(0 -.237(*) .241 (*) 1
.011 .432 .025 .005 .077 .004 .014 .013
OC -.188 -.094 -.209 -.074 -.167 -.071 .179 -.187 -.172 1
.053 .335 .100 .450 .087 .471 .066 .056 .077
GO -.2410 -.136 -.054 .087 -.043 .124 -.129 .194(*) -.070 -.237(*) 1
.013 .165 .674 .376 .663 .204 .187 .046 .475 .014
MI .071 .043 -.029 -.065 .013 -.166 .126 -.122 -.011 .115 -.608(**) 1
.472 .662 .824 .507 .898 .089 .198 .213 .911 .242 .000
IO .170 .115 .058 .043 .194(*) .071 -.079 -.044 .259(**) -.169 -.318(**) -.141 1
.081 .240 .654 .663 .046 .469 .422 .653 .007 .084 .001 .148
IM .040 -.037 .166 .294(0 -.269(0 .000 -.176 .194(*) -.055 -.035 -.020 -.061 .108 1
.681 .705 .192 .002 .005 .999 .072 .047 .574 .720 .837 .533 .272
RD -.192(*) .054 -.051 -.034 .000 -.089 .102 .037 .037 -.060 .369(**) -.300(**) .026 -.036 1
.048 .583 .691 .726 .998 .363 .298 .709 .706 .539 .000 .002 .795 .710
AT .565(0 .255(0 .082 .088 .157 .109 -.138 .100 .204(*) -.055 -,451(**) .297(**) .208(*) -.082 -.246(*) 1
.000 .008 .522 .370 .107 .265 .157 .309 .036 .574 .000 .002 .032 .404 .011
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
EAS2506 Compliance level with EAS 25, EAS3306 Compliance level with EAS 33, VOL06 Voluntary Risk Reporting, FS Firm Size, FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV 
Firm Leverage, BE Barriers to Entry, BS Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, MO Managerial Ownership, IO Institutional Ownership, IM 
Industry Membership, RD Role Duality, AT Auditor Type
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T able 7.19: Correlation am on g D ep en d en ts Variables and Independent Variables - 2007
D ependent Variables Independent Variables













FS .185 .309(0 .219 1
.059 .001 .064
FL .071 .394(**) -.056 .005 1
.469 .000 .643 .956
FP .178 .317(0 .139 .451(0 .393(0 1
.069 .001 .244 .000 .000
FV -.182 -.095 -.159 -.117 -.330(0 -.462(0 1
.064 .334 .181 .233 .001 .000
BE .245ft .400(0 .415(0 .646(0 -.055 .258(0 -.154 1
.012 .000 .000 .000 .581 .008 .117
BS .302(0 .137 .2780 .268(0 .097 .187 -.264(0 .329(0 1
.002 .162 .018 .006 .323 .057 .006 .001
OC -232(*) -.134 -.153 -.005 -.137 -.004 .163 -.180 -.155 1
.017 .172 .198 .958 .163 .965 .096 .067 .113
GO -.260(**) .001 .279(*) .111 .017 .035 -.034 .185 -.032 -.160 1
.007 .996 .017 .261 .863 .722 .732 .059 .745 .102
MO .107 -.116 -238(*) -.087 -.041 .030 -.045 -.107 -.117 .080 -.564(0 1
.279 .237 .044 .378 .680 .758 .645 .276 .233 .413 .000
IO .154 .141 -.114 .011 .133 -.076 .020 -.001 .125 -.1980 -.259(0 -.291(0 1
.118 .150 .339 .914 .178 .440 .838 .989 .203 .042 .007 .003
IM .003 .030 .216 .291(0 -.122 .055 -.155 .2260 -.086 -.010 .042 -.054 .064 1
.976 .765 .068 .003 .215 .580 .114 .020 .385 .923 .670 .581 .518
RD -209(*) .046 .160 -.058 .049 -.140 .071 -.007 .153 -.1940 .299(0 -.2400 -.016 -.041 1
.032 .638 .179 .556 .618 .155 .473 .944 .118 .046 .002 .013 .871 .676
AT .570(**) .191 -.2370 .147 .083 .139 -.119 .119 .117 -.064 -.498(0 .353(0 .186 -.114 -.246(*) 1
.000 .051 .045 .135 .398 .157 .227 .225 .233 .514 .000 .000 .056 .248 .011
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
EAS2507 Compliance level with EAS 25, EAS3307 Compliance level with EAS 33, VOL07 Voluntary Risk Reporting, FS Firm Si2e, FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV 
Firm Leverage, BE Barriers to Entry, BS Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, MO Managerial Ownership, IO Institutional Ownership, IM 
Industry Membership, RD Role Duality, AT Auditor Type
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In respect of EAS 33, the correlation findings indicate significant positive associations 
between firm size, liquidity, barriers to entry and mandatory risk reporting in 2006 and 
2007. In addition, the correlation results reveal a significant positive association between 
mandatory risk reporting and being audited by audit firm with international affiliations in 
2006 only and between mandatory risk reporting and profitability in 2007 only. This 
means that companies that present more compliance with EAS 33 are large firms and 
companies operating in a high barrier to entry environment, companies with more 
liquidity and profitability and companies that are audited by audit firms with international 
affiliations.
In respect of voluntary risk reporting, correlation findings show significant positive 
associations between voluntary risk reporting, barriers to entry and board size in both 
2006 and 2007. In addition, the results indicate a significant positive association between 
voluntary risk reporting and firm size in 2006 and between voluntary risk reporting and 
government ownership in 2007 only. However, the findings indicate significant negative 
associations between voluntary risk reporting, managerial ownership and being audited 
by audit firms with international affiliations in 2007 only. This means that companies that 
provide more voluntary risk reporting are companies operating in a high barrier to entry 
environment, companies with large boards, large in size and those with high government 
ownership while companies that provide less voluntary risk reporting are companies with 
high managerial ownership and those are audited by audit firms with international 
affiliations.
In respect of the second objective, using a correlation coefficient as a diagnostic tool to 
detect collinearity, correlation findings for the most highly correlated independent 
variables reveal a significant positive association between firm size and barriers to entry 
in 2006 and 2007 (The r coefficient is 0.628 and 0.646 respectively). In addition, there is a 
significant negative association between managerial ownership and government 
ownership in 2006 and 2007 (The r coefficient is -0.608 and -.564 respectively). Finally, 
there is a significant negative association between auditor type and government 
ownership in 2007 only (The r correlation coefficient is -0.498). The findings of the 
Pearson correlation suggest that collinearity among independent variables will not result 
in severe problems in multivariate analysis because none of the correlation coefficient





Accounting researchers have used the disclosure index and content analysis to quantify 
accounting narratives and used multiple linear regression to examine the relationship 
between disclosure level (dependent variable) and firm-specific characteristics 
(independent variables). However, there are a number of concerns regarding the 
dependent variable in disclosure research. First, the theoretically correct form of the 
association between dependent variable and independent variables is unknown (Lang and 
Lundholm 1993). Second, the use of the disclosure index and content analysis results in a 
bounded dependent variable (Ahmed and Nicholls 1994). For instance, the use of the 
disclosure index results in a dependent variable expressed as a ratio and constrained to lie 
between 0 and 1 while the use of content analysis imposes a lower constraint of zero.
Consequently, it is recommended to transform dependent variable and/or the 
independent variables to satisfy the assumptions of multiple linear regression (Ahmed 
and Nicholls, 1994; Wallace et al., 1994). Lang and Lundholm (1993) suggest the use of a 
rank regression technique in which dependent and continuous independent variables are 
ordered and ranked from smallest to largest and then the OLS regression could be 
applied to the ranks. Rank regression is characterised by simplicity, resistance to outliers, 
efficiency in representing monotonic non-linear relationship and producing distribution 
free statistical tests (Cooke, 1998). However, despite these advantages, rank regression 
has several disadvantages. It is very difficult to interpret regression coefficients and test 
their significance, it is inappropriate to employ the F-test and t-test and it produces 
regression residuals that are not normally distributed (Cooke, 1998).
Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) suggest transforming the dependent variable to logit form to 
ensure that the predicted dependent variable using ordinary least squares lies between 
zero and one. The main advantage of logit transformation is maintaining the lower and 
upper constraints of the dependent variable (Allison, 1999). However, Cooke (1998) 
argues that this problem is of little importance because the main purpose of disclosure 
studies is explaining rather than predicting the relationship between dependent variable 
and independent variables.
Cooke (1998) suggests the use of normal scores as an extension to rank regression 
particularly when non-linearity is a cause for concern. The normal scores approach aims 
to transform actual observations to their equivalent values on normal distribution. 
Transformation could be applied to dependent and independent variables and then the
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OLS regression could be used. The normal scores approach maintains the advantages of 
rank regression and achieves additional advantages. For instance, regression coefficients 
derived using normal scores are meaningful, the significance level can be determined and 
the usefulness of the F-test and t-test could be maintained (Cooke, 1998). Moreover, the 
normal scores approach eliminates the problem of biased estimates resulting from the 
censored nature of the dependent variable (Camfferman and Cooke, 2002). Following 
Cooke (1998), Camfferman and Cooke (2002), Haniffa and Cooke (2002 and 2005), 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Amran et al. (2009), the dependent variable and 
continuous independent variables in this study will be transformed to normal scores. 
Normal score transformation leads to an approximately normal shape for most variables.
7.6 Multivariate Regression Models* Findings
This study aims to identify the determinants of risk reporting practices in the annual 
reports of Egyptian companies. It does this using disclosure theories and empirical 
research to identify the impact of competition, firm-specific characteristics, corporate 
governance and ownership structure (as independent variables) on mandatory and 
voluntary risk reporting (as dependent variable).
The dependent variables and the continuous independent variables are transformed to 
normal scores to avoid any problems resulting from the violation of regression 
assumptions. In order to examine simultaneously the association between ownership 
structure, corporate governance, firm-specific characteristics and mandatory/voluntary 
risk reporting the following regression model has been employed.
Y = a + bjBE + b2BS + b3RD + b4OC + b5MO + b6GO + b7IO + b8FS + b9FL + b10FP 
+ bnFV + b12IM + +b13AT + e
where:
a = Intercept.
b = The slope of the regression line.
Y = Mandatory (EAS 25 or 33) or Voluntary risk reporting.
BE = Barriers to Entry (measured by total fixed assets).
BS = Board Size (measured by the number of board members).
RD = Role duality (dummy variable 1= CEO is the chairman and 0= otherwise).
OC= Ownership Concentration (measured by the percentage of ordinary share held by
i
substantial shareholders >= 5%).
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MO = Managerial Ownership (measured by percentage of ordinary shares held by 
management).
GO = Governmental Ownership (measured by percentage of ordinary shares held by 
government).
IO = Institutional Ownership (measured by percentage of ordinary share held by 
institutional investors).
FS = Firm Size (measured by net sales).
FL = Liquidity (measured by acid test ratio [current assets excluding inventories/current 
liabilities]).
FP = Profitability (measured by return on total assets [net pro fit/total assets]).
FV = Leverage (measured by total liabilities/total assets).
IM = Industry Membership (dummy variable):
mandatory risk reporting A. IM-manufacturing 1= manufacturing and 0= otherwise,
voluntary risk reporting A. IM-manufacturing 1= manufacturing and 0= otherwise.
B. IM-non-manufacturing 1 = non-manufacturing and 0= otherwise. 
AT = Auditor Type (dummy variable 1 = the auditor is affiliated with international audit
firm and 0= otherwise).
e = error term.
Six regression models have been constructed for the three dependent variables, 
mandatory risk reporting of EAS 25, mandatory risk reporting of EAS 33 and voluntary
risk reporting, for two years, 2006 and 2007. The six models are as following:
• Mandatory risk reporting EAS 25 - 2006.
• Mandatory risk reporting EAS 25 - 2007.
• Mandatory risk reporting EAS 3 3- 2  006.
• Mandatory risk reporting EAS 33 - 2007.
• Voluntary risk reporting - 2006.
• Voluntary risk reporting - 2007.
For each model the following statistics have been reported. The regression coefficient 
and standard error for each independent variable, measures of goodness-of-fit that 
represent the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable explained by the 
independent variables such as R (multiple correlation between the dependent and the 
independent variables), R2 (a squared of R and called coefficient of determination) and 
adjusted R2 (R2 adjusted by the number of independent variables in the regression model), 
t-values and significant level which are used to examine whether the variance explained
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by the independent variances is statically significant, the F-test of significance which tests 
the overall significance of a regression model and the VIF for each independent variable.
7.6.1 Mandatory Risk Reporting EAS 25 - 2006
Regression results indicate that the model is statistically significant (F(13 92)= 5.59, p<0.001) 
and explains 36.3% of the variation in the level of compliance with EAS 25 (see Table 
7.20). The results indicate a significant negative association between firm size (p= 0.059), 
ownership concentration (p= 0.07) and the level of compliance with EAS 25. The results 
suggest that large companies and companies with high ownership concentration present 
marginally less compliance with the mandatory disclosure requirements of EAS 25. In 
addition, the findings reveal a significant positive association between firm profitability 
(p= 0.083), barriers to entry (p= 0.014), auditor type (p< 0.001) and mandatory risk 
reporting of EAS 25. The findings suggest that companies which are more profitable, 
face low competition, and are audited by audit firms with international affiliations are 
more likely to comply with the mandatory risk reporting of EAS 25.
In brief, this result indicates that companies that comply more with the requirements of 
EAS 25 are small sized, more profitable companies, companies operating in a high 
barrier to entry environment, companies with low ownership concentration and those 
that are audited by audit firms with international affiliations.
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T able 7.20: M andatory R isk  R eporting EAS 25 - 2006
R- square: 44.1% Adjusted R-square: 36.3% 
F= 5.59 Significance level (p) <0.001
ANOVA




regression 42.703 13 3.285
Residual 54.029 92 0.587
Total 96.732 105
Independent variables (expected sign) Coefficient Standard t- Sig VIF
error value
Constant -0.416 0.227 -1.830 0.071
FS (+) -0.224 0.117 -1.916 0.059* 2.296
FL (+ /-) -0.129 0.095 -1.351 0.180 1.519
FP (+ /-) 0.174 0.099 1.752 0.083* 1.647
FV (+) 0.093 0.099 .943 0.348 1.632
BE (+) 0.267 0.106 2.512 0.014** 1.890
BS (+/-) 0.111 0.093 1.204 0.232 1.354
OC (-) -0.228 0.125 -1.831 0.070* 1.273
GO (+ /-) -0.173 0.155 -1.115 0.268 3.092
MO (-) -0.157 0.129 -1.215 0.227 2.100
IO (+ /-) -0.022 0.105 -.213 0.832 1.724
IM — manufacturing (+ /-) 0.130 0.186 .696 0.488 1.486
RD (-) -0.164 0.192 -.856 0.394 1.291
AT (+ Mandatory and + /-  Voluntary) 0.963 0.181 5.318 0.000*** 1.479
***Significant at the level 1% 
^^Significant at the level 5% 
^Significant at the level 10%
FS Firm Size, FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV Firm Leverage, BE Barriers to Entry, BS 
Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, MO Managerial Ownership, IO 
Institutional Ownership, IM Industry Membership, RD Role Duality, AT Auditor Type
7.6.2 Mandatory Risk Reporting EAS 25 - 2007
For 2007, regression results indicate that the model is statistically significant (F(13 91)= 5.74, 
p<0.001) and explains 37.2% o f the variation in mandatory risk reporting o f  EAS 25 (see 
Table 7.21). The results indicate a significant positive association between board size (p= 
0.02), auditor type (p< 0.001) and the level o f  compliance with mandatory risk reporting 
o f EAS 25. The result suggests that companies with a large board and companies that are 
audited by audit firms with international affiliations comply more with the disclosure 
requirements o f EAS 25. In contrast, the findings show a significant negative association 
between ownership concentration (p= 0.027), role duality (p= 0.071) and the level o f  
compliance with mandatory risk reporting o f EAS 25. The results suggest that companies 
with high ownership concentration and companies with role duality present less 
compliance with mandatory risk reporting. In summary, this result indicates that 
companies that comply more with the requirements o f  EAS 25 are those with large 
boards, with low ownership concentration, with separation between the CEO and chair 
o f the board and that are audited by audit firms with international affiliations.
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Table 7.21: M andatory R isk  R eporting EAS 25 - 2007
R- square: 45.1% Adjusted R-square: 37.2% 
F= 5.74 Significance level (p) <0.001
ANOVA




















Constant -0.310 0.232 -1.336 0.185
FS (+) -0.060 0.119 -0.506 0.614 2.355
FL (+ /-) -0.009 0.091 -0.096 0.924 1.396
FP (+/-) 0.054 0.107 0.501 0.617 1.926
FV (+) 0.014 0.098 0.139 0.890 1.587
BE (+) 0.085 0.110 0.771 0.443 2.009
BS (+/-) 0.227 0.096 2.363 0.020** 1.448
OC(-) -0.277 0.123 -2.248 0.027** 1.281
GO (+ /-) -0.091 0.150 -0.604 0.547 2.804
MO (-) -0.144 0.132 -1.091 0.278 2.301
IO (+ /-) -0.086 0.108 -0.795 0.429 1.737
IM -  manufacturing (+ /-) 0.138 0.175 0.787 0.434 1.319
RD (-) -0.345 0.189 -1.826 0.071* 1.257
AT (+ Mandatory and + /-  Voluntary) 0.991 0.192 5.174 0.000*** 1.650
***Significant at the level 1% 
** Significant at the level 5% 
^Significant at the level 10%
FS Firm Size, FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV Firm Leverage, BE Barriers to Entry, BS 
Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, MO Managerial Ownership, IO 
Institutional Ownership, IM Industry Membership, RD Role Duality, AT Auditor Type
7.6.3 Mandatory Risk Reporting EAS 33 - 2006
Regression results indicate that the model is statistically significant (F(1392)= 5.08, 
p<0.001). The model explains 33.6% o f the variation in mandatory risk reporting o f  EAS 
33 (see Table 7.22). The results reveal a significant positive association between firm 
liquidity (p= 0.014), barriers to entry (p< 0.001) and the level o f  compliance with 
mandatory disclosure requirements o f EAS 33. This result suggests that firms with high 
liquidity and companies facing low competition are more compliant with the disclosure 
requirements o f EAS 33. Moreover, the results indicate a significant negative association 
between governmental ownership and the level o f  compliance with EAS 33 (p= 0.071). 
The result suggests that companies with high governmental ownership provide less 
compliance with the disclosure requirements o f  EAS 33. In summary, the findings 
indicate that Egyptian companies which present more compliance with mandatory risk 
reporting o f EAS 33 are more liquid companies, companies operating in a high barrier to 
entry environment and those with low governmental ownership.
2 0 0
T able 7.22: M andatory R isk  R eporting EAS 33 - 2006
R- square: 41.8% Adjusted R-square: 33.6% 
F= 5.08 Significance level (p) <0.001 
Durbin-Watson: 2.227
ANOVA
Source Sum of df Mean
squares square
regression 36.990 13 2.845
Residual 51.507 92 .560
Total 88.497 105
Independent variables (expected sign) Coefficient Standard t- Sig VTF
error value
Constant -0.196 0.222 -.884 0.379
FS (+) -0.011 0.114 -.095 0.925 2.296
FL (+ /-) 0.233 0.093 2.499 0.014** 1.519
FP (+ /-) -0.050 0.097 -.512 0.610 1.647
FV (+) 0.104 0.096 1.073 0.286 1.632
BE (+) 0.553 0.104 5.331 0.000*** 1.890
BS (+ /-) -0.123 0.090 -1.358 0.178 1.354
OC(-) -0.038 0.122 -.310 0.758 1.273
GO (+ /-) -0.276 0.151 -1.829 0.071* 3.092
MO (-) -0.075 0.126 -.599 0.551 2.100
IO (+ /-) 0.019 0.103 .189 0.850 1.724
IM -  manufacturing (+ /-) -0.124 0.182 -.682 0.497 1.486
RD (-) 0.253 0.187 1.350 0.180 1.291
AT (+ Mandatory and + / -  Voluntary) 0.238 0.177 1.345 0.182 1.479
***Sigmficant at the level 1% 
^^Significant at the level 5% 
^Significant at the level 10%
FS Firm Size, FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV Firm Leverage, BE Barriers to Entry, BS 
Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, MO Managerial Ownership, IO 
Institutional Ownership, IM Industry Membership, RD Role Duality, AT Auditor Type
7.6.4 Mandatory Risk Reporting EAS 33 - 2007
Regression results indicate that the model is statistically significant (F(1391)= 4.6, p<0.001) 
and explains 31% o f the variation in the mandatory risk reporting o f  EAS 33 (see Table 
7.23). The results reveal a significant positive association between firm liquidity (p< 
0.001), barriers to entry (p< 0.001) and the level o f compliance with the mandatory 
disclosure requirements o f EAS 33. They also indicate that more liquid companies and 
companies facing less competition present more compliance with the EAS 33.
T able 7.23: M andatory R isk  R eporting EAS 33 - 2007
R- square: 39.6% Adjusted R-square 31%
F= 4.6 Significance level (p) <0.001
ANOVA




regression 33.759 13 2.597
Residual 51.497 91 .566
Total 85.256 104
Independent variables (expected sign) Coefficient Standard t- Sig VIF
error value
Constant -0.189 0.229 -0.825 0.412
FS (+) -0.004 0.117 -0.030 0.976 2.355
FL (+/-) 0.373 0.090 4.133 0.000*** 1.396
FP (+/-) 0.131 0.106 1.235 0.220 1.926
FV (+) 0.133 0.096 1.381 0.171 1.587
BE (+) 0.407 0.108 3.760 0.000*** 2.009
BS (+ /-) -0.088 0.095 -0.926 0.357 1.448
OC (-) -0.042 0.122 -0.343 0.732 1.281
GO (+/-) -0.186 0.148 -1.259 0.211 2.804
MO (-) -0.189 0.130 -1.459 0.148 2.301
IO (+/-) -0.009 0.106 -0.086 0.931 1.737
IM -  manufacturing (+ /-) 0.002 0.173 0.009 0.993 1.319
RD (-) 0.170 0.186 0.915 0.363 1.257
AT (+ Mandatory and + /-  Voluntary) 0.195 0.189 1.033 0.304 1.650
***Significant at the level 1% 
^^Significant at the level 5% 
^Significant at the level 10%
FS Firm Size, FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV Firm Leverage, BE Barriers to Entry, BS 
Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, MO Managerial Ownership, IO 
Institutional Ownership, IM Industry Membership, RD Role Duality, AT Auditor Type
7.6.5 Voluntary Risk Reporting - 2006
Regression results indicate that the model is statistically significant (F(1448)= 3.03, p=  
0.002) and explains 31.4% o f the variation in voluntary risk reporting (see Table 7.24). 
Barrier to entry is the only variable that influences voluntary risk reporting in 2006. The 
result reveals a significant positive association between barriers to entry and the total 
voluntary risk reporting (p= 0.001). This means that companies operating in an 
environment with low competition as a result o f high barriers to entry provide 
voluntarily more risk-related information.
2 0 2
T able 7.24: Voluntary R isk  R eporting - 2006
R-square46.9% Adjusted R-square: 31.4% 
F= 3.03 Significance level (p) = 0.002
ANOVA




regression 26.052 14 1.861
Residual 29.510 48 .615
Total 55.562 62
Independent variables (expected sign) Coefficient Standard t- Sig VIF
error value
Constant 0.491 0.355 1.384 0.173
FS (+) -0.113 0.196 -0.575 0.568 4.057
FL (+/-) 0.002 0.125 0.013 0.990 1.688
FP (+ /-) -0.003 0.131 -0.024 0.981 1.810
FV (+) 0.063 0.124 0.508 0.614 1.702
BE (+) 0.723 0.203 3.565 0.001*** 4.053
BS (+ /-) 0.017 0.132 0.127 0.900 1.670
OC (-) 0.089 0.234 0.381 0.705 1.470
GO (+ /-) -0.319 0.222 -1.439 0.157 3.563
MO (-) -0.144 0.234 -0.617 0.540 2.653
IO (+ /-) -0.008 0.153 -0.054 0.957 2.002
IM — manufacturing (+ /-) -0.140 0.279 -0.503 0.617 1.967
IM - non-manufacturing (+ /-) -0.572 0.353 -1.623 0.111 1.835
RD (-) -0.311 0.322 -.966 0.339 1.420
AT (+ Mandatory and + /-  Voluntary) -0.090 0.234 -.386 0.701 1.348
***Significant at the level 1% 
^^Significant at the level 5%
* Significant at the level 10%
FS Firm Size, FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV Firm Leverage, BE Barriers to Entry, BS 
Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, MO Managerial Ownership, IO 
Institutional Ownership, IM Industry Membership, RD Role Duality, AT Auditor Type
7.6.6 Voluntary Risk Reporting - 2007
Regression results indicate that the model is statistically significant (F(14>57)=  2.95, p=  
0.002) and explains 27.8% o f the variation in voluntary risk reporting (see Table 7.25). 
The results indicate a significant positive association between barriers to entry and 
voluntary risk reporting (p= 0.006). In addition, there is a significant negative association 
between firm size and the total voluntary risk reporting (p= 0.094). This means that 
companies that provide more voluntary risk reporting are companies operating in an 
environment o f low product market competition and small size companies.
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T able 7.25: Voluntary R isk  R eporting - 2007
R- square: 42% Adjusted R-square 27.8%
F= 2.95 Significance level (p) =  0.002
ANOVA




Regression 26.841 14 1.917
Residual 37.069 57 0.650
Total 63.910 71
Independent variables (expected sign) Coefficient Standard t- Sig VIF
error value
Constant -0.029 0.379 -0.077 0.939
FS (+) -0.344 0.202 -1.701 0.094* 4.251
FL (+ /-) -0.091 0.117 -0.774 0.442 1.518
FP (+ /-) 0.201 0.141 1.421 0.161 2.113
FV (+) -0.021 0.121 -0.171 0.865 1.599
BE (+) 0.538 0.188 2.866 0.006*** 3.397
BS (+ /-) 0.193 0.121 1.594 0.116 1.452
OC(-) -0.045 0.169 -0.266 0.791 1.214
GO (+ /-) -0.055 0.199 -0.274 0.785 2.865
MO (-) -0.302 0.191 -1.583 0.119 2.386
IO (+ /-) -0.120 0.152 -0.788 0.434 1.711
IM -  manufacturing (+ /-) 0.148 0.276 0.536 0.594 1.905
IM - non-manufacturing (+ /-) -0.394 0.363 -1.086 0.282 1.889
RD (-) 0.116 0.282 0.411 0.682 1.448
AT (+ Mandatory and + /-  Voluntary) -0.349 0.246 -1.419 0.161 1.657
***Significant at the level 1% 
^^Significant at the level 5% 
^Significant at the level 10%
FS Firm Size, FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV Firm Leverage, BE Barriers to Entry, BS 
Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, MO Managerial Ownership, IO 
Institutional Ownership, IM Industry Membership, RD Role Duality, AT Auditor Type
A summary o f the six regression models’ results is presented in Table 7.26.
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T able 7.26: Summary o f  F indings
Determinants Expected Sign EAS25 EAS33 Voluntary Pooling
2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007 EAS25 EAS33 Voluntary
Competition
Barriers to entry BE + + (5%) NS + (1%) + (1%) + (1%) + (1%) + (5%) + (1%) + (1%)
Corporate Governance
Board size BS + /- NS + (5%) NS NS NS NS + (5%) - (10%) NS
Role duality RD - NS - (10%) NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
Auditor type AT ( + Mandatory)/ ( + / - Voluntary) + (1%) + (1%) NS NS NS NS + (1%) NS - (5%)
Ownership Structure NS
Ownership concentration OC - - (10%) - (5%) NS NS NS NS -(1%) NS NS
Managerial ownership MO - NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
Governmental ownership GO + /- NS NS - (10%) NS NS NS NS - (5%) NS
Institutional ownership IO + /- NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
Company Risk Level
Leverage FV + NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
Firm Characteristics
Firm size FS + - (10%) NS NS NS NS - (10%) NS NS NS
Profitability FP + /- + (10%) NS NS NS NS NS + (10%) NS NS
Liquidity FL + /- NS NS + (5%) + (1%) NS NS NS + (1%) NS
Industry membership IM + /- NS NS NS NS NS NS NS - (10%) NS
NS: N on-Significant
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7.7 Testing OLS Regression Assumptions, Outliers, Leverage and Influential 
Observations
Checking and verifying the assumptions o f multiple regression is a crucial step since the 
validity and generalisability o f the results depend on satisfying these assumptions.
7.7.1 Linearity Assumption
Linearity assumption refers to linear relationship between dependent and independent 
variables. Linearity assumption will be checked and verified by using diagnostics graphs 
such as standardised residual values against standardised predicted values plots. In 
addition, linearity assumption will be checked by using Ramsey’s RESET Test to test the 
functional form o f the regression model. Standardised residual values against 
standardised predicted values plots indicate that there is no significant violation for 
linearity assumption (see Figure 7.3; Appendix 12).
Figure 7.3: Standardised Residual Values against Standardised Predicted Values Plots -  Linearity 
Assumption
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Moreover, Ramsey’s RESET Test (see Table 7.27) reveals that the null hypothesis o f a 
correct linear specification o f the regression models cannot be rejected (p> 0.10). 
Therefore, based on the graphical examination and statistical tests, it could be concluded 
that the linearity assumption is not violated.
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T able 7.27: R am sey’s R E SE T  T est R esults
Ramsey RESET test (Ho: m odel has no om itted variables)
EAS 25 F(3, 89) = 0.69, Prob > F = 0.5608
2006 EAS 33 F(3, 89) =  0.53, Prob > F = 0.6616
Voluntary Disclosure F (3 ,45) = 0.83, Prob > F = 0.4854
EAS 25 F(3, 89) =  0.24, Prob > F = 0.8669
2007 EAS 33 F(3, 89) = 1.69, Prob > F =  0.1741
Voluntary Disclosure F(3, 55) = 2.11, Prob > F = 0.1101
7.7.2 Normality Assumption
Normality assumption refers to normal distribution o f regression residuals. Normality 
assumption will be checked graphically by investigating Q-Q plots, histogram and normal 
probability plots o f  the residuals. In addition, the K-S test will be used to test residuals 
normality. Histogram and normal probability plots o f the residuals indicate that the 
distribution o f the residuals is approximately normal (see Figure 7.4; Appendix 13).
Figure 7.4: Residuals Q-Q Plots and Histogram
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Moreover, the K-S test indicates that the null hypothesis that the residuals are normally 
distributed cannot be rejected (p> 0.10) (see Table 7.28).
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T able 7.28: K-S T e st  o f  N orm ality
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Statistic df Sig
SRIS2506 .059 106 P > 0.10
SRIS2507 .037 105 P > 0 . 1 0
SRIS3306 .060 106 P > 0.10
SRIS3307 .054 105 P > 0.10
SRISVOL06 .058 63 P > 0.10
SRISVOL07 .064 72 P > 0.10
7.7.3 Homoscedasticity Assumption
Homoscedasticity refers to homogeneity o f residuals variance at different levels o f  
independent variables. Homoscedasticity could be detected graphically through 
standardised residuals versus standardised predicted values plots. Moreover, the 
homoscedasticity assumption will be assessed through the Breusch-Pagan and Cook- 
Weisberg tests. Standardised residuals versus standardised predicted values plots indicate 
a random array o f  dots and the dots do not take ‘funnels out’ shape (see Figure 7.3; 
Appendix 12). Furthermore, Breusch-Pagan and Cook-Weisberg tests indicate that the 
homogeneity assumption for the six regression models cannot be rejected (p> 0.10) (see 
Table 7.29). Based on the aforementioned graphs and tests, it could be concluded that 
the homogeneity o f  variance assumption is not violated.
Table 7.29: Breusch-Pagan/Cook-W eisberg T est for H eteroscedasticity
Breusch-Pagan /  Cook-W eisberg test for heteroscedasticity (Ho: Constant
variance)
EAS 25 chi2(l)= 0.15, Prob > ch i2  = 0.7004
2006 EAS 33
'
chi2(l)= 1.46, Prob > chi2 =  0.2266
Voluntary
disclosure
chi2(l)= 1.17, Prob > chi2 = 0.2786
EAS 25 chi2(l)= 0.93, Prob > chi2 = 0.3338
2007 EAS 33 chi2(l)= 0.26, Prob > chi2 = 0.6068
Voluntary
disclosure chi2(l)= 0.75, Prob > chi2 = 0.3869
7.7.4 Outliers, Leverage and Influential Observations
Outliers refer to observations with large residuals that are significantly different from 
other observations. Outliers will be checked graphically through standardised residuals 
versus standardised predicted values plots and by identifying observations with 
standardised residuals larger than 2 (see Figure 7.5; Appendix 14). It is expected and
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accepted that 5% o f the observations have standardised residuals larger than 2. Table 
7.30 indicates the threshold and number o f observations with standardised residuals > 2.
Figure 7.5: Standardised Residuals Values against Standardised Predicted Values Plots - outliers
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Table 7.30 indicates that the number o f outliers is within the acceptable range and the 
existence o f some observations with large residuals will not harm the analysis.














No. o f observation with 
standardised residuals > 2 5
2 1 2 4 0
Threshold criteria (No. o f  
observations) 5 5
3 5 5 4
Leverage points and influential observations are observations that have undue impact on 
the regression model. Based on the discussion regarding diagnostics tools o f influential 
observations (see section 6.5.2.7.3), several statistical measures will be used to detect 
these observations (see Appendix 14). Tables 7.31 and 7.32 summarise these statistical 
measures, the threshold criteria, calculated threshold and the number o f cases that exceed 
the threshold.

















4 / n-k-1 0.0435 9 6 0.0439 7 6
Leverage 2 (K + l)/n 0.2642 2 2 0.2667 2 2
DIFBETA 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
DIFFIT
2 j ( K  +  ! ) / ( « 0.7802 9 6 0.47 7 6
Table 7.32: Num ber of cases that exceed threshold - Voluntary Risk Reporting 2006 and 2007
Measures Threshold Criteria
2006 2007
Calculated Threshold N o Calculated Threshold N o
Cook distance 4/n-k-l 0.0833 6 0.0702 2
Leverage 2 (K + l)/n 0.4762 0 0.4167 0
DIFBETA 1 1 1 1 0
DIFFIT 2 V ( a : + i ) / ( / i - a - - i ) 1.118 7 1.026 2
After an in-depth examination o f outliers, high leverage and influential observations, it 
was decided to keep these observations since they slightly exceed the cut-off points and 
provide important information about the population and deleting them might threaten 
the results’ generalisability.
Several procedures have been employed to check the robustness o f the regression results 
and the sensitivity to alternative specifications. This study runs two OLS regression 
models by using pooled data. The findings are reported in Appendix 15. In general, the 
results o f the pooled data indicate, qualitatively, similar results to that o f the individual 
year data. Another procedure is a re-sampling approach. In this approach, a few 
observations are deleted to check any major changes in regression’s coefficients 
(Studenmund, 2006). Following this approach, five observations have been selected 
randomly to be deleted from the analysis and then the regression models were re-run. 
This procedure has been repeated 10 times for each regression model. The results 
indicate, qualitatively, similar results to those obtained from a full sample. The results
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show non-significant changes in the adjusted R2 and the regression’s coefficients. This 
confirms that regression models are robust.
Several approaches have been used to check for collinearity. The VIF for each 
independent variable is calculated to assess any potential collinearity among independent 
variables. As a rule of thumb, it is suggested that a variable with VIF of 10 or more is a 
cause for concern. The VIF has been calculated for the independent variables in 2006 
and 2007 and the results indicate that the largest VIF in 2006 is 3.56 and 4.06 for firm 
size and government ownership respectively while the largest VIF in 2007 is 4.25 and 
3.40 for firm size and barriers to entry respectively. In addition, condition index has been 
calculated for each regression model (see Appendix 16). The condition index of all the 
variables is far below the cut-off point of 15 (Belsley et al., 1980) and none of them has 
an eigenvalue of zero (Myers and Well, 2003). These measures suggest that collinearity 
may not be a serious problem for the regression analysis. However, a further sensitivity 
analysis has been conducted by re-running regression analysis with/without barriers to 
entry and firm size variables because they have the highest correlation coefficient and 
comparing the results with that of the full model. On the one hand, when firm size 
variable has been dropped from while barriers to entry variable has been kept in the 
regression model the results show minor changes. The results indicate that (see Appendix 
17.A):
1- Mandatory risk reporting EAS 25-2006: Barriers to entry variable remained significant 
but at 10% level while auditor type and ownership concentration variables remained 
significant at 1% and 10% level respectively. However, profitability variable became non­
significant and other variables remained without changes.
2- Mandatory risk reporting EAS 33-2006: No changes happened to the results in this 
model. Barriers to entry, liquidity, and governmental ownership variables remained 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively and other variables remained without 
changes.
3- Voluntary risk reporting-2006: No changes happened to the results in this model. 
Barriers to entry variable remained significant at 1% level and other variables remained 
without changes.
4- Mandatory risk reporting EAS 25-2007: No changes happened to the results in this 
model. Auditor type, board size and role duality variables remained significant at 1%, 5%
and 10% level respectively. In addition, ownership concentration variable remained
/
significant at 5% level and other variables remained without changes.
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5- Mandatory risk reporting EAS 33-2007: No changes happened to the results in this 
model. Barriers to entry and liquidity variables remained significant at 1% level and other 
variables remained without changes.
6- Voluntary risk reporting-2007: Barriers to entry variable remained significant but at 
5% level while auditor type variable became significant at 10% level. Other variables 
remained without changes.
On the other hand, when barriers to entry variable has been dropped from and firm size 
variable has been kept in the regression model the results show some changes. The 
results indicate that (see Appendix 17.B):
1- Mandatory risk reporting EAS 25-2006: Auditor type remained significant at 1% level 
while ownership concentration became significant at 5% level. Both firm size and 
profitability became non-significant while other variables remained without changes.
2- Mandatory risk reporting EAS 33-2006: Liquidity remained significant at 5% level. 
Both firm size and auditor type became significant at 5% and 10% level respectively 
while governmental ownership became non-significant. Other variables remained 
without changes.
3- Voluntary risk reporting-2006: Firm size and industry membership became significant 
at 5% and 10% level respectively while other variables remained without changes.
4- Mandatory risk reporting EAS 25-2007: No changes happened to the results. Auditor 
type, board size and role duality remained significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. Ownership concentration remained significant at 10% level while other 
variables remained without changes.
5- Mandatory risk reporting EAS 33-2007: liquidity variable remained significant at 1% 
level and firm size became significant at 5% level while other variables remained without 
changes.
6- Voluntary risk reporting-2007: Board size and industry membership became 
significant at 10% while firm size became non-significant. Other variables remained 
without changes.
These changes in the results may indicate that the barriers to entry variable has a 
significant contribution to the regression model while the firm size variable has a litde 
one but together they provide better explanation to the variation of the dependent 
variables. However, the interpretations of the results should be taken with caution. 
Finally, the results of Ramsey’s RESET Test indicate that there are no major 
specification errors in the regression models (see Table 7.27).
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7.8 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has examined statistically the impact of competition, ownership structure 
and corporate governance characteristics on risk reporting. Barrier to entry is employed 
as a proxy for competition. Ownership structure variables are ownership concentration, 
managerial ownership, governmental ownership and institutional ownership while 
corporate governance variables are board size and role duality. In addition, the study 
controls for firm-specific characteristics such as firm size, profitability, liquidity, leverage, 
industry membership and auditor type. Six regression models have been run to test 39 
research hypotheses for 2006 and 2007.
With respect to mandatory risk reporting, descriptive statistics reveal a very low level of 
compliance with EAS 25 (19.33% and 21.57% in 2006 and 2007 respectively) and EAS 
33 (18.25% and 16.99% in 2006 and 2007 respectively). This result reflects the impact of 
the secretive nature of Egyptian culture on risk reporting and highlights the potential 
difficulties that Egyptian companies face in applying these two standards. Furthermore, it 
emphasises the inactive role of the CMA and the EGX in monitoring listed companies 
compliance with accounting standards. Also, the result indicates that there is a significant 
increase in the level of compliance with EAS 25 between 2006 and 2007 while there is a 
non-significant change in the level of compliance with EAS 33 between 2006 and 2007.
With respect to voluntary risk reporting, Egyptian companies tend to disclose more non- 
financial, qualitative, good news and past risk disclosure than financial, quantitative, bad 
news and future voluntary risk disclosure. The lack of quantitative and forward-looking 
voluntary risk reporting in the annual reports of Egyptian companies impairs the 
usefulness of risk reporting and highlights the impact of the secretive nature of Egyptian 
culture on voluntary risk reporting practices of Egyptian companies. Finally, the 
correlation between mandatory and voluntary risk reporting points to a significant 
coordination between the board o f directors and the management in preparing the 
annual reports of Egyptian companies.
Multivariate analysis indicates positive associations between profitability, liquidity, 
barriers to entry, auditor type, board size and compliance with mandatory risk disclosure. 
In contrast, negative associations are revealed between ownership concentration, 
governmental ownership, firm size, role duality and compliance with mandatory risk 
disclosure. Furthermore, the analysis indicates positive associations between barriers to 
entry, firm size and voluntary risk reporting (see Table 7.26). Finally, a graphical
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examination of the data and statistical tests confirm that multiple regression assumptions 
are satisfied. Moreover, collinearity, outliers, leverage and influential observations are not 
serious problems for regression analysis and this supports the validity and generalisability 
of the results. The next chapter will explain the low compliance with mandatory and 
presentation of voluntary risk reporting evident in this chapter through examining the 
potential factors that may lead to low risk reporting in the annual reports of Egyptian 
companies.
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CHAPTER 8: FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE 
PRESENTATION OF RISK REPORTING
8.1 Introduction
The previous chapter investigated the level of compliance with mandatory risk reporting 
requirements and identified the voluntary risk reporting practices of Egyptian companies. 
The results of the quantitative analysis in the previous chapter indicated a low level of 
compliance with mandatory risk reporting and low presentation of voluntary risk 
reporting in the annual reports of Egyptian listed companies.
This chapter takes a further step by exploring and investigating the factors that influence 
presentation of mandatory and voluntary risk reporting. A semi-structured interview 
method was chosen to elicit respondents’ perceptions regarding the impact of these 
factors on the risk reporting practices of Egyptian companies. Inductive and deductive 
approaches have been used to identify the categories/themes used in qualitative data 
analysis.
Factors that influence presentation of mandatory and voluntary risk reporting have been 
categorised into four groups as follows:
• Factors related to accounting education.
• Factors related to accounting practice.
• Factors related to cost of disclosure
• Other factors.
These factors are discussed in sections 8.2, 8.3, 8.4 and 8.5 respectively. Finally, section
8.6 is a summary and conclusion.
8.2 Factors Related to Accounting Education
Based on prior literature, six factors have been recognised as a potential threat to risk 
reporting practices of Egyptian companies. The potential impact of these factors on 
mandatory and voluntary risk reporting has been discussed as follows.
8.2.1 Inadequate Local Accounting Textbooks
Regarding the impact of local accounting textbooks on risk reporting practices, 12 of the 
interviewees indicated that local accounting textbooks are outdated and do not discuss 
properly the application of accounting standards or highlight the importance of voluntary 
disclosure. This result is in line with the AAA’s (1976) argument that inadequate local
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accounting textbooks are a major problem for accounting education in developing 
countries. According to two respondents (FM-2 and RG-1), several local textbooks have 
not updated their contents and the information provided dates back to the 1980s at best. 
Enthoven (1985) argues that the structure and content of the accounting curricula in 
developing countries should be updated to meet the fast changing international business 
environment. Moreover, upgrading the accounting curricula is a key factor for the 
successful application of IFRS (McGee 2006). A financial manager (FM-1) indicated that 
local textbooks need to be developed because outdated ones spread a state of deadlock 
in accounting practices in Egypt. This result confirms the results of Kayed (1990) and 
ROSC (2002) regarding the inadequate accounting textbooks and lack of learning 
material and their negative impact on accounting practice in Egypt.
The main problem of local textbooks is the weak presentation and discussion of the 
IASs/EASs. It is hard to find an Arabic textbook that discusses properly the application 
of accounting standards not merely summarising the original text of the standards. An 
external auditor (AD-1) argued that most textbooks do not discuss the application of 
EASs and the basics of sound accounting practices, based on accounting standards, are 
not explained adequately in local textbooks.
Two external auditors (AD-2 and AD-3) believed that local textbooks discuss the EASs 
in their tide only but in content they do not. A regulator (RG-2) added that the 
consequence of very poor local textbooks is producing an accountant without sufficient 
awareness regarding sound accounting practices. Moreover, an academic (AC-3) 
indicated that there is no motivation for systematic development of local accounting 
textbooks and the incentive is merely a personal motivation. Finally, an external auditor 
(AD-5) pointed out that local textbooks suffer from the absence of a case study 
approach in presenting the application of accounting standards, their contents depart 
from real accounting practice and they are not related to accounting standards. 
Alternatively, three of the interviewees thought that local accounting textbooks are 
adequate, updated and present accounting standards properly. An academic (AC-2) 
indicated that local textbooks are up-to-date, keep pace with recent amendments in 
accounting standards and provide an adequate presentation for the application of 
accounting standards. Another academic (AC-1) argued that the problem is not the poor 
local textbooks. The main problem is the education process itself. He stated:
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The educational process is characterised by a large number of students, few staff and 
teaching assistants, no reliance on case study approach to introduce the students how to 
apply accounting disclosure.
This result is consistent with that o f Kayed (1990) and ROSC (2002) regarding the poor 
student/staff ratio which reaches 1000:1 in large government universities and lack o f a 
case study approach in undergraduate studies.
Table 8.1 summarises the respondents’ points o f view regarding the potential impact o f  
inadequate local accounting textbooks on risk reporting.
Table 8.1: The Im pact o f the Inadequate Local A ccounting Textbooks on Risk Reporting 
Practices
^ ^ g r e e ^ ^ ^ isa g r e e ^
A. Local accounting textbooks are outdated and 
fail to discuss properly the application of 
accounting standards or emphasise the 
importance o f voluntary disclosure.
B. The contents o f local textbooks depart from 
real accounting practice and they are not 
related to accounting standards.
A. Local accounting textbooks are adequate, 
updated and present accounting standards 
properly but the problem is the educational 
process itself.
8.2.2 Inadequate Accounting Education of Managers and Decision-makers
Regarding the impact o f managers’ accounting education on risk reporting, 14 o f the 
interviewees indicated that the inadequate accounting education o f  managers has a 
negative impact on mandatory and voluntary risk reporting practices in Egyptian 
companies. According to a regulator (RG-1), due to the lack o f adequate accounting 
education, managers consider preparing financial statements a routine process to satisfy 
regulation requirements only. Therefore, there is no need to provide more voluntary 
disclosure. Moreover, an external auditor (AD-4) thought that managers consider 
compliance with the EASs an optional decision and the standards could be applied in a 
selective manner. AAA (1976) recognises the inadequate accounting education o f  
managers as one o f the key problems o f accounting education in developing countries, 
Tai et al. (1990) and Al-Mulhem (2003) indicate that managers, especially in developing 
countries, suffer from difficulties in understanding the requirements o f company law and 
accounting standards. In addition, Akathaporn et al. (1993) argue that managers o f Thai 
companies, especially small and medium sized ones, have very little knowledge about the 
role and benefits o f financial reporting.
The inadequate accounting education of managers and decision makers impaired the 
importance of compliance with risk-related accounting standards and presentation of 
voluntary risk reporting. A regulator (RG-2) believed that information such as risk 
disclosure may not be included in financial reports due to the lack of managers’ 
knowledge regarding the importance of accounting disclosure. An academic (AC-1) 
remarked:
The inadequate accounting background of managers and decision makers may lead to the 
failure to recognise the important role of mandatory and voluntary risk reporting in 
supporting the company’s image.
In the same vein, an external auditor (AD-5) added that managers’ accounting knowledge 
is very poor and therefore they believe that adherence to accounting standards or 
presentation of voluntary reporting, including risk reporting, is useless. Several 
respondents highlighted that the inadequate accounting education of managers and 
decision-makers is a stumbling block to the development of the financial reporting 
practices of Egyptian companies since they resist any attempt to enhance accounting 
practices including risk reporting. An external auditor (AD-3) remarked:
Managers’ knowledge concemingfinancial reporting is very poor and hence thy opposed the 
presentation of voluntary risk reporting within financial reports. In several cases, we put 
pressure on the managers to accept the compliance with risk-related EASs.
Similarly, a financial manager (FM-1) indicated that he faced strong confrontation from 
top management when he proposed some enhancement in the financial reports and 
related disclosure such as segment reporting. In the same vein, a regulator (RG-2) 
highlighted that any attempt from the regulatory authorities to develop financial 
reporting and disclosure practices of Egyptian companies receive very low acceptance 
from companies. An external auditor (AD-1) commented that the main problem in the 
application of EASs is low management awareness concerning the necessity to keep pace 
with the changes that have occurred in accounting standards and practices
A regulator (RG-1) pointed out that the problem of inadequate accounting education for 
managers and decision-makers is exaggerated in small companies because managers in 
these companies may suffer from a shortage of accounting knowledge and do not 
appreciate the role of financial reporting in supporting the market value of companies’ 
shares. Another regulator (RG-4) added that large companies have professional managers
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who depend on accounting information in their decisions and appreciate the importance 
o f financial disclosure in annual reports.
It is worth mentioning that an external auditor (AD-6) highlighted the need for special 
courses for top management in financial reporting as a prerequisite for promotion 
because he witnessed many cases o f managers signing o ff the financial reports while not 
understanding their content. This result is consistent with the result o f Tai et al. (1990) 
that managers might sign off financial statements without any knowledge regarding the 
problems embedded in them.
Alternatively, one o f  the interviewees (FM-2) argued that managers’ lack o f accounting 
background does not mean that the company will not prepare proper financial 
statements because the external auditor will assist in preparing financial statements 
through highlighting what the company should report.
Table 8.2 summarises the respondents’ views regarding the potential impact o f the 
inadequate accounting education o f managers on risk reporting.
Table 8.2: The Impact o f the Inadequate Accounting Education of M anagers on Risk Reporting 
Practices
^^jjrree^ ^ D isa g re e^
A. Managers consider preparing financial 
statements as a routine process to meet legal 
requirements only.
B. The application o f  accounting standards is 
optional and the standards could be applied 
selectively.
C. Managers understate the importance o f risk 
reporting.
D. Managers resist any attempt to enhance 
financial reporting in annual reports.
A. The assistance a company receive from 
external auditor may alleviate the impact o f  
inadequate accounting education o f managers 
on risk reporting.
8.2.3 Bookkeeping and Procedures-oriented Accounting Education
Regarding the impact o f the emphasis on bookkeeping and accounting procedures on 
risk reporting, all the interviewees argued that accounting education limits the attention 
to a procedures-approach to accounting and pays less attention to financial reporting 
which in turn may impede presentation o f mandatory and voluntary risk reporting in the 
annual reports o f Egyptian companies. This result is in line with the conclusion o f AAA 
(1976) that significant focus on bookkeeping and accounting procedures is a major 
feature o f accounting education in developing countries. An external auditor (AD-3) 
remarked:
Accounting education does not discuss accounting disclosure properly. Students in
accounting sections do not know the real meaning of the word "Disclosure ’. Therefore, it is
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difficult for them to deal m th accounting disclosure-related standards especially those related 
to highly sensitive topics such as risk reporting.
Moreover, a financial manager (FM-1) indicated that accounting education does not 
provide illustrations and case studies on how to report certain information such as 
segment reporting.
The participants identify three main characteristics o f accounting education in Egypt that 
contribute to low presentation o f mandatory an d voluntary risk reporting. First, an 
academic (AC-3) argued that accounting education pays less attention to the application 
o f financial reporting standards and this, without doubt, will lead to a limited accounting 
knowledge o f the graduate. Second, an external auditor (AD-5) believed that there is no 
clear approach regarding how to train students on the application o f  financial reporting 
standards. It is very rare to find a graduate able to deal with the standards and who is 
aware o f the importance o f  complying with them. Third, accounting education focuses 
mainly on accounting measurements and ignores accounting disclosure which in turn 
distorts the accounting knowledge o f a graduate. An external auditor (AD-6) indicated 
that accounting measurement dominates the accounting curricula in Egyptian universities.
It is worth mentioning that a regulator (RG-4) indicated that in an interview with 65 
candidates, he found that most candidates did not have sufficient knowledge about 
accounting disclosure and financial reporting standards. Only three candidates were able 
to discuss and present a reasonable understanding regarding accounting standards 
requirements and financial reporting.
Table 8.3 summarises the interviewees’ views regarding the potential impact o f  
bookkeeping and procedures-oriented accounting education on risk reporting.
Table 8.3: The Impact of the Bookkeeping and Procedures-oriented A ccounting Education on 
Risk Reporting Practices
Agree
A. Accounting education pays more attention to a procedure-approach o f  accounting and undermines
the importance o f  financial reporting.
B. Accounting education does not provide educational material regarding the application o f financial
reporting standards.
C. Accounting education focuses mainly on accounting measurements and understates the importance of
accounting disclosure.
220
8.2.4 Limited Emphasis on Conceptual Framework for the Preparation and 
Presentation of Financial Statements and Objectives of Financial Reporting
Lin and Deng (1992) highlight the importance of the objectives of financial reporting,
qualitative characteristics of accounting information and basic elements of financial
reporting in forming a well-established framework for accounting education and practice.
Regarding the impact of limited emphasis on the conceptual framework and objectives of 
financial reporting on risk reporting practices, all the interviewees indicated that a 
relatively low importance has been given by accounting education to the conceptual 
framework and objectives of financial reporting and this is a main reason for low 
presentation of mandatory and voluntary risk reporting. Kayed (1990) indicates that 
Egyptian accounting education focuses principally on technical rather than conceptual 
issues. Moreover, Al-Mulhem (2003) points out that lack of awareness regarding the 
objectives of financial reporting is a key reason for non-compliance with disclosure 
requirements in Saudi companies. An academic (AC-2) remarked:
This is an important factor for non-compliance with accounting standards and low 
presentation of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Egyptian companies. The 
relative weight of accounting measurement in the curricula is much larger than the relative 
weight of accounting disclosure. This in turn led the accountants to focus mainly on 
accounting measurement and ignore disclosure in annual reports.
This result is consistent with the finding of Samaha and Stapleton (2008) that Egyptian 
companies tend to comply more with accounting standards related to measurement 
aspects than accounting standards related to disclosure aspects. Street and Gray (2002) 
and Al-Shammari et al. (2008) reach a similar conclusion. They find that compliance with 
disclosure requirements is lower than compliance with measurement requirements. 
Moreover, a low emphasis on the conceptual framework results in a distortion of 
students’ knowledge regarding their importance as guidance to accounting practices. A 
regulator (RG-3) indicated:
Accounting education does not pay significant attention to the conceptualframework for the 
preparation and presentation of financial statements in spite of its importance in 
highlighting the role of accounting disclosure which in turn influences accountants’ 
awareness regarding the importance of compliance with accounting standards and 
presentation of voluntary disclosure including risk reporting.
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As a result o f the limited emphasis on the conceptual framework, the accountants pay 
less attention to disclosure in annual reports. An academic (AC-1) indicated:
The conceptual framework fo r the preparation and presentation offinancial statements is 
explained in short paragraphs, i f  any, without any depth or without making sure that the 
students understand its basic elements and the objectives o f financial statements.
An external auditor (AD-1) pointed out the failure to present accounting disclosures that 
satisfy the qualitative characteristics o f accounting information as a consequence of 
limited emphasis on the conceptual framework. A regulator (RG-2) supported this point 
o f view by stating that accountants do not know how to prepare disclosure in 
accordance with qualitative characteristics o f accounting information.
Interestingly, an external auditor (AD-6) added that several accountants and auditors are 
confused concerning the basic concepts o f accounting. He stated:
I  discovered that a large number of practitioners do not understand the difference between 
the assumptions, principles, constraints and qualitative characteristics of information. They 
do not know the difference between these elements because of the neglect o f introducing the 
Conceptual Framework in accounting education. Certainly, this will influence disclosure 
practices.
It is worth mentioning that a regulator (RG-2) indicated that to encourage companies to 
apply corporate governance principles, the EIoD held a competition between the top 30 
listed companies for the best website and annual report. The results were disappointing 
because several companies have only financial statements and have no idea about the 
annual reports.
Table 8.4 summarises the respondents’ point o f view regarding the potential impact o f  
limited emphasis on conceptual framework and objectives o f financial reporting on risk 
reporting.
Table 8.4: The Impact o f Limited Em phasis on Conceptual Framework and Objectives of  
Financial Reporting on Risk Reporting Practices
_______________________________________________________ A gree________________________________________________________
A. Accounting education focuses mainly on technical rather than conceptual issues.
B. Accountants assign a very small relative weight to disclosure in financial reports.
C. Accountants fail to present accounting disclosures that meet the qualitative characteristics o f accounting 
information.
num be^^ ractitioner^ n isu nd erstan ^ ^i^b asi^ on ce£t^ D h^ conce£tua^ am ew ork ^ ^^ ^D^Atarge
222
8.2.5 Lack of Sufficient Practical Training of Accounting Students
Tipgos (1987), Kayed (1990), Akathapom et al. (1993) and El-Basteki (2000) highlight 
the importance of practical training or internship programs for accounting students 
during their undergraduate education as a key factor to enhance accounting practice. This 
kind of training will assist them in applying the accounting knowledge they gain in real 
world situations (Lin and Deng, 1992).
Regarding the impact of practical training of undergraduate students on risk reporting 
practices, all the interviewees agreed that the lack of relevant practical training of 
students has a negative impact on risk reporting practices of Egyptian companies. The 
absence of practical training leads to shortage in graduates’ accounting knowledge which 
in turn undermines the importance of accounting disclosure. An academic (AC-3) 
emphasised that:
Students in accounting sections do not get any training regarding accounting standards. 
Therefore, the preparation of financial statements in accordance with EA Ss and the 
presentation of voluntary disclosure is questionable.
An academic (AC-1) indicated that the absence of practical training limits graduates’ 
accounting knowledge to procedural aspects only and hinders the application of 
accounting standards in practice. An external auditor (AD-5) added that the students do 
not receive any practical training which can contribute to building their accounting skills 
and knowledge. Consequently, the result is limited disclosures. Moreover, an external 
auditor (AD-2) highlighted that the absence of relevant practical training as one main 
reason for non-compliance with accounting standards because students do not practice 
how to apply them in preparing financial statements. A regulator (RG-3) remarked:
The lack of practical training for students leads to low knowledge about the process of 
preparingfinancial reports, and low awareness regarding the role of accounting standards in 
this process and the merits of voluntary disclosure.
Another external auditor (AD-1) highlighted the fact that the absence of practical 
training is a major reason that students have no idea about best voluntary disclosure 
practices.
Respondents identify a number of reasons that hinder the provision of practical training 
to graduates of accounting sections in Egyptian universities. First, the large number of 
students accepted by business schools has been given as a major reason for the absence 
of practical training to students (AC-2 and RG-4). Second, an academic (AC-3) pointed
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out that funding problems and lack o f companies’ awareness towards the importance o f  
their contribution in students’ training are key obstacles to offering practical training to 
undergraduate students.
Table 8.5 summarises the respondents’ views regarding the potential impact o f lack o f  
sufficient practical training o f  accounting students on risk.
Table 8.5: The Im pact of Lack of Sufficient Practical Training o f Accounting Students on Risk  
Reporting Practices
Agree
A. The absence o f practical training limits graduates’ accounting knowledge and undermines the
importance o f accounting disclosure.
B. The absence o f  practical training limits graduates’ accounting knowledge to procedural aspects and
hinders the application o f  accounting standards.
C. The absence o f  practical training hinders students from having ideas about sound voluntary disclosure
practices.
8.2.6 Lack of Cooperation between the Profession and Universities
Successful implementation o f the IASs requires integrating accounting and auditing 
standards into accounting curricula and coordinating accounting education programmes 
with professional qualification (UNCTAD, 2008). Enthoven (1985), Tipgos (1987), 
Jensen and Arrington (1983) and Akathaporn et al. (1993) identify the need for effective 
cooperation between the profession and universities in accounting education and 
research in developing countries. Developing countries face several accounting problems 
that require cooperative efforts to address (El-Basteki, 2000). Professional bodies should 
highlight accounting skills and the knowledge required for practicing the profession as 
well as underline the strength and weaknesses o f  accounting education (El-Basteki, 2000). 
This cooperation provides essential inputs to university to re-design the accounting 
curricula to be more dynamic and to fit a country’s needs (Akathapom et al., 1993; El- 
Basteki, 2000).
Regarding the impact o f  cooperation between the profession and universities on risk 
reporting, 10 o f  the interviewees indicated that non-cooperation between the profession 
and universities in education and research issues leads to significant problems in the 
application o f accounting standards and presentation o f  voluntary disclosure related to 
risk reporting. An academic (AC-1) expressed the following opinion:
Due to lack o f cooperation between the profession and universities in education aspects, 
accounting textbooks depart from current accounting practices. Consequently, graduates' 
accounting knowledge is not commensurate with the requirements of professional practice. 
Moreover, the lack of cooperation between the profession and universities in accounting
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research results in severe problems in the application of H AS s. The profession should guide 
academic research to potentialproblems in practice. For example, auditors may identify the 
lack of relevant risk reporting and accounting research could examine the reasons for this 
deficiemy or non-compliance andpropose solutions.
Another academic (AC-3) emphasised the impact of lack of cooperation between the 
profession and universities on compliance with risk-related accounting standards. He 
stated:
There is no coordination between the parties interested in the profession on the macro level. 
Consequently, the graduate is not able to interact with the requirements of accounting 
standards or prepare financial statements in line with EASs. Furthermore, the concept of 
joint research between academics and practitioners is not accepted. Hence, problems such as 
non-compliance with segment reporting and financial instruments are not discussed in a 
scientific manner and the reasons behind these problems are not identified.
An external auditor (AD-1) indicated that the lack of cooperation between the 
profession and universities leads to a very small representation of academics on the 
committee established for the preparation of EASs. The committee consists of seven 
members only one of which is an academic and the rest are practitioners.
The respondents identify a number of reasons for the absence of cooperation between 
the profession and universities in education and research. First, an academic (AC-1) 
indicated that there is no single authority empowered to regulate the profession in Egypt 
and therefore the multiplicity of the parties claiming to represent the profession hinders 
cooperation. Second, another academic (AC-3) believed that academics and practitioners 
suffer from limited awareness regarding the importance of their cooperation in 
accounting education and research. Third, an external auditor (AD-6) indicated that 
academics tend to monopolise accounting research and are not willing to cooperate with 
practitioners for personal reasons.
It is worth mentioning that an external auditor (AD-6) suggested that practical training 
for a certain number of hours should be one graduation requirement and students 
should be given some lectures/classes by experienced practitioners.
Alternatively, five of the interviewees could not find a direct impact of the lack of 
cooperation between the profession and universities on risk reporting practices of 
Egyptian companies. Table 8.6 summarises the respondents’ views regarding the
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potential impact o f lack o f cooperation between the profession and universities on risk 
reporting.
Table 8.6: The Impact of the Lack of Cooperation between the Profession and Universities on 
Risk Reporting Practices
Agree Disagree
A. Non-cooperation between the profession and 
universities in education and research issues 
leads to significant problems in risk reporting.
B. The profession does not guide academic 
research to practice problems^^
A. There is a relative cooperation between the 
profession and universities.
B. There is no direct impact from the lack o f  
cooperation between the profession and 
universities on risk reporting.
8.3 Factors Related to Accounting Practice
Based on previous studies, nine problems related to accounting practice in Egypt have 
been identified as potential obstacles to mandatory and voluntary risk reporting in the 
annual reports o f  Egyptian companies. Interviewees were asked to explain their views 
regarding the potential impact o f these factors on risk reporting practices.
8.3.1 Lack of Qualified Accountants
The shortage o f experienced accountants is one o f the main obstacles to the adequate 
implementation o f accounting standards (UNCTAD, 2008). Regarding the impact o f  
qualified accountants on the presentation o f mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure, 12 
of the interviewees argued that the lack o f qualified accountants has a significant negative 
impact on compliance levels with the EASs as well as voluntary presentation o f risk 
information. This result is consistent with AAA (1976), Tai et al. (1990) and Al-Mulhem 
(2003) who agree that a shortage o f competent accounting staff is a key reason for non- 
compliance with disclosure requirements. A regulator (RG-1) commented:
Yes, there is a significant shortage of qualified financial accountants in many companies 
■which negatively impacts the quality of financial reports.
This shortage o f qualified financial accountants has significant negative consequences on 
risk reporting practices. An academic (AC-3) stated:
The significant shortage in qualified accountants results in a divergence in Egyptian 
companies' accounting practices as benchmarked against E A S s and LAS s.
Interviewees presented two key reasons for a shortage o f qualified financial accountants 
in Egyptian companies. First, interviewees from the academic group (AC-1) and the 
external auditors group (AD-1 and AD-2) highlighted the lack o f up-to-date accounting 
knowledge as a major reason for the shortage o f qualified accountants. An academic 
(AC-1) stated:
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Most - a large proportion - of the accountants in Egyptian companies do not up-date their 
knowledge about accounting standards and their amendments, particularly those related to 
disclosure requirements. This lack of knowledge negatively influences the quality of 
financial reports particularly the disclosure of risk information.
In the same vein, an external auditor (AD-1) remarked:
From my experience, 90% of the accountants in Egyptian companies do not have sufficient 
experience in the preparation of financial statements to make them consistent with EASs 
and IASs and many of them even do not read the EASs.
Second, respondents from the academic group (AC-5 and AC-3) and the external 
auditors group (AD-3and AD-4) highlighted a lack of sufficient training as a potential 
reason for lack of qualified accountants. An external auditor (AD-3) indicated that:
Most accountants have the minimum level of accounting knowledge and suffer from a lack 
of practical training which in turn influences their abilities to prepare financial statements 
and disclosures in accordance with the Egyptian Accounting Standards. They need more 
courses to gain experience and enhance their accounting knowledge.
An external auditor (AD-4) confirmed this point of view and added that:
Egyptian Accounting Standards are not properly presented to practitioners. Accountants 
do not get any adequate training before the application of Egyptian Accounting Standards 
which leads to a low level of compliance.
This result is consistent with Dahawy et al. (2002) who argue that immediate adoption of 
the IASs does not allow sufficient time for companies and the accounting profession to 
prepare. Preparers, users, regulators, professional agencies and educators should be 
engaged in the planning and implementation of IASs (UNCTAD, 2008).
Moreover, the cost of recruiting highly qualified accountants has been highlighted as a 
potential reason for the inadequate financial reports of Egyptian companies. A regulator 
(RG-4) commented:
Highly qualified accountants, holders of CPA or AC C A are few and their salaries are 
too high. Therefore, only large companies can afford them while small companies may 
recruit less qualified accountants with low salaries due to a shortage of financial resources. 
Consequently, small companies are not able to prepare financial statements in accordance 
with Egyptian Accounting Standards or to present high quality voluntary disclosure.
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Alternatively, three o f  the respondents thought that a lack o f qualified accountants may 
not influence the risk reporting practices o f Egyptian companies because o f the 
assistance companies receive from their external auditors in preparing mandatory and 
voluntary risk reporting and this may alleviate the problem o f a lack o f  qualified 
accountants. An external auditor (respondent FM-2) remarked:
There is cooperation between the company and our experienced external auditor who has a 
complete, direct or indirect, supervision over the process ofpreparing financial statements to 
maintain his reputation.
A respondent from the regulators group (RG-2) confirmed this point o f view by 
indicating that companies seek the assistance o f  their external auditors in preparing 
voluntary disclosure including risk reporting in their board o f directors’ report.
Table 8.7 summarises the main reasons that are mentioned by the interviewees regarding 
the potential impact o f the lack o f qualified accountants on risk reporting.
Table 8.7: The Impact o f the Lack o f Qualified Accountants on Risk Reporting Practices
Agree Disagree
A. Lack o f updated accounting knowledge.
B. Lack o f continuing training.
C. Poor presentation o f accounting 
standards.
D. Lack o f practical training at the 
^undergraduate level.
A. Large companies have professional staff.
B. External auditor should ensure the relevance 
of the disclosure in annual reports.
8.3.2 Lack of Well-organised Accounting Information Systems
Regarding the impact o f  the lack o f well-organised accounting information systems on 
mandatory and voluntary risk reporting, 11 o f the interviewees supported a negative 
impact for the lack o f  well-organised accounting information systems on the risk 
reporting practices o f Egyptian companies. One o f the interviewee from the auditors 
group (AD-2) commented:
Accounting information systems in most Egyptian companies are very weak and obsolete. 
Companies' management are not keen to develop and up-date their information systems.
A  respondent from the regulators group (RG-2) confirmed this point o f  view by stating:
Accounting information systems in small Egyptian companies are designed to provide basic 
accounting information needed fo r the preparation of basic financial statements only. A ny  
further disclosure, mandatory or voluntary, depends on the knowledge and skills of 
financial reports' preparers.
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Consequently, a lack of a well-organised accounting information system is a significant 
threat to the risk reporting practices of Egyptian companies. A regulator (RG-1) 
indicated:
Accounting information systems in small Egyptian companies do not assist in satisfying 
disclosure requirements of accounting standards leading to significant non-compliance with 
mandatory and low presentation of voluntary disclosure in companies’ annual reports; risk 
reporting is not an exception.
These major features of accounting information systems in Egyptian companies 
impaired companies’ abilities to provide risk-related information. An external auditor 
(AD-3) expressed the following opinion:
Regarding risk reporting, I  think that accounting information systems in many companies 
may not be able to provide information regarding the different risks companies might face 
as required by accounting standards and this may impede adherence with accounting 
standards.
In the same vein, an external auditor (AD-4) expressed the same point of view by stating:
Especially for segment reporting and other risk reporting requirements, small Egyptian 
companies do not have accounting information systems that assist in preparing such 
information. Therefore, there are difficulties in compliance with the requirements of 
Egyptian Accounting Standards related to risk reporting.
An external auditor (AD-6) argued that the main function of the accounting system is 
satisfying tax needs rather than financial reporting. He expressed the following opinion:
In small and medium si%ed enterprises, accounting information systems can be described as 
tax-oriented systems which do not serve or support the financial reporting process.
This result is consistent with the view of Akathapom et al. (1993) that small companies 
feel that the benefits from using accounting information in decision making may not 
justify the cost of developing an effective accounting information system.
Alternatively, four of the interviewees thought that most Egyptian companies have 
relevant accounting information systems so this factor has a non-significant influence on 
risk reporting practices. A financial manager (FM-1) commented that most companies 
have effective accounting information systems that enable compliance with accounting 
standards and presentation of voluntary risk disclosure.
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The interviewees indicated that management’s willingness to report or withhold the 
information is an important factor for disclosure decision. An academic (AC-3) argued 
that many companies have sound information systems but the problem is how 
management uses accounting information. Another academic (AC-3) explained this 
point more precisely:
The management may use accounting information provided by its information system to 
comply with accounting standards requirements and to provide voluntary disclosure or it 
may decide to ivithhold the information.
Table 8.8 summarises the main reasons that are mentioned by the interviewees regarding 
the potential impact o f lack o f a well-organised accounting information system on risk 
reporting.
Table 8.8: The Impact o f Lack of W ell-organised Accounting Information System on Risk 
Reporting Practices
Agree ^^^ J^Disagree^
A. Accounting information systems in most 
Egyptian companies are very weak and 
obsolete and fail to provide risk-related 
information.
B. Accounting information systems are tax- 
oriented systems that fail to assist financial 
reporting
A. Most Egyptian companies, especially large 
companies, have relevant accounting 
information systems.
8.3.3 Adequacy of IASs to Egyptian Environment
Regarding the question o f  whether the application of IASs is appropriate to the Egyptian 
environment, 11 o f the interviewees argued that the application o f  IASs is adequate for 
Egypt. The main reason for this point o f  view is the important role o f IASs in attracting 
more foreign investments to the Egyptian economy especially after the adoption o f the 
privatisation and economic reform program in the early 1990s. An external auditor (AD- 
2) remarked:
Given the economic reform program adopted by the Egyptian government in the 1990’s 
and in line with the objective of attractingforeign investments, it is essential to apply IASs.
Many foreign companies have branches in Egypt and hence there is a need fo r the 
application of international standards when preparingfinancial statements.
A financial manager (FM-1) argued that the IASs are designed to fit all countries. Egypt 
has become a magnet for foreign investments and thus the application o f EASs which 
are based on the IASs has become a necessity. In the same vein, an academic (AC-1) 
added:
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There is a trend for the application of IASs in the international arena and not keeping 
pace with this trend will make accounting practices in Egypt lag behind those practices 
internationally accepted.
It is worth mentioning that two interviewees indicated that there are many Egyptian 
companies that successfully apply the EASs. These companies are audited by audit firms 
with international affiliations (RG-3) or have global depositary receipts (RG-4). This 
argument is consistent with the result of the previous chapter regarding the positive 
association between auditor type and mandatory risk reporting. In the same vein, several 
prior studies reveal a positive association between auditor type and accounting disclosure 
(Ahmed, 1996; Inchausti, 1997; Patton and Zelenka, 1997; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 
2003).
Alternatively, four of the interviewees argued that the IASs are not adequate for the 
Egyptian environment. Consequently, Egyptian companies may depart from full 
compliance with these standards. They mention three main reasons for the inadequacy of 
IASs. First, there is a need to harmonise the EASs with current accounting practice to 
make sure that they are suitable for the Egyptian environment and gain wide acceptance 
from practitioners. An academic (AC-3) stated:
The application of the IASs has occurred without any reconciliation to the very nature of 
the Egyptian environment. EASs are merely a translation of IASs without any attempt 
at harmonisation.
Second, a number of accounting standards apply accounting treatments that are 
unknown to the preparers of financial statements which in turn lead to non-compliance. 
An external auditor (AD-6) expressed the following opinion:
Several accounting standards such as financial instruments use unfamiliar accounting 
treatments to existing accounting practices in Egypt. Thy are not being taught to students 
at undergraduate/ postgraduate level in the university.
Third, a financial manager (FM-2) believed that business transactions in Egypt, in terms 
of complexity, are completely different from those in the international arena. Therefore, 
it is not appropriate to apply the IASs in the Egyptian context.
Table 8.9 summarises the main reasons that are mentioned by the interviewees regarding 
the adequacy of IASs to Egypt and potential influence on risk reporting practices.
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T able 8.9: T h e A dequacy o f  IASs to Egyptian  E nvironm ent
Agree ^^^^^Disagree^
A. The application o f  IASs is adequate for the 
Egyptian environment especially after the 
privatisation program adopted by Egyptian 
government.
B. IASs suite all countries.
C. Egyptian companies should follow accounting 
practices internationally accepted.
A. Preparers o f financial statements are not 
familiar with accounting treatments o f some 
standards.
B. Local business environment, in terms o f  
complexity, is different from international 
business environment.
8.3.4 Lack of Effective Accounting and Auditing Profession
Successful implementation o f the IASs requires extensive and ongoing support from the 
accounting profession in building the technical capacity o f its members (UNCTAD, 
2008). AAA (1976) and Enthoven (1985) argue that the accounting profession in 
developing countries is very weak and based on an outdated institutional framework. 
Therefore, there is a need to establish an effective professional agency that could 
monitor and regulate the profession (El-Basteki, 2000).
Regarding the impact o f the accounting profession on the risk reporting practices of  
Egyptian companies, all the interviewees indicated that a lack o f an effective accounting 
profession led to a low compliance with mandatory risk reporting and low presentation 
o f voluntary risk reporting in the annual reports o f Egyptian companies. A regulator 
(RG-4) highlighted the impact o f a powerless accounting profession on accounting 
practices:
The accounting and auditing profession is very weak and does not exercise an effective role 
in training its members on the application o f E A S s or in developing their professional 
skills. Moreover, the profession does not provide relevant continuing education programs for 
its members. In addition, the profession lacks powerful punishment mechanisms to oversee 
the professional performance of accountants and auditors.
Consequently, accountants in Egyptian companies have become less concerned about 
applying accounting standards in preparing financial statements. A financial manager 
(FM-1) expressed the following opinion:
The accountants' key objective is to prepare financial statements that match management's 
point o f view in order to ensure its approval even at the expense of compliance with 
accounting standards especially since there are no strict sanctions fo r non-compliance with 
accounting standards.
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The interviewees advanced several reasons for the weak status of the accounting and 
auditing profession in Egypt. A number of interviewees believed that the main reason 
for such a weak profession is the law. Accounting and auditing practices in Egypt are 
organised by law 133/1951 and its amendments. This law is outdated and has not kept 
pace with structural changes in the Egyptian economy. Moreover, the law does not 
include any strict rules regarding continuing education. Besides, the law’s administrative 
sanctions are not effectively applied and the legal liabilities of accountants and auditors 
are vague. An academic (AC-3) argued that the legislation that organises the profession is 
obsolete, does not require the application of IASs/EASs and does not support the legal 
and professional accountability of accountants and auditors. Moreover, another external 
auditor (AD-6) highlighted the powerlessness of the law by stating:
The law which governs the profession is veiy outdated andfree from strict sanctions for the 
violation of accounting standards. Consequently, accountants have become indifferent to 
preparing the financial statements in accordance with the requirements of accounting 
standards.
Kothari (2001) indicates that shareholder litigation against auditors is infrequent in 
developing countries. ROSC (2002) asserts that this is the case in Egypt. An external 
auditor (AD-6) commented:
Apart from the CM A’s auditors registiy, the monitoring of audit quality is absent. There 
is no control over the performance of auditors or assessment for their competence in 
pe forming the duties entrusted to them in accordance with auditing standards.
The CMA in August 2006 established a registry for auditors who are entitled to audit the 
financial statements of listed companies with the aim of ensuring that listed companies 
are being audited by highly qualified auditors. Moreover, in July 2008, the CMA 
established a quality control unit to monitor adherence to quality standards, auditing 
standards and professional and ethical conduct by auditors listed on the CMA auditor 
registry. However, an external auditor (AD-5) believed that despite the efforts of the 
CMA in overseeing the professional performance of auditors this effort is questionable 
because it is limited to auditors listed on the CMA’s auditors registry only.
Several interviewees indicated that the accounting and auditing profession in Egypt is 
weak because professional bodies that organise and regulate the profession do not 
perform their role in developing and improving accounting practices as anticipated. An 
academic (AC-2) remarked:
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Agencies overseeing the accounting profession lack efficiency in training the 
accountants/  auditors and providing them with the essential skills required fo r the 
application of accounting standards.
Two interviewees highlighted the very weak efforts o f the SCP to promote adherence to 
the EASs by practitioners or to monitor the professional performance o f accountants. 
An external auditor (AD-1) expressed the following opinion:
The SCP does not encourage compliance with the E A S s through ensuring that its 
members are adequately applying the standards or impose sanctions in case of standards 
violation.
Table 8.10 summarises the main reasons given by the interviewees regarding the impact 
o f the lack o f an effective accounting and auditing profession on risk reporting.
Table 8.10: The Im pact of the Lack o f Effective Accounting and Auditing Profession on Risk 
Reporting Practices
APreg
A. The profession neither provides relevant continuing education programs nor develops professional
skills o f its members.
B. The lack o f strict sanctions for non-compliance with accounting standards.
C. Law 133/1951 is outdated.
D. The lack o f an effective supervision agency that monitors the professional performance o f
 accountants and auditors.____________________________________________________________________
8.3.5 Precedence of Tax Accounting over Financial Reporting
Regarding the impact o f tax accounting on risk reporting practices, nine o f the 
interviewees indicated that the tax accounting practices o f Egyptian companies have a 
negative influence on risk reporting practices. Egyptian companies are more concerned 
with the tax outcomes o f  their accounting practices and hence they may not comply with 
the EASs or provide voluntary disclosure including risk reporting if this is likely to cause 
any negative tax implications. This result confirms the result o f AAA (1976) that tax- 
oriented accounting practice is one o f the key problems o f  accounting practice in 
developing countries. Moreover, a financial manager (FM-2) argued that management 
and external auditors cooperate in planning a company’s tax liability and therefore a 
company may be reluctant to report certain information to avoid any potential tax 
liability. An external auditor (AD-6) remarked:
Management pays much more attention to tax consequences. For instance, the selection of 
accounting policies is based entirely on their tax consequences. Some clients terminate our 
engagement when we ask them to comply with certain disclosure requirements, such as
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segment reporting, of the Egyptian Accounting Standards due to a lack of understanding 
and a fear of tax implications.
This result is consistent with the finding of Dahawy et al. (2002) that Egyptian 
accountants and managers are well-trained to conceal information to avoid any potential 
tax consequences. ROSC (2002) indicates that there is cooperation between management 
and external auditors in the selection of accounting treatments and disclosures in the 
annual reports of Egyptian companies. This cooperation may take place on mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure with risk reporting being no exception. In addition, Akathapom 
et al. (1993) highlight the fact that companies’ managers in Thailand think that 
accounting is necessary only for tax purposes.
Companies seek to reduce their tax liability as much as possible. Therefore, they are 
reluctant to provide mandatory or voluntary risk reporting if they think that this 
disclosure will signal some information to the tax authorities. A financial manager (FM-2) 
indicated that the main goal of the accounting department is to reduce tax commitments 
to the minimum level. An external auditor (AD-4) highlighted clearly the impact of tax 
on risk reporting by stating:
Regarding accounting disclosure, many Egyptian companies may avoid the application of 
certain disclosures such as segment reporting because of the fear that the tax authority may 
use this information about segment profitability reported in financial statements as a basis 
for estimating a company’s profits and tax liability.
Tax officers have very litde knowledge regarding the EASs and this may cause severe 
problems for companies as a result of disclosures they provide in their financial reports. 
An external auditor (AD-1) expressed the following opinion:
Tax officers have not received any training on the application of accounting standards. A  
company’s management may withhold some disclosures to avoid any potential problems 
with the tax authority.
Interestingly, a regulator (RG-3) indicated that companies may prepare financial reports 
just for tax and borrowing purposes. He remarked:
A  company’s management may seek to prepare financial statements according to its needs.
Some companies prepare three different versions of financial reports for investors, the tax 
authority and lending banks.
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Alternatively, six o f the interviewees play down the impact o f tax rules on the risk 
reporting practices o f  Egyptian companies. Three interviewees (RG-4; FM-1 and RG-4) 
believed that the new tax law rebuilds bridges o f trust between companies and the tax 
authority and significandy decreases any potential opportunities for manipulation.
Table 8.11 summarises the main reasons that are mentioned by the interviewees 
regarding the potential impact o f tax-oriented accounting practices on risk reporting.
Table 8.11: The Impact o f the Tax-oriented Accounting Practices on Risk Reporting Practices
A g ree Disagree
A. Egyptian companies are more concerned with 
tax consequences o f accounting practices.
B. Company management and external auditor 
cooperate in the selection o f accounting 
treatments in annual reports o f Egyptian 
companies even at the expense o f adequate 
disclosure.
A. The new tax regulation establishes bridges of 
cooperation between companies and tax 
authority and eliminates any fraud 
opportunities.
8.3.6 Procedures-oriented Accounting Practices
Regarding the impact o f procedures-oriented accounting practices on the risk reporting 
of Egyptian companies, 11 o f  the interviewees considered procedures-oriented 
accounting practices a key threat to mandatory and voluntary risk reporting because they 
overlook the importance o f accounting disclosure in general and risk reporting in 
particular. This result is consistent with the findings o f  AAA (1976) and McGee (2006) 
that procedures-oriented accounting practice is one o f the major problems o f  accounting 
practice in developing countries. An academic (AC-2) explained the impact o f  
procedures-oriented accounting practices on mandatory and voluntary risk reporting by 
stating:
Companies tend to be concerned with the accurate recording of economic transactions while 
accounting disclosure receives low priority. This is reflected in the low level of compliance 
with accounting standards and low presentation of voluntary disclosure especially risk 
reporting.
Interestingly, two external auditors indicated that procedures-oriented accounting is 
inherent in the accounting practices o f many Egyptian companies and any attempt to 
change this faces significant resistance from management. Moreover, external auditors 
sometimes prepare the required disclosures instead o f their clients. Al-Kalbani (2008) 
reports a similar conclusion where auditors from the Big-4 audit firms prepare their
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clients’ annual reports in Oman. An external auditor (AD-2) expressed the following 
opinion:
We observed this trend in many companies and it is very difficult to persuade them of the 
importance of providing further disclosure regarding the figures in the financial statements.
In the same vein, another interviewee (AUD-3) commented:
Accountants are interested in accounting procedures and bookkeeping only which requires 
us to exercise pressure on the clientfor proper disclosures. However, sometimes, we prepare 
the disclosures ourselves.
The interviewees mentioned two key reasons for such procedures-oriented accounting 
practices in Egyptian companies. The first reason is the company’s management itself as 
it does not assign risk reporting a high significance in its disclosure policy. The main 
concern is bookkeeping and accurate journals and ledgers. This result is consistent with 
the result of Abd-Elmalek (2006) that Egyptian companies give disclosing risk 
information a very low priority. A financial manager (FM-2) remarked:
Top Management in our company believes that accounting disclosure is not important.
Most important is recording company’s transactions and preparing basic financial 
statements while accounting disclosure takes low importance. Sometimes, we seek the 
assistance of our external auditor in preparing the required disclosures.
Another interviewee (RG-1) expressed a similar opinion:
Because top management is not interested in disclosure, the accounting department is not 
concerned either. The importance of disclosure comes from the company’ management and is 
imposed on staff members.
The second reason is the UAS applied in public sector companies. Many managers and 
heads of the accounting department in several companies had worked in state-owned 
companies for a long time where training concentrated on bookkeeping while disclosure 
had little importance. An academic (AC-3) indicated:
This may be as a result of applying the UAS for a long time. The UAS supports 
accounting procedures as the most important accounting practices in Egypt while it gives 
low weight to disclosures.
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Alternatively, four interviewees argue that procedures-oriented accounting practices are 
not a general trend and this trend is obvious in non-listed companies due to non-reliance 
on the capital markets.
Table 8.12 summarises the reasons that are mentioned by the interviewees regarding the 
impact o f procedures-oriented accounting practices on the risk reporting.
Table 8.12: The Impact o f Procedures-oriented Accounting Practices on Risk Reporting Practices
Agree Disagree
A. Egyptian companies are concerned 
about bookkeeping rather than 
accounting disclosure.
B. Company management assigns risk 
reporting low importance.
C. The UAS applied in centrally planned 
era still has significant influence on 
accounting practices.
A. This trend is more apparent in non-listed companies only.
8.3.7 The Lack of an Effective Enforcement Mechanism
Enforcement mechanism is a key element in the effective application o f accounting 
standards because the benefits o f a set o f financial reporting standards are conditional on 
consistent enforcement o f the standards (UNCTAD, 2008).
Regarding the impact o f the absence o f  an effective enforcement mechanism on 
mandatory and voluntary risk reporting, 13 o f  the interviewees argued that the lack o f an 
effective enforcement mechanism is a main hindrance to compliance with mandatory and 
presentation o f  voluntary risk reporting. This result is consistent with that found in the 
Saudi context (Al-Mulhem, 2003). Al-Shammari et al. (2008) reveal a similar conclusion 
for Gulf Cooperation Council Member States. The weak enforcement mechanism 
enables companies to violate accounting standards (Kothari, 2001). A number o f  
interviewees indicated that although the CML and listing and delisting rules o f the EGX  
include several administrative sanctions and fines, the application o f these sanctions on 
companies that violate the rules is ineffective. In addition, the penalties are not strictly 
enforced and do not lead companies to comply with accounting standards. An academic 
(AC-2) expressed the following opinion:
Despite the existence of administrative measures and fines applied by the CM A and the 
E G X  on companies that do not comply with accounting standards and listing rules, their 
implementation is not effective. For example, a company may be delisted from the Egyptian 
exchange for reasons other than non-compliance with accounting standards.
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In the same vein, a regulator (RG-1) remarked:
Non-strict fines do not have significant impact on companies. The fine for a delay in 
submitting financial reports is E E . 5000 and there are no strict fines on non-compliance 
with disclosure requirements of EASs and listing/ de-listing rules of the EGX.
Moreover, an academic (AC-2) indicated the attention of the CMA is limited to format 
aspects only and insufficient attention has been given to the content of annual reports. 
El-Essely (2005) and Abd-Elmalek (2006) came to the same conclusion. Furthermore, 
the lack of criminal commitments for the violation of accounting standards and listing 
rules weakens compliance with them. A regulator (RG-3) highlighted this:
Although there are several measures to force listed companies to comply with the disclosure 
requirements, the violation of these requirements has no criminal liabilities. The 
punishment is limited to blame only without any strict actions. I f  a company did not 
comply there is no action against it. Currently, it is very difficult to write-off a company 
because of non-compliance with disclosure requirements.
This point of view confirms Akathapom et al. (1993) and ROSC (2002) who conclude 
that accounting standards are frequently breached because their violation is not 
considered a criminal or civil violation. The UNCTAD (2008) argues that the application 
of the IFRS lacks the necessary legal backing.
In addition, the EFSA and the EGX do not attempt to provide any motivations to listed 
companies for the presentation of voluntary risk disclosure or to highlight the well- 
presented risk disclosure reported in some Egyptian companies’ annual reports in order 
to encourage other companies to follow the path of these companies. An academic (AC- 
1) remarked:
It is very important to present incentives for voluntary risk disclosure such as a reduction in 
annual subscription fees of the Egyptian exchange or highlighting the names of companies 
that present distinctive risk disclosures.
It is worth mentioning that an external auditor (AD-1) pointed out the important role of 
audit firms with international affiliations as an enforcement mechanism. He argued that 
audit firms with international affiliations can persuade or force their clients to apply 
properly risk-related accounting standards. Dumontier and Raffoumier (1998) argue that 
big audit firms are motivated to force their clients to apply the IASs to support their
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independence and reputation and to maintain their competitive advantage in the 
application o f  IASs.
Alternatively, two o f the interviewees indicated that enforcement mechanisms are 
effectively applied and have a positive impact on accounting disclosure and compliance 
with accounting standards. A regulator (RG-1) stated:
Disclosure is mandated through the CAUL and listing/ delisting rules of the E G X . There 
are several penalties for the violation of any disclosure rules. I think there is a development 
in compliance with disclosure requirements.
Another interviewee (RG-4) confirmed the abovementioned point o f view and 
highlighted the role o f the EFSA in enforcing companies to apply accounting standards.
Table 8.13 summarises respondents’ views regarding the potential impact o f the absence 
o f an effective enforcement mechanism on risk reporting.
Table 8.13: The Im pact o f the Lack of an Effective Enforcem ent M echanism  on Risk Reporting 
Practices
^ g r e ^
A. The application o f administrative sanctions on 
the violation o f  accounting standards is non- 
effective.
B. Supervisory agencies are more concerned with 
the format and procedural aspects rather than 
the content o f annual reports.
C. The absence o f any motivations for listed 
companies to present voluntary risk disclosure.
A. Administrative sanctions are effectively 
applied and have a positive influence on 
accounting disclosure.
8.3.8 Lack of Sufficient Financial Resources
Regarding the impact o f  insufficient financial resources on the risk reporting practices o f  
Egyptian companies, eight o f the interviewees considered the lack o f sufficient financial 
resources a key reason for non-compliance with and low presentation o f mandatory and 
voluntary risk reporting. They argued that Egyptian companies assign very limited 
financial resources to the accounting training budget and refrain from investing in their 
employees. This results in non-compliance with accounting standards and low 
presentation o f voluntary disclosures especially those related to risk reporting because 
such disclosure requires a high level o f professional training. This result is consistent with 
Al-Mulhem (2003) who found that the lack o f  sufficient financial resources is an obstacle 
to compliance with disclosure requirements in Saudi companies. An academic (AC-1) 
expressed the following opinion:
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Because of deficit financial resources, accountants in several companies do not receive any 
continuing training to update their knowledge regarding the application o/LASs/EASs or 
best practices of voluntary disclosure related to risk reporting.
Similarly, an external auditor (AD-1) remarked:
A  large number of companies do not seek to invest in their accounting department 
employees regardless of the skills available to them. Sometimes, we sent invitations to 
companies for training courses and the responses were very poor and disappointing. The cost 
of training is a substantial reason for low responses.
Two external auditors (AD-3 and AD-5) argued that the problem of insufficient financial 
resources for continuing training is exaggerated in small and medium sized companies 
while large companies provide distinctive continuing training to their employees.
Moreover, six of the interviewees believed that the problem is not the lack of financial 
resources. The main problem is management awareness regarding the importance of 
continuing training in assisting their employees to learn the new amendments of 
accounting standards, how to apply them and how to present voluntary risk reporting in 
annual reports. An academic (AC-2) indicated that:
There is a lack of management awareness regarding the importance of continuing training 
for accounting staff on the latest amendments of the EASs and the presentation of 
voluntary disclosure related to risk reporting.
More interestingly, two interviewees (FM-2 and RG-3) highlighted the fact that 
companies might tend to seek the assistance of external auditor to overcome insufficient 
staff skills or might appoint an auditor from an audit firm to make sure that they have a 
knowledgeable person as head of their accounting department. An external auditor (AD- 
1) revealed that he sometimes prepare the disclosures for his clients.
Alternatively, only one interviewee (RG-3) did not agree with the impact of insufficient 
financial resources as a potential reason for non-compliance and low presentation of 
mandatory and voluntary risk reporting because several companies assign a relevant 
training budget for their employees.
Table 8.14 summarises interviewees’ views regarding the potential impact of the lack of 
sufficient financial resources on risk reporting.
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Table 8.14: The Impact o f the Lack o f Sufficient Financial Resources on Risk Reporting Practices
Agree ^^Disagree^
A. Risk reporting requires high quality accounting 
skills and knowledge while Egyptian companies 
assign limited budget to accounting training.
A. Egyptian companies assign adequate training 
budget for their staff especially large 
companies.
B. The main problem is management awareness 
regarding the importance o f  continuing 
training.
C. The assistance o f external auditors may 
alleviate the problem o f insufficient staff skills.
8.3.9 Inadequate Continuing Education
Continuing education is an important element in the development o f accounting practice 
in developing countries because it ensures that qualified and competent accountants 
enter the profession and provides the chance to update their accounting knowledge and 
skills to cope with a rapidly changing business environment (El-Basteki, 2000; Tipgos, 
1987). In addition, Jensen and Arrington (1983) highlight the need for overseeing not 
only the form but also the content o f  continuing education programs by regulatory 
agencies.
Regarding the impact o f the inadequate continuing education o f  chartered accountants 
on risk reporting, all the interviewees indicated that this has a negative impact on 
mandatory and voluntary risk reporting. Because o f the lack o f  continuing education, 
auditors do not perform their tasks effectively and fail to establish appropriate 
professional judgements about clients’ compliance with the EASs. The lack o f continuing 
education contributes to auditors’ lack o f  knowledge about the application o f  
auditing/accounting standards. An academic (AC-1) expressed the following opinion:
Due to the lack of adequate continuing education, several auditors do not update their 
accounting skills and knowledge. Therefore, they do not know the latest amendments in 
accounting disclosure related standards and cannot assess the extent to which the disclosure 
in the client'sfinancial statements is in accordance with accounting standards requirements.
This result confirms the finding o f ROSC (2002) that the lack o f  adequate professional 
continuing education increases the knowledge gap o f external auditors in Egypt. The lack 
o f continuing education is a serious problem for auditors in small audit firms. An 
external auditor (AD-3) indicated:
This problem is very visible in small audit firms but big audit firms or audit firms with 
international affiliations are keen to train their staff continuously and force them to
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complete a certain number of training hours each year as a prerequisite for working in the 
firm.
Moreover, one o f the interviewees (AD-5) highlighted the role o f the ESAA in preparing 
and enforcing general rules o f continuing professional training for its members.
However, another external auditor (AD-6) criticised the effort o f the ESAA in
continuing education because o f the weak education leaflets and periodicals provided. 
He stated:
There is a significant lack of well-established continuing education programs provided by 
the E S A A .. Their bulletins and studies are very weak and written by unqualified
members who do not follow the scientific approach in writing.
The current effort in continuing education is limited to the members o f the ESAA. 
Therefore, there is a need for an authority that provides continuing education for all the 
practitioners o f  the accounting and auditing profession.
Table 8.15 summarises the respondents’ point o f view regarding the potential impact o f  
an inadequate continuing education on risk reporting.
Table 8.15: The Impact of the Inadequate Continuing Education on Risk Reporting Practices
A -g r c c
A. Auditors do not update their knowledge about the application o f auditing/accounting standards.
B. Auditors’ knowledge gap is increased.
C. Auditors fail to assess client’s compliance with accounting standards.
8.4 Factors Related to Cost of Disclosure
This subsection aims to identify the impact o f disclosure cost, proprietary and non­
proprietary cost, on mandatory and voluntary risk reporting in the annual reports o f  
Egyptian companies.
8.4.1 Competitive Disadvantages
Accounting researchers employ proprietary cost perspective to explain why managers 
may withhold information. Verrecchia (1983) argues that competition in the product 
market has a negative impact on voluntary disclosure.
Regarding the impact o f competitive disadvantages on risk reporting, 12 o f the 
interviewees indicated that competitive disadvantages have a negative impact on risk 
reporting. Egyptian companies may present a low level o f compliance with and 
presentation o f mandatory and voluntary risk reporting if  this disclosure threatens their 
competitive advantages. An academic (AC-1) argued that this belief dominates the
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thought of companies’ managements in Egypt. In the same vein, Dahawy et al. (2002) 
report that managers in Egyptian companies perceive disclosure as equivalent to 
revealing companies’ secrets. Competitive disadvantage has been recognised as a main 
reason for segment reporting non-disclosure (Edwards and Smith, 1996). Confirming 
this point of view, an external auditor (AD-2) indicated that a large number of Egyptian 
companies avoid complying with the segment reporting standard because of the fear of 
revealing important strategic information about their business and geographic segments 
to competitors. A financial manager remarked (FM-1):
Our main belief is if  you disclose all the information you have the competitors may read 
your ideas. Consequently, companies tend to present very limited disclosure. Companies 
present a minimum level of mandatory risk reporting and refrain from presenting voluntary 
risk disclosure.
Similarly, another financial manager (FM-2) stressed:
Our company tends to distinguish itself from the competitors. Therefore, we never ever 
disclose any information we think might worsen our competitive advantage.
This result is consistent with the result reported in the previous chapter that indicates a 
significant positive association between barriers to entry and mandatory and voluntary 
risk reporting. Moreover, Tinsley et al. (2006) argue that risk information is commercially 
sensitive information that is related to a high level of competition disadvantages; 
therefore managers are reluctant to disclose it.
An academic (AC-1) suggested that the EFSA should work to raise companies’ 
awareness regarding the importance of compliance with and presentation of mandatory 
and voluntary risk reporting because of their significant impact on investors’ confidence 
in companies’ financial reports and cost of capital.
Alternatively, three of the interviewees believed that there is no significant impact for 
competitive disadvantage on the risk reporting practices of Egyptian companies. They 
advanced two main reasons for their point of view. First, it is important for a company 
to report certain information such as segment reporting to support its competitive 
advantage. An external auditor (AD-1) expressed the following opinion:
Companies operate in open markets where there are no secrets. It is important for a
company to report its strategic vision, including risk and risk management information to
/
highlight its competitive advantages. Current and potential investors need some information
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about the company's future growth, the risks involved and how the company may address 
these risks.
Second, a regulator (RG-1) thought that non-compliance with risk-related accounting 
standards is more closely related to the lack o f effective enforcement mechanism rather 
than competitive disadvantages.
Table 8.16 summarises the interviewees’ views regarding the potential impact o f  
competitive disadvantages on risk reporting.
Table 8.16: The Impact o f Competitive Disadvantages on Risk Reporting Practices
^ A g r e e ^ ^^JDisagre^^
A. Egyptian companies are reluctant to comply 
with and present mandatory and voluntary 
because o f the fear o f  revealing important 
strategic information to competitors which 
may threat their competitive advantages.
A. Companies should present risk information in 
order to support their competitive advantages 
and confirm their ability to address different 
risks they face.
8.4.2 Cost of Collecting, Processing and Disseminating Information or the Cost of 
Developing Accounting Information Systems
Regarding the impact o f the non-proprietary cost o f disclosure, cost o f collecting, 
processing and disseminating information, on risk reporting practices, nine o f the 
interviewees argued that there is no significant impact for non-proprietary cost o f  
disclosure on risk reporting practices. This result is consistent with Edwards and Smith 
(1996) who indicate that most information systems o f  British companies did not need 
significant changes to generate segment information. The interviewees advanced a 
number o f reasons to support their point o f view. First, an academic (AC-1) believed that, 
regardless o f the cost, modem accounting information systems have become an urgent 
necessity not only for high quality disclosure but also because continuity in the markets 
requires a very sophisticated information system. Second, another academic (AC-2) 
argued that due to high technology in the field o f information systems the cost o f  
collecting, processing and disseminating information has become relatively low. Third, an 
academic (AC-3) argued that the management’s willingness rather than disclosure cost is 
the determinative factor regarding the decision to utilise a sophisticated information 
system to provide relevant risk information. Fourth, an external auditor (AD-6) indicated 
that presentation o f mandatory and voluntary disclosure depends on management’s 
willingness to report accounting information produced by accounting information 
systems.
Alternatively, six o f  the interviewees indicated that the cost o f disclosure has a negative 
impact on risk reporting practices. An external auditor (AD-1) argued that the cost o f  
sophisticated information systems is too high which in turn may hinder the presentation 
of mandatory and voluntary risk reporting. For example, segment reporting needs more 
detailed information and existing information systems in several Egyptian companies 
cannot provide such information. Therefore, according to a regulator (RG-3), high 
disclosure cost may lead to non-compliance with accounting standards. However, 
another regulator (RG-4) believed that the problem o f disclosure cost is more apparent 
in small companies than in large companies due to a lack o f financial resources. Table 
8.17 summarises the respondents’ views regarding the potential impact o f  disclosure cost 
on risk reporting.
Table 8.17: The Im pact o f Non-proprietary D isclosure Cost on Risk Reporting Practices
^ \ g r e e ^ ^^Disagree^
A. Risk reporting requires an accounting 
information system that is able to produce 
more detailed information. However, several 
Egyptian companies do not have such 
accounting systems.
B. High disclosure cost is a major reason for non- 
compliance especially in small companies.
A. Business environment emphasises the 
importance o f accounting information systems 
not only for high quality disclosure but only 
for continuous existence in the markets.
B. Due to technological innovations, the cost o f 
producing accounting information diminishes.
C. The important factor is management 
willingness to report risk information not the 
cost o f disclosure.
8.5 Other Factors
The interviewees presented four additional reasons as potential obstacles to the 
presentation o f mandatory and voluntary risk reporting in the annual reports o f Egyptian 
companies. These reasons are Egyptian culture, equivalent positions allowed by the 
profession law, lack o f adequate explanations and interpretations and the technical 
difficulties o f risk-related accounting standards.
8.5.1 Culture
Egypt has very distinctive societal values. Egyptian accounting culture is dominated by 
secrecy which in turn influences the disclosure practices o f Egyptian companies. The 
interviewees argued that Egyptian culture is a key reason that hinders compliance with 
and presentation o f mandatory and voluntary risk reporting and highlighted the secretive 
nature o f Egyptian culture as a stumbling block to the development o f  risk reporting 
practices in Egypt. A regulator (RG-2) remarked:
Given that disclosure is a product of society's values, Egyptian cultural heritage supports 
the reluctance of information disclosure. Companies follow the policy of do not wear your
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heart on your sleeve\ Therefore, there is a need to change management's thoughts to 
abandon the polity of reporting a minimum level of disclosure requirement adopted by a 
large number of Egyptian companies.
In the same vein, an academic (AC-2) highlighted the potential conflict between 
Egyptian cultural values and the values of IASs. He stated:
IASs have been translated into Arabic without any consideration of the secretive nature of 
Egyptian society. There are fundamental differences between Egyptian culture and 
Anglo I  Saxon culture that underpins IASs. Therefore, there is a doubt regarding the 
effectiveness of the application of IASs in Egypt and compliance with standards ’ 
requirements.
This result is consistent with the results of Dahawy and Conover (2007) and Dahawy et 
al. (2002) regarding the conflict between Egyptian and Western culture and its impact on 
accounting disclosure in the annual reports of Egyptian companies. This conflict results 
in the selective implementation of accounting standards.
8.5.2 Equivalent Qualification allowed by the Law governing the Profession
Interviewees highlighted the equivalent positions included in auditing and profession law 
133/1951 as a potential reason for the low presentation of risk reporting in the annual 
reports of Egyptian companies. The profession law allows persons in certain positions 
such as tax officers, teachers of accounting and auditing at college level, custom officers 
and heads of accounting department from public or private companies to work as 
external auditors if they have worked in these positions for three consecutive years. A 
regulator (RG-3) indicated:
Profession law and equivalent positions weaken the profession. For example, tax officers 
can work as external auditors without any knowledge or training regarding the application 
of accounting standards.
Those persons do not have any extensive knowledge nor have they received any training 
regarding the application of accounting/auditing standards and so they cannot advise 
their clients regarding the application of accounting standards. Consequently, according 
to an external auditor (AD-5), they cannot judge whether the client’s financial statements 
breach accounting standards and are unlikely to encourage their clients to provide 
voluntary disclosure.
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8.5.3 Lack of Adequate Explanation and Interpretations of the EASs
An external auditor (AD-6) argued that the EASs do not include any explanations or 
interpretations of standards’ requirements. Roberts et al. (2005) indicate that IAS 14, 
before revision, received significant criticism because it contains relatively little guidance. 
Moreover, the EASs are verbatim translation of IASs and used terminologies unfamiliar 
to the accounting practice in Egypt. ROSC (2002) highlights the lack of implementation 
guidelines of accounting standards and outdated Arabic translation of accounting 
standards as key factors that hinder compliance with their requirements. In addition, 
McGee (2006) underlines translation problems as a major factor that impedes the 
adoption and implementation of IFRS. Similarly, UNCTAD (2008) highlight lack of 
training material, experts and language barriers as main reasons for non-compliance with 
IFRS.
8.5.4 Technical Difficulties of Risk-related Accounting Standards
An external auditor (AD-5) highlighted the difficulty of some accounting standards 
especially those related to risk reporting as a potential obstacle to full compliance with 
disclosure requirements. He remarked:
Certain accounting standards, such as segment reporting and financial instruments, require 
a high degree of accounting knowledge and skills. A  small number of accountants have 
such knowledge and skills. Consequently, accountants who do not have these skills resist 
the application of IA Ss/ EASs.
More interestingly, even for professional auditors some standards such as accounting 
standards related to financial instruments are difficult to understand. An external auditor 
(AD-2) indicated that although he attended several workshops about the application of 
EAS 25 he still could not thoroughly understand its disclosure requirements. This may 
explain why external auditors may stay silent about the violation of risk-related 
accounting standards in clients’ financial statements.
It is worth mentioning that one academic (AC-1) shed light on the importance of 
encouraging companies to present voluntary risk disclosure. He argued that the CMA, 
the EIoD and the EGX should motivate Egyptian companies by providing incentives to 
companies that present voluntarily risk information. ROSC (2002) highlights the role of 
the EFSA in enhancing corporate financial reporting through holding workshops, 
briefing to top management and using case studies in order to explain the application of 
EASs.
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8.6 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter investigated the factors that may lead to the low presentation of mandatory 
and voluntary risk reporting. These factors were identified and categorised into four 
groups:
• Factors related to accounting education (group 1).
• Factors related to accounting practice (group 2).
• Factors related to cost of disclosure (group 3).
• Other factors (group 4).
In respect of group 1, the results indicated that there is a consensus between the 
interviewees that bookkeeping and procedures-oriented accounting education and lack of 
sufficient practical training for undergraduate students have impaired the ability to apply 
accounting standards. Moreover, most of the interviewees highlighted the fact that 
inadequate local accounting textbooks and the inadequate accounting education of 
managers have a significant negative impact on the risk reporting practices of Egyptian 
companies.
In respect of group 2, the results indicated that there is a consensus between the 
interviewees that the lack of an effective profession and lack of adequate continuing 
education for chartered accountants are major hindrances to the risk reporting practices 
of Egyptian companies. In addition, the majority of the interviewees argued that the lack 
of qualified accountants, lack of well-organised accounting information systems, 
procedures-oriented accounting practices and lack of effective enforcement mechanisms 
are the main obstacles to compliance with and presentation of mandatory and voluntary 
risk reporting. Furthermore, a small number of the interviewees indicated that the 
precedence of tax accounting over financial reporting and lack of sufficient financial 
resources are reasons for the low presentation of mandatory and voluntary risk reporting.
In respect of group 3, the majority of the interviewees revealed that competitive 
disadvantage is a significant threat to the risk reporting practices of Egyptian companies. 
In addition, non-proprietary cost of disclosure has a non-significant impact on the risk 
reporting practices of Egyptian companies. Finally, in respect of gtoup 4, the 
interviewees highlighted a number of factors that may hinder compliance with and 
presentation of mandatory and voluntary risk reporting such as the secretive nature of 
Egyptian culture, equivalent positions presented in profession law, the lack of
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explanations or interpretations of EASs besides translations problems and the technical 
difficulties of risk-related accounting standards.
The next chapter will provide a discussion of the determinants of risk reporting and the 
impact of the factors that hinder disclosure of risk-related information in Egyptian 





This chapter presents a discussion of the results of the determinants of risk reporting and 
factors that influence the presentation of risk reporting in the annual reports of Egyptian 
companies and places them in the distinctive context of Egypt. Section 9.2 discusses the 
extent of mandatory and voluntary risk reporting. Section 9.3 discusses the determinants 
of risk reporting while section 9.4 discusses the factors that influence the presentation of 
risk reporting. Finally, section 9.5 is a summary and conclusion.
9.2 Extent of Mandatory and Voluntary Risk Reporting
This section presents a discussion of the main characteristics of the mandatory and 
voluntary risk reporting practices of Egyptian companies.
9.2.1 Mandatory Risk Reporting
The results in chapter 7 indicated a very low level of compliance with EAS 25 and EAS 
33. The average compliance level with EAS 25 is 19.33% and 21.57% while the average 
level of compliance with EAS 33 is 18.25% and 16.99% in 2006 and 2007 respectively.
The relatively low compliance level with EAS 25 and EAS 33 implies that the cost of 
compliance for Egyptian companies exceeds the cost of non-compliance (Hassan et al., 
2006). Non-compliance costs include capital market pressure and sanctions and 
administration actions imposed by regulatory agencies (Abayo et al., 1993). It is argued 
that non-compliance costs in developing countries are smaller than compliance costs due 
to the ineffectiveness of the market for company control since capital markets in 
developing countries are relatively small, new and less developed (Abayo et al., 1993); 
Egypt is not an exception. In respect of sanctions and administration actions, it is argued 
that the Egyptian capital market regulations are insufficient and the application of 
sanctions imposed by companies act and the CML is ineffective (Abd-Elmalek, 2006; 
ROSC, 2002). Furthermore, this result reflects the influence of the secretive nature of 
Egyptian culture and its impact on compliance with the disclosure requirements of 
IASs/EASs which result in a lower level of compliance than required by accounting 
standards (Dahawy et al., 2002; Dahawy and Conover, 2007). In the same vein, Cooke
(1993) indicates a similar result for the impact of the secretive nature of Japan on the 
extent of disclosure in corporate annual reports.
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This result is consistent with Samaha and Stapleton (2008) who report a low level of 
compliance, 50%, with a number of EASs excluding EAS 25 and 33. In the same vein, 
Dahawy and Conover (2007) report a compliance level of 61% with the CMA disclosure 
requirements in annual reports of the most active listed Egyptian companies. A low level 
of compliance with mandatory risk disclosure requirements is to be expected since 
Egyptian companies present a high level of compliance with mandatory disclosure when 
preparers are familiar with the regulation (Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003) but when 
mandatory disclosure is enforced through new or amended regulations compliance is 
expected to be very low (Samaha and Stapleton, 2008). In addition, disclosure studies in 
developing countries provide similar results. Marston and Robson (1997), Patton and 
Zelenka (1997) and Akhtaruddin (2005) reveal levels of compliance of 56.5%, 56% and 
43.53% in India, the Czech Republic and Bangladesh respectively. Moreover, Wallace 
(1988) reports a low level of compliance in Nigeria ranging from 37.55% to 43.11% 
during the period 1982-1986. Besides, Street and Gray (2002), Street and Nichols (2002) 
and Prather-Kinsey and Meek (2004) reveal significant evidence for non-compliance with 
the disclosure requirement of IAS 14 (segment reporting) in global samples while 
Owusu-Ansah (2000), Carlon et al. (2003) and Al-Omari et al. (2007) indicate that 
Zimbabwean, Australian and Jordanian companies failed to comply with IAS 14. In the 
same vein, Street and Bryant (2000) find that US companies that apply IASs do not fully 
comply with IAS 14. Furthermore, Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) report an average 
compliance level with IAS 32/39 (financial instrument disclosure) of 44% in the annual 
reports of Portuguese companies.
All these studies support Street et al. (1999) who indicate that compliance with IASs is 
very mixed and rather selective. A low level of compliance highlights the ineffectiveness 
in external auditors’ and enforcement agencies’ functions (Al-Shammari et al., 2008). For 
example, the IFAC argues that auditors are ineffective in performing their duties because 
they assert that financial statement are prepared in line with the IASs while, in fact, they 
violate these standards (Street et al., 1999). In Egypt, the efforts of the CMA and the 
EGX regarding compliance with accounting standards are questionable (Abd-Elhamed, 
2003; ROSC, 2002; Sobehi, 2002). Moreover, there is evidence regarding a lack of auditor 
independence such as issuance of unqualified audit reports despite material 
misstatements such as non-compliance with accounting standards (ROSC, 2002).
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9.2.2 Voluntary Risk Reporting
Egyptian companies tend to present litde voluntary risk reporting in their annual reports. 
The average risk reporting sentence number is 23 and 26 sentences in 2006 and 2007 
respectively with a tendency to report less quantitative and forward-looking risk 
disclosures.
With respect to quantitative risk reporting, disclosing quantified risk information will 
assist users of annual reports in their assessment of the potential impact of risks on a 
company’s performance (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). Quantitative risk reporting will 
provide shareholders with valuable and useful information rather than boilerplate, 
blurred and subjective disclosures (Linsley and Shrives, 2000). However, risk 
measurement remains a complicated issue (Schrand and Elliot, 1998). Egyptian 
companies seem to be reluctant to provide quantitative risk reporting in their annual 
reports and there are several possible reasons for this phenomenon. Technical problems 
such as data availability and limited use of risk measurement techniques have a negative 
impact upon managers’ ability to quantify the potential impact of risks. In addition, 
managers may refrain from disclosing quantitative risk information because of the 
litigation costs they may face if the estimation of risk size departs significandy from the 
ultimate risk outcome (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). Furthermore, consistent with 
proprietary cost perspective, managers may consider quantitative risk information 
commercially sensitive information that is related to a high level of competitive 
disadvantages and hence managers are reluctant to disclose such information (Linsley et 
al., 2006). As a result, risk reporting seems to be predominantly qualitative in nature 
(Lajili and Zeghal, 2005) and managers tend to describe risks and be reluctant to provide 
any quantitative risk disclosures (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). The lack of quantified 
estimation of the size of risk undermines the usefulness of risk reporting in the annual 
reports of Egyptian companies.
With respect to forward-looking risk reporting, forward-looking information has a 
significant contribution in reducing information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders (Aljiffi and Hussainey, 2007). Shareholders and stakeholders have an 
increased need for information to assist them in identifying the potential impact of risks 
on a company’s prospective performance (Shrives and Linsley, 2003b). Researchers have 
advanced several reasons for managers’ reluctance to disclose forward-looking risk 
information. Forward-looking information is associated with a high level of uncertainty; 
therefore it is more difficult to predict forward-looking information without prediction
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errors (Aljiffi and Hussainey, 2007). Linsley et al. (2008) indicate that it is difficult to 
discuss a future risk than a past risk. In addition, forward-looking information lacks 
reliability and it is difficult to verify (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). Consequently, managers 
may withhold future risk information due to fear of potential legal claims by investors or 
other stakeholders who may use this information for decision-making purposes (Linsley 
and Shrives, 2005; Linsley et al., 2008) especially if managers think that the legal regime 
may fail to distinguish precisely between unexpected forecast errors related to uncertainty 
and those related to management manipulation (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Moreover, 
managers may be reluctant to disclose forward-looking risk information because of its 
commercial sensitivity; therefore reporting such information may harm companies’ 
competitive advantage and impose high proprietary costs on them (Linsley and Shrives, 
2005; Linsley et al., 2006). Rahman (2008) indicates that approximately 43% of Egyptian 
listed companies that comprise the main index of the EGX do not normally include 
forward-looking information, such as forecasts of the company operations for the next 
year, in their annual reports. The lack of quantitative and forward-looking risk 
information in the annual reports of Egyptian companies reduces their relevance to 
external investors and other stakeholders groups (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004).
9.3 Determinants of Risk Reporting
This section discusses the determinants of risk reporting. Disclosure theories and the 
empirical results of prior studies are used to discuss the influence of each independent 
variable on the risk reporting practices of Egyptian companies.
9.3.1 Competition
Regression results indicate a significant positive association between barriers to entry and 
mandatory risk reporting of EAS 25 in 2006. In addition, the findings reveal a significant 
positive association between barriers to entry, mandatory risk reporting of EAS 33 and 
voluntary risk reporting in 2006 and 2007. The result suggests that Egyptian companies 
that operate in a low competition environment comply more with the requirements of 
EAS 25 and EAS 33 and provide voluntarily more risk-related information. This result is 
consistent with the prediction of proprietary cost perspective that companies may be 
reluctant to disclose information due to competition in the product market. The 
companies’ concern is the competitive advantage a competitor may gain as a result of 
disclosing more information. Therefore, Egyptian companies operating in an 
environment with high barriers to eptry disclose more risk-related information to assist 
investors in identifying their risk/return profile because of the difficulty of entering the
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market for any potential competitor. This result supports the significant impact on 
competition on companies’ disclosure policies proposed by proprietary cost perspective 
(Verrecchia, 1983).
Most of the interviewees agreed that competitive disadvantage has a significant impact 
on risk reporting. They argued that Egyptian companies refrain from providing risk- 
related information, such as segment reporting, because it reveals important information 
that may benefit their competitors.
Empirical evidence reveals mixed results for the relationship between barriers to entry 
and disclosure extent. Depoers (2000) reveals a positive relationship between barriers to 
entry and voluntary disclosure. In the same vein, Clarkson et al. (1994) document a 
positive relationship between barriers to entry and voluntary disclosure in the MD&A 
section of annual reports. In addition, Laidroo (2009) documents a positive relationship 
between barriers to entry and disclosure extent. In contrast, Prencipe (2004) finds a non­
significant relationship between barriers to entry and voluntary segment disclosure
The study uses another measure of barriers to entry, namely the percentage of fixed 
assets to total assets. The result indicates a non-significant association between the 
percentage of fixed assets to total assets and risk reporting. The only significant positive 
association between the two variables appears in the model EAS 25-2007 (see Appendix 
18). This indicates the non-significant influence of the percentage of fixed assets to total 
assets on the association between competition and risk reporting. The percentage of 
fixed assets to total assets is used to capture capital intensity (Hagerman and Zmijewski, 
1979; Kelly, 1983); therefore this measure may not capture barriers to entry.
9.3.2 Corporate Governance
This subsection discusses the impact of board size, role duality and auditor type on risk 
reporting.
9.3.2.1 Board Size
Regression results reveal a significant positive association between board size and 
mandatory risk reporting of EAS 25 in 2007. However, the results indicate a non­
significant association between board size, mandatory risk reporting of EAS 33 and 
voluntary risk reporting in 2006 and 2007.
The result suggests that Egyptian companies with a large board comply more with 
mandatory risk reporting of EAS 25; However, the influence of board size on voluntary 
risk reporting and mandatory risk reporting of EAS 33 is non-significant.
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Empirical evidence supports the non-significant association between board size and 
accounting disclosure. Cheng and Courtenay (2006) document a non-significant 
association between board size and voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 
Singaporean companies. In addition, Bassett et al. (2007) find a non-significant 
association between board size and mandatory and voluntary employee stock option 
disclosure in the annual reports of Australian listed companies. In the same vein, 
Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) indicate a non-significant association between board size 
and voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Irish companies.
Companies with a large board have diverse expertise and the ability to alleviate the 
dominance of the CEO over the board. In addition, this result reflects the increase of 
board members’ awareness regarding their duties to support financial disclosure 
especially after the release of the Egyptian corporate governance code of practice in 
October 2005. This code of practice highlights the important role of the board of 
directors in establishing the required mechanisms to ensure compliance with different 
regulations and disclosure of all relevant information to stakeholders. In addition, the 
code emphasises board of directors’ responsibility for identifying and managing different 
types of risks that a company may face and representing clearly all this information to 
stakeholders.
9.3.2.2 Role Duality
Regression analysis indicates a significant negative association between role duality and 
mandatory risk reporting of EAS 25 in 2007 only. However, the result documents a non­
significant association between role duality, mandatory risk reporting of EAS 33 and 
voluntary risk reporting in 2006 and 2007. The result suggests that companies with role 
duality present low compliance with mandatory risk reporting. However, the result does 
not support the influence of role duality over voluntary risk reporting and mandatory risk 
reporting of EAS 33.
A negative association between disclosure extent and role duality is consistent with 
Forker (1992) and Bassett et al. (2007) who find a significant negative association 
between role duality and executive/employees stock options mandatory disclosure. In 
contrast, Ho and Wong 2001, Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Barako et al. (2006), Cheng and 
Courtenay (2006) and Ghazali and Weetman (2006) report a non-significant association 
between role duality and voluntary disclosure.
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In line with agency theory, the result supports the separation between the CEO and chair 
of the board since the separation will enhance the monitoring role of the board of 
directors. In addition, separation between the two positions will enhance board of 
directors’ role in the assessment of the CEO performance and the quality of accounting 
disclosure. The result supports the call of the Egyptian corporate governance code for 
the separation between the two positions in Egyptian listed companies since role duality 
is a potential threat to disclosure quality.
9.3.2.3 Auditor Type
Regression findings indicate a positive association between auditor type and mandatory 
risk reporting of EAS 25 in 2006 and 2007. Ahmed and Nicholls (1994), Wallace and 
Naser (1995), Patton and Zelenka (1997), Owusu-Ansah (2005) and Ahmed (2006) 
document a positive association between auditor type and mandatory disclosure. 
Moreover, Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003) reveal a significant positive association 
between auditor type and mandatory disclosure in Egypt.
In addition, regression results point to a non-significant association between auditor type, 
mandatory risk reporting of EAS 33 and voluntary risk reporting in 2006 and 2007. This 
result is consistent with Tai et al. (1990), Malone et al. (1993), Hossain et al. (1994 and 
1995), Wallace et al. (1994), Dumontier and Raffoumier (1998), Ali et al. (2004), Depoers 
(2000) and Alsaeed (2006) who find a non-significant association between auditor type 
and accounting disclosure.
This result suggests that Egyptian companies audited by audit firms with international 
affiliations comply more with mandatory risk reporting. The result indicates that audit 
firms with international affiliations convince or force their clients to comply with 
mandatory disclosure requirements to confirm their independence, protect their 
reputation and maintain their competitive advantages in applying accounting standards. 
This is because of their accuracy and expertise in collecting and interpreting audit 
evidence, having well-trained staff with relevant knowledge and experience in auditing 
listed companies. However, audit firms with international affiliations have no influence 
on the voluntary risk reporting practices of Egyptian companies. The possible 
explanation for this result stems from the requirement of Companies Act. The 
Companies Act requires independent auditors to indicate in their audit report whether 
the information in the board of directors’ report is consistent with the company’s records 
and legal requirements. Therefore, the independent auditor may expand the audit scope
257
and verification process in order to collect diverse and additional audit evidence to satisfy 
Companies Act requirements and this may increase audit costs and decrease audit returns. 
Consequently, the independent auditors may have less incentive to encourage Egyptian 
companies to disclose voluntarily more risk-related information in order to satisfy legal 
requirements with the lowest possible audit costs. Similarly, Huafang and Jianguo (2007) 
argue that the Big-4 auditors do not encourage Chinese companies to provide disclosure 
over and above mandatory disclosure.
Low presentation of risk reporting reflects the ineffective role of external auditors in 
enhancing the disclosure practices of their clients due to a lack of continuing education, a 
weak profession and profession law (see chapter 2). In addition, there is evidence for lack 
of auditor independence. According to the interviewees, the lack of continuing education 
increases the knowledge gap of external auditors and hence they fail to identify non- 
compliance in clients’ financial statements or advise the preparers regarding the proper 
application of accounting standards. As, the profession is very weak it does not monitor 
the professional performance of auditors or impose sanctions on those who breach 
auditing standards. The profession’s failure to increase its members’ professional skills 
has resulted in out-dated accounting knowledge and skills of most practitioners. 
Furthermore, the interviewees indicated that the profession law opens the door to 
unqualified persons to enter the profession and work as chartered accountants while they 
lack the necessary accounting knowledge regarding the application of accounting and 
auditing standards. The interviewees also highlighted some signs of auditors’ lack of 
independence. They argued that auditors sometimes prepare clients’ financial statements 
and assist them in planning their tax liability even at the expense of financial reporting 
requirements. Egyptian companies are reluctant to provide risk-related information if this 
negatively impacts their tax commitments. This means that auditors may accept a client’s 
financial statements despite non-compliance with accounting standards’ disclosure 
requirements.
9.3.3 Ownership Structure
This subsection discusses the impact of ownership concentration, managerial ownership, 
governmental ownership and institutional ownership on risk reporting
9.3.3.1 Ownership Concentration
Regression analysis reveals a significant negative association between ownership 
concentration and mandatory risk reporting of EAS 25 in 2006 and 2007. Nevertheless,
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the results indicate a non-significant association between ownership concentration and 
mandatory risk reporting of EAS 33 and between ownership concentration and voluntary 
risk reporting in 2006 and 2007. This result suggests that Egyptian companies with high 
ownership concentration tend to present less compliance with mandatory risk reporting 
of EAS 25 because large investors have the ability to collect more information from 
sources other than annual reports to monitor management and exercise more control 
over the firm which in turn decreases the incentive for reporting or demanding more risk 
disclosure.
The result is consistent with Barako et al. (2006), Guan et al. (2007), Tsamenyi et al.
(2007) and Laidroo (2009) who document a negative relationship between ownership 
concentration and voluntary disclosure. However, Craswell and Taylor (1992), 
Dumontier and Raffoumier (1998), Eng and Mak (2003) and Ghazali and Weetman
(2006) reveal a non-significant relationship between ownership concentration and 
disclosure extent.
The negative association between ownership concentration and mandatory risk reporting 
is consistent with the prediction of agency theory. Agency theory predicted that widely 
held companies are motivated to disclose more information in their annual reports in 
order to reduce information asymmetry and monitoring/agency costs. In addition, widely 
held companies are motivated to present more compliance with mandatory disclosure 
requirements to satisfy the need of small investors for more disclosure.
9.3.3.2 Managerial Ownership
Agency theory indicates that agency costs are relatively high in firms with low managerial 
ownership because managers have more incentives to benefit on account of the 
shareholders and consequently more monitoring activates are needed; one of these 
activities is increased disclosure in annual reports.
Regression analysis results indicate a non-significant association between managerial 
ownership and mandatory/voluntary risk reporting in 2006 and 2007. The result suggests 
a non-significant impact of managerial ownership on the risk reporting practices of 
Egyptian companies. The result is inconsistent with the prediction of agency theory for a 
negative association between managerial ownership and accounting disclosure and this 
may be due to the mere 14.18% and 17.39% of managerial ownership in Egyptian 
companies in 2006 and 2007 respectively.
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Empirical evidence presents inconclusive results regarding the association between 
disclosure extent and managerial ownership. Gelb (2000), Chau and Gray (2002), Eng 
and Mak (2003), and Ghazali and Weetman (2003) find a significant negative relationship 
between disclosure extent and managerial ownership while, in contrast, Forker (1992), 
Guan et al. (2007), Huafang and Jianguo (2007) and Laidroo (2009) reveal a non­
significant relationship between disclosure extent and managerial ownership.
Nagar et al. (2003) argue that stock-based compensation contracts encourage managers 
to disclose voluntarily more information because these contracts coincide with the long­
term reporting performance of managers and investors’ need for information and hence 
reduce agency costs and problems. However, stock-based compensation contracts are 
not a prevalent managerial practice in Egyptian companies. The lack of stock-based 
compensation contracts may distort the expected negative association between 
managerial ownership and accounting disclosure expected by agency theory (Donnelly 
and Mulcahy 2008). Rahman (2008) indicates that 50% of the top 30 companies do not 
have a remuneration committee and 46.40% of the companies do not link up managers’ 
compensation to long-term performance. This result reflects the fact that the linkage 
between shareholders’ and managers’ interests is less emphasised in Egyptian companies. 
Therefore, the lack of stock-based compensation contracts in Egyptian companies may 
explain a non-significant association between managerial ownership and risk reporting.
A further descriptive statistical analysis for the data may explain the non-significant 
association between the two variables. The sample will be divided into two groups 
according to the average of managerial ownership (14.18% and 17.39% in 2006 and 2007 
respectively). Group 1 are companies with managerial ownership below the average and 
group 2 are companies with managerial ownership above the average.
A cross-tabulation of managerial ownership, role duality and auditor type may provide 
more insights into the major characteristics of the two groups of companies and hence 
the reasons behind a non-significant association between managerial ownership and risk 
reporting. A cross-tabulation of managerial ownership and role duality for the year 2006 
and 2007 indicates that 80.80% and 79.22% of Egyptian companies in group 1, the group 
that should present more risk reporting according to the prediction of agency theory, are 
companies with role duality and there is a significant association between the two 
variables (see Table 9.1).
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T able 9.1: C ross-tabulation o f  R ole D uality and M anagerial O w nership
Role Duality 2006 2007
g n  u p  (2) Total group (1) group (2) Total
Separation 15 19.2% 13 46.4% 28 16 20.8% 12 41.4% 28
Without separation % ! ’> ■ S % 79.2% r 5S.6", " N
78 100% 28 100% 106 77 100% 29 100% 106
y2  Test y l  (df=l) = 7.84, P < .05 y l  (df=l) = 4.60, P < .05
In addition, a cross-tabulation o f managerial ownership and auditor type indicates that 
56.4% and 57% o f Egyptian companies in group 1 in 2006 and 2007 are audited by audit 
firms without international affiliations and there is a significant association between the 
two variables (see Table 9.2). Consequently, group 1 companies could be described as 
companies with role duality and audited by small audit firms. Taking into account the 
negative impact o f role duality on risk reporting and the inability o f  small audit firms to 
influence the disclosure policy o f their clients, these characteristics may explain the non­
significant association between managerial ownership and risk reporting.
Table 9.2: Cross-tabulation Auditor Type and Managerial Ownership
Auditor Type 2006 2007
gru.m (1) gn up (2) total group (1) group (2) total
Without affiliation 44 56.4% 8 28.6% 52 44 57% 8 27.6% 52
With affiliation 34 20 "1.4% 54 33 43% 21 ~2.4% 54
78 100% 28 100% 106 77 100% 29 100% 106
y2  Test y l  (df=l) = 7.84, P < .05 y l  (df=l) = 4.60, P < .05
The interviewees argued that the inadequate accounting education o f managers may form 
a stumbling block to compliance with and presentation o f mandatory and voluntary risk 
reporting. Due to a lack o f  adequate accounting education, managers thought that an 
annual report is a means to avoiding sanctions from regulatory agencies and accounting 
standards could be applied selectively. They understated the role o f the annual report as a 
communication channel between the company and its stakeholders. In addition, they 
considered financial reporting as a monotonous process and refused any attempts to 
develop financial reporting practices.
9.3.3.3 Governmental Ownership
Regression analysis indicates a significant negative association between governmental 
ownership and mandatory risk reporting o f EAS 33 in 2006 only. However, there is a 
non-significant association between governmental ownership and mandatory risk 
reporting o f EAS 25 and between governmental ownership and voluntary risk reporting 
in 2006 and 2007.
The empirical evidence reveals mixed results for the relationship between governmental 
ownership and disclosure extent. While Eng and Mak (2003) document a positive
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relationship, Ghazali and Weetman (2003), Laidroo (2009) and Makhija and Patton (2004) 
reveal a non-significant relationship between governmental ownership and voluntary 
disclosure. Finally, El-Sayed and Hoque (2010) find a significant negative association 
between voluntary disclosure and governmental ownership in Egypt.
The negative association between governmental ownership and mandatory risk reporting 
may be a result of the weak role of governmental agencies in forcing or persuading 
Egyptian companies with governmental ownership to comply with or provide mandatory 
and voluntary risk reporting. In addition, a slowdown in the privatisation process of the 
remaining state-owned Egyptian companies, besides government support for these 
companies to gain funds from different finance sources, has resulted in decreased 
motivation for presenting more risk disclosure. Moreover, Egyptian companies with 
governmental ownership operate under complete and sole governmental supervision and 
the market for company control has a non-significant impact on these companies. 
Consequently, Egyptian companies with governmental ownership assign very low 
importance to their disclosure policies including risk reporting.
Furthermore, as mentioned in chapter 2, state-owned companies should have been 
applying the UAS since the late 1960s. The UAS was a main tool for economic planning 
purposes during the socialist era. The UAS is a guidebook that focuses mainly on 
bookkeeping and measurements aspects. The interviewees argue that the UAS has a 
significant negative impact on the disclosure practices of these companies because it 
limits users of accounting information to governmental agencies only and hence 
companies are reluctant to provide risk information to other users.
Based on 2006 data, Egyptian companies with role duality and those audited by audit 
firms without international affiliations have, on average, a relatively high governmental 
stake in their ownership structure (31.82% and 40.40% respectively) compared to 
Egyptian companies without role duality and those audited by audit firms with 
international affiliations (7.43% and 10.92% respectively). Taking into consideration the 
negative influence of role duality on risk reporting and the very weak ability of small 
audit firms to force or persuade their clients to comply with mandatory or present 
voluntary risk reporting, this may provide more insights into low presentation of 




Regression analysis reveals a non-significant relationship between institutional ownership 
and risk reporting in 2006 and 2007. The result highlights the weak impact of 
institutional ownership on the mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure practices of 
Egyptian companies. This result is consistent with Lakhal (2007) who document a non­
significant relationship between voluntary earnings disclosure in financial press releases 
and institutional ownership in French companies. In addition, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
find a non-significant association between institutional ownership and voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of Malaysian companies.
This result reflects the inactive role of institutional investors in demanding more risk 
disclosures. The result suggests that institutional investors act as owners rather than as 
traders; therefore they behave as large investors and demand less disclosure because they 
are able to obtain private information from the companies directly. Furthermore, this 
result suggests the existence of other communications channels, such as a seat on the 
board, as a more efficient and timely source of risk-related information compared to 
annual reports. Moreover, institutional investors have the ability to access different 
information sources to obtain the risk-related information they need and hence their 
reliance on annual reports as a basic source of information is diminished. This result is 
consistent with Gray (1988) who argues that in countries with a preference for secrecy, 
such as Egypt, companies tend to limit disclosure to very close parties involved with their 
management and financing.
9.3.4 Company Risk Level
Agency theory predicts a positive association between leverage and disclosure extent 
because high leveraged companies have greater incentives to provide more information 
to highlight their ability to meet their obligations.
Regression analysis results indicate a non-significant association between leverage and 
mandatory/voluntary risk reporting in 2006 and 2007. Contrary to the prediction of 
agency theory, this result suggests a non-significant impact of leverage on the risk 
reporting practices of the Egyptian companies. Empirical evidence reveals inconclusive 
findings regarding the association between leverage and disclosure extent. Malone et al.
(1993) report a positive relationship while Ahmed and Nicholls (1994), Wallace et al.
(1994), Wallace and Naser (1995) and Alsaeed (2006) document a non-significant 
association between leverage and disclosure extent. In addition, empirical evidence from
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Egyptian context provides mixed results as well. Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003) 
document a negative association between leverage and mandatory disclosure (IAS-CML) 
and a non-significant association between leverage and mandatory disclosure of (IAS-CA 
and IAS-NA). In contrast, Hassan et al. (2006) document a positive association between 
leverage and mandatory disclosure and a negative association between leverage and 
voluntary disclosure.
Bonds as a major source of finance have a relatively minor importance in the capital 
structure of Egyptian companies. The annual report of the CMA indicates that the value 
of bonds issues represents 16.68%, 12.33% and 15.05% of the total securities issues in 
2006, 2007 and 2008 respectively (CMA, 2007 and 2008). In addition, the market value 
of bonds traded in the Egyptian capital market has made relatively little contribution to 
the market capitalisation. It ranged between 2% to 12% during 1996-1999 (Hewaidy, 
2000). This means that banking and lending institutions are the major source of finance 
for Egyptian companies (El-Sayed, 2001; Hassan et al., 2006). Companies Act 159/1981 
grants protection and support for bondholders by authorising the bondholders’ 
association the right to have a legal representative in general annual meeting who can 
discuss any issue that may impact the interest of bondholders.
The possible explanation for a non-significant association between leverage and risk 
reporting could stem from the fact that bondholders may have relatively little power to 
influence a company disclosure policy. In addition, banks may have access, through 
communication channels other than annual reports, to obtain their information needs 
from the company directly and promptly. This is consistent with the prediction of 
stakeholder theory that a company is motivated to satisfy the information needs of more 
powerful stakeholder groups (Ullmann, 1985). Furthermore, debt covenants may play an 
important role in mitigating agency costs rather than increased disclosure in companies’ 
annual reports (Jensen, 1986). This may reduce the demand for and supply of risk-related 
information in Egyptian companies’ annual reports.
The non-significant association between leverage and risk reporting highlights that 
leverage may not be a relevant proxy of a company risk level. Farrelly et al. (1985, p.279) 
argue that ‘what constitutes risk and how it should be measured is extremely elusive’. 
Risk is a multi-dimensional concept; therefore a single proxy may fail to capture the 
different aspects of a company risk level.
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9.3.5 Firm Characteristics
This subsection presents the impact of firm size, profitability, liquidity and industry 
membership on risk reporting.
9.3.5.1 Firm Size _
Different disclosure theories and empirical studies underpinned and examined the 
association between firm size and accounting disclosure and a positive association 
between them has been suggested (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999).
Agency theory and the political cost perspective argue that agency costs and political 
costs are an increased function of firm size. Moreover, disclosure costs and proprietary 
costs are a decreased function of firm size. Finally, large firms are more motivated to 
comply with accounting standards in order to support their legitimacy and because of the 
availability of financial resources and expertise required to implement accounting 
standards.
Regression results show a significant negative association between firm size and 
mandatory risk reporting of EAS 25 in 2006 only, a significant negative association 
between firm size and voluntary risk reporting in 2007 only and a non-significant 
association between firm size and mandatory risk reporting of EAS 33 in both 2006 and 
2007.
This result regarding mandatory risk reporting of EAS 25 and voluntary risk reporting is 
inconsistent with the results of several studies which document a positive association 
between firm size and both mandatory (Ali et al., 2004; Craig and Diga, 1998; Dumontier 
and Raffoumier, 1998; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Marston and Robson, 1997; Owusu- 
Ansah, 1998 and 2005; Tai et al., 1990; Wallace et al., 1994) and voluntary disclosure 
(Alsaeed, 2006; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1991 and 1992; Depoers, 2000; 
Hossain et al., 1994; 1995; Meek et al., 1995; Raffoumier, 1995). However, the result of 
mandatory risk reporting of EAS 33 is consistent with Ahmed and Nicholls (1994), 
Patton and Zelenka (1997), Murphy (1999), Street and Bryant (2000), Ahmed (2006) and 
Chavent et al. (2006) who document a non-significant association between firm size and 
mandatory disclosure.
Empirical evidence from Egypt is mixed. Hassan et al. (2006) reveal a significant negative 
association between firm size and mandatory disclosure and a significant positive 
association between firm size and vpluntary disclosure. In addition, El-Sayed and Hoque 
(2010) find a non-significant association between voluntary disclosure and firm size.
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Moreover, El-Dahrawy and Abo-Zaid (1995) document a significant negative association 
between firm size and voluntary disclosure in annual reports of Kuwaiti companies.
The possible explanation for this negative association between firm size and risk 
disclosure is that firm size may play a different role in developing economics with less 
mature reporting systems compared to developed economics with well-established 
reporting systems (Patton and Zelenka, 1997) due to differences in social, regulatory and 
institutional contexts (Hassan, 2009). Wallace et al. (1994, p.44) and Wallace and Nasser 
(1995, p.44) argue that the theoretical basis for the relationship between firm size and 
extent of disclosure is unclear and the direction of the relationship may be either positive 
or negative. They argue that large firms are vulnerable to political pressures and may 
minimise the probability of political actions by reducing the amount of disclosure in their 
annual reports. Furthermore, the interviewees argued that cost of collecting and 
processing information is no longer a function of firm size or a burden on small 
companies because accounting information systems already provide different 
information including risk-related information and modem information systems reduce 
the cost of producing information. This is consistent with the claim of Edwards and 
Smith (1996) that the cost of collecting and processing information is not a significant 
reason for non-presentation of segment information in corporate annual reports.
9.3.5.2 Profitability
Regression findings show a significant positive association between firm profitability and 
mandatory risk reporting of EAS 25 in 2006 only. The result suggests that Egyptian 
companies with high profitability provide marginally more compliance with mandatory 
risk reporting. This result is consistent with the results of Patton and Zelenka (1997) and 
Owusu-Ansah (1998 and 2005). In addition, in line with the results of Malone et al. 
(1993), Wallace et al. (1994), Inchausti (1997) and Dumontier and Raffoumier (1998), the 
results indicate a non-significant association between profitability, mandatory risk 
reporting of EAS 33 and voluntary risk reporting in 2006 and 2007.
Empirical evidence from the Egyptian context presents inconclusive results as well. 
While Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003) document a non-significant association 
between profitability and mandatory disclosure, Hassan et al. (2006) reveal a significant 
positive association between profitability and mandatory disclosure and a non-significant 
association between profitability and voluntary disclosure.
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The possible explanation for the positive association between profitability and mandatory 
risk reporting of EAS 25 stems from different theoretical perspectives. Consistent with 
signalling theory, more profitable companies have greater incentives to signal their 
outstanding performance to the capital market and distinguish themselves from less 
profitable companies. Moreover, based on agency theory, managers of more profitable 
Egyptian companies tend to comply more with accounting standards to protect and 
maintain their interest in terms of compensation and position and to explain the risks 
associated with these high profits and their strategies to mitigate the impact of these risks. 
In line with legitimacy theory and political cost perspective, Egyptian companies with 
high profitability present more compliance with accounting standards to confirm 
complete adherence with societal values and to indicate that their large profits are not a 
consequences of extortion of other groups in the society and hence avoid any political 
intervention.
The possible explanation for the non-significant association between mandatory risk 
reporting of EAS 33, voluntary risk reporting and profitability is the influence of 
proprietary costs on disclosure. Managers of profitable companies may be reluctant to 
provide segment reporting in terms of EAS 33 and voluntary risk reporting because they 
think that providing such information will increase competition in the product market 
and hence increase the proprietary costs they face.
9.3.5.3 Liquidity
Regression results indicate a positive association between firm liquidity and mandatory 
risk reporting of EAS 33 in 2006 and 2007. However, there is a non-significant 
association between firm liquidity, mandatory risk reporting of EAS 25 and voluntary 
risk reporting in 2006 and 2007. The result suggested that companies with a high liquidity 
profile comply more with mandatory risk reporting and provide more disclosure related 
to segmental information. This result is consistent with Owusu-Ansah (2005). However, 
several studies document a non-significant association between firm Hquidity, mandatory 
reporting (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Wallace and Naser, 1995) and voluntary reporting 
(Alsaeed, 2006).
The possible explanation for the positive association between firm liquidity and 
mandatory risk reporting is that firms with high liquidity are motivated to signal more 
information to interested parties to distinguish themselves from other companies with a 
low Hquidity profile. This justification is based on the argument of signalling theory. In
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addition, firms with high liquidity and hence low insolvency risk are keen to reveal 
information regarding their business and geographical segments to emphasise their sound 
financial position and capability to manage adverse circumstances and risks; therefore 
they tend to disclose more risk-related information to a wide range of users.
9.3.5.4 Industry Membership
Regression analysis reveals a non-significant association between industry membership 
and mandatory/voluntary risk reporting practices of Egyptian companies in 2006 and 
2007. This result is consistent with Tai et al. (1990), Wallace et al. (1994), Herrmann and 
Thomas (1996), Inchausti (1997) and Patton and Zelenka (1997) who document a non­
significant relationship between industry membership and disclosure extent. In contrast, 
Kelly (1994), Wallace and Naser (1995), Craig and Diga (1998) and Lopes and Rodrigues
(2007) document a significant relationship between industry membership and disclosure 
extent.
Empirical evidence from the Egyptian context gives mixed results. Abd-Elsalam and 
Weetman (2003) find significant influence of industry membership (being manufacturing 
company) on mandatory disclosure (IAS-CML and IAS-NA) while Samaha and Stapleton
(2008) find a non-significant association between industry membership and extent of 
mandatory disclosure. In addition, El-Sayed and Hoque (2010) reveal a non-significant 
association between voluntary disclosure and industry membership. Several possible 
reasons could be advanced to explain the non-significant influence of industry 
membership on the risk reporting practices of Egyptian companies. First, Egyptian 
financial reporting regulations are applied to manufacturing and other companies evenly 
and hence they adhere consistently to accounting standards. This argument is supported 
by bivariate analysis which indicates non-significant differences between manufacturing 
and other companies regarding mandatory and voluntary risk reporting (see section 
7.3.5.1). Second, political and special interest groups may obtain their information via 
communication channels other than annual reports. Third, the nature and the complexity 
of company operations and products may have a non-significant impact on mandatory 
and voluntary risk reporting. Fourth, Egyptian companies in different industries may not 
acknowledge the impact of increased voluntary disclosure on their cost of capital.
9.4 Factors that Influence Presentation of Risk Reporting
In chapter 2, the key features of the Egyptian context have been briefly presented. The 
presentation identifies several weaknesses in financial reporting related regulations, the
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profession and accounting education. In addition, the main characteristics of Egyptian 
society’s cultural dimensions have been discussed. In chapter 8, the interviewees 
highlighted the factors that influence the risk reporting practices of Egyptian companies. 
Several interrelated and interdependent factors related to accounting education and 
practice problems that may influence risk reporting practices of Egyptian companies will 
be discussed in this section to explain how these factors lead to a low presentation of risk 
reporting in the annual reports of Egyptian companies.
The interviewees argued that one of the main reasons for low presentation of mandatory 
and voluntary risk reporting is the lack of qualified accountants who have up-to-date 
accounting knowledge regarding the application of accounting standards and best 
practices of voluntary disclosure related to risk reporting. The lack of sufficient financial 
resources and adequate training have aggravated this problem. Egyptian companies do 
not acknowledge the importance of assigning a relevant budget for accounting training 
purposes and developing staff skills. Consequently, the accounting knowledge of most 
accountants is out-dated and they fail to implement successfully the IASs/EASs 
disclosure requirements especially those related to risk reporting; a topic that requires a 
high level of professional training.
The Egyptian accounting education system suffers from several drawbacks that impair 
the quality of accounting education. The lack of cooperation between the profession and 
universities in both education and research areas results in inadequate accounting 
textbooks that fail to discuss the application of IASs/EASs or highlight the conceptual 
framework and objectives of financial reporting. Generally, accounting education focuses 
mainly on the bookkeeping and procedures-aspects of accounting and undermines 
disclosure related topics. For example, segment reporting and financial instruments 
disclosures are missing in textbooks and have never been taught to undergraduate 
students; therefore it is not a surprise to find a low level of compliance with these 
disclosure requirements. Moreover, undergraduate students neither receive any training 
nor have any classes given by practitioners. This leads to a procedures-oriented 
accounting practice that undermines risk disclosure because this requires special 
accounting knowledge and skills that most accountants do not hold.
In chapter 2, the main cultural dimensions of Egyptian society and related accounting 
values were addressed. According to Gray (1988), Egyptian society prefers secrecy as an 
accounting value that reflects a preference to disclose information to close parties only.
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The interviewees pointed to secrecy as a major reason for the low presentation of 
mandatory and voluntary risk reporting. The IASs are based on Western culture; 
therefore a conflict between these standards and Egyptian culture is to be expected. In 
addition, due to this secrecy, Egyptian companies refrain from providing voluntarily any 
risk-related information.
In chapter 2, the Companies Act, CML and listing and delisting rules and their potential 
impact on financial reporting were presented. Financial reporting regulations suffer from 
several drawbacks such as the ineffective application of administrative sanctions and the 
focus on the format rather than the content of annual reports. In addition, they do not 
require explicitly disclosing risk-related information. The interviewees indicated that non- 
strict administrative measures lead to non-compliance with accounting standards because 
the companies’ main concern is to meet dates specified by the CMA and the EGX to 
submit annual reports regardless of their contents.
In addition, the interviewees argued that the profession law combined with a weak 
accounting and auditing profession are key factors for low disclosure of risk-related 
information. The profession is regulated by law 133 of 1951; the law is out-dated and 
does not contain any continuing education requirements and hence contributes to a weak 
profession in Egypt. The profession lacks a powerful professional body with the 
authority to monitor the professional performance of accountants and auditors and 
impose sanctions on those who violate accounting and auditing standards. In addition, 
professional bodies play a very limited role in providing continuing education programs 
to their members. Consequendy, auditors and accountants lack the required knowledge 
and skills to perform their tasks appropriately.
The interviewees highlighted the technical difficulties of risk-related accounting standards 
as one of the main reasons for low compliance with accounting standards. Risk reporting 
requires high quality accounting knowledge and skills that are not provided within the 
existing accounting education. Also some external auditors cannot provide any advice to 
their clients because these standards are not easy to understand or apply. In addition, the 
lack of interpretations and explanations of EASs has exaggerated this problem. Preparers 
of financial statements are not provided with any guidelines to assist them in preparing 
financial statements according to the requirements of accounting standards.
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9.5 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has presented a discussion of the results of the secondary data and primary 
data and explained how these results are integrated to present a comprehensive view 
regarding risk reporting practices in Egypt. It discussed the extent of risk reporting and 
the determinants that explain the variation in the extent of risk reporting. In addition, it 
discussed the factors that have led to the low presentation of risk-related information in 
the annual reports of Egyptian companies.
Multivariate analysis indicates that Egyptian companies that comply more with 
mandatory risk disclosure are companies with high profitability and liquidity, companies 
operate in an environment with high barrier to entry, those that are audited by audit 
firms with international affiliations and companies with a large board. In contrast, 
Egyptian companies that comply less with mandatory risk reporting are companies with 
high ownership concentration and governmental ownership, large companies and those 
with role duality. Furthermore, Egyptian companies that provide more voluntary risk 
reporting are companies which operate in an environment with high barriers to entry and 
small si2e companies. This result indicates that agency theory, signalling theory, 
proprietary cost perspective, political cost perspective, legitimacy theory and stakeholder 
theory can explain the variation in risk reporting practices in the annual reports of 
Egyptian companies.
The discussion indicated that there are several factors that can lead to low presentation 
of mandatory and voluntary risk reporting. Culture, proprietary costs and ineffective 
enforcement mechanisms are the main reasons for a low extent of risk reporting. A lack 
of cooperation between the profession and universities leads to inadequate accounting 
education and textbooks that give less attention to accounting disclosure and focus only 
on bookkeeping. Consequently, there is a shortage of qualified accountants. Moreover, 
accounting practice tends to give more attention to accounting measurement than to 
accounting disclosure. In addition, the out-dated profession law and the weakness of the 
profession itself have increased the knowledge gap of chartered accountants. Other 
factors include weak accounting information systems, technical problems, lack of 
interpretations and explanation of the accounting standards and lack of financial 
resources.
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CHAPTER 10: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
10.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a summary and conclusion of the main findings of the study and 
discusses the study’s limitations, recommendations and suggestions for possible future 
research. Section 10.2 provides a summary of the achievement of the research questions. 
Section 10.3 is devoted to discussing the results regarding the compliance level and 
amount of mandatory and voluntary risk reporting. The findings regarding the 
determinants of risk reporting in the annual reports of Egyptian companies are presented 
in section 10.4. Section 10.5 presents the key findings regarding the interviewees’ 
perception of the factors that impede presentation of mandatory and voluntary risk 
reporting. Section 10.6 proposes some recommendations for regulators and policy 
makers. Section 10.7 discusses research the limitations while section 10.8 suggests 
avenues for future research.
10.2 Research Questions and Contribution Achievement
This study is of interest to accounting regulators, such as the IASB, because it provides a 
country case study regarding the application of IASs and illustrates a set of practical 
obstacles faced by companies in their implementation of those standards. This study 
aimed to answer the following research questions:
1. To what extent do Egyptian listed companies comply with the mandatory 
disclosure requirements of EAS 25 and EAS 33?
2. What are the impacts of competition, company risk level, company-specific 
characteristics, corporate governance and ownership structure on compliance 
with the mandatory risk reporting in financial statements of Egyptian listed 
companies?
3. Is there any change in compliance levels of mandatory risk reporting between 
2006 and 2007?
4. To what extent do Egyptian listed companies provide voluntary risk reporting in 
their board of directors’ reports?
5. What are the impacts of competition, company risk level, company-specific 
characteristic, corporate governance and ownership structure on the voluntary 
disclosure of risk-related information in board of directors’ reports of Egyptian 
listed companies? '
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6. Is there any association between the extent of mandatory risk reporting and the 
amount of voluntary risk reporting provided in the annual reports of Egyptian 
listed companies?
7. What are the factors that may impede presentation of mandatory and voluntary 
risk reporting in the annual reports of Egyptian listed companies?
These research questions have been addressed as follows:
1. An unweighted disclosure index was used to measure compliance with 
disclosure requirements of EAS 25 and 33. Information items included in the 
disclosure index are derived entirely from these two standards. A company 
received a score of 1 if the item is disclosed and 0 if the item if not disclosed. 
The index is a relative index that considers the inapplicability of any 
disclosure item.
2. A number of disclosure determinants have been identified such as
competition, company risk level, corporate governance and ownership
structure. In addition the study controls for several company-specific
characteristics. Using regression analysis, these determinants have been 
regressed against compliance levels with mandatory risk reporting that have 
been measured using the disclosure index.
3. The study employs a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test to examine whether there 
is a significant change in compliance level between 2006 and 2007.
4. The study employs content analysis to identify and classify risk-related 
information. A sentence approach has been used for coding and measuring 
purposes. Risk-related information has been classified according to the risk 
categories proposed by ICAEW and German Accounting Standard 5 
(exposure draft) and followed by several prior studies.
5. A number of disclosure determinants have been identified such as
competition, company risk level, corporate governance and ownership 
structure. In addition the study controls for several company-specific 
characteristics. Using regression analysis, the impacts of these determinants 
on voluntary risk reporting have been assessed.
6. In order to test the association between mandatory and voluntary risk 
reporting, the study uses correlation to examine the association between level 
of compliance with mandatory disclosure and the amount of voluntary risk 
reporting.
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7. A semi-structured interview has been used as a research method to elicit 
respondents’ perceptions regarding the factors that may hinder presentation 
of mandatory and voluntary risk reporting. These factors have been classified 
into four categories, namely factors related to accounting education, factors 
related to accounting practice, factors related to cost of disclosure and other 
factors.
This study extends accounting knowledge and literature in several areas. The study 
addresses risk disclosure practices in one of the developing countries which have 
received little attention in accounting research. Egypt has different social, economic and 
institutional contexts and it is important to identify their impacts on risk reporting 
practices. Recently, accounting research has addressed risk reporting focusing only on 
developed countries. This study extends our understanding of risk reporting practices 
through examining these practices in a country with a great preference for secrecy and 
highlighting the conflict between secrecy and risk reporting. In addition, unlike prior 
research, the study provides a comprehensive examination of risk reporting not only by 
addressing both mandatory and voluntary disclosure but also by examining factors that 
impede the presentation of risk reporting. Furthermore, the determinants of risk 
reporting have been examined especially the impact of competition, corporate 
governance and ownership structure on risk reporting. The contribution of this study has 
been achieved through reviewing and acknowledging a substantial stream of accounting 
research to identify the determinants of risk reporting and explore factors that influence 
the presentation of risk reporting, designing and implementing a study that extends 
accounting knowledge of a topic that receives little attention. In addition, the study 
applies different research approaches, quantitative and qualitative approaches, and 
methods, content analysis and semi-structured interview, to better understand the topic 
under examination and relates the findings to the general knowledge and empirical 
evidence of disclosure studies.
10.3 Compliance Level and Amount of Mandatory and Voluntary Risk Reporting
This study measures the compliance with mandatory reporting and the amount of 
voluntary risk reporting in the annual reports of 106 Egyptian listed companies. In 
addition, the study examines the impact of competition, corporate governance and 
ownership structure on the risk reporting practices of Egyptian companies. In order to 
measure the extent of compliance with mandatory risk reporting, a checklist of disclosure 
items based on EAS 25 and 33 was prepared and an unweighted disclosure index was
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employed. A company received a score of 1 if the item was disclosed and 0 if not. 
However, the company was not penalised for non-applicable information items. To 
measure the amount of voluntary risk reporting, the study employed content analysis and 
a sentence approach for coding and counting purposes.
Descriptive statistics regarding compliance with mandatory risk reporting indicate that 
Egyptian listed companies present a low level of compliance with disclosure 
requirements of EAS 25 and 33. The average compliance level with EAS 25 is 19.33% 
and 21.57% in 2006 and 2007 respectively while the average compliance level with 
disclosure requirements of EAS 33 in the same period is 18.25% and 16.99%. This result 
is consistent with Dahawy and Conover (2007) and Samaha and Stapleton (2008) who 
report a low level of compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements in Egypt. In 
addition, several studies report a low level of compliance with mandatory disclosure in 
several developing countries (Akhtaruddin, 2005; Marston and Robson, 1997; Wallace, 
1988). This low level of compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements of EAS 25 
and 33 reflects the impact of the secretive culture of Egyptian society on the disclosure 
practices of Egyptian listed companies (Dahawy et al., 2002). Furthermore, this result 
confirms that the CMA and EGX are more concerned with the format rather than the 
content of financial statements. In addition, it highlights the deficient application of 
sanctions and administrative actions of the CML for the violation of accounting 
standards. The EFSA and the EGX should use their authority to promote and monitor 
the application of EASs/IASs by Egyptian listed companies and work together to impose 
heavy penalties against companies that violate accounting standards. The result indicates 
that the introduction of EASs leads to an increase in risk reporting practices of Egyptian 
companies. However, the compliance level is poor. The positive association between 
mandatory and voluntary risk reporting highlighted the interaction between mandatory 
and voluntary risk reporting.
Descriptive statistics regarding voluntary risk reporting reveal that, on average, Egyptian 
companies present low voluntary risk reporting (23 and 26 sentences in 2006 and 2007 
respectively) compared to prior studies such as Konishi and Ali (2007) in Japan, Linsley 
and Shrives (2006) and Rajab and Handley-Schachler (2009) in the UK. In addition, 
operational risk category is the largest risk category reported by Egyptian companies. 
Regarding the characteristics of voluntary risk reporting, Egyptian listed companies tend 
to disclose more qualitative, good news, past and non-financial risk reporting than 
quantitative, bad news, forward-looking and financial risk reporting. The lack of
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quantified and forward-looking risk reporting impairs the usefulness of risk reporting in 
Egyptian companies’ annual reports. Egyptian companies may be reluctant to provide 
quantitative risk reporting due to measurement difficulties, fear from litigation costs and 
the commercially sensitive nature of risk-related information while the reluctance to 
provide forward-looking information may be caused by fear of litigation costs, difficulties 
in discussing future risks compared to past risks, high uncertainties associated with future 
events and the proprietary cost of risk reporting.
10.4 The Determinants of Risk Reporting in Annual Reports of Egyptian 
companies
This study examined the impact of competition, corporate governance, ownership 
structure and company risk level on risk reporting practices of Egyptian companies. The 
level of compliance with mandatory risk reporting and the amount of voluntary risk 
reporting are regressed against these independent variables. In addition, the study 
controlled for firm-specific characteristics such as firm size, profitability, liquidity and 
industry membership.
The findings revealed a significant positive association between barriers to entry and risk 
reporting practices. The result revealed that barriers to entry as a proxy for competition is 
a key determinant of risk reporting practices in Egypt. Egyptian listed companies that 
operate in low competition provide more mandatory and voluntary risk-related 
information than companies that operate in high competition because any potential 
competitor will not benefit from this information due to the difficulties of entering the 
market. This result provides empirical evidence for the impact of competition and 
proprietary costs on disclosure; a relationship that has not been examined in risk 
reporting studies.
The result indicated a positive association between board size and mandatory risk 
reporting. This means that Egyptian listed companies with large board size tend to 
comply more with mandatory requirements. This result conflicts with the result of Cheng 
and Courtenay (2006), Bassett et al. (2007) and Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008). This result 
suggests that large boards have the power to alleviate the dominance of the CEO over 
the board. In addition, this result reflects the impact of the Egyptian corporate 
governance code of practice on the disclosure practice of Egyptian companies. The code 
encourages boards of directors to ensure compliance with disclosure regulation and the 
effectiveness of risk management strategies.
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The findings revealed a negative association between role duality and mandatory risk 
reporting. This means that Egyptian companies with role duality provide less compliance 
with mandatory disclosure compared to companies without role duality. This result is 
consistent with the prediction of agency theory and the results of Forker (1992) and 
Bassett et al. (2007). The result emphasises the importance of the separation between the 
CEO and chair of the board position because role duality is a major deterrence to 
disclosure and a significant threat to disclosure quality.
The findings pointed to a significant positive association between auditor type and 
mandatory risk reporting. Companies that are audited by auditors with international 
affiliations provide more compliance with mandatory disclosure. This result is consistent 
with Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) and Ahmed (2006). In Egypt, Abd-Elsalam and 
Weetman (2003) reach a similar conclusion. Audit firms with international affiliations 
have the power to convince or force their clients to comply with accounting standards 
because they have the required expertise and well-trained staff needed for the application 
of accounting standards and they also aim to assert their independence and protect their 
reputation. Moreover, the result indicated a non-significant association between auditor 
type and voluntary risk reporting. This result is consistent with Malone et al. (1993) and 
Hossain et al. (1994 and 1995). Audit firms with international affiliations have no impact 
on voluntary risk disclosure because Companies Act requires independent auditors to 
check whether the information included in a board of directors’ report is in line with 
company records and this may increase audit cost. Therefore, audit firms with 
international affiliations discourage their clients from providing voluntary risk reporting.
The results indicated a significant negative association between ownership concentration 
and mandatory risk reporting. This means that Egyptian companies with low ownership 
concentration tend to provide high compliance with mandatory disclosure. This result is 
consistent with Barako et al. (2006) and Guan et al. (2007) and supports the agency 
theory prediction that widely held companies tend to provide more disclosure to reduce 
information asymmetry and agency costs.
The results revealed a non-significant association between managerial ownership and risk 
reporting. In contrast to the prediction of agency theory, the result suggests that 
managerial ownership has no impact on mandatory and voluntary risk reporting practices 
of Egyptian companies. This result supports the result of Forker (1992), Guan et al.
(2007) and Laidroo (2009). The possible explanation for this result is the lack of stock-
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based compensation contracts that motivate managers to disclose their private 
information. Stock-based compensation is not a common practice in Egyptian companies.
The findings revealed a negative association between governmental ownership and 
mandatory risk reporting. Egyptian companies with high governmental ownership 
provide less compliance with mandatory disclosure than companies with low 
governmental ownership. This result highlights the poor ability of governmental agencies 
to force companies with governmental ownership to comply with mandatory disclosure 
requirements. Governmental support for these companies to gain easy access to financial 
resources and the lack of the market for company control discourages them for 
providing more disclosure in their annual reports. The result reflects the impact of the 
UAS on disclosure. These companies have been applying the UAS which is designed to 
satisfy only government needs for information and ignore the needs of other users.
The results pointed to a non-significant association between institutional ownership and 
the risk reporting practices of Egyptian listed companies. This result is consistent with 
Lakhal (2007). The result suggests that institutional investors behave as traders and not as 
owners; therefore they demand less disclosure because of their ability to obtain their 
information needs directly and promptly. In addition, the result suggests that they have 
the ability to access information from different sources and hence the importance of 
annual reports as a main source of information has declined.
The results revealed a non-significant association between leverage and risk reporting. 
This result is consistent with Ahmed and Nicholls (1994), Wallace et al. (1994) and 
Alsaeed (2006). Empirical evidence from Egypt provides mixed results. Abd-Elsalam and 
Weetman (2003) found a negative association between leverage and mandatory disclosure 
while Hassan et al. (2006) revealed a positive association. In Egypt, bonds are a minor 
source of finance for companies while banks and other financial institutions are the main 
source of finance. The non-significant impact of leverage on risk reporting may be 
explained by the little power bondholders have to influence companies’ disclosure 
practices or the fact that banks and other financial institutions use other communication 
channels to satisfy their information needs. Measuring a company risk level is not an easy 
task due to the difficulties of risk operationalisation (Linsley and Shrives, 2006).
The findings revealed a significant negative association between firm size and compliance 
with mandatory risk reporting. This means that small companies tend to comply more 
with mandatory disclosure requirements. This result is consistent with the results of a
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number disclosure studies in developing countries (El-Dahrawy and Abo-Zaid, 1995; 
Hassan et al., 2006). This result contradicts the expectation of agency, legitimacy and 
stakeholder theory. The possible explanation for this result is that large companies are 
politically visible and they try to evade any potential political intervention through 
reducing disclosure in their annual reports (Wallace et al., 1994; Wallace and Nasser, 
1995). In addition, the cost of collecting and processing information, due to 
enhancement in the field of information systems, is no longer an increased function in 
firm size. Interviewees provided support for this point of view. They indicated that the 
cost of collecting and processing information had a non-significant impact on the risk 
reporting practices of Egyptian companies because even small companies could afford 
the cost of modem accounting systems.
The findings indicated a significant positive association with profitability and mandatory 
risk reporting. Companies with high profitability tend to comply with mandatory 
disclosure requirements more than companies with low profitability. This result agrees 
with the results of Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003) and Hassan et al. (2006). This 
result supports the expectation of legitimacy and stakeholder theory that companies with 
high profitability wish to signal their superior performance to capital markets and to 
confirm their compliance with accounting standards to highlight their adherence to 
societal values and norms.
The findings indicated a positive association between liquidity and mandatory risk 
reporting. Companies with a high liquidity comply with mandatory disclosure more than 
companies with low liquidity. This result is consistent with the result of Owusu-Ansah 
(2005). However, it contradicts Wallace and Nasser (1995) and Alsaeed (2006). Based on 
signalling theory, Egyptian listed companies with high liquidity are more motivated to 
signal their superior performance to the capital market and discuss their efficiency in 
managing uncertainties and risks related to their business and geographic segments.
The findings indicated a non-significant association between industry membership and 
risk reporting. Industry membership has no impact on risk reporting practices of 
Egyptian companies. This result is in line with Wallace et al. (1994), Herrmann and 
Thomas (1996) and Inchausti (1997). This result showed that manufacturing companies 
and other companies apply mandatory requirements evenly. In addition, political groups 
have channels to obtain their information needs other than annual reports. In addition,
f
manufacturing and other companies do not appreciate the merits of voluntary disclosure.
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These results confirm the claim of Meek et al. (1995) and Leuz (2003) that disclosure 
determinants may vary according to the nature of reported information.
10.5 Factors that Influence Presentation of Mandatory and Voluntary Risk 
Reporting
This study aimed to identify the factors that influence the presentation of risk reporting 
and found that they could lead to low compliance with mandatory and presentation of 
voluntary risk reporting. These factors have been categorised into four groups:
1. Factors related to accounting education (group 1).
2. Factors related to accounting practice (group 2).
3. Factors related to cost of disclosure (group 3).
4. Other factors (group 4).
With respect to group 1, the results indicated that there is a consensus between the 
interviewees that:
• Bookkeeping and procedures-oriented accounting education impaired the 
importance of accounting disclosure in general and risk reporting in particular. 
The focus on bookkeeping and accounting procedures limits graduates’ 
accounting knowledge regarding accounting disclosure which in turn results 
in low presentation of mandatory and voluntary risk reporting.
•  Limited emphasis on a conceptual framework and the objectives of financial 
reporting is a key reason for low compliance with and presentation of 
mandatory and voluntary risk reporting. Egyptian accounting education pays 
much more attention to accounting measurement compared to accounting 
disclosure which in turn results in inadequate risk disclosure in the annual 
reports of Egyptian companies.
•  Lack of sufficient practical training of undergraduate students impaired their 
ability to apply accounting standards and resulted in low awareness regarding 
best voluntary disclosure practices.
Moreover, most of the interviewees pointed out that:
• Inadequate local accounting textbooks contribute to low compliance with and 
presentation of mandatory and voluntary risk reporting because local 
textbooks are outdated and fail to discuss the application of EASs and 
emphasise the importance of voluntary risk disclosure. Local textbooks 
discuss the application of accounting standards in title only but not in content.
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•  Inadequate accounting education of managers has a significant negative 
impact on the risk reporting practices of Egyptian companies. Due to an 
inadequate accounting background, managers think that preparation of 
annual reports is a routine process and accounting standards could be applied 
selectively. Moreover, they do not appreciate the importance of voluntary 
disclosure including risk reporting and resist any attempt to enhance the 
quality of financial reporting.
Furthermore, a considerable number of the interviewees highlighted the fact that:
• Lack of cooperation between the profession and universities regarding 
education and research aspects result in low presentation of risk reporting in 
annual reports of Egyptian companies. The universities do not receive any 
feedback from the profession to enhance and re-design the accounting 
curricula. Moreover, the profession does not guide accounting research to 
potential problems related to the application of the EASs.
With respect to group 2, the results indicated that there is a consensus between the
interviewees that:
• Lack of an effective profession limits the risk reporting practices of Egyptian 
companies due to the insufficient role of the profession in monitoring the 
professional performance of auditors and enhancing accounting skills and 
knowledge of its members.
• Lack of adequate continuing education is a significant reason for low compliance 
with and presentation of mandatory and voluntary risk reporting since continuing 
education is not a requirement for practising the profession. Therefore, most 
auditors lack the required knowledge to make judgments regarding the adequacy 
of disclosures in clients’ financial statements. Moreover, due to lack of continuing 
education, chartered accountants are not able to advise their clients regarding best 
voluntary disclosure practices including risk reporting.
In addition, the majority of the interviewees highlighted that:
• Lack of qualified accountants results in preparation of financial statements that 
diverge from accounting standards’ requirements related to risk reporting since 
most accountants do not attempt to update their accounting knowledge and do 
not receive professional training regarding the application of accounting 
standards and best voluntary disclosure practices.
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• Lack of well-organised accounting information systems hinder Egyptian 
companies from providing mandatory risk reporting that satisfies the 
requirements of accounting standards or providing voluntary risk disclosure. 
Accounting information systems in most Egyptian companies are tax-oriented 
and do not support financial reporting.
• Procedures-oriented accounting practices negatively impact risk reporting
because they overlook the importance of accounting disclosure. Egyptian 
companies tend to give low priority to accounting disclosure including risk 
reporting. The application of the UAS in state-owned companies during the 
1960s still has a significant impact on the disclosure practices of Egyptian 
companies.
• Lack of effective enforcement mechanisms hinders compliance with and
presentation of mandatory and voluntary risk reporting because administration 
measures and sanctions are not effectively applied by regulatory agencies such as 
the CMA and EGX. Moreover, there is no attempt to provide incentives to 
encourage companies to provide voluntary disclosure including risk reporting.
Furthermore, a small number of the interviewees indicated that:
• The precedence of tax accounting over financial reporting leads to inadequate
risk reporting practices. Egyptian companies do not comply with or present
mandatory and voluntary risk reporting if this disclosure has any potential tax 
consequences.
•  Lack of sufficient financial resources is a reason for low presentation of 
mandatory and voluntary risk reporting because it hinders accounting staff in 
Egyptian companies from updating their accounting knowledge. Moreover, 
several interviewees highlighted management awareness regarding the importance 
of practical training to their staff as a major problem.
Finally, the majority of the interviewees argued that the application of IASs is adequate 
for Egypt especially after the economic reform policy adopted by the Egyptian 
government and the need to attract more foreign investments.
With respect to group 3, the majority of the interviewees revealed that:
• Competitive disadvantage is a significant threat to the risk reporting practices 
of Egyptian companies. Egyptian companies refrain from complying with or 
presenting mandatory and voluntary risk reporting because they think that
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risk disclosure is a very sensitive topic and reporting such information may 
damage their competitive advantages.
A considerable number of the interviewees indicated that:
• Non-proprietary costs of disclosure, such as cost collecting, processing and 
disseminating information or the cost of developing accounting information 
systems, has no impact on the risk reporting practices of Egyptian companies 
since such costs have become relatively low due to technological 
enhancement in the field of information systems.
Moreover, the interviewees shed light on a number of factors that may hinder 
presentation of mandatory and voluntary risk reporting (group 4). They pointed out that:
• The secretive nature of Egyptian culture impaired the risk reporting 
practices of Egyptian companies. Potential conflict between Egyptian 
culture and Anglo-Saxon culture of IASs represent an obstacle to 
compliance with mandatory risk reporting. Moreover, the secretive nature 
of Egyptian culture impedes the presentation of voluntary risk reporting 
as well.
•  Equivalent positions presented in the profession law allow some 
unqualified individuals to work as external auditors while they lack the 
knowledge and expertise about the application o f accounting and auditing 
standards. This is a key reason for non-compliance with the EASs related 
to risk reporting because those individuals are not able to advise their 
clients about the application of accounting standards or the presentation 
of voluntary disclosure.
• Lack of explanations and interpretations of the EASs besides translation 
problems have a negative impact on the risk reporting practices of 
Egyptian companies.
•  Technical difficulties of risk-related accounting standards are a potential 
factor for non-compliance. Risk-related accounting standards are not only 
difficult for accountants but also for some professional auditors.
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10.6 Recommendations
Based on the findings discussed in sections 10.3, 10.4 and 10.5, this section provides 
some recommendations to regulators and policy makers that may assist in enhancing 
financial reporting practices in Egypt:
• A low level of compliance with accounting standards points to a major problem 
in the application of these standards and emphasises the urgent need to activate 
the role o f the EFSA and EGX in monitoring compliance with accounting 
standards and the importance of the strict application of administrative sanctions 
regarding violation of disclosure requirements.
• The findings of this study highlight the determinants of risk reporting practices 
and indicate companies’ characteristics that are associated with low presentation 
of risk reporting and hence the EFSA and EGX should focus and direct their 
efforts to these companies to assist them in enhancing the quality of their 
disclosures.
• The registry of auditors managed by the EFSA cannot ensure high quality 
professional performance of auditors. More scrutiny of auditor performance 
should be exerted. The association between risk reporting and auditor type 
should stimulate the EFSA to support audit firms with international affiliations to 
force/persuade their clients to provide a high level of compliance with disclosure 
requirements. In addition, the EFSA and the EGX should monitor professional 
performance of audit firms without international affiliations since their clients 
provide low compliance with accounting standards.
• The EFSA, the EIoD and the EGX should encourage listed companies to
separate the position of the CEO and the chair of the board since role duality
deters risk reporting.
• There is an imperative need for a professional body with the power and authority 
to monitor professional performance of accountants and auditors, impose 
sanctions on violators and provide continuing education for its members.
• The EFSA and EGX should provide explanations and interpretations of
accounting standards to assist the preparers of annual reports to comply with
disclosure requirements since the lack of qualified accountants hinders companies 
from complying with accounting standards.
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• There is an imperative need to develop accounting curricula and textbooks 
through focusing on the objectives of financial reporting, importance of 
disclosure, best practices of voluntary disclosure and application of accounting 
standards and undergraduate students should be provided with practical training 
during their studies.
• The EFSA and EGX should provide incentives to listed companies that provide 
voluntary disclosure over and above mandatory requirements to encourage other 
companies to follow their path.
• Cooperation between the profession and universities should be strengthened 
regarding accounting education and research which may contribute to preparing 
modem accounting curricula that discuss adequately different aspects of 
accounting practices and directing accounting research to potential accounting 
problems.
• A new profession law has become a necessity which should allow qualified 
persons only to practise the profession and emphasise the importance of 
continuing education.
10.7 Research Limitations
Although this research provides a number of insights regarding the risk disclosure 
practices of Egyptian companies, it has its own limitations. First, despite the measures 
that have been followed to thoroughly understand companies’ annual reports, the scoring 
and classification process suffer from inherent judgement limitations and subjectivity 
which cannot be entirely eradicated. Second, the sample consists of Egyptian companies 
that are listed on the EGX only and hence the results cannot be generalised to unlisted 
companies. Unlisted companies were excluded from the sample due to the difficulties of 
obtaining their annual reports. Third, like other disclosure studies, this study is a time- 
specific research. The study applies a cross-sectional approach and examines risk 
reporting practice and its determinants at two points in time, 2006 and 2007. However, a 
longitudinal research may provide a better understanding of risk reporting practices of 
Egyptian companies especially as financial reporting practices change over time. Fourth, 
to identify the potential factors that may impede presentation of mandatory and 
voluntary risk reporting, the study uses semi-structured interviews to elicit interviewees’ 
perception regarding the impact of these factors on risk reporting practices. Due to the 
conservative nature of Egyptian society and the fear of participating in academic research, 
only 15 interviewees were willing to participate in the research. However, because of their
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expertise in the field of financial reporting, they were able to provide valuable 
information and insights regarding the research questions. Sixth, like other disclosure 
studies, this study aims to examine the impact of competition, corporate governance and 
ownership structure on the risk reporting practices of Egyptian companies. However, 
due to data unavailability, there are several determinants that have been excluded in the 
regression model. Seventh, the study uses a sample that represents 30.3% and 36.8% of 
the total listed companies in 2006 and 2007 respectively. However, using a larger sample 
may provide a more in-depth understanding of the risk reporting practices of Egyptian 
companies. Eighth, this study focuses only on non-financial companies. Due to the 
different characteristics of financial and non-financial companies, the results of this study 
cannot be generalised to financial companies. Ninth, the study used leverage as a proxy 
of company risk level. However, risk is a multifaceted concept that cannot be measured 
easily; therefore leverage may not be able to reflect different risks a company may face; 
therefore there is an imperative need to develop and use a more relevant proxy of a 
company risk level such as earning variability, dividend payout ratio, earning co-variability 
(Abdelghany, 2005; Beaver et al., 1970; Farrelly et al., 1985) and share price volatility 
(Madura, 2006). Finally, in studying the association between competition and risk 
reporting, the study employs only one proxy of competition in the market, namely 
barriers to entry. The use of only one proxy is one of the limitations of this study.
10.8 Future Research
The study highlights several avenues for future research. It is suggested that future 
research could examine the impact of two important corporate governance mechanisms, 
namely the existence/percentage of independent directors on the board of directors and 
audit committees on the risk reporting practices of Egyptian companies. The Egyptian 
corporate governance code was issued in 2005 and listed companies have been advised to 
follow it. Therefore, the impact of corporate governance on financial reporting is a fertile 
ground for research in Egypt. Future research could investigate the impact of family 
ownership and the existence of family members on the board on the risk reporting 
practices of Egyptian companies. Due to close social relationships and cultural values, 
family companies are a common type of business and have made a considerable 
contribution to the Egyptian economy.
As a result of economic reforms and the privatisation program adopted by the Egyptian 
government, Egypt attracts significant foreign investment. Foreign investors have made a 
considerable contribution to the activity and market capitalisation of the Egyptian stock
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market. Foreign investors may influence the disclosure practices of Egyptian companies 
because they may demand more information to be presented in corporate annual reports 
especially risk-related information to assist them in evaluating companies’ risk profiles. 
Therefore, future research could examine the impact of foreign ownership on risk 
reporting practices.
Several Egyptian companies have begun to be listed on the international stock exchange 
and this may require them to provide more information in their annul reports as a 
necessary condition for listing. The impact of dual or multiple listing on risk reporting 
practices of Egyptian companies could be examined. Future research could also examine 
risk reporting practices for a long period through a longitudinal research in order to 
assess the improvement in compliance with mandatory risk reporting and identify the 
pattern of voluntary risk reporting. Another recommendation is to examine the 
consequences of risk reporting. In other words, it is important to investigate the 
association between voluntary risk reporting and the cost of capital. Several studies have 
examined the impact of general voluntary disclosure on the cost of capital. A negative 
association between voluntary disclosure and cost of capital supports the importance of 
providing voluntary disclosure. Another area for research would be to examine risk 
reporting practices and their determinants in financial companies. Financial companies 
have unique features in terms of the risks and uncertainties they face. These unique 
features may lead to different risk reporting practices compared to non-financial 
companies. This study depended on semi-structured interviews to identify factors that 
may impede compliance with and presentation of mandatory and voluntary risk reporting. 
However, a questionnaire survey, based on the results of the study, would enable access 
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Appendix 1: Risk Disclosure Categories and Decision Rules 












Efficiency and performance 
Sourcing
Stock obsolescence 
Product and service failure 
Environmental 
Health and safety 
Brand name erosion 
Management Process
Empowerment Risk » ■



























1. B Decision Rules
• To identify risk disclosures a broad definition of risk is to be adopted as 
explained below.
• Sentences are to be coded as risk disclosures if the reader is informed of any 
opportunity or prospect, or of any hazard, danger, harm, threat or exposure, that 
has already impacted upon the company or may impact upon the company in the 
future or of the management of any such opportunity, prospect, hazard, harm, 
threat or exposure.
• The risk definition just stated shall be interpreted such that ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
‘risks’ and ‘uncertainties’ will be deemed to be contained within the definition. 
Although the definition of risk is broad, disclosures must be specifically stated; 
they cannot be implied.
• The risk disclosures shall be classified according to the Appendix 1.A risk 
categories.
•  Quantitative risk disclosures are those risk disclosures that either disclose direcdy 
the financial impact of a risk or disclose sufficient information to enable the 
reader to calculate the financial impact of a risk.
•  If a sentence has more than one possible classification, the information will be 
classified into the category that is most emphasised within the sentence.
• Tables (quantitative and qualitative) that provide risk information should be 
interpreted as one line equals one sentence and classified accordingly.
• Any disclosure that is repeated shall be recorded as a risk disclosure sentence 
each time it is discussed.
• If a disclosure is too vague in its reference to risk, then it shall not be recorded as 
a risk disclosure.
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Appendix 2: Disclosure Indices
2.A Disclosure Index of EAS 25
Category Disclosure Items
Risk Management Policies
- Description of financial risk management objectives
- Description of financial risk management policies
- An explanation of the extent to which financial instruments are used and the 
associated risks
Terms, Conditions and 
Accounting policies
- For each class o f financial asset, financial liability and equity instrument, 
disclose information about the extent and nature of the financial instruments, 
including significant terms and conditions that may affect the amount, timing 
and certainty of future cash flows.
- Accounting policies and methods adopted including the criteria for 




- Contractual repricing or maturity dates, whichever dates are earlier.
- Effective interest rates.
- Exposure to fair value interest rate risk, such as financial assets 
and financial liabilities with a fixed interest rate.
- Exposure to cash flow interest rate risk, such as financial assets and financial 
liabilities with a floating interest rate that is reset as market rates change.
- No direct exposure to interest rate risk, such as some investments in equity 
instruments.
- Contractual repricing or maturity dates, whichever dates are earlier.
- Effective interest rates.
- Information about exposure to the effects of future changes 
in the prevailing level of interest rates.
- Exposed to fair value interest rate risk, such as financial assets 
and financial liabilities with a fixed interest rate;
- Exposed to cash flow interest rate risk, such as financial assets and financial 
liabilities with a floating interest rate that is reset as market rates change.
Credit risk
- The amount that best represents the maximum credit risk exposure at the 
balance sheet date in the event o f other parties failing to perform their 
obligations under financial instruments.
- Significant concentrations o f credit risk.
- Disclosure of concentrations o f credit risk when they are not apparent from 
other disclosures about the nature of the business and financial positions.
- A description of shared characteristic that identifies each concentration.
- The amount of the maximum credit risk exposure associated with all 
financial assets sharing that characteristic.
Liquidity Risk
- An analysis of assets into relevant maturity groupings based on the remaining 
period between the balance sheet date and the contractual maturity date.
- An analysis of liabilities into relevant maturity groupings based on the 
remaining period between the balance sheet date and the contractual maturity 
date.
Foreign Currency Risk
- Gains mines losses that arise from dealing in foreign currencies.
- The amount of significant net foreign currency exposures.
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- Segment result presenting the result from continuing 




Capital expenditure on property, plant and equipment 
and on intangible assets.
Depreciation and amortisation expense.
Total amount of significant non-cash expenses other 
than depreciation and amortisation.
Secondary Segment Format
•  Primary format is business segments
Segment revenue from external customers by 
geographical area based on geographical location of 
customers.
Total of segment assets by geographical location of 
assets.
Capital expenditure on property, plant and equipment 
and on intangible assets by geographical location of 
assets
• Or Primary format is geographical 
segments
Segment revenue from external customers.
Total o f segment assets.
Capital expenditure on property, plant and equipment 
and on intangible assets.
Additional Disdosures
• If the primary segment format is 
geographical segments by 
location of assets
The revenue from sales to external customers for 
each customer-based geographical segment
• Or if the primary segment format is 
geographical segments by location of 
customers
Total o f segment assets by geographical location of 
the assets.
Capital expenditure on property, plant and equipment 
and on intangible assets by location of the assets
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Appendix 3: Illustration of Coding Process 
3.1 Content Analysis
General Silos & Storage Company
Risk





During 2006, the company re-opened five warehouses in Alexandria 
and other three warehouses are under refurbishment this increased 
storage capacity by 50,000 tones and reduced the time o f discharge ... 
The company started a program to establish a new warehouse in El- 
Dekhila port with a capacity o f  45,000 tons which increased our 
competitive advantages in discharging ... A new system o f sieves has 
been installed in all the silos which contributed in reducing the 
laytime, costs and problems associated with discharging ... As a result 
o f long negotiations with Alexandria Port Authority, the company 
started its operations in the extension o f  the maritime berth 85/1  
which added 150,000 tons to storage capacity that never used for 10 
years; this enhanced our capacity to receive giant ships.
Qualitative/good 
news/past
The metal silo project (82) is considered unprofitable project due to 
the increase in interest and long-term loans charged to the project; the 
management discussed several alternatives for the optimal use o f the 
project ... The cost o f  outsourcing increased significantly and 
unexpectedly due to the increase in transportation prices; the 





Due to fluctuations in currency exchange rates long-term loans and 






Category Risk Reporting Example Sentence characteristics
Operational
Risk
The company faces increased competition in the domestic market. 
The company future plans to deal with these circumstances are to 
reduce product prices to main customers, allow for credit sales for 
main customers and continue providing free transportations and 
after-sales service. The company is planning to participate in all 
tenders related to our business, to export production surplus to 
Arabic countries such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, Palestine, Tunisia and 
Italy in a competitive prices to international prices.
Qualitative/neutral/future
Due to increased competition, the company used only 87% of 
planned capacity and 79% of available capacity. Consequently, the 
total production decreased from £E172.10 in 2005 to £E141.30 
million in 2006. In addition, domestic sales and export decreased 
from £E157.40 to /E ll 22.8 and from £E16.70 to /E l  6.6 million 
respectively. Furthermore, total revenues decreased from /E175.60 
to 140.90 million and average production/employee decreased 
from £E171860 to £E144668.
Quantitative/bad
news/past
The company maintained the operational efficiency of equipment 
and production capacity through re-coating metal electrodes. The 
total number of electrodes re-coated in this year and the previous 
two years are 84 and 139 respectively, in addition, the company 
make sure to rehabilitated old equipments and building and to store 
spare parts to ensure the continued operations... the company 
used and applied the newest technology in the production process 
to maintain the quality of products and to be able to face 
competition in product market. As a result, the company is 
qualified for ISO 9001 from Moody international Certification ... 
the company used environmentally technology in the production 
process. This assisted the company to comply with the 
requirements o f Environment Law 4/1994. The company owned a 
new network o f sewage and sewage treatment unit. In addition, the 
company had an environmental monitoring system to record any 
emissions that may affect the environment or employees in the 
form of gases, liquids, dust or noise. All this effort helped the 
company to be qualified for ISO 14001.
Qualitative/good 
news/past
The company faced increased competition in domestic market 
which forced the company to reduce selling prices to maintain 
major customers. However, the policies adopted by the 
competitors to reduce selling prices below the cost attracted some 
major customers and resulted in a decline in current year’s sales ... 
the competition is extended to foreign markets. The competitors 
offered very low selling prices even lower than variable cost. This 
forced the company to offer competitive prices to cover al least 
variable cost and to use efficiently the available capacity and to 





The negotiation with Housing Construction Bank of Germany led 
to reduction o f interest rate o f borrowing from 8% to 2.25% ... 
the policies adopted by the company to encourage cash sales result 
in a reduction in debtors and reduced the average settlement period 
of trade receivables from 67 to 65 days.
Qualitative/good 
news/past
The agreement with Housing Construction Bank of Germany 




The company suffered from shortage of liquidity due to financial 








Bisk Mdragement Pdiries Example of Disclosure Score
Description o f  financial risk management 
objectives
- Description o f  financial risk management 
policies
- An explanation o f  the extent to which  
financial instruments are used and the 
associated risks
The company faces different financial risks a result o f  
different activities a company perform. Risk management 
policies aim to identify uncertainties in markets and to reduce 
their expected negative impacts on the performance o f  the 
company.
The company monitor fluctuations in exchange rates and 
tries to reduce uncovered currency positions to the minimum  
levels . . .  the company deals only with customers with very 
good credit history . . .  the company maintains adequate level 
o f  liquidity which is well-matched with current activities also 
the company has secured and flexible sourced o f  credit.
Terms, Conditions and Accounting polides
- For each class o f  financial asset, financial 
liability and equity instrument, disclose 
information about the extent and nature o f  
the financial instruments, including 
significant terms and conditions that may 
affect the amount, timing and certainty o f  
future cash flows.
- Accounting policies and m ethods adopted 
including the criteria for recognition and 
the basis o f  measurement applied
Trade receivables recognised initially at fair value and reduced 
by appropriate allowances for estimated irrecoverable 
amounts. The allowance is created i f  there is objective 
evidence that the company cannot collect the contractual 
amount . . .  the investments that the company will hold for 
un-spedfied period will be dassified as long-term  
investments. These investments will be valued according to 
the cost other short-term investm ent will recorded according 
to the fair value....
Interest Rate Risk
•  Assets
- Contractual repricing or maturity dates, 
whichever dates are earlier.
- Effective interest rates.
- Exposure to  fair value interest rate risk, 
such as financial assets
and financial liabilities with a fixed interest 
rate.
- Exposure to cash flow interest rate risk, 
such as financial assets and financial 
liabilities with a floating interest rate that is 
reset as market rates change.
- N o  direct exposure to interest rate risk, 
such as som e investments in equity 
instruments.
•  Liabilities
- Contractual repricing or maturity dates, 
whichever dates are earlier.
- Effective interest rates.
- Information about exposure to the effects 
o f  future changes
in the prevailing level o f  interest rates.
- Exposed to fair value interest rate risk, 
such as financial assets
and financial liabilities with a fixed interest 
rate;
- Exposed to cash flow interest rate risk, 
such as financial assets and financial
The average effective interest rate is 5%.
Financial assets exposure to interest risk rate is ££402335.
The average effective interest rate is 12%.
Financial liabilities exposure to interest risk rate is £ E  
6197300.
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liabilities with a floating interest rate that is
reset as market rates change.
Credit risk. %. :• s
- The amount that best represents the The credit risk exposure is at the minimum level because the
maximum credit risk exposure at the major customers are related party customers.
balance sheet date in the event o f  other 1
parties failing to perform their obligations
under financial instruments.
- Significant concentrations o f  credit risk. The company faces significant concentrations o f  credit risk 1
because 92% o f  sales are sales to three main customers.
- Disclosure o f  concentrations o f  credit risk The company deals with related party companies. The
when they are not apparent from other company received the approval o f  the GM  before
disclosures about the nature o f  the com m encing any transaction with these related party 1
business and financial positions. companies. Related party companies are Lord for trade and
industry, Lord International and Sotraco.
- A  description o f  shared characteristic that 0
identifies each concentration.
- The amount o f  the maximum credit risk
exposure associated with all 0
financial assets sharing that characteristic.
liquidityKisk  ^;
- An analysis o f  assets into relevant maturity
groupings based on the remaining period 0
between the balance sheet date and the
contractual maturity date.
- An analysis o f  liabilities into relevant
maturity groupings based on the remaining 0
period between the balance sheet date and
the contractual maturity date.
Foreign Currency Risk
- Gains mines losses that arise from dealing The net loss as result o f  revaluating foreign currency is 1
in foreign currencies. 29215.
- The amount o f  significant net foreign T he net foreign currency exposures are £E 570529 and € 1
currency exposures. 2195.
Total D isclosed Items 12
Total Applicable Disclosure Items 24
Company Score 50%
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Middle & West Delta Flour Mills
Risk Management Policies Exam ple o f  Disclosure Score
-  Description o f  financial risk management objectives
- Description o f  financial risk management policies





Terms* Conditions anti Aia^ntinfc policies
- For each class o f  financial asset, financial liability and equity instrument,
disclose information about the extent and nature o f  the financial instruments, 0
0
including significant terms and conditions that may affect the amount, timing 
and certainty o f  future cash flows.
- Accounting policies and m ethods adopted including the criteria for recognition 
and the basis o f  measurement applied
Interest Rate Risk ‘
•  Assets
- Contractual repricing or maturity dates, whichever dates are earlier.
- Effective interest rates.
0
0
- Exposure to fair value interest rate risk, such as financial assets 0
and financial liabilities with a fixed interest rate.
- Exposure to cash flow interest rate risk, such as financial assets and financial 0
liabilities with a floating interest rate that is reset as market rates change.
- N o  direct exposure to interest rate risk, such as som e investments in equity 0
instruments.
•  Liabilities
- Contractual repricing or maturity dates, whichever dates are earlier. 0
- Effective interest rates. 0
- Information about exposure to the effects o f  future changes 
in the prevailing level o f  interest rates.
- Exposed to fair value interest rate risk, such as financial assets
0
0
and financial liabilities with a fixed interest rate;
- Exposed to  cash flow  interest rate risk, such as financial assets and financial 0
liabilities with a floating interest rate that is reset as market rates change.
Credit risk
- The amount that best represents the maximum credit risk exposure at the 
balance sheet date in the event o f  other parties failing to perform their 
obligations under financial instruments.




- Significant concentrations o f  credit risk. 0
- Disclosure o f  concentrations o f  credit risk when they are not apparent from o
other disclosures about the nature o f  the business and financial positions.
- A  description o f  shared characteristic that identifies each concentration. 0
- The amount o f  the maximum credit risk exposure associated with all 0
financial assets sharing that characteristic.
Liquidity Risk
- An analysis o f  assets into relevant maturity groupings based on the remaining 
period between the balance sheet date and the contractual maturity date.
0
- An analysis o f  liabilities into relevant maturity groupings based on the 




- Gains mines losses that arise from dealing in foreign currencies. N /A
- The amount o f  significant net foreign currency exposures. N /A
Total D isclosed Items 1
Non-Applicable Items








Primary Segm ent Format , I ; Example o f  Disclosure Score
Segment revenue.
Segment result presenting the 
result from continuing 
operations separately from the 




Capital expenditure on  
property, plant and equipment 
and on intangible assets. 
Depreciation and amortisation 
expense.
Total amount o f  significant 
non-cash expenses other than 
depreciation and amortisation.
The sales o f  raw materials, power and 
special cables, turn key projects and 
electric products and accessories are £E  
2109198059,2626910033, 617444259, 
266349700 and 126369267 respectively. 
Gross margins o f  raw materials, power 
and special cables, turn key projects and 
electric products and accessories are £E  
177872042,351606633, 82393298, 
92159191 and 39179715 respectively.
Assets o f  raw materials, power and special 
cables, turn key projects and electric 
products and accessories are £E  
1432731543,412511334, 695930752, 








Secondary Segm ent 
Format
•  Primary format is 
business segments
Segment revenue from  
external customers by 
geographical area based on  
geographical location o f  
customers.
Total o f  segment assets by 
geographical location o f  
assets.
Capital expenditure on  
property, plant and equipment 
and on intangible assets by 
geographical location o f  assets
Total revenues from Egypt, Syria, Sudan 
are £E  7724113767, 336248007, 
242626679 and 105584123 respectively.
Total assets in Egypt, Syria, Sudan are £ E  
4067093516,413238920,290334587, 




•  Or Primary format 
is geographical 
segments
Segment revenue from  
external customers.
Total o f  segment assets.
Capital expenditure on  
property, plant and equipment 




Additional D isdosures * ; *»*■ s.- : ‘ -■ ■■:•
•  I f the primary 
segment format is 
geographical 
segments by 
location o f  assets
The revenue from sales to 




•  O r i f  the primary 
segment format is 
geographical 
segments by 
location o f  
customers
Total o f  segment assets by 
geographical location o f  the 
assets.
Capital expenditure on  
property, plant and equipment 
and on intangible assets by 
location o f  the assets
N /A
N /A










Middle & West Delta Flour Mills
Primary Segment Format - , Example of Disclosure Score
Segment revenue.
Segment result presenting the 
result from continuing operations 




Capital expenditure on property, 
plant and equipment and on  
intangible assets.
Depreciation and amortisation 
expense.
Total amount o f  significant non­
cash expenses other than 
depreciation and amortisation.
The total profit o f  grinding activities, 
baking activities, packing activities and 
transport activities and storage 
activities is £ E  9.801, (3.025), 2.913, 








•  Primary format is 
business segments
Segment revenue from external 
customers by geographical area 
based on geographical location 
o f  customers.
Total o f  segment assets by 
geographical location o f  assets. 
Capital expenditure on property, 
plant and equipment and on  
intangible assets by geographical 




•  Or Primary format is 
geographical segments
Segment revenue from external 
customers.
Total o f  segment assets.
Capital expenditure on property, 






•  I f  the primary segment 
format is geographical 
segments by 
location o f  assets
The revenue from sales to 




•  Or if  the primary 
segment format is 
geographical segments 
by location o f  
customers
Total o f  segment assets by 
geographical location o f  the 
assets.
Capital expenditure on property, 
plant and equipment and on  




Total D isclosed Items 
Non-Applicable Items 









Company N am e Company N am e
10th of Ramdan for Development &
Educational Services
General Silos & Storage
Olympic Stores Trade and Distribution
Contact
Misr Duty Free Shops
Asek Company for Mining
Arab Aluminium
Egyptian Iron & Steel
EL E z2 Aldekhela Steel - Alexandria
Paper Middle East (Simo)
Egypt Aluminium





Arab Polvara Spinning & Weaving Co.
Oriental Weavers
El Nasr Clothes & Textiles (KABO) 
Olympic Group
Lord Precision Industries
Natural Gas & Mining Project 
Abou Kir Fertilizers 
Egyptian Chemical Industries (KIMA) 
Egyptian Financial & Industrial
- Samad Misr -EGYFERT 
Sidi Kerir Petrochemicals 
Misr Chemical Industries 
Alexandria Mineral Oils Company
- MIDOR
Tourism Urbanization
Egyptian for Tourism Resorts
Orascom Hotel Holdings (OHH) 
Pyramisa Hotels 
Remco for Touristic Villages 
Construction
Rowad Tourism (A1ROWAD) 
Semiramis Hotels 
Sharm Dreams Co. for Tourism 
Investment
- Industrial Gases
- Canal Shipping Agencies
- Egyptian Electrical Cables
- Egyptian Transport (EGYTRANS)
- National Navigation
- El Nasr Transformers (El MACO)
- National Glass & Crystal Co.
- Port Said Containers
- GB auto
- Damietta Containers & Cargo
- Raya Holding For Technology And 
Communications
- Alexandria Real Estate
- Six of October Development & 
Investment (SODIC)
El Shams Housing & Urbanization
- El Arabia for Land Reclamation
- El Kahera Housing
- Egyptian Real Estate Group
- Medinet Nasr Housing
- Heliopolis Housing
- Mena Touristic & Real Estate 
Investment
- Wadi Kom Ombo Land Reclamation
- Ameriyah Cement
- Beni Suef Cement
- Torah Cement
- Alexandria Cement
- Paint & Chemicals Industries (Pachin)
- Giza General Contracting
- Upper Egypt Contracting
- El Ezz Porcelain (Gemma)
- Egyptian Contracting (Mokhtar 
Ibrahim)
- Orascom Construction Industries 
(OCI)
- South Valley Cement
- Somaga Ceramics
- Pharaoh Ceramics
- Ceramica Cleopatra Group
- Lecico Egypt


















- Misr Cement (Qena)
- Telecom Egypt
- Orascom Telecom Holding (OT)
- The Arab Dairy Products Co.
- Extracted Oils
- Cairo Oils & Soap
- Egyptian Starch & Glucose
- Bisco Misr
- Egypt for Poultry
- El Wadi for Exporting Agricultural 
Products
- Misr Oils & Soap
- East Delta Flour Mills
- Upper Egypt Flour Mills
- Middle Egypt Flour Mills
- Middle & West Delta Flour Mills
- South Cairo & Giza Mills & Bakeries
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Appendix 5: Interview Guide and Ethical Forms
5.1 Interview Guide 
Section 1: Introduction
• Introducing the researcher.
• Thanking the interviewee for his/her participation.
• Explain research objectives and importance.
• Explain ethical procedures that the researcher has to follow.
Section 2: Background information
• Interviewee current position.
• Interviewee experience.
• Interviewee education.
Section 3: Factors that may impede Compliance with Mandatory Risk Reporting 
and Provision of Voluntary Risk-related Information.
In your opinion, do you think that the following factors (accounting practices, 
accounting education and disclosure cost factors) may impede Egyptian Companies from 
compliance with risk reporting requirements according to Egyptian Accounting 
Standard.25 and 33 and providing voluntary risk reporting in their board of directors’ 
reports?
A- Accounting Education Factors
Local accounting textbooks.
Accounting education of managers and decision-makers.
Accounting education in universities.
The conceptual framework and the objective of financial reporting in accounting 
education.
Practical training to accounting students during their undergraduate education. 
Cooperation between the profession and the university regarding teaching issues 
and accounting research.
B- Accounting Practices Factors
Qualified professional accountants in the area of financial accounting and 
reporting.
Accounting information systems.
International financial reporting standards and the Egyptian environment. 
Accounting and auditing profession.
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Companies* managers view regarding accounting practices.
Accounting practices.
Enforcement mechanism.
Sufficient financial resources for accounting training.
Continuing education of chartered accountants.
C- Disclosure Cost Factors 
Competitive disadvantages.
The cost of collecting, processing and disseminating information or the cost of 
developing accounting information systems to produce relevant accounting 
information.
2- Do you want to add any factors that may impede compliance with mandatory risk 
reporting requirements and providing voluntary risk reporting?
Section 4: Conclusion of interview 
a- Would you like to see the result? 
b- Can I contact you again for clarification?
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5.2 Consent Form - Anonymous Data
CARDIFF BUSINESS SCHOOL 
RESEARCH ETHICS 
Consent Form - Anonymous data
I understand that my participation in this project will involve providing my opinion 
regarding the factors that may impede the complete compliance with mandatory risk 
reporting and providing voluntary risk reporting in Egypt. Also, provide my opinion 
regarding a proposed guideline of management discussion and analysis risk reporting. 
The interview may require approximately 90 minutes of my time.
I understand that participation in this study is entirely voluntary and that I can withdraw 
from the study at any time without giving a reason.
I understand that I am free to ask any questions at any time. If for any reason I 
experience discomfort during participation in this project, I am free to withdraw or 
discuss my concerns with Professor Howard Mellett (Mellett@cardiff.ac.uk\
I understand that the information provided by me will be held totally anonymously, so 
that it is impossible to trace this information back to me individually. I understand that, 
in accordance with the Data Protection Act, this information may be retained indefinitely.
I also understand that at the end of the study I may request some additional information 
and feedback about the purpose and results of the study by applying to the University.
Name of student conducting the research: Ekramy Said Mokhtar 
Name of student’s supervisor: Professor Howard Mellett
Signed:
Date:
5.3 Consent Form - Confidential Data
CARDIFF BUSINESS SCHOOL 
RESEARCH ETHICS 
Consent Form - Confidential data
I understand that my participation in this project will involve providing my opinion 
regarding the factors that may impede the complete compliance with mandatory risk 
reporting and providing voluntary risk reporting in Egypt. Also, provide my opinion 
regarding a proposed guideline of management discussion and analysis risk reporting. 
The interview may require approximately 90 minutes of my time
I understand that participation in this study is entirely voluntary and that I can withdraw 
from the study at any time without giving a reason.
I understand that I am free to ask any questions at any time. If for any reason I 
experience discomfort during participation in this project, I am free to withdraw or 
discuss my concerns with Professor Howard Mellett.
I understand that the information provided by me will be held confidentially, such that 
only the Experimenter — Ekramy Said Mokhtar- can trace this information back to me 
individually. The information will be retained for up to 2 years (or until finishing the 
research) and will then be deleted/destroyed. I understand that I can ask for the 
information I provide to be deleted/destroyed at any time and, in accordance with the 
Data Protection Act, I can have access to the information at any time.
I also understand that at the end of the study I will be provided with additional 
information and feedback about the purpose of the study.
I, _____________________________________(NAM E) consent to participate in the
study conducted by Ekramy Said Mokhtar of Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, 
under the supervision of Professor Howard Mellett.
Signed:
Date:
Appendix 6: Interviews Coding and Data Matrix
Local Accounting Textbooks Qualified Accountants
ACl Educational process is characterised by a 
large number o f students, few staff and 
teaching assistants, no reliance on case 
study approach to introduce the students 
how to apply accounting disclosure.
Most - a large proportion - o f the accountants in 
Egyptian companies do not up-date their knowledge 
about accounting standards and their amendments, 
particularly those related to disclosure requirements. 
This lack of knowledge negatively influences the 
quality of financial reports particularly the disclosure 
of risk information.
AC2 1 do not think that this is a reason that 
hinders presentation o f risk reporting in the 
annual reports. Accounting textbooks are 
updated and provide an adequate 
presentation of accounting standards.
Most accountants are unqualified for application of 
the accounting standards and did not receive 
sufficient training on their application, for example 
they do not know the differences between different 
versions o f standards and therefore the preparation 
of financial statements and disclosure according to 
standards requirements is in doubt.
AC3 There is no incentive for a systematic 
updating o f accounting textbooks. It is a 
personal motivation. Accounting textbooks 
do not discuss properly the application o f  
accounting standards and the incentives of 
voluntary disclosure.
The significant shortage in qualified accountants 
results in a divergence in Egyptian companies’ 
accounting practices as benchmarked against EASs 
and IASs.
ADI Most textbooks do not discuss the 
application of Egyptian accounting 
standards. Therefore, how a graduate works 
in the profession. The basics o f sound 
accounting practices, based on accounting 
standards, are not explained adequately in 
local textbooks.
From my experience, 90% o f the accountants in 
Egyptian companies do not have sufficient 
experience in the preparation o f financial statements 
to make them consistent with EASs and IASs and 
many of them even do not read the EASs.
AD2 O f course, accounting textbooks are very 
old, do not contain any new ideas and do 
not provide any relevant information on the 
application o f International/ Egyptian 
Accounting Standards except in title only 
but not in content.
Most accountants in companies have no idea about 
the appropriate application o f accounting standards, 
they do not attempt to read about the standards or 
update their accounting knowledge.
AD3 Accounting textbooks are not linked to 
actual accounting practice and do not 
include any real case studies. Textbooks 
discuss accounting standards in title not in 
content.
Most accountants have the minimum level of 
accounting knowledge and suffer from a lack of 
practical training which in turn influences their 
abilities to prepare financial statements and 
disclosures in accordance with the Egyptian 
Accounting Standards. They need more courses to 
gain experience and enhance their accounting 
knowledge.
AD4 I think this cannot influence the 
presentation of risk reporting because there 
are several textbooks that discuss the 
application of accounting standards.
Egyptian Accounting Standards are not properly 
presented to practitioners. Accountants do not get 
any adequate training before the application of 
Egyptian Accounting Standards which leads to a low 
level of compliance.
AD5 I think that accounting textbooks cannot 
help in this aspects because textbooks are 
out-dated and ignore accounting practice 
problems and fail to discuss properly the 
application o f accounting standards.
We are dealing with large companies which have 
qualified accountants with adequate awareness 
regarding the application o f accounting standards, 
but in small and medium-sized companies there may 
be a shortage o f qualified accountants
AD6 Accounting textbooks do not refer to 
accounting standards except in title only 
and still present very old accounting 
treatments which are no longer exist in the 
standards.
Lack of qualified financial accountants in reflects the 
lack of awareness regarding the importance of the 
compliance accounting standards and disclosure 
requirements. This results in low compliance with 
accounting standards and failure to appreciate the
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importance of providing voluntary disclosure.
RGl Accounting Education at university level 
provides the minimum accounting 
knowledge to students and several 
textbooks do not update their content; 
therefore accountants are not able to 
prepare financial statements in line with 
accounting ^ standards requirements.
Yes, there is a significant shortage of qualified 
financial accountants in many companies which 
negatively impacts the quality o f financial reports.
RG2 Actually, accounting curricula are out-dated. 
For example, accounting standards are not 
adequately taught at the university which 
means that accountants are not aware about 
best accounting practices.
Many companies seek the assistance of the External 
Auditor to prepare the annual reports including risk 
reporting in management report to overcome the 
problem of the lack of qualified accountants.
RG3 Accounting standards is not an important 
part in any accounting textbooks. 
Consequently, graduate’s account ting 
knowledge is limited and out-dated.
Due to lack of qualification, some accountants 
cannot prepare adequate disclosure because they do 
not know what the accounting standards are and 
how to apply them.
RG4 The quality of accounting textbooks is very 
poor. Accounting textbooks present only 
basic concepts and focus on accounting 
measurement while accounting disclosure 
received less weight. The result is an 
accountant with limit knowledge And skills.
Highly qualified accountants, holders of CPA or 
ACCA are few and their salaries are too high. 
Therefore, only large companies can afford them 
while small companies may recruit less qualified 
accountants with low salaries due to a shortage of 
financial resources. Consequently, small companies 
are not able to prepare financial statements in 
accordance with Egyptian Accounting Standards or 
to present high quality voluntary disclosure.
FM1 The quality o f the graduates reflects the 
quality o f the educational process. 
Textbooks present the minimum 
accounting knowledge of and therefore 
they need to be developed. They don not 
kept pace with the developments in 
accounting standards. Out-dated textbooks 
spread a state of deadlock in accounting 
practice.
A significant lack of qualified accountants, due to 
lack o f awareness o f the standards, results in low 
compliance with accounting standards
FM2 Accounting textbooks present accounting 
knowledge that date back to 30 year ago. 
Consequendy, they do not discuss 
accounting disclosure properly.
There is cooperation between the company and our 
experienced external auditor who has a complete, 
direct or indirect, supervision over the process of 
preparing financial statements to maintain his 
reputation.
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Appendix 7: H istogram s, Norm al Probability Plots and Q-Q Plots of Dependent
Variables
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LEAS 25
Normal P-P Plot of EAS2506
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Appendix 8: Changes in Compliance Level between 2006 and 2007 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
Ranks
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
EAS2507 - EAS2506 Negative Ranks 13a 21.19 275.50
Positive Ranks 42b 30.11 1264.50
Ties 50°
Total 105
EAS3307 - EAS3306 Negative Ranks 35d 27.14 950.00
Positive Ranks 22® 31.95 703.00
Ties 48f
Total 105
a. EAS2507 < EAS2506
b. EAS2507 > EAS2506
c. EAS2507 = EAS2506
d. EAS3307 < EAS3306
e. EAS3307 > EAS3306 












a- Based on negative ranks, 
b- Based on positive ranks,
c. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
Appendix 9: Differences in Voluntary Risk Reporting Characteristics
Wilcoxon Singed Ranks - 2006
Ranks
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Qualitative - Negative Ranks 6(a) 24.08 144.50
Quantitative Positive Ranks 57(b) 32.83 1871.50
Ties 0(c)
Total 63
Good - Bad Negative Ranks 13(d) 17.54 228.00
Positive Ranks 47(e) 34.09 1602.00
Ties 3(f)
Total 63
Past - Future Negative Ranks 2(g) 2.00 4.00
Positive Ranks 60(h) 32.48 1949.00
Ties 1©
Total 63
N on-Financial - fin Negative Ranks o CTi .00 .00
Qualitative andal Positive Ranks 63 (k) 32.00 2016.00
Ties 0©
Total 63
a Qualitative < Quantitative 
b Qualitative > Quantitative 
c Qualitative = Quantitative 
d Good < Bad 
e Good > Bad 
f Good = Bad 
g Past < Future 
h Past > Future 
i Past = Future 
j Non-Finandal < financial 
k Non-Finandal > financial 
1 Non-Finandal = financial
Test Statistics(b)
Qualitative - 













a Based on negative ranks, 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
Wilcoxon Singed Ranks - 2007 
Ranks
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Qualitative- Quantitative Negative Ranks 12(a) 24.79 297.50
Positive Ranks 58(b) 37.72 2187.50
Ties 2(c)
Total 72
Good - Bad Negative Ranks 9(d) 17.72 159.50
Positive Ranks 63(e) 39.18 2468.50
Ties 0(0
Total 72
Past - Future Negative Ranks 1(g) 5.00 5.00
Positive Ranks 71(h) 36.94 2623.00
Ties 0(i)
Total 72
Non-Finandal - Negative Ranks 0(j) .00 .00
Finandal Positive Ranks 72(k) 36.50 2628.00
Ties 0®
Total 72
a Qualitative < Quantitative 
b Qualitative > Quantitative 
c Qualitative = Quantitative
d Good < Bad 
e Good > Bad 
f Good = Bad 
g Past < Future 
h Past > Future 
i Past = Future 
j Non-Finandal < Finandal 
k Non-Finandal > Finandal 
1 Non-Finandal = Finandal
Test Statistics(b)
Qualitative - 













a Based on negative ranks, 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
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Appendix 10: Correlation between Mandatory and Voluntary Risk Reporting
Correlations
EAS25 EAS33 VOL




































** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Appendix 11: Differences in Mandatory and Voluntary Risk Reporting by
Categorical Independent Variables and Risk Reporting by Industry Sectors
1- Auditor Type - 2006 
Mann -Whitney Test
Ranks
Auditor N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
EAS2506 Without international affiliations 



















a Grouping Variable: Auditor Type
Ranks
Auditor N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
EAS3306 Without international affiliations 



















a Grouping Variable: Auditor Type
Ranks
Auditor N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
VOL06 Without international affiliations 



















a Grouping Variable: Auditor Type
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2- Industry Membership- 2006 
Krus kal-W allis Test
Ranks
Industry Membership N Mean Rank









a Kruskal Wallis Test
b Grouping Variable: Industry Membership
Ranks
Industry Membership N Mean Rank









a Kruskal Wallis Test
b Grouping Variable: Industry Membership
Ranks
Industry Membership N Mean Rank












a Kruskal Wallis Test
b Grouping Variable: Industry Membership
3- Role Duality - 2006
Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks





















a Grouping Variable: Role Duality
Ranks
Role Duality N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
EAS3306 Separation 28 50.82 1423.00













a Grouping Variable: Role Duality
Ranks





















a Grouping Variable: Role Duality
f4- Auditor Type - 2007 
Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks
Auditor N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
EAS2507 Without international affiliations 



















a Grouping Variable: Auditor Type
Ranks
Auditor N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
EAS3307 Without international affiliations 























Without international affiliations 
With international affiliations 
Total


















a Grouping Variable: Auditor Type
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5- Industry Membership- 2007 
Krus kal-W allis Test
Ranks
Industry N Mean Rank
EAS2507 Manufacturing 65 53.32








a Kruskal Wallis Test
b Grouping Variable: Industry Membership
Ranks
Industry N Mean Rank
EAS3307 Manufacturing 65 50.87











a Kruskal Wallis Test
b Grouping Variable: Industry Membership
Ranks
Industry N Mean Rank
VOL07 Manufacturing 48 38.28











a Kruskal Wallis Test
b Grouping Variable: Industry Membership
|
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6- Role Duality - 2007
Mann-Whitney Test
Ranks





















a Grouping Variable: Role Duality
Ranks





















a Grouping Variable: Role Duality
Ranks






















a Grouping Variable: Role Duality
7- Risk Reporting by Industry Sectors
7.1 EAS 25
Industry Groups 2006 2007
Mean Median Max Min Mean Median Max Min
Retail 20.75% 18.18% 425 9% 20.60% 18.18% 41% 0%
Basic Resources 24.5 5% 17.03% 50% 9% 2513% 16.67% 50% 9%
Personal and Household 
Products 25.20% 25% 50% 13% 28.46% 25% 54% 17%
Chemicals 18.73% 19.94% 25% 10% 19.02% 18.75% 25% 15%
Oil , Gas and Utilities 20.44% 23.81% 255 13% 21.83% 23.81% 25% 17%
Travel & Leisure 20.31% 19.05% 29% 11% 20.29% 18.18% 29% 11%
Healthcare and Pharmaceuticals 16.63% 15.48% 29% 13% 18.89% 16.67% 305 13%
Industrial Goods and Services 
and Automobiles 18.67% 16.67% 33% 13% 21.08% 16.67% 52% 13%
Real Estate 18.61% 18.18% 25% 13% 22.52% 20.83% 435 14%
Construction and Materials 19.63% 20.835 29% 8% 22.40% 21.74% 71% 9%
Communication and Technology 21% 21% 21% 21% 27.78% 20.83% 42% 21%
Food and Beverage 14.29% 13.64% 24% 5% 16.98% 20% 25% 5%
7.2 EAS 33
Industry Groups 2006 2007
Mean Median Max Min Mean Median Max Min
Retail 12% 10% 20% 0% 16.98% 205 25% 5%
Basic Resources 21.67% 15% 50% 10% 21.67% 5 15% 60% 0%
Personal and Household 
Products 16.52% 15% 25% 10% 18% 20% 30% 8%
Chemicals 19.17% 22.50% 305 0% 17.5% 15% 30% 10%
Oil , Gas and Utilities 16.67% 10% 30% 10% 15% 10% 25% 10%
Travel & Leisure 20.56% 25% 40% 0% 25% 20% 60% 0%
Healthcare and Pharmaceuticals 16% 12.50% 45% 0% 18.08% 20% 35% 0%
Industrial Goods and Services 
and Automobiles 20.33% 15% 50% 10% 19.33% 10% 60% 0%
Real Estate 17.50% 15% 30% 10% 14.44% 10% 30% 10%
Construction and Materials 18.04% 15% 80% 0% 11.86% 10% 30% 8%
Communication and Technology 43.33% 12.30% 80% 10% 36.67% 40% 60% 10%
Food and Beverage 13.01% 10% 35% 0% 9.94% 10% 20% 0%
7.3 Voluntary Risk Reporting
Industry Groups 2006 2007
Mean Median Max Min Mean Median Max Min
Retail 17.50 17.50 20 15 22.5 22.5 35 10
Basic Resources 24.40 25 43 8 34.20 34.55 50 12
Personal and Household Products 34.67 30 60 16 36.43 30 95 15
Chemicals 40.50 42 62 16 48.80 44 66 35
Oil , Gas and Utilities 35.50 35.50 50 21 32.50 32.50 40 25
Travel & Leisure 16.33 15 24 10 30 30 35 25
Healthcare and Pharmaceuticals 21.17 19 40 9 28.89 30 45 10
Industrial Goods and Services and 
Automobiles 22.91 23 40 15 22.27 22 35 10
Real Estate 18.71 16 36 10 19.33 19 25 15
Construction and Materials 13.57 10 28 6 16.08 14.50 34 4
Communication and Technology 26.33 27 39 13 25 25 30 20














































Appendix 12: Standardised Residuals versus Standardised Predicted Values
Scatterplot
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Appendix 13: Histograms, Normal P-P plots and Q-Q Plots of Regression 
Residuals
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Appendix 14: Residuals, Cooke Distance, Leverage, DIFFIT and DIFBETA 
Appendix 14.1: EAS 25-2006
STRESID COOK LEV c o v DIFFIT DIFB0 DIFB1 DIFB2 DIFB3 DIFB4 DIFB5 DIFB6 DIFB7 DIFB9 DIFB1Q DIFBll DIFB12 DIFB13
0.5653 0.0147 0.2988 1.5700 0.4524 0.1674 -0.1328 0.0432 0.1317 0.0021 0.0656 0.0822 0.1933 -0.1624 -0.1871 -0.1557 -0.0387 - 0.1111 -0.1203
-0.6474 0.0026 0.0641 1.1740 -0.1889 -0.0824 -0.0108 -0.0268 -0.0204 -0.0536 -0.0452 0.0776 0.0274 -0.0152 0.0145 -0.0357 0.0802 -0.0004 0.0475
1.4373 0.0424 0.1795 0.9698 0.7768 -0.0949 0.3811 -0.0683 -0.0837 -0.0241 -0.4304 0.0344 0.2261 0.0082 0.1305 -0.1960 -0.1806 0.2341 ' 0.2108
Z4576 0.1134 0.1682 0.4421 1.3061 0.5497 0.7190 -0.2323 -0.1892 -0.2347 -0.8451 -0.2817 -0.2407 0.1490 0.1559 0.3782 -0.5469 -0.3861 0.1501
-24399 0.0945 0.1483 0.4518 -1.1907 -0.0624 -0.4071 0.0932 -0.3247 0.2617 0.4272 0.6391 0.2433 0.2217 -0.0281 -0.3327 0.4915 -0.4016 -0.1124
1.7910 0.0295 0.0941 0.7460 0.6520 -0.2008 -0.0517 0.0567 0.1663 0.2825 -0.1422 0.0877 -0.1369 -0.1896 -0.2776 0.0225 0.2378 0.1414 0.1909
-0.4528 0.0029 0.1352 1.3136 -0.2005 0.0791 -0.0272 0.0353 -0.0157 -0.0225 0.0731 0.0265 0.0774 0.0426 -0.0212 0.0939 -0.0491 -0.0807 -0.0632
-1.3948 0.0462 0.1988 1.0075 -0.8103 -0.0824 -0.1273 -0.1533 0.2816 -0.2522 -0.1212 -0.3953 0.1528 0.3160 0.3624 0.3765 -0.1366 -0.0183 0.1900
0.8521 0.0078 0.1072 1.1634 0.3291 -0.0250 0.0400 -0.1389 0.0561 0.0252 0.1029 0.0413 -0.0100 -0.0160 -0.0438 0.0730 -0.0119 0.0556 0.0707
-0.9004 0.0081 0.1016 1.1402 -0.3373 -0.0174 0.0307 0.0849 0.1221 0.1122 -0.0118 0.0372 -0.1795 -0.0296 0.0348 -0.0947 -0.0180 -0.0208 0.0360
-0.1875 0.0009 0.2008 1.4655 -0.1083 0.0115 0.0276 -0.0376 -0.0630 -0.0571 -0.0343 0.0235 -0.0003 -0.0270 -0.0125 0.0016 -0.0386 0.0001 0.0038
0.8115 0.0043 0.0682 1.1328 0.2447 -0.0637 -0.0375 -0.1010 -0.0399 -0.0772 0.0366 0.0348 0.0002 0.0432 -0.0356 0.0021 0.0314 0.0406 0.1237
22225 0.0487 0.1000 0.5479 0.8471 0.1878 0.2068 -0.4827 0.1183 -0.1719 0.2497 -0.2513 -0.1930 -0.1999 -0.1200 -0.0298 -0.1759 0.1582 -0.2411
0.5205 0.0039 0.1372 1.3011 0.2327 -0.0135 -0.0277 0.0765 -0.0891 0.1062 0.0025 -0.0555 -0.0315 0.0296 -0.0426 0.0058 0.0819 -0.0184 0.0116
-0.1287 0.0002 0.1305 1.3510 -0.0557 0.0010 -0.0034 -0.0316 0.0153 0.0212 0.0015 0.0072 0.0056 0.0104 -0.0031 0.0135 -0.0130 -0.0118 0.0186
0.7854 0.0052 0.0862 1.1611 0.2682 -0.0875 0.0307 0.1048 -0.1553 -0.0528 -0.0240 0.1001 0.0095 0.0404 0.0124 -0.0593 0.0916 0.0460 0.0951
-0.7959 0.0059 0.0951 1.1681 -0.2870 -0.0872 -0.1083 0.0540 0.1003 0.1302 0.0715 -0.0884 0.0283 -0.0061 -0.0527 -0.0089 0.0024 0.1001 -0.0084
-1.0361 0.0078 0.0755 1.0641 -0.3304 0.0922 0.0665 0.0974 0.1036 0.1359 -0.0158 -0.0511 -0.0079 -0.0832 -0.0882 -0.0863 -0.0550 -0.0748 -0.1178
0.5326 0.0058 0.1787 1.3609 0.2835 0.0510 0.0258 -0.0406 0.0123 -0.0668 0.0565 -0.0217 0.1332 -0.0897 -0.1334 -0.0654 -0.0045 -0.0653 0.0365
2.0363 0.0531 0.1250 0.6368 0.8811 -0.3198 -0.2452 -0.1061 0.3524 -0.0529 -0.1562 0.3570 -0.0925 0.0110 0.3450 -0.0218 0.3006 0.3092 0.1126
0.0429 0.0000 0.1261 1.3476 0.0182 -0.0028 -0.0054 -0.0006 0.0110 0.0074 -0.0007 0.0009 -0.0012 0.0051 -0.0010 -0.0025 -0.0005 0.0016 0.0087
-0.1952 0.0002 0.0669 1.2538 -0.0581 -0.0147 -0.0075 -0.0046 0.0012 0.0090 -0.0186 -0.0107 0.0032 0.0155 0.0096 -0.0099 -0.0019 -0.0074 0.0313
0.5480 0.0051 0.1567 1.3228 0.2669 0.0071 -0.0364 -0.1786 0.1271 -0.0378 0.0123 -0.1342 -0.0546 0.0212 0.0184 0.0307 -0.0134 0.0412 -0.0103
0.2267 0.0002 0.0475 1.2254 0.0570 -0.0233 -0.0089 -0.0185 0.0115 0.0119 0.0069 0.0091 -0.0010 0.0226 0.0152 0.0112 0.0180 0.0125 0.0317
-0.7762 0.0090 0.1419 1.2320 -0.3553 0.0292 -0.0683 -0.0060 -0.0073 -0.0251 0.2249 -0.0565 0.1470 0.1408 0.0396 0.1459 -0.0924 -0.0969 0.0884
0.4234 0.0022 0.1189 1.2956 0.1732 0.0194 -0.0074 0.0441 0.0298 0.0198 0.0367 0.0998 -0.0032 -0.0344 -0.0281 -0.0195 0.0398 0.0117 -0.0720
0.7071 0.0031 0.0643 1.1586 0.2067 0.0043 -0.0915 0.0143 0.0142 0.0954 0.1061 -0.0402 -0.0304 0.0022 -0.0310 0.0176 0.0698 0.0006 -0.0334
-1.0512 0.0111 0.1020 1.0839 -0.3953 -0.0339 -0.0675 -0.1829 -0.0847 -0.0871 -0.0347 -0.1014 0.0097 0.0435 0.0456 0.0101 -0.0989 -0.0286 0.1495
1.9307 0.0234 0.0657 0.6730 0.5820 0.0207 0.1239 0.1834 -0.1169 0.0149 0.0324 0.0610 0.0507 0.2808 0.0714 -0.0259 0.1509 -0.0384 -0.0457
-1.9261 0.1427 0.2700 0.7222 -1.4465 0.1748 0.2930 -0.2399 0.2550 0.2055 0.2643 -0.6167 -0.2269 -0.7700 -0.1136 0.2252 -0.0622 0.0972 -0.6244
0.6028 0.0038 0.1064 1.2379 0.2312 0.1135 0.0141 0.0521 0.0827 0.0148 -0.0215 0.0254 -0.0345 -0.0525 -0.0544 -0.0025 -0.0603 -0.0868 -0.0075
0.0545 0.0001 0.2545 1.5823 0.0379 0.0019 -0.0257 -0.0085 0.0028 0.0072 0.0229 0.0031 0.0012 0.0035 0.0072 0.0183 -0.0050 0.0019 0.0032
-0.7538 0.0110 0.1723 1.2808 -0.3920 0.0005 0.1663 0.1367 -0.0657 -0.0034 -0.1867 -0.1450 -0.1954 -0.0243 -0.1048 -0.0690 0.0888 -0.0746 -0.0388
0.4371 0.0017 0.0933 1.2572 0.1554 -0.0147 -0.0257 0.0172 0.0066 0.0331 0.0349 -0.0497 0.0760 0.0257 0.0486 0.0577 -0.0338 0.0380 0.0443
-0.6501 0.0114 0.2160 1.3843 -0.3976 -0.1263 0.0816 0.0276 0.0343 -0.0129 -0.0205 -0.0729 0.1282 0.2111 0.2762 0.2468 0.0615 0.1071 -0.0477
-0.4509 0.0025 0.1190 1.2904 -0.1847 -0.0763 0.0411 -0.0090 -0.0423 0.0205 -0.0306 0.0372 -0.0191 -0.0950 -0.0782 -0.0878 0.0482 0.0884 ' -0.0307
-0.1287 0.0003 0.1484 1.3796 -0.0604 -0.0206 0.0268 0.0126 -0.0203 0.0128 -0.0285 -0.0002 0.0093 0.0185 -0.0160 -0.0132 0.0210 -0.0147 0.0344
1.1347 0.0137 0.1069 1.0546 0.4391 0.1448 -0.0840 0.0226 0.0336 -0.2109 0.1006 -0.0313 0.0102 0.0826 0.2022 0.0929 -0.1604 0.0619 -0.1760
0.3462 0.0027 0.1912 1.4249 0.1931 0.1041 -0.0297 -0.0250 -0.0209 -0.0367 -0.0029 0.1109 0.0407 -0.0283 0.0098 -0.0520 -0.0407 -0.0630 -0.0780
-0.1137 0.0000 0.0345 1.2164 -0.0248 0.0015 -0.0010 -0.0036 -0.0054 -0.0024 0.0080 0.0023 0.0067 -0.0001 0.0054 0.0072 -0.0102 -0.0038 0.0043
-0.5503 0.0021 0.0730 1.2077 -0.1716 0.0128 0.0269 0.0716 -0.0584 -0.0260 0.0172 0.0215 -0.0672 -0.0430 0.0002 -0.0254 -0.0366 -0.0142 -0.0010
-0.6187 0.0037 0.0979 1.2228 -0.2264 -0.0974 -0.0217 -0.0960 0.0256 -0.0496 0.0473 0.0259 0.0200 -0.0568 0.0389 0.0045 -0.0707 0.1571 0.0328
0.7133 0.0024 0.0498 1.1405 0.1840 0.0085 0.0271 0.0343 0.0049 -0.0024 -0.0027 0.0829 -0.0174 0.0129 0.0441 -0.0353 0.0537 0.0294 -0.0758
-0.6766 0.0040 0.0894 1.1967 -0.2354 -0.0232 -0.0288 -0.0623 0.0023 0.0228 0.0278 -0.0994 0.0010 -0.0042 -0.0679 -0.0623 -0.0502 -0.0324 0.1172
0.7734 0.0117 0.1731 1.2747 0.4035 -0.0509 -0.0302 0.0466 0.1109 -0.1521 0.0486 -0.1504 -0.0126 -0.1177 -0.0661 0.1184 0.0192 0.1195 0.0072
0.3399 0.0010 0.0881 1.2663 0.1171 -0.0181 0.0556 0.0222 -0.0449 -0.0400 -0.0353 -0.0096 -0.0057 -0.0151 -0.0049 0.0380 0.0064 0.0336 0.0162
-0.2684 0.0004 0.0532 1.2288 -0.0713 0.0075 0.0073 -0.0108 -0.0078 -0.0048 0.0033 0.0143 -0.0423 -0.0284 -0.0033 -0.0129 -0.0254 -0.0029 0.0018
0.8015 0.0067 0.1053 1.1783 0.3063 -0.0201 -0.0238 0.0188 0.0778 -0.0368 0.0276 -0.0322 0.1812 -0.0442 0.0768 0.0349 0.0566 0.0942 -0.1134
0.2780 0.0007 0.0876 1.2739 0.0954 0.0307 0.0052 -0.0204 0.0400 -0.0078 0.0069 -0.0356 -0.0188 0.0061 -0.0031 -0.0186 -0.0423 0.0112 -0.0144
0.7681 0.0165 0.2216 1.3478 0.4794 0.0252 -0.2720 0.0907 -0.0667 -0.0622 0.2649 -0.0530 -0.0260 -0.0220 0.0617 -0.0712 0.1254 -0.1132 0.0354
0.1243 0.0002 0.1028 1.3092 0.0466 0.0089 -0.0043 -0.0021 0.0134 0.0027 -0.0089 -0.0098 -0.0101 -0.0107 -0.0206 0.0048 0.0091 -0.0181 0.0088
-0.1002 0.0001 0.1318 1.3546 -0.0436 -0.0119 0.0045 -0.0073 -0.0058 -0.0101 0.0104 -0.0010 0.0176 0.0132 0.0020 0.0210 -0.0148 0.0138 0.0143
0.2299 0.0008 0.1418 1.3600 0.1048 0.0278 -0.0196 -0.0405 -0.0178 0.0233 0.0103 -0.0183 -0.0241 0.0084 -0.0166 -0.0022 -0.0313 -0.0047 0.0015
0.1756 0.0006 0.1622 1.3988 0.0873 -0.0116 -0.0108 0.0047 0.0039 0.0016 -0.0089 -0.0045 -0.0260 -0.0116 0.0422 -0.0230 0.0240 0.0272 -0.0255
0.4880 0.0022 0.0959 1.2508 0.1764 0.0402 0.0086 0.0312 0.0085 -0.0187 -0.0307 -0.0996 -0.0269 0.0347 -0.0063 -0.0114 -0.0504 0.0090 -0.0070
1.3706 0.0208 0.1106 0.9533 0.5430 -0.1586 0.0300 0.0686 -0.2962 0.1966 -0.0176 0.2315 -0.0197 0.1203 -0.0115 -0.0582 0.1884 0.0197 0.2428
0.3076 0.0013 0.1289 1.3300 0.1321 -0.0101 0.0457 0.0264 -0.0607 -0.0155 -0.0565 0.0031 0.0697 0.0224 0.0196 0.0202 -0.0294 0.0258 0.0393
0.0141 0.0000 0.1507 1.3875 0.0067 0.0009 0.0033 0.0006 -0.0034 -0.0032 -0.0002 -0.0011 0.0005 0.0014 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0031 0.0005 0.0020
-0.4223 0.0015 0.0884 1.2534 -0.1458 -0.0245 -0.0155 0.0815 -0.0312 -0.0016 0.0335 -0.0199 0.0277 0.0088 0.0084 -0.0557 0.0009 -0.0154 0.0434
-1.4516 0.0628 0.2312 0.9995 -0.9469 0.3008 0.2432 -0.6865 0.1587 -0.5584 -0.1168 -0.0571 -0.0981 -0.2844 -0.0614 -0.1911 -0.4949 0.0403 -0.3009
-0.6846 0.0042 0.0909 1.1964 -0.2405 -0.0778 0.0026 0.0500 -0.0406 0.0464 -0.0015 -0.0428 0.0027 -0.0923 -0.0305 0.0320 0.0890 0.0039 0.0252
0.2150 0.0015 0.2460 1.5503 0.1452 -0.0069 0.0032 0.0059 0.0430 0.0806 0.0018 0.0188 0.0683 0.0181 0.0067 -0.0255 0.0420 -0.0380 0.0376
0.0502 0.0000 0.0786 1.2773 0.0163 0.0058 0.0014 0.0001 0.0022 -0.0054 0.0014 -0.0063 -0.0029 -0.0007 -0.0021 -0.0047 -0.0075 0.0022 -0.0035
-0.3242 0.0006 0.0549 1.2244 -0.0875 0.0010 0.0328 -0.0025 -0.0079 -0.0047 -0.0203 -0.0231 0.0186 0.0246 -0.0046 0.0082 0.0223 -0.0319 -0.0119
-0.8579 0.0110 0.1417 1.2024 -0.3926 -0.0241 0.1021 0.1963 -0.1154 -0.0564 -0.0963 -0.1750 0.0523 0.0249 -0.1090 -0.0434 0.1139 -0.0927 -0.0162
0.2802 0.0007 0.0850 1.2699 0.0946 0.0561 0.0321 0.0245 -0.0124 -0.0324 -0.0104 -0.0047 -0.0147 -0.0199 -0.0070 -0.0070 -0.0423 -0.0344 -0.0056
1.9408 0.0273 0.0756 0.6710 0.6295 0.1807 -0.1455 0.2325 0.0056 0.2846 -0.1037 0.2292 -0.0710 0.0568 -0.1108 0.0412 -0.0398 -0.0513 -0.1406
-0.0011 0.0000 0.1338 1.3602 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0002
-0.2599 0.0005 0.0697 1.2515 -0.0790 0.0149 0.0191 -0.0181 0.0046 -0.0145 0.0243 -0.0072 0.0160 -0.0064 0.0007 0.0182 0.0026 -0.0174 ' -0.0366
1.1955 0.0243 0.1564 1.0738 0.5860 0.3566 -0.2082 0.0855 -0.0331 0.2391 0.0921 0.0861 -0.0861 0.0263 0.0816 0.1600 -0.0601 -0.3079 -0.2241
-0.4886 0.0021 0.0887 1.2411 -0.1690 0.0247 0.0430 -0.0325 -0.0168 -0.0874 -0.0038 -0.0145 -0.0619 -0.0261 0.0510 0.0077 0.0058 -0.0098 -0.0911
-1.0174 0.0127 0.1207 1.1164 -0.4223 -0.1868 0.0556 0.2749 -0.0818 0.1362 -0.1725 0.1652 0.0602 0.0055 -0.0086 -0.0914 0.2625 -0.0425 0.1039
-0.5444 0.0019 0.0669 1.2014 -0.1622 0.0039 -0.0416 0.0017 0.0043 0.0096 0.0879 0.0048 0.0444 0.0204 -0.0173 -0.0115 0.0545 -0.0595 -0.0366
-1.2053 0.0418 0.2260 1.1380 -0.7686 -0.0019 -0.0151 0.0166 0.0534 0.0099 -0.0362 0.2355 0.3003 0.5222 0.5125 0.4705 0.1804 -0.2119 -0.1369
0.5215 0.0034 0.1237 1.2816 0.2187 0.0235 0.0121 -0.0030 0.0225 -0.0401 0.0412 -0.0730 -0.0459 -0.0095 0.0908 -0.0517 0.0231 -0.0340 0.0123
-0.3456 0.0018 0.1422 1.3445 -0.1579 -0.0334 -0.0006 0.0516 -0.0047 0.0695 -0.0527 0.0634 0.0220 0.0004 -0.0716 -0.0102 0.0138 0.0238 -0.0001
0.7742 0.0054 0.0925 1.1718 0.2747 0.0727 0.0000 -0.0032 -0.0113 -0.0003 0.0400 0.0567 0.0456 0.1516 0.0891 0.1334 0.0439 -0.1643 0.0592
-0.3532 0.0015 0.1196 1.3091 -0.1449 -0.0309 -0.0162 0.0371 0.0418 -0.0083 -0.0322 0.0345 0.0256 -0.0164 -0.0464 -0.0139 -0.0039 0.0493 -0.0237
-0.3050 0.0012 0.1257 1.3256 -0.1290 0.0532 -0.0065 -0.0552 0.0059 0.0247 0.0404 0.0146 -0.0526 -0.0198 0.0241 0.0190 -0.0468 -0.0236 -0.0601
-0.3634 0.0016 0.1166 1.3030 -0.1469 -0.0325 -0.0385 -0.0303 0.0464 -0.0420 0.0383 -0.0198 -0.0731 -0.0626 -0.0482 -0.0495 0.0299 0.0060 0.0182
-0.4877 0.0027 0.1140 1.2755 -0.1947 -0.0394 -0.0140 -0.0223 0.0185 -0.0398 0.0571 -0.0303 -0.0945 0.0092 -0.0090 -0.0335 0.0371 -0.0224 0.0515
0.4299 0.0012 0.0700 1.2278 0.1310 -0.0374 0.0217 0.0270 -0.0400 0.0149 0.0101 -0.0578 -0.0255 -0.0272 -0.0125 0.0192 0.0262 0.0408 0.0393
0.8542 0.0082 0.1125 1.1689 0.3394 0.1096 0.1788 0.0362 -0.1082 0.0759 -0.0876 0.0000 -0.0183 0.1509 0.0944 0.0422 -0.1174 -0.0231 -0.0315
1.0464 0.0130 0.1176 1.1015 0.4279 0.1853 0.1301 0.1408 -0.0058 0.1228 0.0261 0.0289 -0.0863 -0.0541 0.0244 -0.1206 -0.1045 -0.1467 0.0039
-1.1258 0.0194 0.1442 1.0943 -0.5228 -0.0680 -0.1172 0.1704 -0.1619 0.0045 0.3198 -0.0545 0.1064 -0.0330 -0.0394 -0.0689 -0.0615 0.1437 -0.0837
1.3906 0.0284 0.1396 0.9649 0.6354 -0.1161 -0.2718 -0.0650 0.2425 0.0781 -0.1279 0.1327 -0.0397 0.2469 0.0603 -0.1320 0.2661 -0.0005 0.0672
-0.0561 0.0000 0.1238 1.3438 -0.0235 0.0002 0.0039 0.0021 0.0019 0.0006 -0.0027 0.0083 -0.0061 -0.0040 -0.0073 0.0024 -0.0053 0.0063 -0.0071
-1.1861 0.0220 0.1465 1.0689 -0.5570 0.0255 -0.0782 -0.1075 0.0465 0.0727 -0.1154 0.2024 -0.0792 0.1316 -0.1896 0.1149 -0.0571 -0.1892 0.1943
-0.0715 0.0000 0.0877 1.2896 -0.0245 0.0053 -0.0009 0.0012 0.0016 -0.0047 -0.0009 -0.0060 0.0070 0.0144 0.0160 0.0085 -0.0052 -0.0067 -0.0057
-1.0110 0.0149 0.1384 1.1379 -0.4566 -0.0257 0.0826 -0.0458 -0.1214 -0.0830 -0.1226 0.0262 -0.2995 -0.2333 -0.1732 -0.1695 -0.1174 0.1936 -0.1174
-0.3149 0.0008 0.0852 1.2659 -0.1065 0.0232 0.0231 0.0465 -0.0584 0.0025 -0.0228 -0.0136 0.0155 0.0292 0.0284 0.0010 -0.0127 -0.0330 -0.0239
-0.0856 0.0002 0.2175 1.5052 -0.0525 -0.0084 -0.0280 0.0024 0.0253 0.0182 -0.0022 -0.0036 0.0016 0.0022 0.0126 0.0163 0.0236 -0.0050 -0.0111
-0.2969 0.0019 0.1887 1.4291 -0.1640 0.0015 -0.0342 -0.0559 -0.0288 -0.0552 -0.0405 0.0208 0.0319 0.0473 -0.0084 0.0502 0.0281 -0.0459 -0.0044
-1.2541 0.0120 0.0794 0.9811 -0.4120 -0.0737 -0.0258 0.0677 -0.1366 -0.0935 0.1219 0.0483 0.0713 -0.0677 -0.0731 -0.1500 -0.0893 0.1794 -0.0843
0.5912 0.0047 0.1294 1.2720 0.2550 0.1364 0.0278 -0.0332 -0.1319 0.0126 -0.0175 0.0434 -0.0217 0.0489 -0.0488 0.0355 0.0165 -0.1710 -0.0407
1.5861 0.0524 0.1815 0.8900 0.8666 0.0973 0.1080 -0.1532 -0.3225 -0.3593 0.0283 -0.1385 0.4473 -0.2418 -0.2383 0.1571 -0.0752 0.1325 -0.2016
-0.5710 0.0039 0.1188 1.2626 -0.2337 -0.0692 0.0155 -0.0149 0.0396 0.0212 -0.0513 0.0905 0.0195 0.0371 0.0856 -0.0777 -0.0131 0.1011 -0.0294
0.3949 0.0010 0.0698 1.2334 0.1202 -0.0450 -0.0057 0.0383 -0.0111 -0.0279 -0.0350 0.0157 -0.0058 -0.0085 -0.0398 -0.0142 0.0460 0.0287 0.0479
-0.3794 0.0022 0.1445 1.3421 -0.1751 0.0022 0.0521 0.0173 0.0255 0.0850 0.0191 -0.0226 0.0354 0.0513 0.0540 0.0670 -0.0319 -0.0292 0.0313
-0.1495 0.0004 0.1565 1.3915 -0.0726 -0.0548 -0.0207 -0.0103 0.0307 0.0101 0.0245 -0.0126 0.0056 -0.0022 0.0162 -0.0181 0.0253 0.0417 0.0249
-0.3662 0.0011 0.0861 1.2597 -0.1246 -0.0069 -0.0027 0.0670 0.0026 0.0003 0.0210 -0.0378 0.0076 -0.0572 -0.0531 -0.0333 -0.0132 -0.0029 0.0148
-1.0537 0.0037 0.0335 1.0194 -0.2282 -0.0158 -0.0532 -0.0042 0.0026 -0.0356 0.0539 -0.0744 0.0416 -0.0297 -0.0628 -0.0235 -0.0684 -0.0355 0.0956
0.1463 0.0001 0.0459 1.2294 0.0363 0.0065 0.0162 -0.0132 -0.0011 -0.0100 -0.0114 0.0020 -0.0115 -0.0104 -0.0110 -0.0070 -0.0004 0.0080 -0.0127
-1.9076 0.0197 0.0567 0.6808 -0.5339 -0.0649 -0.2000 0.1314 0.1167 0.1705 0.0151 0.0151 -0.2361 0.1015 0.0129 -0.0221 0.0168 -0.1377 0.2009
-25387 0.0511 0.0822 0.4171 -0.8759 -0.5531 -0.1617 0.1344 0.1273 -0.0429 0.0534 -0.2338 0.0578 -0.2660 -0.1362 -0.1911 -0.0670 0.6167 0.3070
-0.5440 0.0028 0.0961 1.2387 -0.1968 0.0034 -0.0544 -0.0268 0.0398 0.0338 0.0177 0.1061 -0.1040 -0.0411 0.0074 -0.0335 -0.0182 -0.0166 0.0047
Appendix 14.2: EAS 25-2007
STRESID COOK LEV c o v DIFF DIFBO DIFBi DIFB2 DIFB3 DIFB4 DIFB5 DIFB6 DIFB7 DIFB8 DIFB9 DIFB10 DIFB11 DIFB12 DIFB13
0.4750 0.0097 0.2878 1.5810 0.3672 0.1259 -0.1308 -0.0032 0.1028 -0.0081 0.0685 0.0284 0.1475 -0.1442 -0.1764 -0.1272 -0.0507 -0.0798 -0.0675
-0.6394 0.0032 0.0812 1.1977 -0.2111 -0.0985 -0.0337 0.0461 0.0248 0.0488 -0.0577 0.1177 0.0239 -0.0032 0.0199 -0.0440 0.1387 -0.0276 0.0636
1.0494 0.0490 0.2933 1.3103 0.8310 -0.0181 0.5900 -0.0813 -0.2164 0.0202 -0.4725 0.0343 0.1711 0.0378 0.1441 -0.1014 -0.2083 0.1642 0.1195
1.4228 0.0358 0.1608 0.9616 0.7133 0.3137 0.4082 -0.1069 -0.1043 -0.0499 -0.4977 -0.0189 -0.2008 0.0812 0.0970 0.1562 -0.2383 -0.2689 0.0297
-26960 0.1481 0.1785 0.3373 -1.5081 -0.0631 -0.3211 0.1514 -0.5952 0.3299 0.4874 0.6660 0.1732 0.2141 0.0736 -0.4934 0.5369 -0.4992 -0.0387
1.3686 0.0143 0.0793 0.9304 0.4503 -0.1356 0.0000 0.0599 0.0300 -0.0139 -0.1240 0.0366 -0.0795 -0.1888 -0.2573 -0.0736 0.1641 0.1083 0.1433
-0.8602 0.0100 0.1303 1.1881 -0.3736 0.1322 -0.0242 0.1415 -0.0912 -0.0603 0.1455 0.0408 0.1220 0.0346 -0.0334 0.1244 -0.1137 -0.1140 -0.1148
-1.8109 0.0607 0.1665 0.7575 -0.9378 -0.1544 -0.1471 -0.2323 0.2325 -0.3474 -0.2299 -0.2912 0.2141 0.3937 0.3312 0.4474 -0.1592 0.0392 0.2395
0.9257 0.0099 0.1143 1.1453 0.3717 -0.0711 0.0354 -0.1586 0.1374 0.0926 0.0468 0.0601 -0.0169 0.0085 -0.0459 0.0786 0.0421 0.0802 0.0898
-0.6709 0.0066 0.1396 1.2643 -0.3036 0.0460 0.0780 0.0930 -0.0021 0.0855 -0.0335 0.0601 -0.2106 -0.0204 0.0270 -0.0860 -0.0374 -0.0823 0.0089
0.2119 0.0004 0.0939 1.2919 0.0756 0.0086 0.0239 0.0027 -0.0105 -0.0080 0.0211 -0.0367 -0.0062 0.0138 -0.0025 -0.0033 -0.0045 0.0082 -0.0094
0.8307 0.0099 0.1367 1.2067 0.3716 -0.0905 -0.0285 0.0343 -0.1627 -0.2398 0.0395 -0.0090 0.0512 0.0593 -0.0728 -0.0197 0.0546 0.0447 0.1579
24271 0.0949 0.1499 0.4523 1.1934 0.1827 0.2457 -0.7310 0.1745 -0.2198 0.2830 -0.5877 -0.2497 -0.2748 -0.2887 -0.0336 -0.1948 0.2616 -0.2881
0.6118 0.0063 0.1550 1.3039 0.2961 -0.0240 -0.0718 0.1398 0.0002 0.1546 0.0464 -0.1028 -0.0491 -0.0119 -0.0556 -0.0322 0.0981 0.0120 -0.0017
0.4091 0.0014 0.0838 1.2514 0.1372 0.0017 -0.0677 0.0541 0.0142 -0.0111 0.0327 0.0299 -0.0089 -0.0257 0.0039 -0.0183 0.0524 0.0143 -0.0452
0.3062 0.0016 0.1553 1.3737 0.1481 -0.0285 0.0169 0.0533 -0.1101 -0.0785 0.0063 0.0089 0.0166 0.0224 0.0076 -0.0121 0.0245 0.0122 0.0460
-0.7905 0.0055 0.0898 1.1643 -0.2761 -0.0873 -0.1267 0.0546 0.1031 0.0885 0.0992 -0.0598 0.0680 -0.0087 -0.0444 0.0012 -0.0272 0.1326 -0.0174
-0.1835 0.0005 0.1305 1.3492 -0.0794 -0.0087 0.0134 0.0286 0.0199 0.0077 0.0102 -0.0283 0.0058 -0.0284 -0.0048 -0.0126 -0.0210 0.0416 -0.0281
0.5185 0.0053 0.1736 1.3583 0.2706 0.0176 0.0038 0.0516 -0.0254 -0.0083 0.0603 -0.0020 0.1337 -0.0887 -0.1459 -0.0934 0.0390 -0.0622 0.0567
1.7510 0.0478 0.1462 0.7818 0.8307 -0.2954 -0.2486 -0.2180 0.3428 0.1734 -0.2612 0.4844 -0.0180 0.2339 0.3639 0.2049 0.3637 0.1448 0.1995
0.2461 0.0005 0.0914 1.2850 0.0865 -0.0050 0.0254 0.0068 -0.0153 -0.0014 -0.0251 -0.0086 -0.0083 0.0290 -0.0194 -0.0201 -0.0260 0.0061 0.0511
-0.4704 0.0018 0.0819 1.2375 -0.1559 -0.0371 -0.0013 -0.0091 -0.0298 -0.0050 -0.0591 -0.0154 0.0095 0.0510 0.0195 -0.0410 -0.0083 -0.0230 0.0840
-0.1004 0.0001 0.0651 1.2593 -0.0295 0.0026 0.0070 -0.0008 -0.0121 0.0016 0.0019 0.0096 0.0040 -0.0059 0.0045 0.0018 -0.0083 -0.0042 0.0004
0.1711 0.0002 0.0670 1.2578 0.0510 -0.0237 -0.0125 -0.0220 0.0163 0.0146 -0.0019 0.0150 0.0001 0.0241 0.0102 0.0111 0.0205 0.0104 0.0293
-0.2407 0.0011 0.1690 1.4056 -0.1231 -0.0051 -0.0252 -0.0233 -0.0144 0.0203 0.0711 -0.0024 0.0378 0.0472 0.0184 0.0347 -0.0284 -0.0176 0.0367
0.0444 0.0000 0.1491 1.3868 0.0209 0.0018 -0.0007 0.0048 0.0046 0.0034 0.0028 0.0108 0.0002 0.0039 0.0106 0.0019 0.0044 0.0009 -0.0076
0.8858 0.0069 0.0906 1.1337 0.3113 -0.0124 -0.1693 -0.0949 0.1087 0.0864 0.1606 -0.0755 -0.0144 0.0579 0.0744 0.0987 0.0663 0.0545 -0.0552
-0.4498 0.0019 0.0962 1.2606 -0.1628 -0.0255 -0.0191 -0.0701 -0.0407 -0.0397 -0.0255 -0.0305 0.0101 0.0184 0.0075 -0.0189 -0.0264 -0.0110 0.0646
1.4772 0.0151 0.0720 0.8775 0.4627 -0.0019 0.0380 0.0790 0.0657 0.1592 0.0328 0.0607 -0.0243 0.2305 0.0627 -0.0092 0.1141 -0.0141 -0.0042
-1.3769 0.0219 0.1144 0.9512 -0.5568 0.0305 0.1888 -0.0596 0.0034 0.1916 -0.0709 0.0652 0.0638 0.1161 -0.0041 0.2168 0.1029 -0.1516 -0.1052
0.9191 0.0128 0.1427 1.1802 0.4230 0.0397 0.1232 0.0774 0.0711 -0.1625 -0.0535
0.8396 0.0219 0.2375 1.3413 0.5541 -0.0247 -0.3681 -0.0939 0.0467 0.1040 0.2960
-1.3769 0.0231 0.1196 0.9550 -0.5719 0.0092 0.2131 0.0537 -0.0772 -0.1558 -0.1849
-0.3439 0.0008 0.0692 1.2423 -0.1042 -0.0032 0.0014 -0.0328 0.0159 -0.0128 -0.0212
-0.3518 0.0018 0.1365 1.3367 -0.1566 0.0184 0.0905 0.0590 -0.0251 -0.0320 -0.0273
0.1647 0.0004 0.1270 1.3454 0.0701 0.0243 -0.0168 0.0064 0.0180 -0.0036 0.0097
0.0082 0.0000 0.1098 1.3255 0.0032 0.0015 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0008 0.0010
-1.1629 0.0150 0.1106 1.0452 -0.4596 -0.1613 0.0681 -0.1225 0.0378 0.1920 -0.1075
-0.2127 0.0009 0.1771 1.4228 -0.1123 -0.0609 0.0176 0.0078 0.0085 0.0066 0.0108
-0.2331 0.0003 0.0534 1.2346 -0.0620 0.0031 0.0032 -0.0112 -0.0137 0.0011 0.0132
-0.5216 0.0015 0.0573 1.1959 -0.1439 0.0306 0.0289 -0.0062 -0.0349 -0.0010 0.0298
-1.2439 0.0136 0.0900 0.9927 -0.4376 -0.2209 -0.0444 -0.1236 0.0438 -0.0257 0.0851
0.4585 0.0017 0.0850 1.2439 0.1550 - 0.0205 0.0194 0.0097 0.0150 0.0214 0.0010
1.7710 0.0235 0.0778 0.7461 0.5811 0.1040 0.0821 0.1391 0.0201 0.0020 -0.1003
0.7489 0.0114 0.1778 1.2911 0.3981 -0.0715 0.0163 0.2460 -0.0231 0.1547 0.0341
0.0663 0.0000 0.0866 1.2905 0.0226 -0.0037 0.0085 0.0045 -0.0076 -0.0079 -0.0055
-0.1798 0.0002 0.0509 1.2358 -0.0468 0.0061 0.0042 0.0011 -0.0019 0.0097 -0.0004
0.9723 0.0102 0.1083 1.1210 0.3784 -0.0141 0.0111 -0.0191 0.0103 -0.0490 0.0436
0.5434 0.0028 0.0966 1.2411 0.1974 0.0529 -0.0168 -0.0631 0.0993 0.0294 -0.0061
1.5649 0.0324 0.1283 0.8685 0.6806 0.1454 -0.1252 -0.0264 -0.0268 -0.3449 0.2771
-0.0850 0.0001 0.1396 1.3701 -0.0384 -0.0041 0.0064 0.0060 -0.0185 -0.0035 0.0101
0.1061 0.0001 0.1047 1.3153 0.0403 0.0137 -0.0042 0.0071 -0.0028 0.0015 -0.0035
0.7495 0.0082 0.1383 1.2373 0.3376 0.0591 -0.0673 -0.0625 -0.0540 0.0992 0.0351
-0.0928 0.0001 0.1490 1.3850 -0.0437 0.0004 0.0011 0.0010 0.0027 -0.0048 0.0074
-0.3760 0.0011 0.0813 1.2535 -0.1240 -0.0316 0.0109 -0.0319 0.0063 0.0073 0.0236
0.5585 0.0029 0.0943 1.2345 0.2001 -0.0674 -0.0147 0.0077 -0.0971 0.0319 0.0031
-0.0809 0.0001 0.1320 1.3581 -0.0353 0.0053 -0.0083 -0.0051 0.0063 0.0023 0.0139
-0.5776 0.0066 0.1747 1.3435 -0.3029 -0.0037 -0.0676 -0.0937 0.0994 0.0066 0.0092
-0.3290 0.0009 0.0887 1.2707 -0.1138 -0.0091 -0.0174 0.0682 -0.0391 -0.0114 0.0465
-1.8016 0.0731 0.1916 0.7709 -1.0291 0.2897 0.2173 -0.7166 0.3289 -0.4085 -0.2079
-1.2320 0.0164 0.1083 1.0129 -0.4814 -0.1078 0.0602 0.1024 -0.2037 -0.0348 0.0255
0.2458 0.0011 0.1622 1.3936 0.1224 -0.0023 0.0151 -0.0007 0.0229 0.0415 -0.0003





































































































































-0.3870 0.0016 0.1077 1.2882 -0.1494 0.0262 0.0776 -0.0051 -0.0501 -0.0502 -0.0532
-1.1020 0.0333 0.2191 1.1852 -0.6852 -0.1266 -0.0578 0.3771 0.0749 0.3547 -0.1208
1.2088 0.0147 0.1018 1.0176 0.4554 0.2070 0.0704 0.1811 -0.0380 -0.0231 -0.0267
0.7512 0.0059 0.1059 1.1958 0.2879 0.0921 -0.0145 0.1196 -0.1497 0.0464 -0.0206
-0.7419 0.0053 0.0973 1.1884 -0.2709 0.0388 0.0625 -0.0086 -0.0197 -0.0711 0.0891
0.4530 0.0038 0.1647 1.3606 0.2281 0.1606 -0.0410 0.0451 -0.0228 0.0640 0.0780
-0.4248 0.0025 0.1343 1.3199 -0.1873 -0.0321 0.0668 -0.0030 -0.0485 -0.0722 -0.0218
-0.6393 0.0037 0.0920 1.2112 -0.2260 -0.0970 0.0003 0.1166 -0.0360 0.0833 -0.0622
0.5850 0.0028 0.0847 1.2159 0.1976 -0.0044 0.0453 0.0209 -0.0007 0.0677 -0.1170
0.2716 0.0020 0.2164 1.4861 0.1659 0.0033 -0.0096 -0.0012 -0.0145 0.0053 0.0184
-0.3563 0.0012 0.0981 1.2797 -0.1304 -0.0273 0.0007 0.0180 -0.0086 0.0110 -0.0295
0.3240 0.0017 0.1521 1.3657 0.1546 r 0.0321 -0.0015 -0.0678 -0.0131 -0.0461 0.0417
0.0456 0.0000 0.0971 1.3062 0.0166 0.0025 -0.0024 0.0000 0.0041 0.0025 0.0000
-1.3437 0.0157 0.0891 0.9483 -0.4707 -0.1004 0.0235 -0.1483 0.0067 -0.0876 -0.1567
-0.2576 0.0011 0.1476 1.3683 -0.1205 0.0516 0.0142 -0.0122 -0.0121 0.0382 0.0058
0.1680 0.0002 0.0892 1.2889 0.0582 0.0152 0.0166 0.0087 -0.0172 0.0174 -0.0140
-1.0856 0.0139 0.1168 1.0840 -0.4425 -0.1526 -0.1009 0.0211 -0.0330 -0.1055 0.1773
0.5520 0.0031 0.1026 1.2469 0.2074 0.0345 0.0641 -0.0325 -0.0571 -0.0490 0.0402
0.4051 0.0018 0.1074 1.2846 0.1562 0.0638 0.0949 0.0017 -0.0475 0.0193 -0.0338
1.9814 0.0623 0.1481 0.6638 0.9536 0.4748 0.0925 0.2722 0.2224 -0.0640 0.2463
-1.6782 0.0214 0.0790 0.7896 -0.5542 -0.1381 0.0002 0.1615 -0.2829 0.0481 0.0397
1.1357 0.0294 0.1931 1.1388 0.6432 -0.1389 -0.2565 -0.1414 0.1964 0.0085 -0.1885
0.0065 0.0000 0.1367 1.3671 0.0029 -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0007 -0.0002
-0.9798 0.0181 0.1689 1.1856 -0.5042 -0.0268 -0.0797 -0.1114 0.1349 0.0153 -0.1656
-0.9225 0.0089 0.1047 1.1358 -0.3519 0.0988 0.0959 0.0208 -0.1516 -0.1347 -0.0500
0.0325 0.0000 0.1074 1.3217 0.0125 0.0053 0.0007 0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0043
0.0094 0.0000 0.0926 1.3000 0.0033 0.0006 0.0002 0.0002 0.0007 -0.0008 0.0007
-1.1247 0.0296 0.1968 1.1485 -0.6459 0.0704 -0.2578 -0.0979 0.3484 0.1954 -0.0737
1.0151 0.0225 0.1873 1.1913 0.5615 -0.1005 0.0121 0.0628 0.1649 0.3581 0.1807
-0.5853 0.0035 0.1024 1.2386 -0.2198 -0.0322 -0.0179 0.0877 -0.0543 -0.0813 0.0842
0.0386 0.0000 0.1348 1.3638 0.0171 0.0087 0.0030 0.0061 -0.0102 -0.0042 -0.0012
0.7902 0.0078 0.1224 1.2033 0.3301 0.0670 0.0605 -0.0745 -0.1279 -0.0948 -0.0331
-0.0441 -0.0794 0.0032 -0.0036
-0.0662 -0.0393 0.0833 0.0058
0.1519 0.1704 0.0149 0.0242
0.0928 -0.0172 0.0379 -0.0094
-0.0212 0.0492 0.0026 0.1131
-0.0333 -0.0466 -0.0364 0.0303
0.0065 -0.0773 -0.0847 -0.0217
0.0736 0.0269 0.0066 0.0380
0.0643 -0.0376 0.0159 0.0349
-0.0399 -0.0518 -0.1061 -0.1274
0.0393 0.0418 0.0219 -0.0148
-0.0417 -0.0208 0.0143 0.0643
0.0074 0.0001 0.0083 0.0048
0.1208 0.0908 -0.0112 -0.1644
0.0549 -0.0531 -0.0399 -0.0136
0.0101 0.0197 0.0163 0.0219
0.0846 0.1880 0.1920 0.0652
-0.1273 -0.0320 -0.0748 -0.0393
-0.0296 -0.0339 0.0257 -0.0059
-0.2485 -0.2215 -0.2878 -0.0711
0.0759 0.1329 0.0438 -0.0090
0.1540 -0.0202 0.3621 0.0394
-0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0007
0.2110 -0.0864 0.1236 -0.1636
-0.0564 0.0691 0.1645 0.1972
-0.0016 0.0073 0.0007 0.0018
0.0003 0.0001 -0.0007 0.0001
0.0034 0.0182 -0.0059 0.1823
-0.0053 -0.1114 -0.1379 0.0140
-0.0425 0.0641 -0.0382 -0.0409
0.0008 -0.0038 -0.0015 -0.0052
-0.0136 -0.0659 -0.1597 -0.1055
-0.0041 0.0134 -0.0428 -0.0403
-0.2367 0.3163 -0.1329 0.0332
0.0173 -0.1345 -0.1984 0.0170
0.0129 -0.0486 -0.0452 -0.0408
0.0493 0.0107 -0.0245 -0.1425
0.0541 -0.0675 -0.1027 -0.1144
-0.0595 0.0249 0.0697 -0.0693
-0.0088 0.1402 -0.0321 0.0621
0.0260 -0.0270 0.0278 0.0465
-0.1210 -0.0288 0.0252 0.0383
0.0460 -0.0157 0.0390 -0.0083
0.0203 -0.0035 -0.0329 -0.0005
0.0058 0.0048 -0.0090 0.0040
-0.0013 -0.0953 0.1744 -0.0135
-0.0316 -0.0222 -0.0415 -0.0526
0.0122 -0.0178 0.0037 -0.0131
0.0629 0.1261 -0.0601 0.1737
0.0220 -0.1181 0.0693 0.0097
-0.0076 -0.0771 -0.0043 -0.0253
-0.2530 -0.3703 -0.2562 -0.1220
-0.1276 -0.0710 0.1870 -0.0146
-0.0616 0.2407 -0.0318 0.1794
-0.0006 0.0010 -0.0008 0.0010
0.0515 -0.0098 -0.1481 0.1988
0.0936 -0.1267 -0.0815 -0.0927
0.0035 -0.0057 -0.0034 0.0003
0.0009 -0.0015 0.0010 -0.0003
0.2921 -0.0148 -0.0348 -0.2206
-0.1524 0.1189 0.1260 0.0467
-0.0557 -0.0614 0.0956 -0.0393
-0.0053 0.0022 -0.0109 -0.0035
0.0381 0.0132 0.0367 -0.1282
-0.5701 0.0038 0.1156 1.2601 -0.2297 -0.0602 -0.0015 0.0432 0.0279 0.0349 -0.0352 0.0913 0.0452 0.0641 0.0993 -0.0421 -0.0095 0.0797 -0.0262
0.2888 0.0005 0.0677 1.2475 0.0865 -0.0312 -0.0028 0.0136 -0.0094 -0.0282 -0.0199 0.0171 -0.0075 -0.0056 0.0167 -0.0151 0.0334 0.0266 0.0227
0.8804 0.0162 0.1820 1.2449 0.4765 0.0366 -0.0392 -0.0290 -0.1757 -0.2739 -0.0459 -0.0289 -0.0970 -0.2244 -0.1378 -0.1787 0.0645 0.0567 -0.1152
0.8615 0.0130 0.1598 1.2239 0.4264 0.3169 0.1330 0.0656 -0.1506 0.0054 -0.1529 0.1099 -0.0885 0.0205 -0.0223 0.0903 -0.1300 -0.2664 -0.1482
-0.1733 0.0003 0.1082 1.3162 -0.0670 0.0066 0.0021 0.0393 -0.0042 0.0098 0.0107 -0.0181 -0.0337 -0.0122 0.0031 -0.0094 -0.0108 -0.0108 0.0013
-0.7322 0.0033 0.0645 1.1529 -0.2147 0.0190 -0.0209 0.0139 -0.0001 -0.0230 0.0161 -0.0504 -0.1447 -0.0679 -0.0818 -0.0801 -0.0501 -0.0482 0.0457
-1.0635 0.0080 0.0739 1.0519 -0.3355 -0.0209 -0.0669 0.1251 -0.1372 -0.1072 0.1016 -0.0319 0.1304 0.0744 0.1163 0.0977 -0.0729 -0.0353 0.0652
-1.9252 0.0286 0.0800 0.6756 -0.6439 -0.0078 -0.1679 0.0798 0.1794 0.1869 -0.0553 0.0914 -0.3944 0.0835 0.1362 -0.0261 -0.0149 -0.1673 0.1289
-1.9758 0.0388 0.1007 0.6569 -0.7516 -0.4516 -0.2554 0.1067 0.1319 0.0072 0.2036 -0.2467 0.1625 -0.2116 -0.1984 -0.1704 -0.0593 0.5015 0.2786
0.7956 0.0080 0.1233 1.2026 0.3339 -0.0268 0.0494 0.0127 -0.0326 -0.0700 0.0176 -0.1803 0.1550 0.1256 0.1419 0.1315 0.0067 0.0931 -0.0412
Appendix 14.3: EAS 33-2006
STRESJD COOK LEV c o v DIFF DIFBO DIFBl DIFB2 DIFB3 DIFB4 DIFB5 tDIFB6 DIFB7 DIFB8 DIFB9 DIFBIO DIFB11 DIFB& D IFB il
-0.28183 0.00365 0.29883 1.65545 -0.22512 -0.08332 0.06607 -0.02148 -0.06553 -0.00107 -0.03265 -0.04089 -0.09619 0.08083 0.09312 0.07748 0.01927 0.05527 0.05988
0.07327 0.00003 0.06411 1.25673 0.02133 0.0093 0.00122 0.00302 0.00231 0.00606 0.00511 -0.00877 -0.00309 0.00171 -0.00164 0.00403 -0.00905 0.00005 -0.00537
-1.59424 0.05213 0.17947 0.88446 -0.86447 0.10556 -0.42408 0.07598 0.0931 0.02682 0.47899 -0.03829 -0.25156 -0.00909 -0.14524 0.21809 0.20098 -0.26055 -0.23457
1.87541 0.06601 0.16824 0.72771 0.9791 0.41207 0.53898 -0.17413 -0.14184 -0.1759 -0.63354 -0.21121 -0.18046 0.11169 0.11684 0.28349 -0.40996 -0.28942 0.11254
-0.91666 0.01334 0.14827 1.18767 -0.43217 -0.02266 -0.14777 0.03382 -0.11785 0.09498 0.15505 0.23196 0.0883 0.08046 -0.01021 -0.12076 0.1784 -0.14577 -0.04081
-1.06209 0.01038 0.09407 1.07194 -0.38169 0.11756 0.03025 -0.03318 -0.09737 -0.16536 0.08325 -0.05136 0.08016 0.11098 0.16252 -0.01319 -0.13921 -0.08279 -0.11174
-0.342 0.00165 0.13522 1.33433 -0.15135 0.05973 -0.02053 0.02667 -0.01185 -0.01701 0.05521 0.02001 0.05846 0.03215 -0.01603 0.07088 -0.03709 -0.06089 -0.04774
0.23536 0.00131 0.19876 1.45615 0.13494 0.01372 0.02121 0.02554 -0.0469 0.04199 0.02018 0.06584 -0.02544 -0.05262 -0.06036 -0.06271 0.02275 0.00304 -0.03164
1.17436 0.01472 0.1072 1.03812 0.45544 -0.03463 0.05536 -0.19215 0.07766 0.03488 0.14242 0.05709 -0.01388 -0.02219 -0.06057 0.10107 -0.01641 0.07698 0.09785
-0.04644 0.00002 0.10158 1.31038 -0.01731 -0.00089 0.00158 0.00436 0.00627 0.00576 -0.00061 0.00191 -0.00921 -0.00152 0.00178 -0.00486 -0.00092 -0.00107 0.00185
-0.31695 0.00242 0.20077 1.44718 -0.18311 0.01951 0.04674 -0.06352 -0.10656 -0.09661 -0.05807 0.03966 -0.0005 -0.04559 -0.02113 0.00269 -0.06528 0.00008 0.00634
-0.26881 0.00047 0.06818 1.24842 -0.08078 0.02101 0.01239 0.03334 0.01316 0.02549 -0.01208 -0.01148 -0.00007 -0.01424 0.01174 -0.0007 -0.01036 -0.01339 -0.04082
0.53405 0.00281 0.10001 1.2462 0.19766 0.04382 0.04825 -0.11264 0.02761 -0.04011 0.05827 -0.05865 -0.04503 -0.04664 -0.02799 -0.00695 -0.04105 0.03692 -0.05625
0.09651 0.00013 0.13722 1.36334 0.04308 -0.0025 -0.00513 0.01416 -0.01649 0.01966 0.00046 -0.01028 -0.00582 0.00548 -0.00789 0.00108 0.01516 -0.0034 0.00215
-1.18091 0.01885 0.13054 1.05638 -0.51548 0.00901 -0.03141 -0.29261 0.14138 0.19595 0.01353 0.06679 0.05174 0.09652 -0.02835 0.12454 -0.1203 -0.10923 0.1726
-0.41414 0.00143 0.08624 1.25192 -0.14102 0.04599 -0.01612 -0.05512 0.08167 0.02775 0.0126 -0.05266 -0.00499 -0.02125 -0.00649 0.03118 -0.04817 -0.02416 -0.05003
-0.59434 0.00329 0.09514 1.22545 -0.21394 -0.065 -0.08071 0.04023 0.07475 0.09709 0.05329 -0.06586 0.02108 -0.00455 -0.0393 -0.00663 0.00178 0.07464 -0.00629
0.80315 0.00468 0.07554 1.14353 0.25545 -0.07126 -0.05139 -0.0753 -0.08009 -0.10505 0.01224 0.03947 0.00608 0.06433 0.06821 0.06672 0.04253 0.05779 0.09105
0.07149 0.0001 0.17867 1.43394 0.03798 0.00684 0.00345 -0.00544 0.00165 -0.00895 0.00757 -0.00291 0.01785 -0.01202 -0.01787 -0.00877 -0.0006 -0.00875 0.00489
1.28641 0.02121 0.12499 1.00337 0.54764 -0.19878 -0.15239 -0.06593 0.21901 -0.03291 -0.0971 0.22188 -0.05749 0.00684 0.21445 -0.01353 0.18682 0.19217 0.06997
-0.73454 0.00699 0.12607 1.22547 -0.31213 0.04735 0.09256 0.01064 -0.18912 -0.12646 0.01233 -0.01454 0.02105 -0.08727 0.01643 0.04219 0.00873 -0.02662 -0.14997
0.54081 0.00187 0.06692 1.20222 0.16119 0.04068 0.02088 0.01264 -0.00335 -0.02494 0.05173 0.02957 -0.0088 -0.04296 -0.02654 0.02755 0.00533 0.0204 -0.08676
0.26145 0.00117 0.15669 1.38016 0.12715 0.00339 -0.01735 -0.08507 0.06053 -0.01802 0.00586 -0.06393 -0.02601 0.0101 0.00878 0.0146 -0.00637 0.01961 -0.00488
0.41331 0.00078 0.04745 1.20199 0.10405 -0.04246 -0.01625 -0.0337 0.02095 0.02162 0.01258 0.01667 -0.00183 0.0413 0.02764 0.02043 0.03277 0.02278 0.05778
-0.82907 0.01032 0.14192 1.21327 -0.37967 0.03124 -0.07304 -0.00641 -0.00785 -0.02678 0.24039 -0.06042 0.1571 0.15051 0.04234 0.15588 -0.09876 -0.1035 0.09443
0.24417 0.00072 0.11886 1.323 0.09982 0.01116 -0.00424 0.02539 0.01715 0.01142 0.02117 0.0575 -0.00183 -0.01984 -0.01621 -0.01126 0.02292 0.00672 -0.04151
0.83543 0.00428 0.06428 1.12125 0.24454 0.00503 -0.1082 0.01696 0.01673 0.11285 0.12546 -0.04752 -0.036 0.00258 -0.03661 0.02077 0.08261 0.00074 -0.03946
0.48757 0.0024 0.10196 1.25903 0.1824 0.01564 0.03114 0.0844 0.03907 0.0402 0.01602 0.04677 -0.00447 -0.02007 -0.02103 -0.00466 0.04561 0.01319 -0.06898
-1.07812 0.00729 0.06571 1.03931 -0.32 -0.0114 -0.06814 -0.10085 0.06425 -0.00818 -0.01782 -0.03355 -0.02787 -0.15439 -0.03927 0.01422 -0.08295 0.02111 0.02514
361
-1.37866 0.07309 0.27004 1.07626 -1.02077
0.55594 0.00327 0.10637 1.24955 0.2132
-2.10994 0.15494 0.25453 0.61105 -1.51543
0.68599 0.00912 0.17225 1.30439 0.35649
0.53924 0.00265 0.09326 1.2361 0.19187
-0.87421 0.02051 0.21602 1.29373 -0.53588
1.82084 0.04005 0.11902 0.7403 0.76058
0.90013 0.01288 0.14842 1.19438 0.42457
-0.86627 0.00799 0.10691 1.1582 -0.3341
-1.17583 0.03101 0.19121 1.11767 -0.66155
-0.2393 0.0002 0.03452 1.20785 -0.05221
0.2937 0.0006 0.07299 1.25196 0.09144
-0.26454 0.00067 0.0979 1.28996 -0.0966
-0.87534 0.00366 0.04978 1.09369 -0.22619
0.18192 0.00029 0.08937 1.28589 0.06312
1.0995 0.02358 0.17305 1.13614 0.57604
-0.45077 0.00174 0.08808 1.24771 -0.15532
1.92833 0.01895 0.05324 0.67075 0.52363
0.31928 0.00107 0.10534 1.29355 0.12161
-0.68851 0.00403 0.08764 1.19125 -0.23697
1.22469 0.04185 0.22157 1.12264 0.76948
0.48676 0.00241 0.1028 1.26034 0.18295
0.21751 0.00065 0.13184 1.34571 0.09471
0.76723 0.00883 0.14179 1.23495 0.35092
0.81068 0.01174 0.16218 1.24611 0.40495
-0.33421 0.00105 0.09594 1.27806 -0.12069
0.14367 0.00023 0.11059 1.31956 0.05626
0.98388 0.01288 0.12888 1.13868 0.42494
1.33072 0.02872 0.15074 1.00297 0.63804
0.12267 0.00013 0.08843 1.28847 0.04231
-0.83321 0.02069 0.23117 1.33432 -0.53794
0.12332 0.20676 -0.1693 0.17996 0.14499
0.10462 0.01298 0.04801 0.07623 0.01367
-0.07591 1.02916 0.34024 -0.11123 -0.28817
-0.00042 -0.15123 -0.12431 0.05973 0.00307
-0.01808 -0.03168 0.02121 0.0082 0.04081
-0.17027 0.11 0.03718 0.04624 -0.01734
0.31417 -0.16946 0.03696 0.17424 -0.08437
0.14474 -0.18839 -0.0887 0.14266 -0.08994
-0.11015 0.0639 -0.01721 -0.02557 0.16045
-0.35654 0.10185 0.08548 0.07149 0.12566
0.00309 -0.00215 -0.00755 -0.01145 -0.00501
-0.00681 -0.01436 -0.03818 0.03115 0.01386
-0.04156 -0.00926 -0.04096 0.01094 -0.02118
-0.01046 -0.03328 -0.04217 -0.00597 0.00289
0.00622 0.00773 0.0167 -0.00062 -0.00612
-0.07261 -0.04315 0.06658 0.15836 -0.2171
0.02396 -0.07371 -0.02942 0.05959 0.05307
-0.05501 -0.05369 0.07955 0.05743 0.0349
-0.00799 -0.00946 0.00745 0.03088 -0.01462
-0.07631 -0.01302 0.0506 -0.09931 0.01946
0.04036 -0.43661 0.14562 -0.10708 -0.09986
0.0347 -0.01677 -0.00803 0.05255 0.01048
0.02594 -0.00975 0.01578 0.01248 0.02182
0.09314 -0.06551 -0.1355 -0.05972 0.07801
-0.05368 -0.05011 0.02163 0.018 0.00747
-0.02752 -0.00585 -0.02137 -0.00583 0.0128
-0.01643 0.00311 0.0071 -0.03069 0.02037
-0.0324 0.14708 0.0848 -0.19514 -0.04977
0.08799 0.31641 0.05469 -0.32424 -0.30123
0.0071 0.0045 -0.02366 0.00906 0.00046
0.17089 0.13815 -0.39 0.09017 -0.31722
0.18652 -0.43519 -0.16012 -0.54337 -0.08018 0.15888 -0.04388 0.06858 -0.4406
-0.01985 0.02344 -0.03182 -0.04844 -0.05018 -0.00234 -0.05558 -0.08005 -0.00695
-0.91829 -0.12319 -0.04914 -0.13882 -0.28615 -0.73273 0.19934 -0.07393 -0.12732
0.16975 0.13188 0.17775 0.02214 0.09528 0.06279 -0.08079 0.06782 0.03526
0.04313 -0.06139 0.0938 0.03167 0.05998 0.07117 -0.04173 0.04689 0.05465
-0.02757 -0.09822 0.1728 0.28452 0.37222 0.33269 '0.08287 0.14441 -0.06433
0.12587 -0.15324 0.07849 0.39117 0.32204 0.36144 -0.19869 -0.36391 0.12633
0.20005 0.00126 -0.06501 -0.13016 0.11274 0.09284 -0.14748 0.10353 -0.24188
-0.07653 0.02381 -0.00777 -0.06287 -0.15384 -0.07071 0.12203 -0.0471 0.13393
0.01 -0.37982 -0.1395 0.09692 -0.03352 0.17817 0.13947 0.2159 0.26718
0.01688 0.00479 0.01416 -0.00027 0.01128 0.01505 -0.02138 -0.00794 0.00905
-0.00915 -0.01146 0.03581 0.02294 -0.00008 0.01355 0.01952 0.00756 0.00055
0.02018 0.01107 0.00853 -0.02426 0.01659 0.0019 -0.03016 0.06704 0.01399
0.0033 -0.10186 0.02137 -0.01581 -0.0542 0.04334 -0.06605 -0.03617 0.09312
-0.00746 0.02666 -0.00026 0.00112 0.01822 0.01672 0.01347 0.00869 -0.03142
0.06938 -0.21463 -0.01792 -0.16804 -0.09433 0.16904 0.02743 0.17063 0.01025
0.04681 0.01273 0.00755 0.0201 0.00646 -0.05046 -0.00846 -0.04452 -0.02147
-0.02438 -0.10458 0.31045 0.20845 0.02437 0.09474 0.18645 0.02123 -0.01335
0.01095 -0.0128 0.07195 -0.01754 0.0305 0.01387 0.02247 0.0374 -0.04504
-0.01713 0.08848 0.04678 -0.01523 0.00761 0.04618 0.10508 -0.02781 0.03585
0.42513 -0.08512 -0.04164 -0.03529 0.09909 -0.1143 0.20119 -0.18161 0.05688
-0.03485 -0.03839 -0.03972 -0.04186 -0.08073 0.01868 0.03586 -0.07103 0.03451
-0.02251 0.00216 -0.03819 -0.02856 -0.00439 -0.0455 0.03217 -0.02994 -0.03113
0.03441 -0.06128 -0.08062 0.02826 -0.05552 -0.00741 -0.10494 -0.01574 0.00505
-0.04144 -0.02098 -0.12033 -0.05372 0.19572 -0.10653 0.1111 0.12626 -0.11821
0.02102 0.06819 0.01843 -0.02371 0.00434 0.0078 0.03448 -0.00618 0.00478
-0.00182 0.02398 -0.00205 0.01247 -0.00119 -0.00603 0.01952 0.00204 0.02516
-0.18179 0.0098 0.22406 0.07197 0.06315 0.06508 -0.09458 0.08303 0.12644
-0.01673 -0.10293 0.0456 0.13284 -0.05238 -0.00591 -0.29819 0.04841 0.1925
-0.00973 0.00578 -0.00805 -0.00256 -0.00244 0.01615 -0.00027 0.00446 -0.01258
-0.06637 -0.03243 -0.05571 -0.16155 -0.03486 -0.10854 -0.28117 0.02288 -0.17092
362
1.30023 0.01498 0.09094 0.9703 0.46013
1.20567 0.04783 0.24596 1.15908 0.8226
-0.88263 0.00589 0.07864 1.12142 -0.28701
-1.54142 0.01248 0.05492 0.8417 -0.42151
-0.27046 0.0011 0.14169 1.3549 -0.12324
0.77231 0.0049 0.08496 1.16366 0.26153
-0.42004 0.00128 0.07561 1.23678 -0.13329
-0.64366 0.00577 0.1338 1.26341 -0.28352
1.00856 0.00678 0.06974 1.06863 0.30836
0.40621 0.00281 0.15642 1.35557 0.19746
-0.17687 0.00027 0.08871 1.28534 -0.06112
-0.92022 0.0104 0.12065 1.15424 -0.38147
1.67085 0.01785 0.06692 0.79038 0.5055
-0.83743 0.02017 0.22596 1.32463 -0.53114
-1.55045 0.03043 0.12372 0.87582 -0.65912
-1.53796 0.03559 0.14219 0.8928 -0.71293
-0.21369 0.00041 0.09249 1.28758 -0.07557
0.71443 0.0062 0.11956 1.22343 0.29393
-0.62633 0.00506 0.12573 1.25738 -0.26546
-0.33679 0.00134 0.11655 1.30722 -0.13612
0.9942 0.01134 0.11396 1.11858 0.39868
-0.47683 0.00152 0.06999 1.21912 -0.14538
0.22624 0.00058 0.11253 1.31548 0.08952
1.65103 0.03246 0.11761 0.8232 0.68214
-0.78273 0.00939 0.14422 1.23274 -0.36197
1.02241 0.01537 0.13962 1.13453 0.46445
0.33127 0.00139 0.12383 1.31883 0.13886
-0.35861 0.00201 0.14653 1.34899 -0.16702
0.54262 0.00251 0.08768 1.22808 0.1866
-1.31432 0.02511 0.13836 1.00103 -0.59628
-1.33515 0.0147 0.0852 0.9508 -0.4561
0.14879 -0.00504 -0.09568 0.07773 -0.08869
-0.03935 0.01785 0.03356 0.24344 0.45658
-0.10226 -0.02398 -0.00121 -0.03954 0.09464
0.00496 0.15781 -0.01187 -0.03821 -0.02258
-0.00757 0.03206 0.06162 -0.03623 -0.01771
0.15522 0.08874 0.06773 -0.03438 -0.08958
-0.03827 0.03081 -0.04924 -0.00119 -0.06027
-0.12826 -0.05185 0.00605 0.03998 0.0487
-0.05801 -0.07456 0.07075 -0.0179 0.05644
0.12017 -0.07016 0.02882 -0.01114 0.08058
0.00893 0.01554 -0.01176 -0.00606 -0.03161
-0.16879 0.05024 0.24829 -0.07391 0.12307
-0.01222 0.12962 -0.0052 -0.01348 -0.03003
-0.00131 -0.01041 0.01149 0.03687 0.00684
-0.07088 -0.03655 0.009 -0.06787 0.12069
-0.15062 -0.00281 0.23314 -0.02105 0.31397
-0.02 0 0.00089 0.00311 0.00009
0.06265 0.03283 -0.07516 -0.08466 0.01678
0.10949 -0.01345 -0.11354 0.01212 0.05072
-0.03016 -0.03564 -0.0281 0.04298 -0.03893
0.0806 0.02876 0.04571 -0.03787 0.08145
0.04145 -0.02408 -0.02998 0.04442 -0.01656
0.0289 0.04716 0.00955 -0.02853 0.02003
0.29545 0.20737 0.22454 -0.00928 0.1958
-0.04707 -0.08113 0.11794 -0.11211 0.00314
-0.08489 -0.19866 -0.0475 0.17729 0.05709
-0.00095 -0.02305 -0.01236 -0.01121 -0.00361
0.00764 -0.02344 -0.03224 0.01393 0.0218
-0.04055 0.00646 -0.00903 -0.01245 0.03577
-0.03361 0.10781 -0.05974 -0.1586 -0.10844
0.09915 0.09896 0.1993 -0.2503 0.01059
0.00277 0.08179 -0.0052 0.17652 0.05841 -0.06127 -0.17037 -0.00745 -0.04826
0.01039 0.10643 0.38715 0.10281 0.03788 -0.14441 0.23815 -0.21524 0.21279
-0.02519 0.1117 0.05184 0.01173 0.03634 0.0838 0.13289 -0.0394 0.06138
-0.09773 -0.11112 0.08953 0.11844 -0.02228 0.0393 0.10747 -0.15347 -0.05733
-0.03024 -0.05493 0.01643 0.0078 -0.03421 -0.01363 0.03577 -0.0291 -0.0051
-0.02874 -0.01296 -0.04076 -0.0551 -0.01923 -0.01932 ,-0.11687 -0.09518 -0.01541
0.02197 -0.04854 0.01504 -0.01203 0.02346 -0.00873 0.00842 0.01086 0.02978
-0.0422 0.12481 0.05247 0.0817 -0.02065 -0.12952 0.148 -0.04978 0.14173
-0.09488 0.02793 -0.06245 0.02479 -0.00287 -0.07094 -0.01018 0.06781 0.14296
0.03102 0.02903 -0.02902 0.00888 0.02749 0.05391 -0.02024 -0.10375 -0.07553
-0.00137 -0.00523 -0.02239 -0.00942 0.01843 0.00277 0.00211 -0.00355 -0.03293
-0.15582 0.14922 0.05438 0.00494 -0.00778 -0.08254 0.23715 -0.0384 0.09387
-0.27392 -0.01503 -0.13822 -0.06361 0.05384 0.03569 -0.16973 0.18539 0.11394
-0.02501 0.16271 0.2075 0.36086 0.35419 0.32511 0.12467 -0.14646 -0.09457
-0.1243 0.21996 0.13822 0.0286 -0.27365 0.15585 -0.06972 0.10255 -0.03705
-0.23779 0.2864 0.09935 0.00164 -0.3233 -0.04614 0.06214 0.10744 -0.00048
-0.011 -0.01559 -0.01255 -0.0417 -0.0245 -0.03669 -0.01208 0.04519 -0.01629
0.06532 -0.07003 -0.05187 0.03318 0.09409 0.02819 0.00788 -0.09987 0.04806
0.08303 0.02996 -0.1082 -0.04069 0.04961 0.03901 -0.09628 -0.04862 -0.1237
0.03553 -0.0183 -0.06774 -0.05804 -0.04463 -0.04584 0.02769 0.00555 0.016 88
-0.11692 0.06212 0.19363 -0.0188 0.01836 0.06853 -0.07604 0.04578 -0.1055
-0.01115 0.06409 0.02824 0.03017 0.01391 -0.02126 -0.02906 -0.04525 -0.04356
-0.02311 -0.00001 -0.00482 0.0398 0.02489 0.01113 -0.03097 -0.00609 -0.00829
0.04164 0.04603 -0.13763 -0.0862 0.03888 -0.19224 -0.16663 -0.23384 0.00619
0.22138 -0.03773 0.07368 -0.02281 -0.02728 -0.04768 -0.04257 0.09946 -0.05791
-0.09351 0.09703 -0.02905 0.18051 0.04407 -0.09647 0.19452 -0.00037 0.04915
0.0157 -0.04927 0.03625 0.02342 0.04291 -0.01397 0.03123 -0.03696 0.04206
-0.03462 0.06069 -0.02373 0.03946 -0.05686 0.03445 -0.01712 -0.05673 0.05826
0.00671 0.04587 -0.05291 -0.10917 -0.12156 -0.0648 0.03965 0.0511 0.04329
-0.16014 0.03421 -0.39111 -0.30465 -0.22622 -0.22131 -0.15326 0.2528 -0.15336
-0.09774 -0.05808 0.06655 0.12497 0.12182 0.00436 -0.05447 -0.14128 -0.10217
363
0.51205 0.00711 0.2175 1.43146 0.3144
0.42924 0.00405 0.18868 1.40325 0.23726
-1.46087 0.01632 0.07944 0.89139 -0.48156
-0.06741 0.00006 0.12942 1.35215 -0.02901
-0.53066 0.00587 0.18146 1.36584 -0.28553
0.52614 0.00334 0.11876 1.27353 0.21527
-0.16142 0.00017 0.0698 1.26018 -0.04909
3.16928 0.15422 0.14445 0.19908 1.56589
-1.51916 0.03932 0.15649 0.91112 -0.74922
-0.743 0.00461 0.08611 1.17379 -0.25338
0.48 0.00077 0.03346 1.1737 0.10343
-0.31661 .0.00044 0.04594 1.21387 -0.07849
-0.67949 0.0025 0.05672 1.15721 -0.18662
-0.22236 0.00039 0.08221 1.27231 -0.07372
-0.6307 0.00375 0.09608 1.21735 -0.22834
0.05008 0.16754 -0.01452 -0.15141 -0.10875
-0.00215 0.04951 0.08093 0.04159 0.0799
-0.0861 -0.03011 0.07911 -0.15965 -0.10926
-0.01552 -0.00316 0.00378 0.015 -0.00144
-0.03206 -0.03557 0.05048 0.10625 0.11838
0.06369 -0.01424 0.01372 -0.03645 -0.01951
0.0184 0.00231 -0.01563 0.00455 0.01141
-0.01928 -0.46578 -0.15472 -0.22833 -0.75992
-0.56524 -0.21307 -0.10601 0.31652 0.10418
-0.01405 -0.00546 0.13626 0.00528 0.00063
0.00717 0.02412 0.00191 -0.00115 0.01613
-0.01401 -0.03508 0.0285 0.00241 0.02155
-0.02269 -0.0699 0.04592 0.04079 0.0596
-0.04656 -0.01361 0.01132 0.01072 -0.00361















































Appendix 14.4: EAS 33-2007
ST RESID COOK LEV c o v DIFFIT DIFBETAO DIFBl DIFB2 DIFB3 DIFB4 DIFB5 DIFB6 DIFB7 DIFB8 DIFB9 DIFB10 DIFBl 1 DIFB12 DIFB13
0.4595 0.0091 0.2878 1.5861 0.3552 0.1218 -0.1265 -0.0031 0.0994 -0.0078 0.0663 0.0274 0.1427 -0.1395 -0.1707 -0.1230 -0.0491 -0.0772 -0.0653
0.7244 0.0041 0.0812 1.1743 0.2393 0.1117 0.0382 -0.0523 -0.0281 -0.0553 0.0654 -0.1335 -0.0271 0.0036 -0.0226 0.0498 -0.1572 0.0313 -0.0721
-1.2703 0.0718 0.2933 1.1673 -1.0101 0.0220 -0.7171 0.0988 0.2630 -0.0245 0.5743 -0.0417 -0.2080 -0.0460 -0.1752 0.1232 0.2532 -0.1996 -0.1452
1.8018 0.0574 0.1608 0.7604 0.9109 0.4005 0.5213 -0.1365 -0.1332 -0.0638 -0.6355 -0.0241 -0.2564 0.1037 0.1238 0.1995 , -0.3043 -0.3434 0.0379
0.1998 0.0008 0.1785 1.4268 0.1062 0.0044 0.0226 -0.0107 0.0419 -0.0232 -0.0343 -0.0469 -0.0122 -0.0151 -0.0052 0.0347 -0.0378 0.0351 0.0027
-1.1720 0.0105 0.0793 1.0140 -0.3845 0.1158 0.0000 -0.0511 -0.0256 0.0119 0.1058 -0.0312 0.0678 0.1612 0.2196 0.0628 -0.1401 -0.0925 -0.1224
0.4092 0.0023 0.1303 1.3170 0.1771 -0.0627 0.0115 -0.0671 0.0432 0.0286 -0.0690 -0.0193 -0.0578 -0.0164 0.0158 -0.0590 0.0539 0.0540 0.0544
0.7218 0.0097 0.1665 1.2850 0.3668 0.0604 0.0575 0.0909 -0.0909 0.1359 0.0899 0.1139 -0.0837 -0.1540 -0.1296 -0.1750 0.0623 -0.0153 -0.0937
1.5690 0.0284 0.1143 0.8589 0.6366 -0.1217 0.0607 -0.2715 0.2352 0.1585 0.0801 0.1029 -0.0289 0.0146 -0.0786 0.1345 0.0720 0.1374 0.1538
-1.4903 0.0327 0.1396 0.9128 -0.6824 0.1033 0.1754 0.2091 -0.0047 0.1922 -0.0752 0.1350 -0.4733 -0.0457 0.0606 -0.1934 -0.0841 -0.1849 0.0200
0.0027 0.0000 0.0939 1.3019 0.0010 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001
-0.1086 0.0002 0.1367 1.3642 -0.0484 0.0118 0.0037 -0.0045 0.0212 0.0312 -0.0051 0.0012 -0.0067 -0.0077 0.0095 0.0026 -0.0071 -0.0058 -0.0206
0.8675 0.0121 0.1499 1.2092 0.4118 0.0630 0.0848 -0.2522 0.0602 -0.0759 0.0976 -0.2028 -0.0862 -0.0948 -0.0996 -0.0116 -0.0672 0.0903 -0.0994
0.0946 0.0002 0.1550 1.3949 0.0457 -0.0037 -0.0111 0.0216 0.0000 0.0239 0.0072 -0.0159 -0.0076 -0.0018 -0.0086 -0.0050 0.0151 0.0019 -0.0003
1.2754 0.0132 0.0838 0.9742 0.4316 0.0053 -0.2130 0.1703 0.0445 -0.0349 0.1028 0.0942 -0.0281 -0.0808 0.0122 -0.0574 0.1647 0.0449 -0.1421
0.5246 0.0047 0.1553 1.3284 0.2541 -0.0488 0.0290 0.0915 -0.1889 -0.1346 0.0108 0.0152 0.0284 0.0385 0.0130 -0.0208 0.0420 0.0209 0.0790
-1.2401 0.0135 0.0898 0.9941 -0.4356 -0.1377 -0.1999 0.0861 0.1627 0.1397 0.1565 -0.0943 0.1073 -0.0138 -0.0700 0.0019 -0.0430 0.2092 -0.0275
0.5804 0.0046 0.1305 1.2778 0.2517 0.0274 -0.0424 -0.0906 -0.0631 -0.0243 -0.0323 0.0897 -0.0185 0.0900 0.0150 0.0401 0.0665 -0.1317 0.0890
-0.2484 0.0012 0.1736 1.4124 -0.1295 -0.0084 -0.0018 -0.0247 0.0122 0.0040 -0.0288 0.0009 -0.0640 0.0424 0.0698 0.0447 -0.0187 0.0298 -0.0271
1.3633 0.0290 0.1462 0.9813 0.6415 -0.2281 -0.1919 -0.1683 0.2647 0.1339 -0.2017 0.3741 -0.0139 0.1806 0.2811 0.1583 0.2809 0.1118 0.1541
-0.8831 0.0070 0.0914 1.1355 -0.3119 0.0179 -0.0916 -0.0246 0.0550 0.0051 0.0906 0.0310 0.0297 -0.1045 0.0698 0.0723 0.0936 -0.0218 -0.1840
0.5104 0.0021 0.0819 1.2293 0.1692 0.0403 0.0015 0.0099 0.0323 0.0054 0.0642 0.0167 -0.0103 -0.0553 -0.0211 0.0445 0.0090 0.0249 -0.0912
-0.7692 0.0037 0.0651 1.1429 -0.2266 0.0202 0.0539 -0.0059 -0.0927 0.0123 0.0145 0.0736 0.0310 -0.0454 0.0343 0.0136 -0.0637 -0.0321 0.0034
-0.5713 0.0021 0.0670 1.1970 -0.1705 0.0794 0.0418 0.0736 -0.0545 -0.0488 0.0065 -0.0502 -0.0003 -0.0806 -0.0341 -0.0370 -0.0687 -0.0349 -0.0980
-0.0692 0.0001 0.1690 1.4196 -0.0354 -0.0015 -0.0072 -0.0067 -0.0042 0.0059 0.0204 -0.0007 0.0109 0.0136 0.0053 0.0100 -0.0082 -0.0051 0.0105
0.4668 0.0035 0.1491 1.3331 0.2200 0.0186 -0.0075 0.0503 0.0486 0.0356 0.0295 0.1139 0.0020 0.0409 0.1109 0.0202 0.0459 0.0097 -0.0799
0.8272 0.0061 0.0906 1.1535 0.2906 -0.0116 -0.1580 -0.0885 0.1014 0.0806 0.1499 -0.0705 -0.0134 0.0540 0.0694 0.0921 0.0619 0.0508 -0.0515
-0.2955 0.0008 0.0962 1.2858 -0.1069 -0.0168 -0.0126 -0.0460 -0.0267 -0.0261 -0.0168 -0.0200 0.0066 0.0121 0.0049 -0.0124 -0.0174 -0.0072 0.0424
-1.2720 0.0112 0.0720 0.9666 -0.3971 0.0017 -0.0326 -0.0678 -0.0564 -0.1366 -0.0282 -0.0521 0.0209 -0.1978 -0.0538 0.0079 -0.0979 0.0121 0.0036
-0.5217 0.0031 0.1144 1.2701 -0.2088 0.0114 0.0708 -0.0224 0.0013 0.0719 -0.0266 0.0245 0.0239 0.0435 -0.0015 0.0813 0.0386 -0.0568 -0.0395
0.3519 0.0019 0.1427 1.3463 0.1612 0.0151 0.0469 0.0295 0.0271 -0.0619 -0.0204 -0.0540 -0.0247 -0.0480 -0.0018 -0.0293 -0.0636 0.0543 -0.0047
365
-0.6764 0.0142 0.2375 1.4115 -0.4455
0.5316 0.0034 0.1196 1.2750 0.2186
1.5424 0.0158 0.0692 0.8468 0.4740
0.3986 0.0023 0.1365 1.3282 0.1775
1.9778 0.0512 0.1270 0.6614 0.8635
0.9893 0.0108 0.1098 1.1160 0.3883
0.4311 0.0021 0.1106 1.2843 0.1691
-1.0432 0.0219 0.1771 1.1663 -0.5550
0.7873 0.0032 0.0534 1.1247 0.2103
1.0353 0.0059 0.0573 1.0471 0.2869
0.7683 0.0052 0.0900 1.1715 0.2687
-20137 0.0334 0.0850 0.6361 -0.6974
0.2081 0.0003 0.0778 1.2696 0.0670
-0.1746 0.0006 0.1778 1.4280 -0.0925
0.1812 0.0003 0.0866 1.2843 0.0618
1.5756 0.0121 0.0509 0.8225 0.4161
0.5604 0.0034 0.1083 1.2525 0.2172
-0.5692 0.0031 0.0966 1.2350 -0.2068
2.1556 0.0615 0.1283 0.5760 0.9514
-0.8502 0.0106 0.1396 1.2031 -0.3855
0.3273 0.0011 0.1047 1.2935 0.1243
0.6196 0.0056 0.1383 1.2779 0.2787
-1.1229 0.0202 0.1490 1.0995 -0.5328
0.9226 0.0067 0.0813 1.1108 0.3056
-0.4057 0.0015 0.0943 1.2662 -0.1452
1.2665 0.0220 0.1320 1.0170 0.5577
0.8541 0.0144 0.1747 1.2462 0,4491
0.2498 0.0005 0.0887 1.2807 0.0863
-0.6822 0.0105 0.1916 1.3356 -0.3821
-0.5914 0.0038 0.1083 1.2448 -0.2294
2.2697 0.0921 0.1622 0.5231 1.1700
-0.8967 0.0060 0.0771 1.1154 -0.2887
-1.1447 0.0141 0.1077 1.0503 -0.4451
0.9825 0.0265 0.2191 1.2466 0.6098
0.0198 0.2960 0.0755 -0.0375 -0.0836
-0.0035 -0.0814 -0.0205 0.0295 0.0595
0.0145 -0.0063 0.1489 -0.0721 0.0580
-0.0208 -0.1025 -0.0669 0.0285 0.0363
0.2991 -0.2068 0.0792 0.2213 -0.0444
0.1843 -0.0576 -0.0357 -0.0352 -0.0923
0.0594 -0.0251 0.0451 -0.0139 -0.0707
-0.3006 0.0870 0.0383 0.0421 0.0324
-0.0105 -0.0109 0.0381 0.0465 -0.0039
-0.0609 -0.0577 0.0123 0.0695 0.0020
0.1356 0.0273 0.0759 -0.0269 0.0158
-0.0922 -0.0870 -0.0438 -0.0676 -0.0963
0.0120 0.0095 0.0160 0.0023 0.0002
0.0166 -0.0038 -0.0572 0.0054 -0.0360
-0.0100 0.0233 0.0123 -0.0209 -0.0217
-0.0541 -0.0374 -0.0097 0.0166 -0.0860
-0.0081 0.0064 -0.0110 0.0059 -0.0281
-0.0554 0.0176 0.0661 -0.1040 -0.0307
0.2032 -0.1750 -0.0368 -0.0375 -0.4821
-0.0408 0.0640 0.0599 -0.1858 -0.0349
0.0424 -0.0130 0.0220 -0.0087 0.0047
0.0488 -0.0555 -0.0516 -0.0446 0.0819
0.0047 0.0136 0.0127 0.0334 -0.0581
0.0780 -0.0269 0.0787 -0.0156 -0.0179
0.0489 0.0107 -0.0056 0.0705 -0.0232
-0.0838 0.1319 0.0810 -0.0990 -0.0363
0.0054 0.1002 0.1389 -0.1474 -0.0099
0.0069 0.0132 -0.0518 0.0297 0.0087
0.1076 0.0807 -0.2661 0.1221 -0.1517
-0.0514 0.0287 0.0488 -0.0971 -0.0166
-0.0216 0.1444 -0.0069 0.2193 0.3969
-0.0910 0.0641 -0.0015 -0.0780 -0.0040
0.0780 0.2312 -0.0152 -0.1494 -0.1497








































































































0.9417 0.0089 0.1018 1.1256 0.3535
-0.2376 0.0006 0.1059 1.3066 -0.0908
0.9857 0.0093 0.0973 1.1045 0.3609
-0.5882 0.0063 0.1647 1.3252 -0.2964
-0.6603 0.0061 0.1343 1.2604 -0.2917
-0.4207 0.0016 0.0920 1.2604 -0.1486
-0.3003 0.0007 0.0847 1.2692 -0.1013
-0.9384 0.0237 0.2164 1.2645 -0.5767
-0.6896 0.0046 0.0981 1.2048 -0.2529
0.0865 0.0001 0.1521 1.3904 0.0413
-1.2093 0.0140 0.0971 1.0134 -0.4436
-1.4016 0.0170 0.0891 0.9223 -0.4915
-0.9272 0.0136 0.1476 1.1828 -0.4361
0.1902 0.0003 0.0892 1.2871 0.0660
1.1428 0.0154 0.1168 1.0596 0.4662
-2.1917 0.0488 0.1026 0.5574 -0.8474
-0.4630 0.0023 0.1074 1.2733 -0.1785
-0.9128 0.0132 0.1481 1.1892 -0.4302
-1.0015 0.0076 0.0790 1.0801 -0.3271
-0.6083 0.0084 0.1931 1.3627 -0.3423
0.4563 0.0030 0.1367 1.3167 0.2035
-0.6060 0.0069 0.1689 1.3262 -0.3106
0.5413 0.0031 0.1047 1.2523 0.2057
-1.1923 0.0152 0.1074 1.0296 -0.4633
-1.9310 0.0337 0.0926 0.6760 -0.6995
0.9830 0.0226 0.1968 1.2181 0.5633
0.8294 0.0150 0.1873 1.2731 0.4577
-1.1480 0.0134 0.1024 1.0442 -0.4337
-0.3335 0.0016 0.1348 1.3372 -0.1473
0.2652 0.0009 0.1224 1.3280 0.1104
0.4815 0.0027 0.1156 1.2809 0.1939
0.1882 0.0002 0.0677 1.2575 0.0564
-1.1422 0.0273 0.1820 1.1239 -0.6205
0.1607 0.0547 0.1406 -0.0295 -0.0180
-0.0290 0.0046 -0.0377 0.0472 -0.0146
-0.0517 -0.0833 0.0115 0.0262 0.0947
-0.2087 0.0533 -0.0586 0.0297 -0.0832
-0.0500 0.1041 -0.0047 -0.0755 -0.1124
-0.0637 0.0002 0.0767 -0.0236 0.0547
0.0022 -0.0232 -0.0107 0.0004 -0.0347
-0.0116 0.0333 0.0043 0.0505 -0.0183
-0.0530 0.0014 0.0348 -0.0167 0.0212
0.0086 -0.0004 -0.0181 -0.0035 -0.0123
-0.0677 0.0653 -0.0005 -0.1101 -0.0672
-0.1049 0.0246 -0.1548 0.0070 -0.0915
0.1867 0.0513 -0.0440 -0.0436 0.1382
0.0172 0.0187 0.0098 -0.0195 0.0197
0.1608 0.1063 -0.0223 0.0348 0.1111
-0.1411 -0.2619 0.1326 0.2332 0.2002
-0.0730 -0.1085 -0.0019 0.0544 -0.0221
-0.2142 -0.0417 -0.1228 -0.1003 0.0289
-0.0815 0.0001 0.0953 -0.1669 0.0284
0.0739 0.1365 0.0752 -0.1045 -0.0045
-0.0174 -0.0302 0.0033 -0.0182 0.0487
-0.0165 -0.0491 -0.0686 0.0831 0.0094
-0.0578 -0.0561 -0.0122 0.0887 0.0788
-0.1962 -0.0264 -0.0286 0.0126 0.0100
-0.1194 -0.0429 -0.0478 -0.1550 0.1608
-0.0614 0.2249 0.0854 -0.3039 -0.1704
-0.0819 0.0099 0.0512 0.1345 0.2919
-0.0635 -0.0353 0.1730 -0.1071 -0.1605
-0.0754 -0.0262 -0.0530 0.0877 0.0365
0.0224 0.0202 -0.0249 -0.0428 -0.0317
0.0509 0.0013 -0.0365 -0.0236 -0.0294
-0.0203 -0.0018 0.0088 -0.0061 -0.0184





































































































0.1192 0.0003 0.1598 1.4015 0.0587
-0.5296 0.0030 0.1082 1.2598 -0.2052
-0.1748 0.0002 0.0645 1.2543 -0.0511
-0.3953 0.0011 0.0739 1.2405 -0.1240
-0.3256 0.0008 0.0800 1.2594 -0.1065
0.0933 0.0001 0.1007 1.3100 0.0346
-0.2775 0.0010 0.1233 1.3278 -0.1161
0.0436 0.0183 0.0090 -0.0207 0.0007
0.0202 0.0065 0.1203 -0.0130 0.0301
0.0045 -0.0050 0.0033 0.0000 -0.0055
-0.0077 -0.0247 0.0462 -0.0507 -0.0396
-0.0013 -0.0278 0.0132 0.0297 0.0309
0.0208 0.0118 -0.0049 -0.0061 -0.0003























Appendix 14.5: Voluntary Risk Reporting-2006
ST
RESID COOK LEV c o v DIFF DIFBO DIFBl DIFB2 DIFB3 DIFB4 DIFB5 DIFB6 DIFB7 DIFB8 DIFB9 DIFB10 DIFBl 1 DIFB12 DIFB13 DIFB14
0.5462
-0.3614 0.0016 0.1186 1.5114 -0.1517 -0.0795 -0.0140 -0.0252 -0.0018 -0.0495 -0.0098 0.0487 0.0085 -0.0055 0.0182 -0.0411 0.0855 0.0134 0.0264 0.0799
0.3351
0.3138
0.7903 0.0304 0.3131 1.5236 0.6750 -0.0774 0.3105 -0.0600 0.0731 -0.1374 -0.3607 -0.1720 -0.2298 -0.0107 0.0508 0.1568 -0.1192 0.1705 0.1045 0.1691
0.7924 0.0174 0.2241 1.3907 0.5098 0.0157 0.0296 -0.0208 0.1404 0.2244 -0.1904 0.1334 -0.1386 -0.1844 -0.2417 0.0314 -0.0298 0.0200 0.1709 -0.1577
-1.2934 0.1018 0.3506 0.9263 -1.2581 0.3621 -0.3296 0.2456 0.0087 -0.0485 0.4750 0.1744 0.4029 0.1090 -0.4742 0.3753 -0.2433 -0.4699 -0.2823 0.0575
-1.6653 0.1261 0.3018 0.5331 -1.4226 0.0324 -0.1423 -0.2579 0.4282 -0.3682 -0.0708 -0.6759 0.1978 0.6442 0.6430 0.7443 -0.1315 -0.2174 0.4213 -0.0104
0.0508 0.0001 0.1880 1.7207 0.0285 0.0007 -0.0016 -0.0153 0.0078 0.0060 0.0073 0.0055 0.0030 0.0012 -0.0015 0.0097 -0.0035 -0.0001 0.0108 -0.0015
0.1745 . -
0.0359 0.0001 0.3156 2.0501 0.0306 -0.0001 -0.0077 0.0111 0.0143 0.0114 0.0115 -0.0094 0.0097 0.0085 0.0047 -0.0007 0.0129 -0.0061 -0.0011 0.0020
0.2628 0.0008 0.1117 1.5334 0.1065 -0.0235 -0.0357 -0.0463 -0.0092 -0.0282 0.0351 0.0101 0.0054 0.0189 0.0014 0.0140 0.0217 0.0037 0.0557 0.0209
1.2253 0.0207 0.1336 0.9192 0.5617 0.0560 0.1021 -0.2601 0.0204 -0.1192 0.1382 -0.1765 0.0206 -0.0429 0.0316 -0.0101 -0.0016 0.0504 -0.1268 0.0455
-0.2203 0.0014 0.2261 1.7733 -0.1415 0.0038 0.0023 -0.0537 0.0710 -0.0349 -0.0038 0.0544 0.0220 -0.0155 0.0074 -0.0086 -0.0387 0.0043 0.0029 0.0150
0.2484
1.0164 0.0157 0.1443 1.1062 0.4857 -0.2141 0.0200 0.1540 -0.2740 -0.1615 0.0127 0.0506 -0.0452 0.0804 0.1317 -0.0775 0.2132 0.1500 0.0950 0.1133
1.6682 0.0588 0.1861 0.5543 0.9652 0.2804 0.2447 -0.2244 -0.1310 -0.3429 -0.1658 -0.0258 -0.0914 0.0637 0.2651 0.0694 0.0826 -0.3459 0.2048 -0.0111
-0.1027 0.0002 0.1714 1.6804 -0.0541 0.0171 0.0154 0.0185 0.0136 0.0197 -0.0116 0.0002 0.0043 -0.0163 -0.0269 -0.0192 -0.0114 -0.0143 -0.0181 -0.0074
0.4445
0.2146
0.5988 0.0114 0.2447 1.5925 0.4111 0.0742 -0.0825 -0.0689 0.2619 0.2225 -0.0464 0.0993 -0.0009 0.0396 -0.0712 0.0028 -0.1235 -0.0535 0.2077 -0.1338
0.8750 0.0068 0.0910 1.1718 0.3197 0.0277 0.0109 0.0506 -0.0281 -0.0671 0.0791 0.0423 0.0066 -0.0747 -0.0619 0.0342 0.0284 0.0467 -0.1689 0.0135
0.0895 0.0002 0.2037 1.7516 0.0532 0.0019 -0.0025 -0.0314 0.0191 -0.0072 0.0017 -0.0251 -0.0014 0.0108 0.0136 0.0095 0.0048 0.0001 0.0030 0.0021
0.0925
0.2791
1.5543 0.0489 0.1802 0.6468 0.8750 -0.0186 -0.0792 0.2035 0.1768 0.0867 0.1001 0.5220 0.0317 -0.2295 -0.2575 -0.1852 0.1531 0.1109 -0.3666 0.0798
0.3649 0.0015 0.1153 1.5044 0.1507 0.0085 -0.0808 0.0156 -0.0033 0.0409 0.0961 -0.0444 0.0169 0.0046 -0.0002 0.0172 0.0489 -0.0157 -0.0158 -0.0049
0.9077 0.0131 0.1496 1.2032 0.4425 0.0055 0.1129 0.2212 0.0644 0.0649 -0.0503 0.0993 0.0106 -0.0575 -0.1021 -0.0557 0.0944 0.0356 -0.1851 0.0080
0.1153









0.3269 1.9909 -0.2773 -0.0704 0.1525 0.0655 -0.0791 0.0282
-0.8094 0.0151 0.1980 1.3414 -0.4752 -0.0642 0.1210 -0.0384 0.0149 0.2094
1.3365 0.1449 0.3997 0.8746 1.5074 0.8207 -0.4837 -0.2487 0.3314 -0.0245
-1.2677 0.0106 0.0672 0.8561 -0.4017 0.0497 -0.1429 -0.1246 0.0049 0.0182
0.3400 0.0020 0.1581 1.5890 0.1701 0.0130 -0.0153 -0.0543 0.0649 0.0316
0.1959
0.3689 0.0013 0.0972 1.4737 011387 -0.0407 0.0333 0.0239 -0.0134 -0.0194
-0.8528 0.0119 0.1531 1.2522 -0.4212 0.0749 -0.1120 -0.0848 0.0439 0.0650




-0.8393 0.0079 0.1124 1.2194 -0.3441 -0.1411 -0.0531 0.0322 -0.1151 -0.0075
0.4600
0.2570
0.0559 0.0001 0.2969 1.9927 0.0450 0.0149 0.0005 0.0089 0.0060 0.0040
0.9034 0.0252 0.2402 1.3032 0.6150 0.1875 -0.0947 -0.2309 -0.1030 0.1900
0.3319
1.6339 0.0478 0.1645 0.5831 0.8676 0.2625 0.2112 0.3031 -0.1247 -0.1029
0.6492 0.0081 0.1739 1.4374 0.3473 -0.1169 0.0089 -0.0260 -0.1613 0.1039
1.1967 0.0630 0.2963 1.0252 0.9835 0.1391 0.2928 0.0508 -0.1931 0.0339
0.8621 0.0190 0.2121 1.3108 0.5330 0.0763 0.2292 0.0807 -0.2906 -0.2245
-0.4320 0.0041 0.1897 1.6037 -0.2445 -0.0155 -0.0773 0.1244 -0.0364 -0.0341
0.2531 0.0037 0.3429 2.0728 0.2341 -0.0347 -0.0689 0.1379 -0.0408 0.1007
0.4849 0.0029 0.1228 1.4616 0.2081 0.0410 0.0128 -0.0376 0.0313 -0.0132
0.4732
-0.8743 0.0086 0.1118 1.1924 -0.3576 -0.1349 -0.0395 -0.0809 0.0019 0.1110
-0.1326 -0.0132 0.0102 0.0684 -0.0796 -0.0631 0.0963 -0.0614 0.0947 0.0804
-0.1408 0.0750 -0.0097 -0.1004 -0.2510 -0.1138 0.1001 -0.1085 0.1777 0.0489
0.2990 0.5345 0.6107 -0.4304 -0.0644 -0.4622 -0.3149 -0.4838 -0.3195 -0.3787
0.2031 0.0413 0.1067 0.0186 0.0730 0.1397 -0.1616 -0.0619 0.1097 -0.0294
0.0061 -0.0228 0.1093 0.0344 0.0095 0.0146 0.0338 -0.0174 0.0119 -0.0103
-0.0183 0.0375 -0.0131 0.0229 0.0547 -0.0296 0.0548 0.0555 -0.0628 0.0340
0.1292 -0.1349 0.0873 -0.0389 -0.1380 -0.0892 -0.0685 -0.1747 0.2013 -0.0177
-0.0358 0.0879 -0.0061 0.0749 0.0553 -0.0574 -0.0128 0.0084 -0.0195 0.0297
0.0253 0.0944 0.0094 -0.0089 0.0198 0.0553 0.1556 0.0100 0.0558 0.1011
-0.0084 -0.0085 -0.0087 -0.0148 -0.0002 -0.0220 0.0135 -0.0152 -0.0086 -0.0061
0.0364 -0.0363 -0.1346 0.0156 -0.0490 0.0761 -0.2852 -0.0023 0.0470 -0.2284
-0.2440 -0.4693 -0.1481 0.0883 -0.0513 -0.0283 -0.2368 -0.0252 -0.1140 -0.2709
-0.0024 0.1001 -0.0544 0.0915 0.0792 0.0186 0.0761 0.0773 0.1448 0.0114
-0.2965 -0.0921 0.4133 0.0820 0.1883 0.1727 -0.3261 0.1526 0.2383 -0.4273
-0.0329 -0.1413 -0.0010 0.1185 -0.0163 0.0577 -0.2070 0.0142 0.1190 -0.0613
0.1227 -0.0728 0.0808 0.0030 0.0182 -0.0887 0.0516 -0.0496 0.0287 0.0389
0.0567 -0.0320 0.0162 0.0633 0.0305 0.0677 0.0843 -0.0169 0.0704 -0.0264
-0.0200 0.0606 -0.0016 0.0716 0.0189 -0.0142 -0.0777 0.0142 -0.0313 -0.0138
-0.0100 0.1359 0.0146 0.0457 0.0578 0.1105 0.1254 -0.0025 0.1114 0.0797
370
-1.5530 0.0474 0.1764 0.6479 -0.8616 -0.1341 0.3563 0.1511 -0.1567 -0.1529
0.3120
-0.4154 0.0048 0.2234 1.6790 -0.2649 -0.0762 -0.0294 -0.0482 -0.0007 0.0909
-0.1219 0.0004 0.2156 1.7736 -0.0755 0.0136 0.0031 -0.0149 0.0032 -0.0177
-0.1861 0.0010 0.2355 1.8054 -0.1234 0.0021 -0.0176 0.0008 0.0379 0.0367
0.1611
1.7655 0.1125 0.2645 0.4613 1.3478 0.4708 -0.6127 -0.0051 0.0689 0.3711
-0.1719 -0.2278 0.1553 0.2518 -0.0757 -0.0597 0.3726 -0.2095 -0.1722 0.3788
0.0025 0.0349 0.0161 0.0292 0.0235 0.0379 -0.0103 0.1151 -0.0275 -0.1215
0.0195 -0.0383 0.0224 -0.0046 0.0179 0.0022 -0.0032 -0.0126 0.0133 -0.0368
-0.0065 0.0395 0.0327 0.0037 -0.0285 -0.0487 0.0221 -0.0381 0.0466 -0.0427
0.3910 0.1137 -0.1454 0.1275 0.1915 0.3198 0.0494 -0.5794 -0.1584 0.3578
371
Appendix 14.6: Voluntary Risk Reporting-2007
ST
RESID COOK LEV cov DIFF DIFBO DIFBl DIFB2 DIFB3 DIFB4 DIFB5 DIFB6 DIFB7 DIFB8 DIEB9 DIFB10 DIFB11 DIFB12 DIFB13 DIFB14
0.4021
0.6289 0.0058 0.1419 1.3649 0.2927 0.1710 0.0518 -0.0322 -0.0508 -0.0485 0.0348 -0.1447 -0.0451 0.0040 -0.0183 0.0814 -0.2199 -0.0145 -0.0765 -0.1250
0.4134
0.2748
0.0795 0.0003 0.3129 1.9325 0.0669 -0.0061 0.0151 -0.0086 0.0188 -0.0191 -0.0222 -0.0194 -0.0096 -0.0040 0.0033 0.0197 -0.0119 0.0210 0.0084 0.0142
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Appendix 15: Regression Results of Pooling Data
1- EAS 25
regress EAS25 FS FL FP FV BE BS OC GO MO 10 IM-man RD AT
Source | SS df MS Number of obs 
F ( 13, 197)
211
11.25
Model | 84.616107 13 6.!50893131 Prob > F = 0.0000
Residual | 114.006564 197 .578713524 R-squared = 0.4260
Adj R-squared = 0.3881
Total |> 198.622671 210 .945822244 Root MSE = .76073
neas25 | Coef. Std. Err t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
FS | -.1273747 .0809276 -1.57 0.117 -.2869702 .0322209
FL | -.0488852 .0634764 -0.77 0.442 -.1740656 .0762952
FP | .1244235 .0704504 1.77 0.079^ -.0145103 .2633572
FV | .0483724 .067447 0.72 0.474 -.0846384 .1813833
BE | .1837234 .0738594 2.49 0 . 014^ .0380668 .3293801
BS | .1539867 .0643566 2.39 0. 0 1 8 ^  .0270704 .280903
OC | -.2390587 .085111 -2.81 0 . 0 0 5 ^  -.4069043 -.0712131
GO | -.149156 .1045947 -1.43 0.155 -.355425 .057113
MO I -.1389228 .0903109 -1.54 0.126 -.3170231 .0391775
10 | -.064824 .073732 -0.88 0.380 -.2102294 .0805814
IM-man | .1237979 .1260126 0.98 0.327 -.124709 .3723047
RD | -.2148451 .1319634 -1.63 0.105 -.4750874 .0453972
AT | .9536776 .1297787 7.35 0 . 0 0 0 ^  .6977437 1.209611
_cons | -.3708919 .1606243 -2.31 0.022 .6876557 -.0541281
♦♦♦Significant at the level 1%
♦♦Significant at the level 5%
♦Significant at the level 10%
. estat hettest
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of neas2506
chi2(1) = 0.21
Prob > chi2 = 0.6470
. estat ovtest
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of neas2506 
Ho: model has no omitted variables
F (3, 194) 0. 60
Prob > F 0. 6133
2- EAS 33
. regress EAS33 FS FL FP FV BE BS OC GO MO IO IM-man RD AT
Source I SS df MS Number of obs 211P ( 1 ^  1 0*7 \ — Q 70r \  j ^ X J — O * / U
Model | 65.966327 13 5. 07433284 Prob > F = 0 . 0000
Residual | 114.84807 197 .582985127 R-squared - 0.3648
7\/4*i 15 e m laroH = 0.3229n U J  1\ O v ju C lL C U
Total | 180.814397 210 .861020938 Root MSE = .76353
neas33 | Coef. Std. Err t P> 111 [95% Conf. Interval]
FS | .0001145 .0812257 0.00 0.999 -.1600689 .160298
FL | .3054278 .0637102 4.79 0 . 0 0 0 ^ + .1797862 .4310694
FP | .0366326 .0707099 0.52 0.605 -.102813 .1760781
FV | .1324231 .0676955 1.96 0.052^ -.0010778 .2659239
BE | .4727664 .0741315 6.38 0 . 0 0 0 ^  .3265732 .6189596
BS | -.1119992 .0645937 -1.73 0.084^ -.239383 .0153846
OC | -.035613 .0854245 -0.42 0. 677 -.2040769 .1328509
GO | -.2390479 .10498 -2.28 0 . 0 2 4 ^  -.4460767 -.032019
MO | -.1428376 .0906436 -1.58 0.117 -.321594 .0359188
10 | -.002036 .0740037 -0.03 0.978 -.1479771 .143905
IM-man | -.0400908 .1264768 -0.32 0.752 -.2895131 .2093315
RD | .2077725 .1324496 1.57 0.118 -.0534285 .4689736
AT | .21063 .1302568 1.62 0.107 -.0462467 .4675067
_cons | -.1942958 .161216 -1.21 0.230 -.5122265 .1236348
♦♦♦Significant at the level 1%
♦♦Significant at the level 5%
♦Significant at the level 10%
. estat hettest
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of neas3306
chi2(1) = 0.26
Prob > chi2 = 0.6084
. estat ovtest
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of neas3306 
Ho: model has no omitted variables
F (3, 194) = 0.53
Prob > F = 0.6622
3- Voluntary Risk Reporting
. regress VOL IM-nonman FS FL FP FV BE BS OC GO MO 10 IM-man RD AT
Source | SS df MS Number of obs = 135
F ( 14, 120) = 4.62
Model | 43.9195027 14 3.13710734 Prob > F 0.0000
Residual I 81.4698768 120 .67891564 R-squared = 0.3503
Adj R-squared = 0.2745
Total | 125.38938 134 .935741639 Root MSE .82396
Ntrisk | Coef. Std. Err. t P> 111 [95% Conf. Interval]
IM-nonman | -.4244392 .2567854 -1.65 0.101 -.9328564 .083978
FS | -.1048837 .1374997 -0.76 0.447 -.3771235 .1673561
FL | .0169056 .0839861 0.20 0.841 -.149381 .1831921
FP | .0059121 .0939699 0.06 0.950 -.1801417 .191966
FV | -.0273576 .087843 -0.31 0.756 -.2012807 .1465654
BE | .5500106 .1338239 4.11 0.000 + ^ .2850486 .8149726
BS | .1117325 .0869036 1.29 0.201 -.0603305 .2837955
OC | -.0303716 .134382 -0.23 0.822 -.2964385 .2356954
GO | -.2434277 .1497266 -1.63 0.107 -.539876 .0530206
MO | -.2065201 .1505151 -1.37 0.173 -.5045296 .0914894
IO | -.1011993 .1098791 -0.92 0.359 -.3187523 .1163537
IM-man | -.0062892 .1968487 -0.03 0.975 -.3960359 .3834575
RD | -.001803 .2063517 -0.01 0.993 -.410365 .4067589
AT | -.3695583 .1694523 -2.18 0 . 0 3 1 ^ -.705062 -.0340546
_cons | .2045378 .2566885 0.80 0.427 -.3036876 .7127632
♦♦♦Significant at the level 1% 
♦♦Significant at the level 5% 
♦Significant at the level 10%
. estat hettest
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of ntrisk06
chi2(1) - 0.07
Prob > chi2 = 0.7983
. estat ovtest
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of ntrisk06 
Ho: model has no omitted variables
F (3, 117) = 0.20
Prob > F = 0.8949
Appendix 16: Condition Index
1- EAS 25-2006
































3- Voluntary Risk Reporting 2006

















































6- Voluntary Risk Reporting 2007

















Appendix 17: Regression Analysis With/without Firm Size and Barriers to Entry 
Variables 
17.A Regression Analysis with Barriers to Entry and without Firm Size
1- Mandatory Risk Reporting EAS 25-2006
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
.647 .419 .344 .7772568
ANOVA
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 40.548 12 3.379 5.593 .000(a)







B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -.359 .229 -1.571 .120
FL -.118 .097 -.119 -1.224 .224
FP .094 .091 .095 1.033 .304
FV .044 .097 .044 .455 .650
BE .150 .088 .151 1.699 .093*
BS .084 .093 .083 .910 .365
OC -.244 .126 -.172 -1.931 .057*
GO -.194 .157 -.171 -1.236 .219
MO -.177 .130 -.155 -1.357 .178
IO -.035 .107 -.034 -.326 .745
IM-man .029 .181 .015 .158 .875
RD -.145 v .194 -.067 -.746 .457
AT .952 .184 .498 5.186 ooo***
***Significant at the level 1%
^^Significant at the level 5%
^Significant at the level 10%
Dependent Variable: EAS2506
Independent variables FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV Firm Leverage, BE Barriers to Entry, 
BS Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, MO Managerial Ownership, 
IO Institutional Ownership, IM-man Industry Membership-Manufacturing companies, RD Role Duality, 
AT Auditor Type
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2- Mandatory Risk Reporting EAS 33-2006
M odel Summary
R R Square Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
.646 .418 .343 .7442405
ANOVA
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 36.985 12 3.082 5.564 .000(a)







B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -.194 .219 -.884 .379
FL .233 .092 .245 2.522 .013**
FP -.053 .088 -.056 -.610 .543
FV .101 .093 .107 1.092 .278
BE .548 .084 .577 6.487 ooo***
BS -.124 .089 -.127 -1.397 .166
OC -.038 .121 -.028 -.318 .751
GO -.277 .150 -.257 -1.850 .068*
MO -.076 .125 -.070 -.612 .542
IO .019 .102 .019 .185 .854
IM-man -.129 .174 -.069 -.743 .460
RD .254 .186 .122 1.364 .176
AT .237 .176 .130 1.349 .180
***Significant at the level 1%
**Significant at the level 5%
♦Significant at the level 10%
Dependent Variable: EAS3306
Independent variables FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV Firm Leverage, BE Barriers to Entry, 
BS Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, MO Managerial Ownership, 
IO Institutional Ownership, IM-man Industry Membership-Manufacturing companies, RD Role Duality, 
AT Auditor Type
382
3- Voluntary Risk Reporting-2006
M odel Summary
R R Square Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
.682 .465 .323 .7787150
ANOVA
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 25.849 13 1.988 3.279 .001(a)







B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) .488 .352 1.386 .172
FL .010 .123 .011 .083 .934
FP -.034 .118 -.036 -.283 .778
FV .050 .121 .056 .416 .680
BE .634 .130 .662 4.881 .000***
BS .007 .130 .008 .057 .955
OC .056 .225 .030 .248 .805
GO -.316 .220 -.283 -1.434 .158
MO -.151 .232 -.110 -.649 .519
IO -.014 .152 -.014 -.093 .926
IM-man -.171 .272 -.090 -.627 .534
RD -.280 .315 -.109 -.888 .379
AT -.105 .232 -.055 -.452 .653
IM-nonman -.580 .350 -.234 -1.658 .104
***Significant at the level 1%
**Significant at the level 5%
^Significant at the level 10%
Dependent Variable: VOL06
Independent variables FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV Firm Leverage, BE Barriers to Entry, 
BS Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, MO Managerial Ownership, 
IO Institutional Ownership,, IM-man Industry Membership-Manufacturing companies, RD Role Duality, 
AT Auditor Type, IM-nonman Industry Membership-non-manufacturing companies
4- Mandatory Risk Reporting EAS 25-2007
M odel Summary
R R Square Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
.670 .449 .377 .7604237
ANOVA
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 43.373 12 3.614 6.251 .000(a)







B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -.287 .227 -1.266 .209
FL -.006 .091 -.006 -.065 .949
FP .031 .097 .031 .319 .750
FV .003 .095 .003 .030 .976
BE .056 .094 .056 .598 .552
BS .220 .095 .214 2.324 .022**
OC -.285 .122 -.204 -2.344 .021**
GO -.098 .149 -.085 -.656 .513
MO -.144 .131 -.129 -1.095 .276
IO -.088 .107 -.083 -.818 .416
IM-man .114 .168 .058 .677 .500
RD -.345 .188 -.159 -1.832 .070*
AT .977 .189 .509 5.177 ooo***
♦♦♦Significant at the level 1%
♦♦Significant at the level 5%
♦Significant at the level 10%
Dependent Variable: EAS2507
Independent variables FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV Firm Leverage, BE Barriers to Entry, 
BS Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, MO Managerial Ownership, 
IO Institutional Ownership, IM-man Industry Membership-Manufacturing companies, RD Role Duality, 
AT Auditor Type
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5- Mandatory Risk Reporting EAS33-2007
M odel Summary
R R Square Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
.629 .396 .317 .7481709
ANOVA
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 33.758 12 2.813 5.026 .000(a)







B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -.187 .223 -.839 .403
FL .373 .089 .398 4.166 ooo***
FP .129 .096 .138 1.355 .179
FV .132 .093 .141 1.416 .160
BE .405 .092 .432 4.387 ooo***
BS -.088 .093 -.091 -.946 .347
OC -.042 .120 -.032 -.352 .726
GO -.187 .147 -.172 -1.274 .206
MO -.189 .129 1 00 o -1.466 .146
IO -.009 .105 -.009 -.088 .930
IM-man .000 .165 .000 .001 .999
RD .170 .185 .084 .920 .360
AT .194 .186 .108 1.046 .298
***Signi£icant at the level 1%
^^Significant at the level 5%
* Significant at the level 10%
Dependent Variable: EAS3307
Independent variables FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV Firm Leverage, BE Barriers to Entry, 
BS Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, MO Managerial Ownership, 
IO Institutional Ownership, IM-man Industry Membership-Manufacturing companies, RD Role Duality, 
AT Auditor Type
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6- Voluntary Risk Reporting-2007
M odel Summary
R R Square Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
.625 .391 .254 .8194881
ANOVA
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 24.960 13 1.920 2.859 .003(a)







B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) .147 .370 .396 .693
FL -.062 .118 -.066 -.530 .598
FP .076 .123 .079 .619 .538
FV -.074 .119 -.078 -.621 .537
BE .306 .131 .303 2.334 .023**
BS .148 .120 .148 1.229 .224
OC -.101 .169 -.066 -.600 .551
GO -.069 .202 -.059 -.341 .735
MO -.272 .193 -.223 -1.412 .163
IO -.134 .155 -.116 -.868 .389
IM-man .002 .266 .001 .006 .995
RD .093 .286 .040 .324 .747
AT -.417 .247 -.220 -1.687 .097*
IM-nonman -.559 .356 -.214 -1.573 .121
***Significant at the level 1%
**Significant at the level 5%
♦Significant at the level 10%
Dependent Variable: VOL07
Independent variables FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV Firm Leverage, BE Barriers to Entry, 
BS Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, MO Managerial Ownership, 
IO Institutional Ownership,, IM-man Industry Membership-Manufacturing companies, RD Role Duality, 
AT Auditor Type, IM-nonman Industry Membership-non-manufacturing companies
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17.B Regression Analysis with Firm Size and without Barriers to Entry 
1- Mandatory Risk Reporting EAS 25-2006
Model Summary
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 .635(a) .403 .326 .7879046
ANOVA
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 38.998 12 3.250 5.235 .000(a)







B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -.464 .233 -1.993 .049
FS -.055 .099 -.056 -.559 .577
FL -.108 .098 -.108 -1.103 .273
FP .128 .100 .129 1.279 .204
FV .076 .101 .076 .747 .457
BS .136 .095 .133 1.433 .155
OC -.262 .127 -.185 -2.060 .042**
GO -.140 .159 -.124 -.884 .379
MO -.179 .132 -.157 -1.352 .180
IO -.057 .108 -.055 -.527 .599
IM-man .151 .191 .077 .788 .432
RD -.156 .197 -.072 -.791 .431
AT 1.025 .184 .536 5.556 ooo***
***Significant at the level 1%
^^Significant at the level 5% -
^Significant at the level 10%
Dependent Variable: EAS2506
Independent variables FS Firm Size, FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV Firm Leverage, BS 
Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, MO Managerial Ownership, IO 
Institutional Ownership, IM-man Industry Membership-Manufacturing companies, RD Role Duality, AT 
Auditor Type
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2- Mandatory Risk Repotting EAS 33-2006
M odel Summary
R R Square Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
.488(a) .238 .140 .8514251
ANOVA
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 21.079 12 1.757 2.423 .009(a)







B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -.296 .252 -1.177 .242
FS .340 .106 .358 3.195 .002**
FL .276 .106 .291 2.618 .010**
FP -.144 .108 -.152 -1.329 .187
FV .067 .110 .071 .615 .540
BS -.073 .102 -.074 -.710 .479
OC -.109 .138 -.080 -.789 .432
GO -.209 .171 -.194 -1.220 .225
MO -.121 .143 -.111 -.849 .398
IO -.052 .116 -.052 -.444 .658
IM-man -.080 .207 -.043 -.386 .700
RD .270 .213 .130 1.268 .208
AT .366 .199 .200 1.836 .070*
***Significant at the level 1%
**Significant at the level 5%
♦Significant at the level 10%
Dependent Variable: EAS3306
Independent variables FS Firm Size, FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV Firm Leverage, BS 
Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, MO Managerial Ownership, IO 
Institutional Ownership, IM-man Industry Membership-Manufacturing companies, RD Role Duality, AT 
Auditor Type
3- Voluntary Risk Reporting-2006
M odel Summary
R R Square Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
.573 .328 .150 .8727553
ANOVA
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 18.239 13 1.403 1.842 .063(a)







B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) .373 .393 .949 .347
FS .422 .141 .455 2.996 .004**
FL .039 .139 .043 .283 .778
FP -.087 .143 -.095 -.612 .543
FV .063 .138 .070 .457 .650
BS .092 .145 .095 .633 .530
OC -.245 .239 -.133 -1.025 .310
GO -.312 .247 -.279 -1.263 .213
MO -.253 .258 -.186 -.982 .331
IO -.072 .169 -.070 -.423 .674
IM-man -.247 .309 -.131 -.801 .427
RD -.100 .353 -.039 -.285 .777
AT -.083 .261 -.043 -.319 .751
IM-nonman -.675 .391 -.273 -1.727 .090*
***Significant at the level 1%
^^Significant at the level 5%
*Significant at the level 10%
Dependent Variable: VOL06
Independent variables FS Firm Size, FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV Firm Leverage, BS 
Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, MO Managerial Ownership, IO 
Institutional Ownership, , IM-man Industry Membership-Manufacturing companies, RD Role Duality, 
AT Auditor Type, IM-nonman Industry Membership-non-manufacturing companies
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4- Mandatory Risk Reporting EAS 25-2007
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
.669 .447 .375 .7618293
- ANOVA
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 43.177 12 3.598 6.199 .000(a)







B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -.319 .231 -1.381 .171
FS -.013 .102 -.013 -.130 .897
FL -.016 .091 -.016 -.173 .863
FP .050 .107 .050 .468 .641
FV .011 .097 .011 .113 .911
BS .243 .094 .237 2.600 .011**
OC -.293 .121 -.209 -2.413 .018**
GO -.072 .148 -.063 -.489 .626
MO -.141 .131 -.126 -1.073 .286
IO -.088 .107 -.083 -.817 .416
IM-man .150 .174 .076 .860 .392
RD -.355 .188 -.164 -1.886 .062*
AT 1.008 .190 .525 5.311 .000***
***Significant at the level 1%
**Significant at the level 5%
^Significant at the level 10%
Dependent Variable: EAS2507 v
Independent variables FS Firm Size, FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV Firm Leverage, BS 
Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, MO Managerial Ownership, IO 
Institutional Ownership, IM-man Industry Membership-Manufacturing companies, RD Role Duality, AT 
Auditor Type
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5- Mandatory Risk Reporting EAS 33-2007
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
.550 .302 .211 .8041961
ANOVA
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 25.757 12 2.146 3.319 .001(a)







B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -.233 .244 -.956 .342
FS .222 .107 .237 2.069 .041**
FL .339 .096 .362 3.535 ooi***
FP .113 .113 .120 .997 .322
FV .120 .103 .128 1.170 .245
BS -.010 .099 -.010 -.100 .920
OC -.117 .128 -.089 -.912 .364
GO -.098 .156 -.090 -.627 .533
MO -.177 .139 -.168 -1.273 .206
IO -.020 .113 -.020 -.173 .863
IM-man .059 .184 .032 .322 .748
RD .124 .199 .061 .623 .535
AT .277 .200 .154 1.382 .170
***Significant at the level 1%
^^Significant at the level 5%
^Significant at the level 10%
Dependent Variable: EAS3307
Independent variables FS Firm Size, FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV Firm Leverage, BS 
Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, MO Managerial Ownership, IO 
Institutional Ownership, IM-man Industry Membership-Manufacturing companies, RD Role Duality, AT 
Auditor Type
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6- Voluntary Risk Reporting-2007
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
.580 .336 .188 .8551255
ANOVA
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 21.498 13 1.654 2.262 .017(a)







B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) .125 .398 .316 .753
FS .077 .148 .079 .519 .606
FL -.085 .124 -.091 -.689 .494
FP .119 .147 .123 .810 .422
FV -.048 .128 -.051 -.378 .707
BS .226 .128 .226 1.763 .083*
OC -.152 .175 ©oT—l1* -.866 .390
GO .004 .210 .003 .018 .986
MO -.252 .201 -.206 -1.250 .216
IO -.146 .161 -.127 -.907 .368
IM-man .057 .290 .029 .197 .845
RD .061 .298 .026 .206 .837
AT -.304 .261 -.160 -1.167 .248
IM-nonman -.704 .368 -.269 -1.915 .060*
***Significant at the level 1%
^^Significant at the level 5%
^Significant at the level 10%
Dependent Variable: VOL07
Independent variables FS Firm Size, FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV Firm Leverage, BS 
Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, MO Managerial Ownership, IO 
Institutional Ownership, , IM-man Industry Membership-Manufacturing companies, RD Role Duality, 
AT Auditor Type, IM-nonman Industry Membership-non-manufacturing companies
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R R Square Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
.636 .404 .320 .7914688
ANOVA
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 39.101 13 3.008 4.802 .000(a)







B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -.481 .237 -2.024 .046
FS -.058 .099 -.059 -.585 .560
FL -.106 .098 -.107 -1.082 .282
FP .127 .101 .128 1.256 .212
FV .072 .102 .073 .710 .480
FA/TA .006 .015 .034 .405 .686
BS .141 .096 .138 1.470 .145
OC -.254 .130 -.179 -1.961 .053*
GO -.140 .159 -.124 -.877 .383
MO -.178 .133 -.156 -1.339 .184
IO -.059 .108 -.057 -.546 .586
IM-man .162 .194 .082 .833 .407
RD -.153 '■ .198 -.071 -.772' .442
AT 1.029 .186 .539 5.546 ooo***
***Significant at the level 1%
^^Significant at the level 5%
*Significant at the level 10%
Dependent Variable: EAS2506
Independent variables FS Firm Size, FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV Firm Leverage, FA/TA  
Barriers to Entry, BS Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, MO 
Managerial Ownership, IO Institutional Ownership, IM-man Industry Membership-Manufacturing 




R R Square Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
.492 .242 .135 .8536807
ANOVA
Sum of 
















B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -.327 .256 -1.277 .205
FS .335 .107 .352 3.125 .002**
FL .279 .106 .294 2.637 .010**
FP -.147 .109 -.155 -1.353 .179
FV .061 .110 .064 .556 .580
FA/TA .011 .016 .067 .714 .477
BS -.062 .104 -.064 -.600 .550
OC -.093 .140 -.069 -.665 .508
GO -.208 .172 -.193 -1.213 .228
MO -.120 .143 -.109 -.834 .406
IO -.056 .117 -.057 -.480 .632
IM-man -.060 .209 -.032 -.285 .776
RD .276 .214 .133 1.290 .200
AT .375 v .200 .205 1.871 .065*
***Significant at the level 1%
^^Significant at the level 5%
^Significant at the level 10%
Dependent Variable: EAS3306
Independent variables FS Firm Size, FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV Firm Leverage, FA/TA  
Barriers to Entry, BS Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, MO 
Managerial Ownership, IO Institutional Ownership, IM-man Industry Membership-Manufacturing 




R R Square Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate




Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 18.487 14 1.321 1.710 .085(a)







B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) .428 .407 1.050 .299
FS .435 .144 .470 3.028 .004**
FL .034 .140 .037 .242 .810
FP -.087 .144 -.095 -.608 .546
FV .072 .140 .080 .514 .610
FA/TA -.011 .019 -.073 -.567 .573
BS .079 .148 .082 .537 .594
OC -.264 .243 -.144 -1.088 .282
GO -.313 .248 -.280 -1.258 .214
MO -.256 .260 -.188 -.986 .329
IO -.058 .172 -.056 -.337 .738
IM-man -.295 .322 -.156 -.916 .364
RD -.104 .355 -.041 -.293 .770
AT -.104 .265 -.054 -.391 .697
IM-nonman -.720 .402 -.291 -1.793 .079*
***Significant at the level 1%
^^Significant at the level 5%
^Significant at the level 10% 
a Dependent Variable: VOL06
b Independent variables FS Firm Size, FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV Firm Leverage, 
FA/TA Barriers to Entry, BS Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, 
MO Managerial Ownership, IO Institutional Ownership,, IM-man Industry Membership-Manufacturing 





R R Square Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
.684 .468 .392 .7514854
ANOVA
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 45.181 13 3.475 6.154 .000(a)







B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -.298 .228 -1.306 .195
FS -.003 .101 -.003 -.026 .979
FL -.021 .090 -.021 -.232 .817
FP .061 .106 .062 .580 .564
FV .011 .096 .011 .112 .911
FA/TA .040 .021 .151 1.884 .063*
BS .249 .092 .242 2.693 .008**
OC -.300 .120 -.214 -2.505 .014**
GO -.046 .147 -.040 -.311 .756
MO -.137 .130 -.122 -1.054 .295
IO -.094 .106 -.090 -.890 .376
IM-man .133 .172 .068 .773 .442
RD -.387 .186 -.178 -2.077 .041**
AT .956 .189 .498 5.054 ooo***
***Significant at the level 1%
^^Significant at the level 5%
^Significant at the level 10%
Dependent Variable: EAS2507
Independent variables FS Firm Size, FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV Firm Leverage, FA/TA  
Barriers to Entry, BS Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, MO 
M anagerial Ownership, IO Institutional Ownership, IM-man Industry Membership-Manufacturing 




R R Square Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
.550 .302 .203 .8083811
ANOVA
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 25.790 13 1.984 3.036 .001(a)








B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -.231 .246 -.939 .350
FS .224 .108 .239 2.068 .041 ♦
FL .338 .096 .361 3.509 .001♦♦♦
FP .114 .114 .122 1.002 .319
FV .120 .103 .128 1.164 .247
FA/TA .005 .023 .020 .223 .824
BS -.009 .099 -.010 -.093 .926
OC -.118 .129 -.089 -.914 .363
GO -.094 .158 -.087 -.599 .551
MO -.176 .139 -.168 -1.262 .210
IO -.020 .114 -.021 -.179 .858
IM-man .057 .185 .031 .308 .759
RD .119 .200 .059 .596 .553
AT .270 ^ .204 .150 1.328 .187
♦♦♦Significant at the level 1%
♦♦Significant at the level 5%
♦Significant at the level 10%
Dependent Variable: EAS3307
Independent variables FS Firm Size, FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV Firm Leverage, FA/TA  
Barriers to Entry, BS Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, MO 
Managerial Ownership, IO Institutional Ownership, IM-man Industry Membership-Manufacturing 




R R Square Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
.581 .337 .175 .8619038
- ANOVA
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 21.566 14 1.540 2.074 .027(a)







B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) .124 .401 .309 .758
FS .083 .150 .085 .550 .584
FL -.084 .125 -.090 -.674 .503
FP .115 .149 .119 .772 .443
FV -.046 .129 -.048 -.354 .724
FA/TA .015 .051 .036 .302 .764
BS .228 .129 .229 1.765 .083*
OC -.142 .179 -.093 -.793 .431
GO .000 .212 .000 -.001 .999
MO -.257 .204 -.210 -1.262 .212
IO -.149 .163 -.129 -.917 .363
IM-man .065 .294 .033 .222 .825
RD .044 .306 .019 .144 .886
AT -.319 .267 -.168 -1.194 .237
IM-nonman -.703 .371 -.268 -1.896 .063*
♦♦♦Significant at the level 1%
♦♦Significant at the level 5%
♦Significant at the level 10%
Dependent Variable: VOL07
Independent variables FS Firm Size, FL Firm Liquidity, FP Firm Profitability, FV Firm Leverage, FA/TA  
Barriers to Entry, BS Board Size, OC Ownership Concentration, GO Government Ownership, MO 
Managerial Ownership, IO Institutional Ownership, , IM-man Industry Membership-Manufacturing 
companies, RD Role Duality, AT Auditor Type, IM-nonman Industry Membership-non-manufacturing 
companies
